Regional development and the action of public investment: the FNDR and the ERDF, a comparative analysis by Urrea, Jorge
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Urrea, Jorge (2002) Regional development and the action of public 
investment: the FNDR and the ERDF, a comparative analysis. PhD 
thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2739/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 Regional Development and the Action of  Public Investment: 
The FNDR and the ERDF, a Comparative Analysis 
By 
Jorge Urrea 
Thesis submitted for the degree of  Doctor of  Philosophy (PhD) 
Department of  Urban Studies 
Faculty of  Social Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
UK 
Jorge Urrea 
October 2002 Acknowledgements 
I would  like to  express thanks to  many people who  helped me in the  course of this 
research. First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Professor John B Parr 
for  his  constant  support,  guidance  and  respect  over  the  last  three  years.  I  owe  a 
particular debt to Professor Bill Lever, who took the time to read through most of the 
chapters of my thesis giving me always wise advise. 
I would also like to thank the Department of Urban Studies for providing an excellent 
human  and  material  environment  for  conducting  the  research.  I  benefited  from 
suggestions received in numerous occasions in the workshops and seminars organised 
by  the  Department.  I  also  benefited  from  comments  and  discussions  during  my 
internship  in the  University of Barcelona,  Spain and from  several researchers  at the 
Institute of  World Economics in Kie1, Germany. 
Thanks  are  also  due  to  the programme  "Beca Presidente de  la Republica" of Chile, 
which provided the financial assistance for the completion of  the PhD studies. 
Special thanks are extended to my Canadian friend Bryan Elliott for his valuable help 
with the logic of  English and formal aspects on the construction of  this thesis. 
Finally,  I  must  acknowledge  the  help  and  patience  of my  family  during  the  PhD 
process.  This includes my wife Andrea Barros, my daughters A  velina, Florencia, and 
the new-comer
D
, to first to arrive in the new millennium. 
n Martin Alonso Urrea Barros was born in January 25,2002, healthy and pretty Abstract 
Regional  economic  growth and  development is  triggered by a  combination of many 
factors  such as  public sector intervention,  national  and regional policies,  and private 
sector investments. 
Regional development funds, through the application of pertinent objectives, focusing, 
participation,  and  co-ordination  can  certainly  make  an  important  contribution  on 
regional development. 
In Chile one of the main public sector policy instruments for regional development are 
the  Regional  Investment Funds.  The role  of these  funds  in the  economic and  social 
development of regions in difficulty or whose development is lagging has significantly 
increased in recent years. 
The country has had a regional development fund, the "Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo 
Regional"  (FNDR)  since  the  mid-1970s.  This  fund,  modest  in  its  beginning,  was 
significantly  increased  starting  in  1985  due  to  loans  from  the  Inter  American 
Development Banle  The  FNDR has  played  an  important role  providing basic  social 
infrastructure in regions. 
However, despite the increasing amount of resources channelled to regions, twenty five-
years of existence of the FNDR, and almost a decade since establishment of Regional 
Governments  in  Chile,  few  improvements  can be  recorded  in the  way  the  Regional 
Funds are being used or on their overall effect on regional development. 
The main purpose of  the study is to analyse the action of  the regional development fund 
of Chile  (the  FNDR)  and  its  relationship  with  the  overall  objective  of regional 
development. 
Two  different empirical approaches evaluated specific effects of the FNDR. The first 
was concerned with the analysis of particular aspects of the fund labelled as the "key 
elements"  in  the  running  of the  FNDR.  The  second  presents  and  compares  the 
11 experience of a similar fund for regional development. The fund  selected to  carry out 
this comparison was the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
The  specific  questions  to  the  'key elements'  address  three  different  aspects  of the 
existence and performance of  the fund: questions 1 and 2 deal with the very existence or 
the overall aim of the fund; questions 3 and 4, with the way the fund is being allocated 
and  used;  and,  question  5 is  rather  different  as  it tries to  explore the  possibility of 
finding  other potentials  for  regional  development,  not  exploited as  such,  due  to  the 
dominance and statutory primacy of  the fund. 
The analysis of  the 'key elements' unveiled important features about operational aspects 
of the fund. It also set out the role the fund may play in regional development in terms 
of contemporary growth theory and policy making. 
This study then compares these key aspects of the FNDR with those of the European 
Regional  Development Fund  (ERDF).  The  critical  analysis  of these  features  of the 
FNDR together with the comparison with those of the ERDF constitute the results of 
this study from which the conclusions and recommendations are drawn. 
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IX Chapter 1 
Research Aim 
Introduction 
Economic  restructuring,  state  intervention and  accelerated  global  changes  are  giving 
greater prominence to  the  nature  and  performance  of local  and  regional  economies. 
Regional  economic  growth and  development is  triggered by a combination of many 
factors,  such as  public sector intervention, through national and regional policies, and 
public and private sector investments. 
In Chile one of the main public sector policy instruments for regional development are 
the Regional Investment Funds. The role of regional funds in the economic and social 
development of regions in difficulty or whose development is lagging has been widely 
recognised (Holtz-Eakin and A. E.  Schawartz, 1995, the European Commission, 2001). 
Regional Funds, through the application of pertinent objectives, focusing, participation, 
co-ordination and  suitable  approaches to  face  local  problems  certainly may make  an 
important contribution in this direction. 
Chile has had a regional investment fund, the "Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional" 
(FNDR)  [regional  development fund]  since  the  mid-1970s.  This  fund,  modest in its 
beginning,  was  significantly  increased  starting  in  1985,  due  to  loans  from  the  Inter 
American Development Bank (IDB).  Since then, the FNDR has played an important 
role providing basic social infrastructure in regions. 
The  creation of Regional  Governments,  in  1993, was  supposed to  have  a significant 
impact in the way these funds were being used and allocated into and within regions. A 
presidential mandate in the mid-1990s established that regional investment funds were 
to double by the end of the decade. The FNDR thus came to be viewed as a powerful 
instrument for intervening in the regions' economic and social performance. 
Despite the increasing amount of resources channelled to regions, twenty five-years of 
existence  of the  FNDR,  and  almost  a  decade  since  establishment  of Regional 
1 Governments  in Chile,  few  improvements can be recorded in the  way the  Regional 
Funds are being used or on their overall effect on regional development. 
The expertise gained by the public institutions involved in FNDR administration and the 
resulting social infrastructure of the fund's action are said to be the main assets of the 
FNDR after twenty-five years of  operation. 
The starting point for this thesis is the question of whether the fund has managed to 
address  many  of the  problems  for  which  it  was  actually  designed.  Answering  this 
question requires consideration of the way in which the different parts of the fund are 
being allocated, the nature of the objectives set and the kind of actions and projects 
financed by the FNDR. 
1  Research question and objectives 
Purpose 
The main purpose of  the study is to analyse the action of  the regional development fund 
of  Chile (FNDR) and its relationship with the overall objective of  regional development. 
For  comparison,  the  FNDR is  evaluated  with  reference  to  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). 
Specific objectives 
The  specific objectives of the study are presented as  five  questions.  These questions 
address three different aspects of the existence of  the fund: questions I and 2 deal with 
the very existence or the overall aim of the fund;  questions 3 and 4, with the way the 
fund is being allocated and used; and, question 5 is rather different as it tries to explore 
the possibility of finding  other potentials for  regional  development,  not exploited as 
such, due to the dominance and statutory primacy of  the fund. 
Question I: What is the overall aim or concept underpinning the operation of  the FNDR 
and how has this concept evolved during its twenty-five years of  existence? This sets the 
2 context under which the fund  was created and its adaptability to  the new social  and 
economic realities undergone in the country. 
Question 2:  What are the objectives of  the FNDR and how they are linked with regional 
development? An analysis and critical discussion ofthe specific objectives ofthe FNDR 
and the way the fund has actually been used to stimulate regional development. 
Question  3:  Do  the  methods  of allocation  of FNDR  funds  all  serve  the  specific 
objectives set up for the fund?  This question explores the different methods, variables 
and indicators employed for the allocation of  the various parts of  the fund to the regions 
of  Chile. These results will be then compared with the specific objectives of  the fund. 
Question 4:  What are the  types of  action and the sectors of  investment financed by the 
FNDR? A detailed account of  the type of action and sectors (Education, Health, Roads, 
etc) financed by the FNDR. It also discusses their relevance for regional development. 
Question  5:  What  kind of actions,  beyond the  mere  physical  investment,  are  being 
pursued by  the  FNDR  that  may  contribute  to  regional  development?  This  question 
examines  whether  unanticipated  actions  and  results  of  FNDR  action  leverage 
investment and builds institutional and social capacity. 
This  study  compares  these  key  aspects  of the  FNDR with  those  of the  European 
Regional  Development Fund  (ERDF).  The  critical  analysis  of these  features  of the 
FNDR together with the comparison with those of the ERDF constitute the results of 
this study from which the conclusions are drawn. 
The rationale of  the thesis is that despite the significant contribution of the fund in the 
provision of  social infrastructure in regions, the FNDR action appears to be very limited 
and of low impact on regional development. This view is shared by the results of  three 
studies that have analysed the performance of  the fund in recent years. Evidence of the 
differentiated performance of  region on the variation of social indicators during the last 
ten years is also used to sustain this argument. 
3 2  Main contents and methodology 
The  thesis  has  been  structured  in  8 chapters,  exclusive  of the  bibliography  and  the 
appendixes.  The  main  contents  of each  chapter  and  the  specific  aspects  of its 
methodology, when it corresponds, are presented below. 
* Chapter 1,  Introduction, presents the rationale, purpose of the study and the specific 
objectives, as well as a summary ofthe main contents and the methodology used in each 
case. 
*  Chapter  2,  Economic  Growth  and  Development:  Global  and  Regional  Scale, 
corresponds to  the presentation of the main theoretical approaches used in this  study. 
This section also provides the definitions for the principal concepts relevant to the thesis 
such  as  those  of development,  economic  growth,  region,  decentralisation,  public 
infrastructure, and others that set the basis for the discussion of  the following sections. 
* Chapter 3, Chile's Regional Development Experience, gives account of  the experience 
in regional development in Chile with emphasis in three aspects: firstly, the process of 
decentralisation  in  the  country  since  its  origin  and  manifestations  in  recent  years; 
secondly, it describes the newly created institution of 'Regional Governments' in Chile, 
its  main tasks  and  importance  for  the  development of regions;  thirdly,  it provides  a 
summary  of Chile's  recent  economic  evolution,  problems  and  achievements.  The 
chapter ends with a presentation of  the economic and social disparities that exist among 
regIOns. 
Section 4 of this chapter introduces the concept of "winner" and "loser" regions that is 
used to group territorial units that have performed well or badly under Chile's present 
strategy  of development.  Regions  grouped  under  the  different  categories  do  not 
necessarily present geographical continuity. 
Economic and social indicators are used to group regions under 3 categories depending 
on whether they performed above or below the average in one, two or more indicators. 
The resulting grouping of regions under each of these categories, economic or social, 
4 was then combined to  produce a final  grouping of regions that permitted to  conclude 
whether  they  belonged  to  the  winner  or  loser  regions  of the  current  strategy  of 
development  of the  country.  The  results  of this  analysis  are  later  correlated  to  the 
allocation of  FNDR funds (chapter 5). 
* Chapter 4,  The  Regional Development Fund of Chile  (FNDR), concentrates  in the 
FNDR fund, the subject matter of this research. The first part of the chapter provides a 
general description of  the fund.  There follows a detailed account of the fund's purpose, 
its  objectives,  areas  of action,  budgetary  procedures,  and  method  of allocation  of 
resources. This presentation illustrates the fund's main aim,  its importance within the 
total Chilean's public investment as well as its importance for particular regions. 
The  second part introduces three recent studies about the performance of the  FNDR. 
These  studies  are  critically  analysed  and  some  of their  findings  are  later  used  to 
reinforce some of this research's own arguments.  Each of the studies is  presented in 
terms of  its main purpose, main contents, methodology used and conclusions. 
* Chapter 5,  Key elements of  a well/badly working system:  The  action of  the  FNDR, 
deals with the five  questions that lead the research.  These five  questions refer to:  the 
concept of the FNDR, the specific objectives of the fund,  the method of allocation of 
resources, the type of action and sectors of investment, and the poor utilisation of the 
fund's existence to stimulate other actions for regional development. These five aspects 
of the fund,  it is  argued,  are  not functioning  well for  the overall performance of the 
FNDR. 
This  chapter  discusses  whether  the  five  aspects  of the  FNDR  are  functioning 
appropriately given the objectives of  the fund. Data used for this purpose came basically 
from  three  sources:  a)  official  publications  and  studies  about  de  FNDR,  b)  the 
methodologies  used  for  allocation  of the  different  FNDR  parts
l
,  and  c)  first  hand 
information from interviews conducted in Chile with relevant informers. 
1 The FNDR is not just one fund, but includes several parts that will be described in chapter 4. 
5 In February 2000 a three weeks fieldwork was conducted in Chile.  This consisted of 
interviews with public officials in charge of the different areas of the administration of 
the fund, both at the national and regional level. The instrument was a semi-structured 
interview whose main purpose was to  find out the view of these key informers about 
three particular aspects of the operation of the fund.  These aspects were: a) the overall 
concept  and  specific  objectives  of the  fund,  and  to  what  extent they  thought these 
objectives had changed through time;  b)  the rationale of the methods of allocation of 
funds face to face with the specific objectives currently in operation; c) the relationship, 
in  their view,  between the  actual  action  of the  FNDR and regional  development  in 
Chile. 
The concept of the FNDR (or the overall objective of the fund)  and the type of action 
and  sectors  of investment  are  also  tested  against  theoretical  arguments  about  what 
should be appropriate/rational for public funds designed for regional development. 
During the correction period of the thesis (November 2001-April 2002) a second set of 
interviews were applied to number of key informers (politicians and public servants) in 
Santiago and the Bioblo Region. This time, to find out about the expected changes that 
the  concept and  specific  objectives of the  FNDR might had  suffered,  in their view, 
when transiting  from  a  dictatorship  government  (1970s  and  1980s)  to  a  democratic 
regime. 
The  instrument  for  gathering  information  was  a  semi-structured  questionnaire  that 
included 3 parts and 8 questions in total.  The first part was designed to  identify the 
interviewed  and  hislher  relationship  with the  FNDR by the  period  1989/1990.  The 
second  part asked  for  the  role  that these  key  informers  saw for  the  FNDR under  a 
democratic government (in different aspects such as the role of the fund in the process 
of decentralisation, the type of investment to finance,  etc). The last part was one open 
question to give the opportunity to informers to refer to other aspects no considered in 
the previous section. 
The specific objectives and the method of  allocation of  resources (section 2 and 3 of  this 
chapter) are tested in term of  their congruence with each other. This correlates the actual 
allocation of funds  to  the  regions  (FNDR per capita)  with the regional  indicators of 
6 poverty and income distribution.  The resulting tables identify the  most and the least 
favoured  regions  with respect to  these  indicators.  The results  of this  information  is 
presented and discussed in the first two sections of  chapter 5. 
* Chapter 6,  The  European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).  After analysing in 
detail the five aspects identified as the key elements for the functioning of the FNDR, 
this  chapter presents the  'reference fund'  that will  be used for  comparison with the 
FNDR  of Chile.  The  fund  selected  is  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF). Although the ERDF and the FNDR differ greatly in terms of their magnitude 
(territories they cover and amount of  resources involved) and scope (number and quality 
of actions with respect to their objectives), both funds, set up more or less at the same 
time, by the mid-l970s, present significant differences and similarities that are worth 
exploring. 
This section begins with an introduction to the European Union's institutions and the 
main aspects  of regional policy in the Union,  followed  with the  presentation of the 
Structural Funds,  and within them, the ERDF, the main component of the  Structural 
Funds. Finally, it presents the ERDF's main and specific objectives, its tasks, method of 
allocation of funds,  and the type of action and areas of investment as well as the main 
aspects of  its administrative procedures. 
ERDF  analysis  relies  mainly  on  official  documentation,  although  some  analytical 
studies on the fund's functioning have been used for a critical view on the performance 
of the fund.  Structural Funds' regulations, data on the amount of resources allocated to 
objectives and countries and the periodic evaluations carried out by the Commission 
were also used. 
* Chapter 7,  Main Similarities and Differences between the  FNDR  and the  ERDF,  is 
one of the main outcomes of this study. It presents and discusses the main similarities 
and  differences  highlighted by the  comparison between the  two  funds.  This  section 
introduces a two-column table for  presenting the characteristic elements of each fund 
that  account  for  the  five  aspects  selected  for  comparison.  This  two-column  feature 
provides a rapid and clear visualisation of  these similarities and differences. The graphic 
presentation is followed by a discussion of  the causes that may explain these similarities 
7 and differences and their relevance for the functioning of the fund and its capability to 
achieve the stated objectives. 
Particular examples are used to further develop some of the main points of discussion, 
i.e. the case of  the Regional Development Fund of Spain (FCI), the Electric Projects and 
the Programming Documents in the case of Chile, and the management of budgetary 
procedures in the case of  the Scottish Executive. 
* Chapter  8,  Conclusions  and  Considerations  for  Further  Research.  This  chapter 
presents  some  conclusions  and  considerations  for  further  research.  Conclusions  are 
basically drawn up from chapter 5, the analysis of the functioning of the key elements 
of  the FNDR, and from chapter 7, the comparison between the FNDR and the ERDF. 
3  Finalrernarks 
Opportunity of  the study 
* The study took place from 1998 to 2001. In the year 2000 a new programming period 
began  for  the  Structural  Funds.  The  transit  from  one  period  to  another  implied  a 
structural reform of  the ERDF, which provided valuable information with respect to the 
evaluation of the final programming period as well as a great deal of discussion on the 
theoretical and practical aspects of  regional planning and public policy in Europe. 
* The year 2000 was also the beginning of another programming period for the FNDR 
fund.  This new programme' features were not included in this study, but a summary of 
its main contents are presented in Appendix 4. As it will be seen in this appendix, and 
contrary to  what happened in the  case of the ERDF, no  major transformations were 
introduced to the FNDR in this opportunity. As it will be shown, the fund will basically 
continue to operate in the same way and it will be financing the same kind of  projects as 
in previous periods. 
8 Limitations 
* Several limitations are imposed by the availability and opportunity of data. There is a 
lack  on  information  regarding  the  FNDR.  Few  studies  have  analysed  critically  the 
functioning and performance of  the fund. No systematic data about the fund is produced 
by  any  of the  instances that have the  responsibility for  its  administration.  The  most 
recent data available are figures of 1998 for the allocation ofFNDR funds. 
* Although the way the  FNDR fund  is  being  allocated within regions  may be  very 
important for the analysis of the way the fund actually impacts local development, this 
study concentrated mainly on the regional scale. The reason for this is that information 
for the local level simply does not exist and therefore would have to be generated. 
* This study concentrated mainly in the processes rather than in the products. Therefore, 
whenever opinions or conclusions are drawn at this respect, they have to be considered 
suggestive rather than conclusive. 
9 Chapter 2 
Economic Growth and Development 
Introduction 
This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  on  the  main  theoretical  concepts  and  theories 
associated  with  economic  growth  and  regional  development.  Theory  plays  a 
fundamental  role  providing  the  basic  framework  for  understanding  the  concept  of 
growth and development in their many dimensions. Theory underpins the concept of  the 
regIOn. 
The  chapter has  five  parts.  The  first part introduces  the  linked concept of economic 
growth, development, and regional development. This part defines the main concepts to 
be  used  in  this  work  and  explores  different  theories  of development  and  regional 
development with emphasis on the most recent explanation of  the so called 'new growth 
theory'.  This  focus  acknowledges  increasing  interest  among  theorists  to  apply  this 
analysis  to  explain  current  regional  divergence  throughout  the  industrialised  and 
developing world. 
Development, for the purpose of this work, has to be understood not only as economic 
development  but  also  as  incorporating  its  social  and  cultural  dimensions.  Thus, 
whenever  utilised  from  now  on  in  its  two  variations  i.e.  national  development  (or 
development)  and  regional  development,  the  concepts  of development  should  be 
understood as  including these  other dimensions.  The  way  these  concepts  have  been 
defined and utilised in the literature is extensively presented in this chapter. 
As the main concern of this work have to  do  with 'development' within the 'regional' 
context,  the  first  part also  discusses  on the  main definitions  of 'regional theory  and 
development' . 
Part 2 of the chapter discusses about the concept of 'region', and about the types of 
regions which this work deals with  .. 
10 Because of  its special importance for the case of  regional development in Chile's recent 
history, the third part of this chapter discusses the concept of 'decentralisation' and its 
influence on the country's present administrative structure and strategy of development. 
The historical evolution that the concept has experienced in Chile as well as the most 
recent steps toward decentralisation taken by the Chilean Government are presented. 
The  fourth  part of this  chapter is  devoted to  the  role  of infrastructure investment in 
economic  growth.  As  infrastructure  represents,  and  it  will  continue  to  do  so,  the 
principal  component  of the  regional  funds  in  Chile,  this  part  concentrates  on  the 
discussion of the  role that public infrastructure  investment may have  on the  regions 
economic growth and development. 
Finally,  part fifth,  Conclusions,  is  devoted to  link the  concepts of economic growth, 
regional  theory,  decentralisation  and  public  infrastructure  investment  to  provide  a 
theoretical  framework  for  analysing  the  role  regional  funds  may  play  in  regional 
development. 
1  Economic growth and development: Global and Regional scale 
"Throughout the industrialised world,  Widespread economic restructuring,  rapid 
technological  change,  the  configuration  of State  intervention,  and  increasing 
globalisation  are  giving greater prominence  to  the  nature  and performance  of 
individual and local economies within nations.  The  old patterns and processes of 
regional  development  that  characterised  the  post-war  period  are  being 
fundamentally redrawn,  creating new problems of  uneven  development and new 
theoretical  and policy  changes.  What  ever  interpretation  of this  contemporary 
transformation  is  adopted,  regions  and localities  are  back on  the  academic and 
political agenda" (Forewords of the Regional Policy and Development Series of 
the Regional Studies Association. London, 1997). 
Economic and social development issues are not unique to the "industrialised world". 
The  significant  problems  of economic  growth,  resource  allocation,  investment  co-
ordination and the effects that the driving forces of democratisation and decentralisation 
may have on local development have put the 'regional question' on the agenda of many 
developing nations. 
11 Many authors have studied how economic growth and development occur and how it 
spreads through space. The earliest works of Von Thunen and Weber in the 1800s, and 
afterward,  during  the  193 Os  and  1940s,  the  studies  of Christaller (1933)  and  Losch 
(1940);  and  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  Perroux  (1954),  North  (1955),  Hirshman 
(1958), Isard (1956), Myrdal (1957), Friedmann (1966), Siebert (1969) among others, 
and  most  recently,  the  works  of Lisk  (1983),  Sala-i-Martin  (1994),  Barro  (1995), 
Rodriguez-Pose (1998), Todaro (1989 and 2000). 
Theories of economic growth have focused in both the national and the regional level. 
Theories of growth at a national scale have not paid much attention to the differences 
generated  among  different  regions  within  a country.  Regional  level  theories,  on  the 
contrary,  have emphasised the  economic and  social  differences  generated among the 
different territorial units of a country and in particularly have concentrated on regions 
lagging behind. 
1.1  Economic growth and development: the global scale 
Concepts definition: development, development economics and economic growth 
In order to understand the difference between the concepts of traditional economics and 
development economics it is worth looking at the analysis of Todaro (2000). He argues 
that  "'traditional  economic,2  is  concerned  primarily  with  the  efficient,  least-cost 
allocation of scarce productive resources and with the optimal growth of  these resources 
over  time  so  as  to  produce  and  over-expanding  range  of goods  and  services". 
'Development economics', continues Todaro "has a greater scope. In addition to being 
concerned with the efficient allocation of existing scarce (  or idle) productive resources 
and with their sustained growth over time, it must also deal with the economic, social, 
political,  and  institutional  mechanisms,  both  public  and  private,  necessary  to  bring 
about rapid (at least by historical standards) and large scale improvements in levels of 
living for the masses of poverty-stricken, malnourished and illiterate people of Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America" (p. 8). 
2 Todaro makes clear that by 'traditional economics' he means the classical and neo-classical economics 
taught in mostly American and British literature. 
12 'Development economics', according to Todaro, had nothing to  do with the economies 
of European  countries  or  other  'developed'  countries,  with their  industrial  areas  in 
decline,  with  their  deprived  urban  centres  or  their  malfunctioning  rural  systems. 
Although incomplete, Todaro's definition includes, along with the economic, the social, 
political and institutional dimensions of  development. 
Glasson (1978) points out that, no matter the kind of development, this always involves 
implicit  and  explicit  value  judgements  about  the  direction  and  speed  of change. 
Although economic factors are of fundamental importance, development is much more 
than economic development or economic growth. 
This  author  argues  that  development  can  be  seen  as  a  multi-dimensional  process, 
including,  in  addition  to  the  economic  development  process,  social  development 
processes  concerned  with  the  distributive  aspects  of development;  and  political-
administrative  development processes  concerned  with the  shift  in the  influence  and 
power  of groups  and  individuals.  All  the  processes  are  complexly  interrelated  and 
interdependent. 
Glasson also mentions the political-administrative development processes related to the 
shift in the  influence and power of groups.  These  will be  more extensively covered 
when analysing the motion force of 'decentralisation' later in this chapter, as one of  the 
main reason for the definition of  regions and regional development in Chile. 
Economic  growth,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  essential  component  of  economIC 
development,  although not the  only  component.  According to  Gupta (1983),  certain 
elements playa pivotal role in the growth process. Gupta takes growth as the rising of 
the standard of living for the average family, that is, raising their per capita income. He 
suggests that considerable confusion has been caused by mixing up 'growth theory' and 
'planning theory'.  He  claims that what we have become accustomed to  call national 
'development plans' are in truth, little more than co-ordination and budget exercises. 
13 1.1.1  Theories of  economic development and growth 
Two  ways  of understanding  economic  growth,  suggests  Gupta,  were  developed 
separately  by  Rostow  and  Schumpeter3:  First,  the  work  of Rostow  "contained  an 
implied suggestion that once an economy reached a certain minimum level of saving 
and investment, it would be ready for take-off into self-sustained growth. The widely 
accepted Harrod-Domar model of growth places capital formation at the centre of the 
stage. The strength of this belief is evident from the fact that policy measures in most 
developing  countries  are  even today  concentrated on raising the  rates  of saving  and 
investment.  An associated belief that growth was brought about by industrialisation. 
This belief arose from the oft-cited fact that all the developed countries were also the 
industrialised ones ...  " (Gupta, 1983 p. 2). 
The five stages of growth, that according to Rostow (1990) it is possible to  identify in 
all societies, are: 
a)  The  traditional  society.  This  is  one  whose  structure  is  developed  within 
limited  production  functions,  based  on  pre-Newtonian  science  and 
technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world; 
b)  The  precondition  to  take-off.  This  refers  to  societies  in  the  process  of 
transition.  This  is  the  period  when  the  preconditions  for  take-off  are 
developed; 
c)  The take-off.  This  is  the  interval  when the  old blocks  and  resistances  to 
steady  growth  are  finally  overcome.  The  forces  making  for  economic 
progress expand and come to dominate the society; 
d)  The  drive  to  maturity.  This  is  the  long  interval  that  follows  the  take-off 
period.  It corresponds to  a long  interval of sustained although fluctuating 
progress,  as  the now regularly growing economy drives to  extend modem 
technology over the whole front of  its economic activity; 
e)  The age of high mass-consumption. In this, the leading sectors shift toward 
durable  consumers'  goods  and  services.  According  to  Rostow,  this  is  "a 
phase  from  which  Americans  are  beginning  to  emerge;  whose  not 
unequivocal joys Western Europe and Japan are beginning energetically to 
3 See Gupta, 1983 for Rostow and Schumpeter refrences. 
14 probe;  and with which  Soviet  society is  engaged in an uneasy flirtation" 
(Rostow, 1990 p. 10). 
Based on what has been known as  the "sector theory"  and the "development-stages 
theory", and the subsequent critic on these theories, Parr (1999) proposes a modified 
version of  the development-states theory called the "export-stages framework". 
The framework is based on two propositions. The first states that "regional development 
over the long run is primarily dependent on the growth of  the region's export base", the 
second that "if  the export base of a region undergoes a structural change, it is likely to 
do so in a systematic (and thus predictable) manner, involving a well-defined sequence 
of stages" (p. 98). Parr argues that in the resulting framework, development is viewed as 
resulting largely from growth of the export base. He emphasises that over the long run 
the export base may well undergo a major structural change. 
Conversely,  Schumpeter, "associated the process of development neither with capital 
accumulation  nor  with  industrialisation  but with  'doing  things  better'  or technical 
progress. Lately, this has gained a reluctant recognition among economists in the form 
of the  'residual factor'  in growth".  The so  called 'residual factor'  has to  do  with the 
proportion of growth  rate  that  remains  unexplained  by the  additions  to  productive 
resources of  capital and labour. 
Back in the 1960s, Friedmann
4 argued that there were four states of  development: 
a)  pre-industrial; 
b)  transitional; 
c)  industrial; and, 
d)  post-industrial. 
According  to  Friedmann  (1966),  in  pre-industrial  societies,  such  as  Bolivia  and 
Afghanistan, the policy emphasis was on the creation of preconditions for  economic 
'take-off  and  regional  policy  was  inappropriate.  In  transitional  societies,  such  as 
Venezuela  and  Brazil,  there  was  a  need  to  create  a  spatial  framework  suitable  for 
4 Quoted by Glasson, 1978. 
15 sustaining economic growth, and here regional policies become critical. The third stage, 
the industrial society, typical of  much of  Western Europe, including the UK, often reaps 
the cost of industrialisation, especially in the form of depressed regions resulting from 
overspecialisation.  The  final  stage,  the  post-industrial  society,  typified by the  USA, 
there is a shifts to a new focus with the emphasis on urban and metropolitan problems. 
Similarly, Kaldor typified economic growth processes as  follow:  (cited by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995 p. 5). 
a)  per capita output grows over time, and its growth rate does not tend to diminish, 
b)  physical capital per worker grows over time, 
c)  the rate of  return to capital is nearly constant, 
d)  the ratio of  physical capital to output is nearly constant, 
e)  the shares of  labour and physical capital in national income are nearly constant, 
f)  the growth rate of  output per worker differs substantially across countries 
Another approach on how the economy of a country grows was presented by Kuznets 
(1983)5. For the case of  a developed country, this author defines economic growth as "a 
long  term  rise  in  capacity  to  supply  increasingly  diverse  economic  goods  to  its 
population, this growing capacity based on advancing technology and the institutional 
and ideological adjustments that it demands" (p.56). 
Kuznets identifies six characteristic features manifested in the growth process of almost 
every developed nation. These are: 
a)  high rates of growth of  per capita output and population, 
b)  high rates of  increase in total factor productivity, 
c)  high rates of  structural transformation of  the economy, 
d)  high rates of  social and ideological transformation, 
e)  the propensity of  economically developed countries to reach out to the rest of  the 
world for markets and raw materials 
f)  the  limited  spread  of this  economic  growth  to  only  a  third  of the  world's 
population. 
5  The  Nobel  Prize-winning  Harvard  economist  Simon  Kuznets.  From  his  work  that  appears  in  the 
American Economic Review 63, N.3 (June 1973), pp 247-258; and reproduced in Todaro, 1983, pp 56-67. 
16 Todaro (2000) states that these six characteristics can be grouped into three categories, 
the  first  two  as  aggregated  economic  variables,  3  and 4  as  structural-transformation 
variables,  and  the  5  and  6  as  affecting  the  international  spread  of growth.  These 
categories, more or less common in the experience of most developed countries do not 
explain why economic growth does not spread to less developed nations. Todaro argues 
that the answer to this come from the internal condition of most Third Wodd countries, 
and from the contemporary nature of international economic and political relationships 
between rich and poor nations. 
Lisk (1983), based on the differences and similarities in objectives and policy emphasis, 
distinguishes four approaches to development: 
a)  growth-oriented; 
b)  employment-oriented; 
c)  poverty-oriented; and, 
d)  the Basic-needs approach. 
What is common to these four views is that all of  them recognise the need for economic 
growth.  Because several features  of these strategies are observed in the development 
model followed  by Chile during the  last two  decades,  Lisk'  strategies are  presented 
below in detail. 
a) Growth-oriented strategy of  development 
Main facts: 
the primary objective is to increase the rate of output within the economy over a 
period of  time, mainly by increasing the rate of  capital formation, 
the growth rate is presented as a function of increase in capital stock, and emphasis 
is placed on the mobilisation of saving and investment, 
it is assumed that rapid growth of GNP suffices to bring about higher standards of 
living through its beneficial influence on other economic and social parameters. 
Lisk points  out that there  are  two  major theoretical variants among growth-oriented 
strategies: a) balanced growth, which calls for massive capital investment on all fronts 
simultaneously. This theory assumes that technical and commercial complementarities 
exist  between  the  new  industries  at  different  stages  of production  and  in  different 
17 sectors of the economy.  Lisk emphasises that this corresponds, in some ways, to  the 
external economies of large-scale production; b) unbalanced growth theory.  This places 
similar reliance on forward and backward linkage effects between industries at different 
stages  of production to  provide the  impetus  for  growth.  Lisk argues  that,  while  the 
capital  accumulation  concept  may  be  valid  in  relatively  developed  countries,  it  is 
certainly  not  clear  so  in  countries  with  structural  constraints  such  as  scarcity  of 
managerial and technical skills, insufficient capacity to absorb new knowledge. 
The development assumption of  these theories is that rapid growth rates over a period of 
time will result in an overall improvement in quality of  life of  people. 
This  argument  that  rapid  growth  necessarily  improves  the  standard  of living  in 
deVeloping  countries  can be  disputed  by looking  at  the  recent  experience  of South 
American countries. The rapid growth achieved in the 1990s has actually resulted in the 
worsening  of income  distribution,  increases  in  the  number  of poor  and  higher 
unemployment (see Riveros, 1997 and Meller, 2000 for the case of  Chile). 
b) Employment-oriented strategy of  development 
Main facts: 
Lisk states that the objectives of this strategy reflect a wider definition of development 
that  includes  improvement  in  the  living  conditions  of individuals  in  addition  to 
economic growth, like the previous strategy (Lisk, 1983). 
employment promotion is viewed as the principal means of spreading the benefits of 
economic growth more evenly throughout the economy, 
the growth objective is modified so as to maximise not only output but also the rate 
of  labour absorption, 
there  is  an  emphasis  in the  reallocation of resources  in favour  of disadvantaged 
sectors and groups, 
emphasis  in put on the  central  objective  of reducing  unemployment and  under-
employment, 
redistribution of  incomes and productive assets receive some attention. 
Lisk  argues  that  there  exists  the  possibility  of conflict  between  the  output  and 
employment objectives.  The  theory stresses,  however,  that simultaneous  increases  in 
18 output and employment can be achieved through direct substitution of labour for capital 
in the production process. This author draws attention to the fact that due to  structural 
constraints many developing countries may find difficult to achieve gains in both output 
and employment. 
c) Anti-poverty strategy of  development 
One of the main reasons for the adoption of  this strategy is that, after several examples 
of  the application of  the two other strategies presented above, it was seen that the effects 
on  the  redistribution  of income,  through  access  to  productive  employment,  still 
excluded the principal poverty groups. 
An  important  constraint  on  adopting  this  kind  of strategy  is  that  a  redirection  of 
consumption and investment in favour of  the poor may probably lead to some reduction 
in saving and investment by the rich. This implies a lower rate of capital accumulation 
during the transitional period. Growth of GNP  is  abandoned as an objective, but it is 
pursued only to the extent that it is  complementary to the reduction of economic and 
social inequalities, which may have been accentuated by the growth process itself. 
The  poor,  in both the  rural  and  urban  areas  are  among  the  less  qualified  groups  in 
society  and  for  this  reason  they  are  usually  outside  the  organised  sectors  of the 
economy. As most development strategies are concentrated in the most advance sectors 
of the economy the poor cannot easily find employment for their low skill levels. This 
has led to a reorientation of  the development policies towards the eradication of  poverty, 
setting the basis for the emergence of 'anti-poverty strategies'. 
According to  Lisk, the  main objective  of poverty-oriented development  strategies  of 
development  is  to  raise per capita incomes  above  a predetermined  'poverty line'  as 
quickly  as  possible,  with the  related  aim of reducing  income  distribution and  social 
inequalities. 
This can be well illustrated by the case of Chile where the high growth rate achieved 
during the  1980s  actually worsened the  country's income  distribution.  This  situation 
started to  be reversed during the  1990s  where,  although keeping the high rate  of the 
increase of the economy (over 6%  annually from  1990 to  1998), income distribution 
19 started to  improve slightly. For example, poverty in Chile amounted to a 38.0% of the 
total population by the year 1990. This figure dropped drastically under the democratic 
government,  reaching  21.7%  by  1998  (MIDEPLAN,  1998).  Income  distribution, 
however,  moved  much  more  slowly  toward  in  the  direction  of reducing  the  high 
disparities in the same period. 
d) The Basic-needs strategy of  development 
Lisk (1983), points out that the main objective of  this approach is to satisfy the essential 
requirements of each country's population within the time horizon of one generation. 
Two complementary sets of  target are laid down for this purpose. The first is concerned 
with personal consumption needs such as food,  shelter and clothing; the second has to 
do with the provision of public services such as health, sanitation, the provision of safe 
drinking water, education, transport and cultural facilities. 
This strategy is similar to the poverty-oriented strategy, although they present important 
conceptual differences. For example, an anti-poverty programme would be directed to 
target specific poverty groups within the economy. The basic-needs approach is based 
on the premise that poverty in most developing countries is widespread and that action, 
as a consequence, should be directed at the population as a whole. 
1.1.2  The new growth theory 
The theory of 'endogenous growth' or the 'new growth theory' started to be developed 
at  the  end  of the  1980s.  It was  the  answer  of few  neo-classical  and  institutional 
economists who began to look for a new growth theory (Todaro, 2000). 
This  theory  provides  a  theoretical  framework  for  analysing  endogenous  growth, 
persistent  GDP  growth  that  is  determined  by  the  system  governing  the  production 
process rather than by forces outside the system. The principal motivations of the 'new 
growth theory,  argues  Todaro  (2000),  are  to  explain both growth differentials  across 
countries and a greater proportion of the  growth observed.  To  complement Todaro's 
statement,  it  is  worth saying  that growth  differentials  are  not  only  observed  at  the 
national level, in fact, regional differences, within countries, are a major preoccupation 
in 'endogenous growth' theories. 
20 According to Cypher and Dietz (1997), the Solow-type neo-classical economic growth 
model, one of  the most influential neo-classical growth models, and one that has shaped 
much modem thinking about the process of economic growth since the 1950s, has been 
interpreted  as  predicting  that  the  per  capita  incomes  of economies  would  tend  to 
converge to the same level over time, as lower income nations grew faster that higher 
income  nations,  assuming  they  all  have  access  to  the  same  technology  and  shared 
similar saving and investment rates. 
Cypher and Dietz suggest that "the relatively slow progress of many African and South 
Asian economies,  as well  as  the  decline in per capita incomes brought on by severe 
crisis in many less developed nations that had been successful for a time until the early 
1980s, have cause quite a number of economists to question the validity of any growth 
model which predicts eventual income convergence, conditional or unconditional" (p. 
243). 
As  a consequence, "in the late  1980s, a spate of endogenous growth models began to 
appear in the economic literature. Endogenous growth theories do  not assume, nor do 
they  find,  physical  capital  accumulation  to  be  the  dominant  determining  factor  in 
spurring  economic  growth,  nor  in  explaining  differences  in  income  levels  amongst 
nations".  "In the  endogenous  growth models,  a higher level  of investment,  properly 
defined,  not  only  can get  a country to  higher  level  of per capita income,  as  in the 
neoclassical  view,  but higher  investment  rates,  again  properly  understood,  also  can 
sustain higher rates of growth of per capita income in the future" (Cypher and Dietz, 
1997 p. 424). 
Setting the birth of the  'endogenous growth models', Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
state that "In the  mid-1980s,  a group  of growth theorists  led by Paul Romer (1986) 
became  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  exogenous  driven  explanations  of long-run 
productivity growth. This dissatisfaction motivated the construction of  a class of growth 
model in which the key determinants of growth were endogenous to the model" (p.  38). 
According to these authors, the reason for the name 'endogenous growth'  come from 
the  determination  of long-run  growth  within the  model,  rather  by  some  exogenous 
growing variables like unexplained technological progress. 
21 Barro (1997),  points out that "recent works on endogenous growth theory have sought 
to  supply  the  missing  explanation  on  long-run  growth.  In  the  main,  this  approach 
provides  a  theory  of technical  progress,  one  of the  central  missing  elements  of the 
neoclassical model" (p. 4). 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), emphasise the importance of the concept of technical 
progress, widely discussed in the  'endogenous-growth' literature of recent years. They 
argue that "the level of the technology can be advanced by purposeful activity, such as 
R&D expenditure. This potential for endogenous technological progress may allow an 
escape from diminishing returns at the aggregate level, especially if the improvements 
in technique can be shared in a nonrival manner by all producers" (p. 41). 
According to  a  European Commission study  (1997):  "The failure  of the  basic  neo-
classical model to  provide a satisfactory model of long-term per capita output growth 
has been addressed by the 'new' endogenous growth theories which seek to endogenize 
the  sustained accumulation of factors,  among which they include human capital  and 
knowledge  capital"  (p.  8).  This  study  states  that  endogenous  growth  models  focus 
attention on the micro-foundations of the accumulation process, that is, on the private 
and social costs and benefits of investing in capital (infrastructure capital), skill (human 
capital) or technological progress (knowledge capital). 
This study notes two strands of  endogenous growth theories: 
The first stresses the importance of the accumulation of human capital, defined as the 
quality  of labour an  individual  is  able  to  supply,  i.e.  their  general  skill  capital;  the 
second highlights the importance of  sustained innovation. 
In 'endogenous growth model focusing on human capital', the engine of growth is the 
accumulation of human capital. Introducing human capital into the production function 
implies the need to investigate both how current human capital affects the same period 
production,  and  how  the  current  allocation  of time  by  the  individual  affects  the 
accumulation of  human capital. 
The  'endogenous growth model focusing  on the  accumulation of knowledge'  tries to 
endogenise  technological  progress,  that  is,  the  process  by which the  same  input  of 
22 labour and capital can produce more output. Technological progress, this study argues, 
is nothing other than knowledge creation, and sustained technical knowledge creations 
leads to a continually rising stock of  knowledge. 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) point out that "a great deal of evidence has been produced in 
recent years casting doubt on endogenous growth theory".  They argue that "the neo-
classical growth model of Slow and Swan, with exogenous technological progress and 
diminishing returns to capital, explain most of the cross-country variation in output per 
person"  (p.  403).  They  also  point  out  that,  contrary  to  what  'endogenous  growth' 
models predict, cross-country evidence suggests that countries are converging toward a 
common growth rate in the long-run. 
Finally,  they  cite  Jones  (1995),  who  "has  challenged  endogenous  growth theory  by 
pointing out that the input to R&D, as proxied by the number of scientists and engineers 
engaged  in R&D,  has  risen dramatically  over the past half century,  with no  visible 
tendency for growth in output per person or in productivity to increase" (p. 417). 
Summary 
As  presented  by  Todaro  (2000)  five  theories  of development  "explore  the  recent 
historical  and  intellectual  evolution  in  scholarly  thinking  about  how  and  why 
development does or does not take place" (p. 77). These are: 
a)  the linear-stages-of-growth model; 
b)  theories and patterns of structural change; 
c)  the international dependence revolution; 
d)  the neo-classical, free market counterrevolution; and, 
e)  the new or endogenous theory of  economic growth. 
Of these, the first prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s. Todaro (2000) points out that 
the theorists of  these period viewed the process of development as a series of  successive 
stages of economic growth through which all countries must pass in order to follow the 
pass that historically had been followed by the more developed nations.  Friedmann's 
model is one of  the most-cited illustration of  this theory. 
23 This  linear-stage  approach was  replaced in the  1970s by two  competing ideological 
school of  thought. The first focused on theories and patterns of structural change (again 
using modem economic theory and statistical tools). The second was more radical and 
political in orientation. In the latter, Latin American theorists played a determinant role. 
Its development and abundant literature explained the many ways by which the 'centre' 
managed to keep the 'periphery' underdeveloped, or how the two faces of development 
and underdevelopment were both part of  the same system. According to Todaro (2000), 
dependence theories tended to emphasise external and internal institutions and political 
constraints on economic development. 
Throughout the  1980s the  neo-classical  (neo-liberal)  approach prevailed.  This theory 
emphasised the 'beneficial role' of free markets, open economies, and the privatisation 
of inefficient and wasteful public enterprises. Rejecting dependence theory, it asserted 
that  failure  to  is  not  due  to  exploitative  external  and  internal  forces.  Rather,  it  is 
primarily  the  result  of too  much  government  intervention  and  regulation  of the 
economy. 
Based  on this  theory  is  that the  profound transformations  of Chilean economy took 
place since the end of the 1970s. Chile became a laboratory to test the validity of the 
assumptions  under  this  neo-liberal  approach.  High  rates  of growth  were  actually 
achieved but at a high cost in many socio-economic indicators, especially employment 
and income distribution. 
Overall, what lies in the basis and are of prime importance in any society, are the three 
factors or components of  economic growth (Todaro, 2000): 
capital  accumulation,  including  all  new investments  in land,  physical equipment, 
and human resources, 
growth in population and hence eventual growth in the labour force, 
technological progress 
24 1.2  Regional Economic Development: Theory and policy 
The  emphasis  of most  of the  development  strategies  discussed  above  was  on  the 
national  scale.  The  regional  level  analysis  that  follows  refers  not  only  to  the  sub-
national  level,  but  it  should  also  be  understood  as  'regional  analysis'  that  sees 
development as it interacts among the different unit of a larger totality, not necessarily a 
country. A good example of  this are the countries of  Europe, taken as regions of  a larger 
unit  called the  European Union.  Another  example  would  be  the  countries  of South 
America as regions of  that larger unit that is the sub-continent. 
The importance of the regional level in the analysis of economic growth or economic 
development is that, as Siebert (1969) points out, growth actually occurs in space or it is 
influenced by the spatial structure and it has a feedback upon the economic landscape. 
On the  other hand,  continues Siebert, the problems of regional  economic  growth are 
equally relevant to developed and underdeveloped economies. In developed countries, 
depressed areas exist which lag behind the national growth rate.  These countries also 
experience the problems of  over-agglomeration, both cases requiring intervention. In the 
case of developing countries, regional problems have to do with the allocation of scarce 
resources,  with which strategy to  follow  for  economic  development,  with the  severe 
problems in particular regions, etc. 
The regional approach has been a subject of study since the  1950s with the works of 
Myrdal, Isard, North, Perroux, Friedmann, among others. Recently the theme has also 
gained attention,  as Riffo (1999) pointed out,  due to the interest of many scholars for 
trying to  answer the questions of how economic growth occur, what are the causes of 
regional growth, what are the reasons that explain regional disparities, and what are the 
long-run tendencies in growth. This interest, argues Riffo (1999), come from the current 
phase  of capitalist development,  which is  characterised by an accelerated process  of 
globalisation  that,  once  again  "would  be  retaking  its  secular  behaviour  toward 
divergence in interregional growth" (De Mattos, 1997
6
). 
6 Quoted by Riffo, 1999. 
25 As regional development has to do with the economics of a region, it is worth defining 
what is to be understood by 'regional economics and 'regional economic growth'. For 
Siebert  (1969),  "'regional economics'  is  the  study  of man's economic  behaviour  in 
space. It analyzes economic processes in a spatial setting and inquires into the structure 
of  the economic landscape" (p. 1). 
On  the  other  hand,  Kuznets  provides  a  definition  of regional  economic  growth: 
"regional  economic  growth  is  the  sustained  increase  in the  volume  of an  economic 
variable of a spatial subsystem of a nation" (Kuznets,  1959, p.  162l Siebert suggests 
the following variables to be used as indicators of economic growth: the increase in the 
welfare of a region, the increase in the output of a region, the increase in the set of final 
commodities which are available to the region. He also draws attention to the fact that 
'regional  growth'  requires  the  explicit  introduction  of two  fundamental  dimensions: 
time and space. 
Oosterhaven  (2000)  sets  out  critical  distinctions  between  several  concepts  used  in 
regional analysis.  He argues that,  as  uneven initial distribution of economic activities 
over space is  empirically normal,  polarisation or concentration occur when the  initial 
spatial distribution becomes more uneven, and dispersion or deconcentration take place 
when the distribution of activities over space becomes more even.  In  different words, 
"an uneven spatial distribution of any single variable implies spatial differences in the 
density  of that  variable,  e.g.  in  population  densities  when  looking  at  numbers  of 
inhabitants. Consequently, polarisation occurs when density differentials become larger, 
whereas deconcentration occurs when differences in densities become smaller" (p. 2). 
Oosterhaven also defines the concepts of  convergence and divergence. He argues that is 
important to distinguish cases with absolute growth differential from cases with relative 
growth differential. In the case of  relative growth differentials, "it is not primarily initial 
density differences that are looked at; rather the analysis is started with the initial spatial 
differences in the relative variable at hand, such as  income per capita". To  distinguish 
this  case  from  absolute growth differential, "one speaks of convergence if the  initial 
distribution becomes more even,  i.e.  when the per capita income differences become 
7 Quoted by Siebert, 1969. 
26 smaller,  and  of  divergence  when  the  initial  distribution  becomes  more  even" 
(Oosterhaven, 2000 p. 2). 
The same author argues that the single most important aspect of this distinction is that 
convergence  might,  in  fact,  coincide  with  the  concentration  as  well  as  with  the 
deconcentration of economic activity.  Something similar occurs for divergence. It will 
all  depend  on  whether  or  not  the  absolute  (de )concentration  of one  variable  (for 
example  income)  proceeds  faster  or  slower  than the  (de  )concentration  of the  other 
variable (for example population). 
1.2.1  Regional theory 
Defined in the mid seventies (Isard 1975, Kuklinski et a11975) regional theory provides 
the  theoretical  framework  through  which  regional  problems  can be  rationalised  and 
analysed. Also refers to as  'regional science', Isard defines it starting from the concept 
of region. For him, regional science " .. .is obviously about regions. But a region is not 
merely an arbitrary demarcated area; rather it is an area that is meaningful because of 
one or more problems associated with it which we as regional scientist want to examine 
and help solve" (Isard,  1975 p.  1).  To  give regional studies the character of scientific, 
Isard argues that "regional science is  also  about science" (p.  2).  That is,  it involves 
study which uses scientific methods and procedures. Not purely scientific to spend too 
long collecting and processing information, because "regional scientist like to  ask as 
well;  Why  are  things  as  they  are?  And he  likes  to  follow up  this  query  with  some 
hypothesis or theory to  be tested,  or a policy proposal relating to  one or more  social 
problems of  his region of  study" (p. 2). 
This author provides a variety of definitions of regional science ranging from general 
ones to more specific and applied ones. As they are quite diverse is not difficult to find 
one for most purposes. Of all thirteen definitions proposed by Isard (1975), five of  them 
seem to be relevant for the purpose of  this work. 
•  Definition 1 states that: "Regional Science is the study of a meaningful region (or 
system of  regions) as a dynamic organism"; 
27 •  Definition  2:  "Regional  Science  is  the  synthesised  (integrated)  analysis  of the 
political,  economic,  sociological,  cultural,  and psychological factors  affecting the 
development of  a meaningful region or system of  regions"; 
•  Definition  5:  "Regional  Science  is  the  study  of the  diverse  organisational  and 
institutional structure of  society as they govern the behaviour and spatial distribution 
of  population and economic activity"; 
•  Definition 8: "Regional Science aims to identify and expose simple, basic principles 
of spatial organisation-principle that govern equilibrium and organisational structure 
and relate to efficiency, equity, and social welfare"; 
•  Definition  10:  "Regional  Science  is  a  synthesis  of the  art  of planning  and 
management with the science of spatial systems" (Isard, 1975 pp 4-5). 
The  other eight definitions  given  by  Isard  stress,  among  other aspects,  the  cultural, 
space-time, psychological dimensions, rural-urban dichotomy, natural regions, industry 
and other sectoral economic activities. 
The five  definitions of regional science discussed here emphasise aspects that will be 
considered in the analysis and comparison of the  selected processes of investment of 
regional funds of  this study. Definition 1, the most general one, points to the concept of 
'meaningful  region',  basic  concept  that  defines  the  sub-national  level  of the  given 
territory  to  which the  analysis  will  refer to.  Definition 2  stresses  the  importance  of 
integrated  factors  such  as  political,  economic,  etc,  affecting  the  development  of a 
particular region.  Definition 5 talks  about the  diverse  organisational and institutional 
structures that govern the spatial distribution of population and economic activities, as 
regional public investment do.  Definition 8 appears to  be of great significance for this 
study,  specially  when  emphasising  the  'simple,  basic  principles'  that  govern 
organisational structure that relate to  efficiency and equity.  As this research principal 
aim is to present, and by comparison, discover new forms of  basic principles of  regional 
investment,  this  8
th  definition appears  to  greatly address  this  objective.  And,  finally, 
definition 10 introduces the concept of 'planning' and 'management', quite essential to 
the process of  public regional investment. 
28 1.2.2  Regional development planning: the ground for regional policy 
According  to  Alden  (1996),  a  recent  European  Commission  policy  document  on 
regional development
8 has stressed the fact that "there is a growing acceptance of the 
need  for  spatial  planning at a European level  among  Member  States,  as  well  as  in 
academic and professional circles. The European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee,  The  Consultative  Council  of Regional  and  Local  Authorities,  and  most 
recently the Committee of the Regions, have all emphasised the need for increased co-
operation on spatial planning issues" (p. 1). 
This  document has  emphasised that the  rapidly  changing European and  international 
context for spatial planning would require a responsive and effective planning system. 
This  come  from  the  fact  that a number of major trends  have  been observed by  the 
Commission in all Member States,  specially in those with a longer history of spatial 
planning.  Based on these arguments, Alden (1996)  suggests that there is  a number of 
reasons  to  believe that the  need  for  more  regional  planning will  be  maintained  and 
further advanced in the years ahead. 
Anyway,  in order to  define  regional  planning first  we  have to  accept that there  are 
regional problems that need to be solved. The question to what are 'regional problems' 
is addressed by Hallett (1973). 
This  author points  out that some  economists would deny their existence - except as 
transitory phenomenon or the outcome of  ignorance or misguided government policies -
on the ground that firms and households will locate themselves in what they find to be 
the most satisfactory situation, thus, ensuring that in the spatial economy, as well as in 
the production of  goods and services, the economic optimum is achieved. Hallett quoted 
the definition of  the economist Brown who attempts a very general definition: 
'Regional  problems  ... are  whatever  are  felt  as  inter-regional  economIC 
inequities.  The  main  examples  are  inequalities  in  regional  levels  of income, 
poverty,  unemployment,  migration  and  economic  growth  rate.  Rather  less 
8  European  Commission  policy  document  on  regional  development:  Europe  2000+:  Cooperation  for 
European Territorial Development CEC 1994a 
29 obviously, however, they may spring from apparent violations not of equity but 
of the general national advantage -an inter-regional distribution of population, 
for instance, marked by over-population in the sense of external diseconomies of 
congestion in some  regions  and  perhaps under-population  in a corresponding 
sense in others: or perhaps a geographical distribution of  the population which is 
thought to make national defence more difficult, or is for some other important 
reasons  less than optimal,  without necessarily involving inequity between one 
region  or  another.  In  short,  any  economic  circumstances  that  give  rise  to  a 
regional sense of grievance, or any that give rise to a general, or a governmental, 
belief that the inter-regional distribution of population and economic activity is 
seriously wrong, may be said to constitute a regional problem' 9. 
For  Hallett,  this  definition  is  'behaviourist'  because  leaves  out  of  account  the 
'normative' question whether the people of a region, or the government are right to feel 
that a regional problem ought to be recognised. Therefore, although regional problems 
do  arise,  government intervention is  not always justified, and specific policies are not 
always  well  conceived  (Hallet,  1973).  Answering  to  Hallett,  one  may  say  that 
government  action,  in  front  of  regional  problems,  will  depend  on  ideological 
preconceptions, and the fact that 'regional policies are not always well conceived' has to 
do  more with the quality of the planning than with the argument of intervention or no 
intervention. 
Hallett  argues  that  attitudes  to  regional  policies  must,  explicitly,  be  based  on  an 
economic 'model' of  regional change. He discusses on two extremes models, one which 
is an extension of the neo-classical model of price determination, which assumes that 
divergences between  regions (in average income or unemployment rates) will tend to 
be eliminated by self-equilibrating mechanism. At the other extreme is Myrdal's model 
of unstable equilibrium, which suggests that regional divergences, once established by 
historical accident, become increasingly wide. Areas which have established themselves 
as  industrial  centres  provide  the  seed-bed  for  new inventions  and  new ideas;  areas 
which have failed to  'take-off' are unable to  do  so, while the emigration of the most 
enterprising labour weakens economic potential even more (Hallett, 1973). 
9 A. J. Brown, 'Survey of Applied Economics: Regional Economics, with Special Reference to the United 
Kingdom', Economic Journal, Dec. 1969, p. 760. Quoted by Hallett et all 1973. 
30 No matter how they occur, we end up with regional disparities that have to be solved. 
Hallett suggests that regional disparities in countries such as the UK are neither rapidly 
and smoothly self-correcting nor (in the longer term) wildly cumulative, and that they 
can  often  bear hardly  on  individuals.  Facing  the  question,  what  attitude  should  the 
government adopt toward them,  he  revises  different  situations  arising  from  regional 
disparities and ends up asking for the right of government and scholars to address these 
as regional problems requiring regional policy solutions. 
According  to  Hayek  10,  the  different  VIews  about  planning  move  from  the  central 
planning of the  Stalinist system to  the liberal approach that 'non-intervention always 
produces the best possible results. 
A first major trend is the growing awareness that spatial planning has shifted from  a 
concern from  purely physical planning and land-use matters to  a wider concern from 
social, economic, environmental and political issues. A second trend has been the need 
not only to  identify specific strategic planning issues, but also to integrate the various 
strategic  issues  into  a  more  comprehensive  and  complex  form  of spatial  planning 
including  economic  development,  transportation,  retailing,  tourism,  housing,  urban 
regeneration, waste management, water quality, the countryside, and nature protection, 
and their integration with each other. 
Third,  the wider recognition of the need to  take account of market forces  within the 
spatial  planning  process,  notwithstanding  the  importance  of public/private  sector 
partnerships  in the  development process.  The  attraction of inward  investment and  a 
wider choice as regards location for many companies operating in a global economy has 
increased  the  need  for  spatial  plans  to  respond  more  fully  and  readily  to  market 
circumstances  and  requirements.  A  fourth  trend  examined  has  been  the  increased 
decentralisation of  responsibility for planning policies and controls to regional and local 
level of government. 
On the other hand, regional policies and the policy instruments associated to it are also 
seen as  the necessary steps through which a process of regional development can be 
10 Quoted by Hallett et all, 1973, p.1S. 
31 achieved. By looking at the increasingly process of integration of Europe triggered and 
sustained by the European Union, the Agenda 2000 proposals sustain that the building 
of Europe  is  creating  a  group  of States  that  are  forging  close  economic  links  and 
regulating issues of common interest together. This document states that the concept of 
European  integration  can  only  be  considered  credible  if these  States  maintain  a 
sufficient level of economic and social cohesion.  To  do  this, the  document stress the 
improvement  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  structural  policy  instruments  and  the 
increasingly  role  that  this  policies  should  play  in  the  Union's  future  enlargement. 
(Alden, 1996). 
With regard to regional development and policy in eastern European countries, Downes 
(1996)  argues  that the  regional  dimension  of development has  been put  behind the 
national level but this situation has necessarily started to  change through the nineties. 
The reform task being undertaken by the Central and East European countries (CEE), 
and the former Soviet Union, is virtually unprecedented. The need to  construct a new 
political and economic system in the ruin of  a completely different one has never before 
been  undertaken  on this  scale.  Given  this  background,  priority  has  been  given  to 
national rather regional economic reforms. The design and implementation of regional 
development strategies or policies were considered of secondary importance to national 
economic  policy  issues.  However,  as  economic  reform  has  continued,  its  spatial 
ramifications have become increasingly clear, thus forcing the issue of regional policy 
response  onto  the  political  agenda.  Regional  disparities  have  emerged  in individual 
countries, as well as for the CEE region as a whole. 
The need for regional development planning has also been stressed for the case of Japan 
(Abe,  1996),  where  the  problems  have  been  mainly  associated  with  excessive 
metropolisation and relative regional disparities.  The rapid economic growth in post-
war Japan has caused the concentration of economic activities and population in few 
metropolitan regions. Regions have been losing their economic vitality due to regional 
income disparities and population losses. 
Abe argues that with the aim of preventing excessive growth of metropolitan regions 
and  correcting regional  disparities,  the  government has,  since  1962,  formulated  four 
Comprehensive National Development Plans (CNDP).  Regional development policies 
32 under  the  four  CNDPs  have  sought  to  tackle  regional  problems  by  adopting  three 
particular  regional  development  policies:  the  construction  of a  national  network  of 
transportation and communications, the development of growth poles in local regions, 
and the  relocation of industries  from  the  metropolitan to  the  local  regions.  Looking 
towards the 21 st century, however, substantial socio-economic changes are foreseen: the 
rapid changes in the industrial structure under the progress of technology changes, the 
rising Japanese currency, a trend towards an information network society, the ageing of 
population and the integration of Japan into international society. These among others 
causes had made regional development planning in Japan seek a new direction (Abe, 
1996). 
2  The Concept of  the Region 
In  order  to  understand  the  notion  of regional  SCIence,  regional  development  and 
planning or regional policy, we  have to  go  back to  the basic concepts of region and 
planning. It is not the intention of  this study to extensively define what is, and has been, 
understood for a 'region', or a 'system of regions', for the different disciplines that use 
the term. The two type of regions to which the regional fund of both cases are directed 
do  present some differences that will be discussed in this section.  The most common 
definitions of the term, used both in older and recent literature, will be presented and 
discussed 
Glasson (1978) points out that the concept of region has been much used and abused 
over the years and there has been numerous controversies and disagreements over its 
meaning,  perhaps  reflecting  the  variety  of disciplines  involved  in  regional  studies. 
According  to  Hallett  (1973),  governments  increased  concern  for  the  economic 
conditions of regions, as  distinct from the country as  a whole, date back to the 1930s, 
but  the  systematic  economic  study  of regions  is  even  more  recent;  most books  on 
regional economics have appeared since the 1950s, although some ideas on the location 
of economic activities go  back to the work of Von Thunen in the early 19
th  centuryll. 
The  concept  of the  'region'  was  first  developed  by  geographers,  who  based  their 
33 classifications on physical characteristics. When economists took the concept and tried 
to  classify  regions  through  economic  criteria  it  soon  became  clear  that  -in most 
countries- it was very difficult to draw clear-cut dividing lines, which differed according 
to the criteria. 
To some, the region is a real entity that can be positively identified - a 'natural region'; 
to others, it is merely a product of the imagination, a method of classification. Glasson 
identifies  two  divergent  views  of the  concept  of region - one  objective,  the  other 
subjective. The subjective view sees a region as a means to an end, simply an idea, a 
model to help in the study of a particular country or area in the world. According to this 
author, this would be a method of classification, a device to  segregate areal features, 
with the only 'natural' region being the surface of  the earth. The objective view adopts 
an opposite stance, seen the region as  an end in itself, a real entity, and organism, that 
can be identified and mapped (Glasson, 1978). 
The objective view that regions actually exist was held by many academics in the early 
twenty  century,  and was  linked with the  search for  the  elusive  'natural'  region.  At 
present this  view of a  natural  region  is  sustained by  geographer  and  other  natural 
scientists that are able to identify natural regions adopting analytical tools on the basis 
of physical  phenomena  such  as  land  configuration,  weather  (climate)  conditions, 
vegetation, latitude and altitude, etc. 
The subjective view, where regions are seen as descriptive tools, defined according to 
particular criteria, for  a particular purpose - there being as many regions as  there are 
criteria to define them. Based on this conception the literature present many types of 
regions: formal regions, functional regions, economic regions, planning regions, etc. 
Hall  (1970)  distinguishes  two  types  of regions:  For the  first  of them  he  uses  the 
terminology  applied  by  the  French  writer  on  regional  planning  Boudeville
12
.  The 
Boudeville's homogeneous region, also called statistically uniform region or the static 
region. According to Hall, this region is defined as a combination of areas exhibiting a 
11  Von Thunen, H. Isolated State, trans. C. H.  Wartenburg, ed. P. Hall, Pergamon Press, 1966. Quoted by 
Hallet et all, 1973. 
12 Boudeville J. R., 1966. Problems of  Regional Economic Planning. Edinburgh (not revised in this work). 
34 certain statistical uniformity within a stated range.  For this  definition of region Hall 
argues that there is a contiguity constraint, that is, the area which are included within the 
region must be  contiguous to  each other in order to  form  a region.  In Boudeville's 
terminology this is a distinction between homogeneous areas, which simply fall within 
stated statistical ranges, and so  are  similar to  each other, and a 'homogeneous region' 
which is a combination of those homogeneous areas that are contiguous to each other. 
For  this  type  of regions  Hall  concludes  that  is  easy  to  define  them  based  on  one 
criterion,  however,  the  improvement  of statistics  has  provided  a  greater  and  more 
reliable range of  information to find patterns of  variation among contiguous areas. 
The other type of region distinguished by Hall is the so called 'nodal region' or dynamic 
flow region.  This region results from  trying to  consider the patterns of movement in 
geographic space. Some of these movements, of a regular or periodic character, can be 
used  to  determine  regional  boundaries.  Examples  include:  commuting  or  shopping 
patterns, or on a large scale, commodity movement or the regular flow of business men 
travelling on their regular routes. Hall stresses the idea that a characteristic of many of 
such flow systems is their hierarchic or nodal structure, thus, many small flows out of 
smaller centres converge and  coalesce in bigger ones;  in tum, the bigger flows  from 
these  bigger  centres,  together with  flows  of other  smaller centres,  may  flow  into  a 
bigger centre still. 
A good  example of this system of flows  was presented by Christaller
13  in the  1930s 
where  these  systems  do  correspond in a  systematic  way  in many  cases to  levels  of 
economic activity which are associated with the centres or nodes themselves. 
Hall discusses the fact that in this simple system,  difficulties can be observed.  In the 
first place, whole sets of  regions can in fact be observed at different levels. For example, 
looking at regions defined in terms  of shopping for  convenience goods  such as  food 
needs; where the analysis gives a very large number of rather small regions; and if one 
compares this with the set of regions produced also for shopping for the higher level of 
comparison goods,  such as  furniture, where one can find  a more restricted number of 
larger  regions  because  people  are  willing  to  go  further  for  this  type  of shopping. 
13  Christaller,  Walter,  1966.  Central places in  Southern Germany.  Prentice-Hall,  1966  (idem  previous 
title) 
35 Therefore, the pattern of nodal regions which one produces in any area is not a single 
pattern of  regions. There is no unique set of  nodal regions; there are number of  possible 
sets of  nodal regions depending on the level of activity one is specifying (Hall, 1970). 
As the same author points out, this distinction between homogeneous regions and nodal 
regions has many practical consequences because the kind of planning will depend on 
the type of regions  used as  a  starting point.  He  gives  an example of both types of 
regions  as  the  starting  point  depending  on the  planning  purposes.  For instance,  in 
economic planning it may be felt that a homogeneous region is the clear starting point. 
Thus, economic planning regions may be defined in terms of  the type and also degree of 
economic development. As a practical application of this categories Hall mentions the 
North of England, or North East England as a distinctive economic planning region as 
homogeneous  region  in  need  of development.  He  argues  that  by  using  statistical 
information it could be proved that these regions have a very high proportion of the 
work force engaged in industries that were nationally declining, and it could be proved 
also to have a very high proportion of it total social capital stock over 50 years old or 
even over 100 years old, etc. It would be, therefore, possible to define this area as  a 
region in need of development and to be in fact part of  a set of  areas in the country with 
these characteristics. For some other planning purposes, specially those connected with 
physical planning, the nodal region is very often, according to Hall, the starting point. 
On the opposite direction one may argue that the given type of planning pursued may 
well define the type of  region suitable for it. 
Another interesting definition of 'region' is given by Isard. To fit with his 'analytical 
equilibrium theory' Isard treats regions as points within a system of  regions with a finite 
number of separated and distinctive regions. "By treating the region as a point we are 
assuming away distances between the behaving units within the region and hence we 
assume  that  transportation  cost  inputs  are  required  in the  execution  of exchanges 
between such units.  Conceptually, however, we may allow individuals to  reside and 
organisations to locate at places in their regions other than the economic market, so long 
as we assume there are no transaction costs of interregional exchange" (Isard 1969, p. 
602). 
36 In his work of 1975  Isard provides a different approach to the understanding of the 
concept  of region.  He  argues  that  a  true  regional  scientist  is  first  concerned  with 
acquiring  knowledge  to  understand  phenomena;  second,  he  wants  to  attack  social 
problem. Hence, although he may want to study the city and region abstractly and as an 
intellectual pursuit, he should also seek to obtain knowledge that leads to wiser policies 
helping to mitigate urban and regional problems (Isard, 1975). He also argues that any 
definition is dependent on the particular problem with which we are concerned. We may 
define an area in terms of a political unit or if our problem is to attack transportation 
congestion, we must look beyond political boundaries  and concentrate on sites from 
which goods are shipped (factories, warehouses, terminals) and sites to which they are 
shipped (shops, institutions, houses). He suggests that in order to work with such unit, 
this may well be provided to us  by somebody or this delineated (not entirely defined) 
because of a deadline that exited "which forced us to immediately define our regions" 
(Isard,  1975 p  12). A comment on Isard suggestion is that this would be the case of a 
planning purpose before the definition of  the region. 
For Lipietz (cited in Carney et all,  1980) regional spaces must be constructed on the 
basis of the concrete analysis of modes of production and their articulation, as they are 
not delimited by legal-political space, in particular by administrative divisions. A region 
is a concrete articulation of spatialities appropriate to different social relation.  Just as 
there are several levels in the object of  an analysis, so there are several levels in regional 
division. He argues that is not just a question of a empirically greater or smaller spatial 
scale.  The  required  scale  is  determined  by  socio-economic  spatial  forms.  So,  an 
economic region is characterised by the dominance of  an economic form. 
For  practical  reasons,  StOhr  (1969a)14  defined  regions  within  the  context  of 
development planning, with special reference to Latin America at the end of  the decade 
of the 1960s. He begins by pointing out a series of  restrictive conditions that have to be 
observed in this particular case: the countries in their majority are still in the process of 
national building; the social system are not yet fully articulated, both in terms of spatial 
organisation and along lines of social strata; their economic system are in a transitional 
14  Professor  Walter  Stohr's  paper to  the  I  Inter-American  Seminar  of the  Definition  of regions  for 
Development  Planning.  Instituto  Panamericano  de  Geografia  e  Historia,  Comisi6n  de  Geografia. 
Documento del I Seminario sobre Regionalizaci6n. Rio de Janeiro. 1969. 
37 phase  towards  industrialisation;  the  countries  are  relatively poor;  the  countries have 
experienced a process of  urbanisation considerably faster than their process of  economic 
development. In this context, StOhr argues that 'regional policy' need no necessarily be 
formulated  in  terms  of carefully  delimited  regions.  It  may  also  be  viewed  as  the 
ordering of population and activities  in a continuous terrestrial space,  or as  a point-
related location policy. To explain his assertion he argues that delimiting regions, like 
any  other  procedure  containing  arbitrary  elements,  will  inevitably  give  rise  to 
arguments. 
StOhr  made  clear that he  did  not intend to  tackle  the task of delimiting regions  for 
development  from  the  traditional  angle  of homogeneous,  nodal  or  administrative 
regions  (concepts  defined  above  in  this  chapter),  "we are  rather looking toward the 
functions  of regions  in  the  frame  of national  development"  (StOhr,  1969a  p.  75). 
National development in this case, in the context of  Latin American countries
15
• 
He then proposes four type of  regions for development: 
a)  Information  (statistical)  units,  the  basic  areas  for  the  collection,  analysis  and 
projection of  information for development planning; 
b)  Sectoral  development  areas,  these  are  regions  that  form  the  framework  for  the 
planning and administration of sectoral development programmes, carried out by 
ministries and specialised agencies; 
c)  Multi-function programme areas, are usually concerned with solving the problems 
of a  specific  area through an  integrated development,  metropolitan development, 
redevelopment  of depressed  areas,  resource  frontier  development  projects,  and 
border area development schemes; and, 
d)  Regions  for  integrated  development.  These  unite  the  maximum  of functions  of 
regional  development.  They  constitute  a  level  of regional  aggregation where  the 
search  for  direct  information  and  the  participation  in  decision-making  is  still 
possible,  and  from  the  national  level  downward  where  it  become  desirable  to 
delegate  decision making  and  administrative  functions  in order to  maintain their 
efficiency (pp 75-82). 
15  Based in Chile,  by this time Stohr was serving as  Senior Regional Planning Advisor for the  Ford 
Foundation. 
38 2.1  The type of  regions in this work 
First, regions are understood as the territorial units that exist in the two cases studied, in 
Chile and in the European Union. These units are already defined, by different means 
and for different purposes. Is not the intention of  this work to discuss the appropriate or 
inappropriate definition of  regions in both cases. They are taken as they are. 
The main conclusion that could be drawn from the theoretical considerations about the 
definition of regions discussed earlier is that there are as many regions as  objectives 
behind their definition. 
In the case of  Chile, following StOhr (1 969b  ) the definition of  regions had to do with the 
explicit  desire  of the  central  government  for  stimulating  national  development,  in 
particular:  to  raise  gross  national  product,  improve  income  distribution,  increase 
economic autonomy, rate of employment, standard of living, etc. The actual definition 
of regions,  however,  responded more  to  implicit existing  geographic,  climatic,  and 
cultural differences in a country of more than 4,200 kilometres long and less than 250 
kilometres  wide  in average.  Although having been designed  with the  geographical, 
cultural and social background in mind of  these territories, the thirteen regions of Chile 
(see Appendix 2), located from North to South, have to be understood as administrative 
regions for most purposes. Using StOhr's categories of regions, Chilean regions would 
correspond to 'Regions for Integrated Development'. 
In the case of  the European Union regions, the territorial units utilised for the purpose of 
regional policy design and for the allocation of  resources are defined in two ways. 
First,  the  existing NUT regions  are  the  basic territorial  units utilised.  These  would 
correspond to the so  called 'Information (statistical) Units'  defined by Stohr (l969a). 
Then,  according to  different purposes  more  than  one NUT unit is  used to  define  a 
particular region for assistance. As an example, in the case of  regions to be benefited by 
the Structural Funds's Objectives 1 and 2
16
,  regions are defined in terms of economic 
16 Chapter 6 provides the definitions of  the objectives of  the Structural Funds. 
39 indicators such as  GDP per capita, unemployment rate,  industrial problems, etc.  As  a 
consequence, the resulting region for assistance is one or more NUT units. 
Thus, regions utilised by the Structural Funds' allocation purposes can be understood as 
objective regions.  Following the categories defined by Stohr, regions in the European 
Union context would correspond to  'Sectoral Development Areas', in the case of the 
industrial areas  in decline regions,  and  'Regions for  Integrated Development', in the 
case of Objective 1 regions. 
The  'regional level' must be distinguished from  'the local or municipal level' , which 
also fit under sub-national level, but which are different in the scale and scope of the 
public policies designed to  deal  with sub-national problems. As the local  level is  the 
lowest  administrative  and  government  level,  its  territory  is,  most  of the  time, 
significantly smaller than a 'typical region', and it is,  by definition, ruled by its  own 
government,  commonly  a  mayor  and  a  local  council.  The  scope  and  extent  of its 
policies  are  limited,  generally  speaking,  to  a  main  urban  centre  and  its  rural 
surrounding. National policies of  regional scope usually target areas larger than those of 
local municipalities  .. 
Thus,  the  regions  in  this  work  correspond  to  a  sub-national  entities  situated  at  an 
intermediate  level  between the  national  government and the  local  governments.  The 
main difference between these two  type of regions is that while in the case  of Chile 
these  regions  do  have  a  regional  authority  (which  some  argue  is  a  requisite  to  be 
considered a region), in the case ofthe European Union, this is not always the case. 
3  Decentralisation and regional development 
Centralisation and decentralisation are concepts that have been present for a long time 
in  societies  and  governments  syllabus.  As  Pieterse  (2001)  points  out,  in  1800s  and 
1900s Europe, the centralisation of government was viewed as a necessary condition for 
progressive  change  because  the  provinces  were  the  strongholds  of  conservative 
aristocratic  elites.  France  is  probably  the  most  remarkable  example  of the  different 
40 stages  these  two  concepts  have  passed through  (Pieterse,  2001;  Garrish,  1986;  and 
Keating  and  Hainsworth,  1986).  As  Garrish  points  out,  the  ancient  regime  and  the 
French revolution alike believed that in practice France had to be firmly held together. 
The  Napoleonic  state  also  saw  centralisation  as  a  desirable  condition  for  the 
administration of the territory. Garrish argues that the pre-eminence of the State's role 
compared with that of local government is associated with'  Jacobinism', or the Jacobin 
myth, as Keating and Hainsworth claim. As time passed, the meaning of centralisation 
changed. 
Within the theoretical debate of  the changing role of the post-Second World War state, 
decentralisation symbolised democracy in countries that had fascist rules, such as Spain 
and Italy, and efficiency of service delivery in Western European welfare states (Ozcan, 
2000).  To  this  author,  the  core  themes  of this  debate  are  the  issues  of democratic 
participation, local governance, efficiency and accountability. The reasons for that are 
that local economies would perform better if they were  free  from  top-down political 
power and resource allocation structures, and that a better functioning local democracy 
and  governance  would  be  achieved  by  being  accountable  for  resources  and  policy 
decisions and by maximising local capacities. 
Nowadays, Pieterse states that "decentralisation is widely considered a necessary step 
toward progressive change ... but what kind of progressive change?" (Pieterse 2001, P 
414). The same author suggests that decentralisation involves at least five dimensions: 
administrative, political, fiscal, public investment and economic policy. He argues that 
decentralisation pays off only in combination with both central and local measures and 
effectively can work towards democratisation if it is combined with positive action in 
favour of  underprivileged groups. 
Dunford (1998)  argues that the slowdown in productivity from the middle of  the 1970s 
and the globalisation of the economic life led to a crisis of nationally organised models 
of development.  According to  this  author,  one  consequence of this was  a significant 
change in the structure of economic life and in the organisation and strategies of the 
state. At a political level, argues Dunford, these changes included a deconcentration and 
decentralisation of the  State with in  many  cases  a significant role  for  regions  in the 
shaping of  their economic development. 
41 3.1  Political/administrative decentralisation 
For  Ozcan  (2000),  decentralisation  and  centralisation  are  referred  to  as  particular 
situations, and they are not necessarily dichotomies.  Cited by Ozcan,  Bennett (1990) 
and Wolman (1900)  define  decentralisation in relation to  centralisation in two  main 
areas.  First,  decentralisation  is  analysed  within  the  governance  structure.  In  this, 
administrative  decentralisation relates  to  concentration or dispersal  of administrative 
functions.  Second,  as  part of the  free  market,  decentralisation  symbolises  a  shift  of 
economic  policymaking  power  from  the  central  authority  to  localities,  non-
governmental  organisations  and  the  market  in  general.  Economic  centralisation  or 
decentralisation would be concern, therefore, with the location of economic decisions 
within the market mechanism. 
On the  other hand,  Maddick (1963)  argues that as  all  countries  are  short of certain 
highly specialised technical skills, with this problem being more severe in developing 
countries,  the  central  government would be  wise  to  concentrate them,  and therefore, 
their particular function at the central level. To  complement Maddick's statement, it is 
worth saying that not only the  shortage of specialised technical skills but all  kind of 
specialised or scarce resources tend to be managed in a centralised form. 
For  Maddick,  decentralisation  embraces  both  processes  of  deconcentration  and 
devolution. He defines these concepts as: 
deconcentration: the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of specified 
functions to staff of  a central department who are situated outside the headquarters. 
devolution:  the  legal  conferring  of power  to  discharge  specified  or  residual 
functions upon formally constituted local authorities. 
For Maddick centralisation is not a problem. What he identifies as a disadvantage is too 
much centralisation or overcentralisation, a problem that according to  him,  would be 
more acute in underdeveloped countries. He mentions several general responsibilities of 
the central government that would be either ignored or inadequately handled when to 
much centralisation exist. These functions are: 
42 fixing broad priorities between: 
i)  different sections of  policy, 
ii)  different parts of  the country; 
Allocating scarce resources in accordance with these priorities; 
Planning the speed and the method of implementation (either by itself or through 
field agencies and local authorities); 
Planning the speed and method of  industrial development; 
Where necessary, providing support services or enabling field agencies  and local 
authorities to do this; 
Where necessary, providing finance for the execution of  the plan (either directly or 
through granting of  revenue-raising powers to local authorities). 
Martinez (2000), defines several concepts related to decentralisation. According to this 
author these concept have played an important role in the evolution of the process of 
decentralisation in Chile. 
Administrative Centralisation. A system is  administrative centralised when all  its 
organisation is structured around a common axis. This administration if  vertical and 
hierarchical and all decisions are taken by a central authority. Dependent bodies are 
judiciary, functionally and economically subordinated to the administrative centre. 
An example of  these kind of  dependent bodies are the ministries; 
Des-localisation. Consists of  moving, from one place to another within the territory, 
productive activities, services or administrative functions. This re-localisation does 
not imply a restructuring  of the  administrative  system,  but a mere  relocation of 
services or institution. A good example of this is the inauguration of the Congress 
in Valparaiso in Chile, at the end of  the military government; 
Deconcentration. A deconcentrated administration is a variation of the centralised 
regime in which the central authority transfers to territorial bodies and personnel 
competence  and responsibilities.  This  does  not mean that these  bodies  gain  any 
autonomy or  acquire their own patrimony. The territorial bodies are dependent and 
accountable to the central authority.  The main aim of deconcentration is to  fight 
excessive centralisation and because of this, it can be understood as  an important 
tool for achieving decentralisation; 
Regionalisation.  For  the  case  of Chile,  regionalisation  meant  a  new  way  of 
structuring  the  country  with  the  aim  of achieving  a  balance  and  harmonic 
43 development of each of its  territories.  For Martinez,  it  is  a reaction  against the 
excessive  centralisation  that  has  characterised  the  country  through  its  history. 
Chilean regionalisation aimed to strengthen and foster a particular territorial level, 
in administrative terms, known in Chile as the 'region'. Regionalisation, by itself, 
can not be understood as part of a concentrated or de-concentrated system, although 
strengthening the regional level will eventually lead to a delegation of  functions and 
resources to minor administrative units, which in turn will end up contributing to 
the process of  decentralisation; 
Decentralisation.  Decentralisation implies a transference of competence from  the 
central  administration  (presidency  and  ministries)  to  inferior  administrations 
(regional  and  local).  Although  short  and  restrictive,  this  definition  embraces  an 
essential  element of the  process  of decentralisation,  that is,  the transference  of 
competence  from  a  centralised  organ  to  a  distinct  one.  This  features  a  major 
difference  with  the  process  of  deconcentration,  where  the  transference  of 
competence was confined within the same hierarchical structure. On the contrary, 
decentralising  entails  the  existence  of  two  differentiated  organs,  with  no 
hierarchical dependence between them. 
According to  these definitions,  Chile has not yet achieved a fully  decentralised status 
since  its  regionalisation  does  not  consider  the  democratic  election  of  regional 
authorities.  Although regional  governments  posses legal identity and have their own 
patrimony, which is different from that of the central government, their authorities are 
directly appointed by the president of  the republic. 
As the process of decentralisation is evolving to new stages in Chile (with the election 
of the  Regional  Councils as  the most probable outcome of recent agreements for  the 
advancement of decentralisation in  the  country),  Tobar  (2000)  introduces  a question 
about the  difference  between a regional  State  and  a politically decentralised unitary 
State.  Cited  by  Tobar,  Cea argues  that a  'regional  State'  have  to  comply with five 
prerequisites:  1)  legal identity, functions,  attributions and own patrimony; 2) directly 
elected authorities; 3) autonomy, given by the constitution, to design and carry out its 
own duties; 4) the administration, jurisdiction and control of its duties should be done 
by the decentralised institution. Only ex-post revision of its act should be carried out by 
44 the  central  competent authority;  5)  the right of appeal to  the  Constitutional Tribunal 
when its designated tasks are invaded (Tobar 2000, p. 6). 
For Ambrossini, the 'regional State' is an intermediate model between the Federal State 
and the Unitary State.  The regional State would be characterised for the existence of 
two  basic principles:  1)  The unity of the  State,  and;  2)  the political autonomy  of its 
territorial entities.  As  a consequence, regions would enjoy of political and normative 
autonomy, but they would be neglected of having sovereignty (quoted by Tobar 2000, 
p.6). 
On the contrary, in a decentralised unitary State, regions do  have normative capacity, 
although only in aspects regarding to regulations, not in laws or to  a lesser extent with 
regard to parliamentary power, as in the case of 'federalist States'. 
For SUBDERE (2000a), decentralisation is  concerned, firstly,  with the distribution of 
political power among the different territorial institutions of the state. This distribution 
of political power has to  do  with the  functions  and responsibilities associated to  the 
different bodies and with the legal attributions and financial resources they have for the 
accomplishment  of  their  duties.  Therefore,  decentralisation  can  be  understood, 
primarily,  as  a process  where  political  and  decisional  power is  transferred to  lower 
territorial unit. 
In order to  effectively have distribution of power to  the different territorial units it is 
necessary,  therefore,  that  these  units  have  the  competence  to  take  decisions  with 
autonomy  respect to  the  units  placed higher  in  the  hierarchical  scale.  According  to 
SUBDERE  this  can  only  be  achieved,  from  the  political  point  of view,  when  the 
regional and local authorities have been democratically elected and not appointed from 
the central  government.  In this  sense,  decentralisation is  strongly associated with the 
concept of democracy, incorporating, as a result, a variety of other values and concepts 
inherent to different cultures. 
Under this conception, decentralisation is overall a process that enhance democracy by 
highlighting  the  values  of equity,  participation  and  autonomy  of the  sub-national 
entities. SUBDERE  also emphasises the importance of decentralisation as a mechanism 
45 for contributing to  the modernisation of the State, for reducing the distance between 
those who make decisions and those that actually are affected by such decisions. This 
closer  link  between  decision-makers  and  citizens  would  reinforce  the  pertinence, 
focusing, efficiency and efficacy of measures, it would also diminish bureaucracy, and 
it would improve resource allocation and public expenditures. 
One of  the most illustrative examples of  the application of  decentralisation in a country 
is the case of  France since 1982. In this case, the central government deliberately carried 
out a profound process of  decentralisation of  the administrative and political structure of 
the  country.  The  reform  implemented represented  a  remarkable  renovation of local 
administration,  of it power and in its  capabilities.  According to  Gruber (1986),  two 
technical instruments permitted to achieve this: deconcentration and decentralisation. 
The main difference between deconcentration and decentralisation is the political aspect 
involved  in the  second  one.  Decentralisation  involves  the  redistribution  of power. 
Deconcentration does not have the same democratic value as decentralisation, and it is a 
mere  instrument  within  decentralisation.  Authorities  appointed  in  deconcentrated 
administrative  bodies  are  accountable  to  the  central  authority,  they  are  their 
representatives at the territorial level. 
In a decentralised system, the administrative distribution of functions lies on a genuine 
democratic concept of power. Decentralisation allow decentralised bodies to run their 
businesses in an autonomous manner; it assumes that these bodies have the necessary 
means to carry out their duties; and in particular, it assumes they posses legal identity. 
For the case of France, Gruber (1986), define two type of decentralisation: territorial 
decentralisation and functional decentralisation. 
Territorial decentralisation involves a geographical distribution of power in the benefit 
of local administrative bodies. In consequence, and in apposition to what happen with 
deconcentrated  bodies,  the  relationship  between  the  central  administration  and  the 
decentralised one is not hierarchical, but instead, a surveillance relationship intended to 
avoid the rupture of the national unity. In the case of a functional decentralisation, this 
is done for different services on the basis of a technical decision. It need not be a local 
46 administrative  body  - it can be  an  specialised public  establishment in charge  of the 
provision of  a public service. 
Another  example  of decentralisation  is  that  that  took  place  in  the  UK  during  the 
eighties. This was primarily concerned with the decentralisation of local governments 
(Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987, Hodge, 1987, Arnold and Cole, 1987, Maddick, 1986, 
Garrish,  1986).  According  to  Hambleton  and  Hoggett,  this  was  because  local 
governments in Britain were in crisis. Several problems, originated at the national level, 
were  having  a major  impact on British local  government.  One  way they  saw these 
problems  could  be  solved  was  through  the  decentralisation  and  democratisation  of 
public service. In their view, democratisation involves accepting that local government 
is more a political than an administrative system. 
Another example of  decentralisation is that of 1994 with the creation of  ten Government 
Offices  for  the  English  Regions  (GORs).  Under this  structure,  civil  servants  in the 
Training Enterprise and Employment Division of the Department of Employment and 
the Department of the Environment, Transport and Industry were made accountable to 
one Senior Regional Director. Later, in 1995 the Department of Education was merged 
with the Department of  Employment adding a further significant dimension to the work 
and responsibility of  the GORs (Mawson & Spencer, 1997). 
Within  the  British  experience  on the  decentralisation  of local  government,  Hoggett 
(1997)  draw attention on the  use  of the  word  decentralisation  and  on what may  be 
hidden  behind  it.  He  suggests  that  decentralisation  usually  masks  a  multiplicity  of 
prescriptions addressed to different symptoms. He continues, "there is a sense in which 
decentralisation is an almost empty term, a kind of camouflage behind which a diverse 
range  of,  often  incompatible,  political  and  organisational  strategies  can  find  cover" 
(Hoggett  1987,  p.  215).  His  research on decentralisation in the  London Borough of 
Hackney in 1982-83  shows that in that case  "the word 'decentralisation'  concealed a 
situation in which there were a number of competing initiatives with entirely different 
political and organisational factions lining up behind each other" (idem, p. 215). 
As  noted  by  Sharpe  (1997),  decentralisation of the  modem unitary  state  was  not  a 
profusely  predicted  characteristic  for  many  social  scientist in  the  past  from  Mill  to 
47 Marx,  rather  the  reverse  was  the  tendency.  The  centralisation  of government  was 
thought to be essential for equalisation. 
3.2  Financial decentralisation 
Of all  possible  functions,  using  Musgrave's  trilogy  of public  functions:  allocation, 
redistribution  an  stabilisation,  the  fiscal  federalism  literature  has  reached  a  broad 
consensus that while allocation can be assigned to lower levels of government, the latter 
two remain more appropriate for the national government (Shah, 1999). 
For  Shah,  an  implication  of public  sector  decentralisation,  specially  in  developing 
countries,  poses  significant  risks  for  the  aggravation  of macroeconomic  problems. 
However,  as  Ter-Minassian (1999)  states,  the  literature  on fiscal  federalism has  also 
highlighted the potential trade-offs between decentralisation and income distribution, 
especially in countries with wide regional disparities in resource endowments and levels 
of  development. 
Financial (or fiscal)  decentralisation is defined by Fukasaku and Mello (1999) as  "the 
devolution of  taxing and spending powers to lower levels of government" (p. 9).  Mello 
(2000) provides a more comprehensive definition for fiscal decentralisation. He argues 
that  "Fiscal  decentralization  consists  primarily  of devolving  revenue  sources  and 
expenditure functions to lower tiers of government. By bringing the government closer 
to  the people, fiscal  decentralization is  expected to boost public sector effciciency,  as 
well as  accountability and transparency in service delivery and policy-making" (Mello 
2000, p. 365). 
Mello  (2000)  argues  that the  decentralisation  of expenditure  functions  and  revenue 
sources  also  calls  for  decentralisation  in  fiscal  policy-making.  This  would  include 
greater autonomy in debt management, tax administration, and budget execution, so that 
the task of providing public goods and services and performing standard public sector 
functions can be shared across levels of  governments. 
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central government cannot adequately meet the growing local demand for public good 
and services.  They argue that the centre often fails  to  improve fiscal  efficiency,  as  it 
tends  to  ignore  local  differences  in  culture,  environment  and  natural  resources 
endowment as well as economic and social factors, all important determinants of  public 
sector  performance.  By  action  of bringing  government  closer  to  the  public,  they 
continue,  is  supposed  to  enhance  accountability  in  service  delivery  and  allocative 
efficiency by closing the  gap  between  expenditure  assignment and  revenue  sources. 
With significance efficiency gains, fiscal decentralisation will enhance growth as well. 
At the same time, it can reduce operational and information costs in service delivery and 
streamline public sector activities, hence facilitating fiscal consolidation and improving 
overall macroeconomic performance. 
A  World  Bank  statement
17  declares  that  the  potential  benefits  of devolving  fiscal 
responsibilities  to  sub-national  levels  of governments  area  increased  efficiency  in 
service  delivery  and  reduce  information  and  transaction  costs  associated  with  the 
provision of  public goods and services. 
The expected benefits of decentralisation must be, however, weighed against the risks 
involved in the devolution of taxing and spending powers to  sub-national governments. 
This means that loses can also be expected with decentralisation. Fukasaku and Mello 
(1999)  and  Mello  (2000)  claim  that  fiscal  decentralisation  may  aggravate  fiscal 
imbalances by creating a deficit bias in fiscal policy making and consequently endanger 
overall  macroeconomic  stability.  The  key  policy  challenge  for  many  developing 
countries,  at  this  respect,  is  to  develop  appropriate  systems  of public  finance  and 
financial  decentralisation to  provide  local  public  services  effectively  and  efficiently 
without risking macroeconomic stability.  Such has been the case of Chile during the 
second half of  the last decade. 
In  general terms,  as  the  study by  Mello  (2000)  shows,  among  countries the  relative 
importance in the provision of public goods and services is reflected in the size of the 
government expenditure. This can be measured both, in absolute terms (as in the case of 
17 World Bank, 1997. Cited in Mello 2000. 
49 the  expenditure-GDP  ratio),  and  in  relative  terms  (as  in  the  case  of sub-national
18 
spending  relative  to  central  government  spending).  As  for  the  absolute  size  of 
government,  they tend to  be  smaller in Latin America and Asia,  than in the  OECD 
countries. As Mello argues, it is widely accepted that the demand for public goods and 
services increases with income, in such a way that government expending tends to be 
larger in richer countries. 
Central  government  spending  ratios  go  from  20%  of GDP  in  Asia,  to  40%  in  the 
European countries of  the OECD, Latin America being around 25%. In terms of  relative 
government size, the sub-national share of total government expending is below 5% in 
Asia, ranges from 10% to 40% in Latin American, and from 12% to 60% in the OECD 
sample. 
Despite significant fiscal decentralisation until 1995, in Chile, seen through the increase 
in the share of sub-national spending, this did not worsen central government or sub-
national governments budget deficits significantly. The reason for this, argues Mello, is 
that the increase in sub-national spending was financed by higher sub-national non-tax 
revenue (fees, sales, fines, royalties, etc), instead of intergovernmental transfers and/or 
local tax revenue. Probably a very different situation could be appreciated in Chile at 
this respect by the end of the  1990s. The reason is that during the second half of the 
1990s fiscal decentralisation started to be strongly financed by transfers from the central 
government. 
4  Public Infrastructure and Economic Development 
Public infrastructure investment is of  particular importance for this work. The reason for 
this is  that in both cases, the  Chilean Regional Development Fund (FNDR),  and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),  infrastructure investment is the main 
type of assistance of the funds. It is worth, therefore, to take a look at the way public 
18  In  his  study,  Mello  aggregates  data  for  local  and  middle-tiers  governments.  In the  case  of Chile, 
included in his sample, this is the aggregation of  the municipal and the regional governments. 
50 infrastructure is defined, why it is important, and how this seems to be related to the 
process of  regional development. 
Infrastructure  issues  have  been  and  continue  to  be  a  matters  of great  concern  for 
economist and policy making in the sphere of the public sector.  Several studies have 
been carried out with respect to  the  importance  of public capital  investment and its 
relationship with a number of aspects such as  quality of life and the effect of public 
infrastructure in the overall performance of  the economy. Although in the decade of  the 
1960s and in the mid 1980s some studies were conducted in this area, it was only until 
the  work  of  Aschauer  in  1989a  "Is  Public  Expenditure  Productive",  that  the 
preoccupation widespread and a debate on the relevance of  the subject as well as on the 
results shown by the study commenced. After that, a number of other authors started to 
conduct studies of similar nature (Munnell, 1990; Aschauer, 1989b and 1990; Peterson, 
1990; Biehl,  1991; Gramlish 1990 and 1994; Cutanda and Parisio, 1994; Holtz-Eakin, 
1995; Krol1995 and 1998; Boamet, 1998; Stain, 1998; Darby, Li and Muscatelli, 1998; 
Chandra and Thompson, 2000; Anwar, 2001, and many others). 
According to Aschauer (1990a), public infrastructure is the capital stock of social and 
economic  overhead,  in its  broad  sense  includes  roads,  highways,  water and  sewage 
systems, electric utilities, telecommunications systems, buildings such as education and 
health services, and bridges owned by the government. In a similar way Cutanda (1994) 
points out that 'public infrastructure' "refer to highways, airports, railways, telephones 
and  telegraphs,  water  and  energy  supplies,  schools,  hospitals,  etc.,  that provide  an 
environment which facilitate private production" (p. 70). 
Cited by Perry (1995), Muschamp states that "infrastructure  ... stands for the connective 
tissue  that  knits  people,  places,  social  institutions  and  the  natural  environment  into 
coherent urban relationships .... It is  shorthand for  the structural underpinning of the 
public realm" (p. 1). 
Infrastructure does not only includes the obvious area of physical infrastructure such as 
roads,  bridges,  public  buildings,  but  also  it  includes  what  has  been  called  'soft 
infrastructure'.  In this  category  enters  basic  research  and  development  and  training 
development  (Vickerman,  1991).  The  terms  'infrastructure',  'public  investment', 
51 'public capital' and 'capital investment' are used as synonymous in the literature and so 
are here. 
4.1  The importance of  infrastructure investment 
Perry stresses the idea that public infrastructure is often taken for granted. He quotes a 
passage from  a work by the  'National Council of Public Work Improvement', of the 
United  States  where  it is  stated that "When roads,  bridges,  waste  disposal  sites,  and 
water systems work best,  they are  noticed least or not at  all.  And when attention is 
finally  focused  on  'infrastructure', usually in response to  system failure  or severe or 
continued congestion, real damage has already been done" (Perry 1995, p. 2) 
Anwar (1995)  argues that public finance  plays an  important role in the  economy by 
providing  an  industrial  base  by  way  of significant  public  investment  in  production 
infrastructure.  He  claims  that  empirical  works  that  have  examined  the  relationship 
between government spending and productivity growth have shown significant cross-
country differences in productivity growth due to differences in the provision of public 
infrastructure. 
Aschauer (1990a)  stresses the  importance  of infrastructure to  the  quality of life,  the 
environment,  and  private  economic  activity.  He  argues  that  there  is  a  widespread 
concern about  whether  existing  and  projected  infrastructure  facilities  can adequately 
support quality of  life requirements and improvements in matters such as air quality, the 
reduction  of infections  and  toxicity,  reduce  road  accidents,  etc.  He  argues  that 
"apprehension appears to be greatest in the areas of  the environment and transportation" 
(p.  25),  that  is,  on  water  quality,  solid  waste  disposal,  mobility  needs,  and  traffic 
congestion. 
Aschauer noted quite a progress in the construction and updating of sewage treatment 
facilities  in certain regions of the  USA during the  1970s and  1980s. As a result, this 
seems have to  had a significant positive impact on the nation's water quality.  Despite 
this  progress,  however,  inadequate  municipal  wastewater  treatment  remains  a 
significant problem in many other areas of the country. Something similar has occurred 
52 with the ability of municipalities to deal with garbage management
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. The main reason 
for this would be the rate at which garbage is being generated compared to the number 
of  facilities capable of  handling these wastes. 
Congestion problems, on the other hand, were expected to become increasingly severe 
in  coming  years.  Aschauer  claims  that  the  usage  of the  Nation's  surface  and  air 
transportation  network  has  grown  tremendously  in  the  three  decades  preceding  the 
1990s. Apart from these cases where the current nature and future  status of a nation's 
infrastructure  may  add  to,  or  detract  from,  the  overall  quality  of life,  numerous 
additional cases can be identify where  quality of life has been or will soon be improved 
or eroded as a result of infrastructure capabilities. For example crime (in the number of 
prisons  or  preventive  institutions),  traffic  congestion  (and  its  direct  effect  on,  for 
example, loss of leisure time). A second direct effect of infrastructure is that associated 
with the economy. From the 1980's, Aschauer also sees an increasing preoccupation on 
infrastructure and its role in the economy. 
Krol (1998) argues that at the most basic level public infrastructure, such as roads and 
sewers, make direct contribution to commerce and health because and efficient road and 
highway system helps to move people and their products in a timely low-cost manner. 
On  the  other hand,  modern water and  sewage  systems have  improved health in the 
industrialised world and are making a similar contribution in many of  today's emerging 
economies. 
This author examined the literature investigating the impact of public infrastructure on 
economic growth and development of  recent years. He argues that the evidence suggests 
that examinations of  the return to incremental investment in the United Stated and other 
industrialised  countries  shows  a  mixed  result,  while  for  developing  countries  the 
potential return is higher. The works of Aschauer (1989a and b) and Munnell (1990a) 
suggested that decline in US productivity growth and poor economic performance in the 
1970s were caused by slower growth in public investment. Cited by Kro1  (1998), Ford 
and Poret (1991) were unable to replicate Aschauer's and Munnell's results using data 
from a group of OECD countries, while other authors questioned the methods used by 
19  A current widespread problem in  several regions  in Chile and a highly sensitive topic,  as  it usually 
involves the interest of  several public sectors as well as private interests. 
53 Aschauer and Munnell for not considering the time trends in their data. These authors 
suggested that the direction of causality might go  in opposite direction when greater 
level of  outputs may encourage infrastructure investment. 
Munnell  (1990b)  presented  a  further  study  on  public  infrastructure  and  economic 
growth focusing on the regional level. She estimated state production function in the US 
which included a measure of a state's public capital  stock.  Krol  (1998),  quoting the 
works of  Holtz-Eakin (1994) and one by himself (Krol 1995) argues that Munnell failed 
to  control  for  unobserved  state  differences  in  production  characteristics  which  can 
seriously  bias  the  results.  According  to  Krol  these two  works  found  that  additional 
infrastructure has little or no impact on state-level output. 
4.2  Infrastructure and economic growth 
There seems to be a consensus on the importance of infrastructure, specially in aspects 
related to  the quality of life of people. What is still under discussion is the effect that 
public capital may have on the performance of the economy. For some authors there is 
no doubt about the impact infrastructure has on the process of economic growth, what 
has to be further studied and analysed is the magnitude and direction of  the effects. 
Stain (1988)  suggests that changes  in the rate,  structure,  and  distribution of national 
economic  growth play  an  important role  in both the  demand  for  and  the  ability  to 
support infrastructure  investment.  For this author,  economic growth do  have  several 
effects on infrastructure demand. 
First, the rate of  growth influences the intensity of infrastructure use and, consequently, 
the extent to  which capital facilities deteriorate over time and need to be replaced.  In 
rapid  growth  periods,  for  example,  the  volume  of goods  produced  and  transported 
increases. Highways are then more intensely used, resulting in more rapid deterioration. 
This,  eventually,  creates  a  need  for  increased  expenditures  to  repair,  replace  and 
construct new roads and bridges. 
54 Second, growth is not uniformly distributed across all sectors of  the economy or regions 
within a country.  Different types of economic  activity will  generate different sets  of 
demands  for  infrastructure facilities.  Stain portraits the example of the  United States 
economy as it has moved from reliance on heavy industry and traditional manufacturing 
to a high technology, knowledge-intensive, and service-based economy. Such dramatic 
changes have affected the economic well-being of individuals, as well as communities, 
states and regions.  It has  also  altered the required mix of infrastructure facilities  and 
results in new capital demands. For example, to accommodate the travel requirements of 
executives  involved  in  the  supervision  of global  production  processes,  such  as  the 
production  of world-cars,  many  communities  have  built  new  airports  or  expanded 
existing facilities and runaways to handle the larger planes used in international flights. 
Similarly, the need for public regulation of cable networks has greatly increased as data 
transmission and computer communications have grown in importance. 
Third, again using the case of  the United State, Stain argues that economic restructuring 
and sectoral shifts have combined with other factors to  create uneven spatial growth. 
Some  areas  of the  country,  experiencing  rapid  population  and  economic  growth, 
generate  intense  pressures  to  expand  infrastructure  facilities.  Simultaneously,  other 
areas  are  suffering  from  population and  economic  decline  and  must struggle just to 
maintain facilities and to manage excess capacity. 
Thus,  from  an  infrastructure  perspective  a  highly  inefficient  situation  has  emerged. 
Some communities struggle to  expand their infrastructure facilities, while others must 
consolidate  or  close  facilities,  such  as  schools  or  police  stations,  to  reduce  excess 
capacity (Stain, 1988). 
According  to  Stain,  the  rate  and  distribution  of  economic  growth  influences 
infrastructure demand in three important ways: 
First,  it  affects  the  intensity  at  which  facilities  deteriorate  and  need  to  be 
replaced; 
Second,  it  alters  the  mIX  of required  capital  investment.  As  the  economy 
restructures and new production technologies develop, demand patterns change 
and evolve. To the extent that the rate at which infrastructure became outdated 
55 is the result of economic transformations and not neglect, it can be an important 
indicator of  economic vitality; 
Finally,  since  economic  growth  is  distributed  unevenly,  some  areas  of the 
country  require  additional  infrastructure  to  serve  growing  population,  while 
other face  the  often painful  and  politically controversial  choices  involved in 
closing and/or consolidating public facilities. 
After  looking  at the  way public  infrastructure  has  been financed  and  owned  in  the 
United  Stated  since  the  middle  of the  1800  century,  Tarr  (1990)  notes  that  the 
ownership  of major infrastructure  services  such  as  roads,  bridges,  water  supply  and 
sewer systems have shifted from private to public several times depending on economic 
circumstances and on the level of satisfaction of the population with the service, among 
other reasons.  He  also  argues that burst of infrastructure spending do  not necessarily 
result  from  concerns  over  infrastructure  deterioration  or  inadequacy  of service,  as 
claimed by Choate and Walter (1984), but instead, agreeing with Stain postulates, rapid 
increase in investment occur because of a combination of factor  on the demand and 
supply sides. 
According to  Stain, while concentrating in economic growth the federal government in 
the United State affects infrastructure investment in different ways.  First, federal  and 
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  have  major  impacts  on  the  rate  and  distribution  of 
economic growth.  Expansionary policies accelerate economic growth, which generate 
tax revenue. At the same time, it also increases the rate of change and alters the mix of 
required infrastructure. The distribution of federal  outlays, the incidence of taxes,  and 
budget priorities all contribute to sectoral and spatial restructuring. 
Second,  the  federal  government makes  direct  investments  in public  physical  capital 
assets. Third, federal regulatory policies affect the direct cost of infrastructure. Federal 
environment standards have raised costs in many infrastructure-related areas.  Meeting 
standards, often a prerequisite for  state and local governments to receive grants, have 
resulted in higher per unit costs of many infrastructure investments. In period of rapid 
inflation the costs of constructing facilities will increase and may unfavourably alter the 
expected ratio of  benefits to costs. 
56 Finally, the federal government provides directs grants to state and local government for 
capital  outlays.  Peterson (1988)  states that,  although federal  assistance has  varied in 
importance  by  functional  category  in  the  USA,  since  1977  it  has  accounted  for 
approximately 40% of  state and local government funds for fixed capital formation. 
In a study carried out for several countries in Europe, Darbi, Li and Muscatelli (1998), 
found  that there  was  a significant link between increase political instability,  reduced 
public  investment and  lower  productivity.  They  demonstrated,  based on a model  of 
endogenous growth and using political data for various countries for the period 1960-
1998, that there was a strong correlation between increased political instability and the 
reduction in government investment as a proportion of  total fiscal spending. 
Munnell (1990b), on the other hand, examined the relationship between infrastructure 
and three aspect that may have an impact on economic growth. These are:  the role of 
public  capital  in  the  production process,  public  capital  and  private  investment,  and 
infrastructure and firm location. 
According to Munnell (1990b), several studies have been carried out in order to present 
empirical evidence of the actual relationship between 'public capital and the production 
process'. In this direction is the work by Rioja (1995), who developed a model that can 
be used to make prediction concerning changes in the welfare of agents resulting from 
additional infrastructure investment. 
Munnell  (1990b) points out that the  benefits  of the  contribution from  public  capital 
seem to greatly differ depending on the sector of the economy, for example, the public 
capital that one would expect to enhance private output e.g. highways and streets, and 
water  and  sewer  systems,  are  actually  the  ones  that  have  the  highest  statistically 
important relationship (see the works of Boarnet,  1998; Feltenstein and Ha,  1999; and 
Chandra and Thompson, 2000).  On the other hand,  public buildings,  such as  schools 
and hospitals, appear to have no direct measurable impact. 
In  the  second  one,  that  is  the  relationship  between  'public  capital  and  private 
investment', Munnell (1990b) argues that in this process two opposing forces may be at 
work.  On the one hand, public capital appears to  enhance the productivity of private 
57 capital, thereby raising the rate of return and encouraging more private investment. On 
the other hand, public capital may serve as a substitute for private capital; to the extent 
this occurs, more public capital will result in less private investment. She concludes that 
the more robust results in the investment area are: a) public capital positively affects the 
marginal productivity of private capital, and b) public capital and private capital in the 
aggregate are substitutes. 
The  third  aspect  explored  by  Munnell  (1990b),  'infrastructure  and  firm  location', 
focuses  on  the  relationship  between  public  capital  and  new  business  formation  or 
employment  growth.  According  to  this  author,  infrastructure  could  influence  the 
location  decisions  of both  firms  and  households.  For  example,  the  construction  or 
improvement  of roads,  sewer  systems,  schools  and  hospitals  would  be  expected  to 
encourage  people  to  move  to  a  given  area;  in a  similar  way,  firms  requiring  large 
amounts  of water for  their production process,  would  be  attracted,  all  else  equal,  to 
areas with better water supply facilities, etc. In order to test for this hypothesis, Munnell 
(1990b) uses empirical data dis-aggregated at the regional level for the United State for 
the period 1970 to  1988.  She concludes that the empirical work provided convincing 
evidence, that a state's investment in public capital has a significant positive impact on 
the state's private employment growth. 
In a different attempt for measuring the impact of infrastructure in economic growth, 
Arrow  and  Kurz  (1970),  and  Aschauer  and  Greenwood  (1985),  cited  by  Aschauer 
(1990a),  presented  a  framework  for  analysing  the  potential  importance  of trends  in 
infrastructure  spending  to  the  macroeconomy.  They  included  the  public  stock  of 
infrastructure  capital  on  the  standard neoclassical  production  function,  expressed  in 
labour-intensive form: 
where: 
y =  f(k, kg) 
y =  private sector output, 
k = private capital, and 
kg = public infrastructure capital (all expressed to employment) 
Aschauer recognises that although limited empirical evidence suggests that the public 
capital  stock  is  an  important  factor  of  production  in  the  aggregate  production 
technology,  this seems to  playa direct role in promoting private sector productivity. 
58 This assertion has been questioned by Aaron (1990), for whom there is little evidence of 
this  relationship  between infrastructure and economic growth or,  in words of Aaron, 
Aschauer "has greatly exaggerated its quantitative importance" (Aaron 1990, p. 52). 
In a previous work, Aschauer (1989a) presented time series evidence for the post-World 
War II period in the United States that a 'core infrastructure' of streets and highways, 
mass transit, airports, water and sewer systems, and electrical and gas facilities nears a 
substancially  positive  and  statistically  significant  relationship  to  both  labour  and 
multifactor productivity.  He  suggests that infrastructure expenditures may well have 
been a key ingredient to the robust performance of the economy in the'  golden age' of 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
In a similar study, Aschauer (1989b) uses cross-country data from seven countries over 
the period  1965  to  1985  and  finds  that "upon controlling for private investment and 
employment  growth,  public  nonmilitary  investment  bears  a  significantly  positive 
relationship with growth in gross  domestic product per employed person  .. "  (Cited in 
Aschauer, 1990a p. 32). It was in this direction that, according to Girand et al (1994), a 
EU policy response recommended to  increase the spending in infrastructure in the so-
called Trans-European Networks. 
Similarly,  a  work  by Nadiri  &  Mamuneas  (1994)  found  out that  publicly  financed 
infrastructure  and  R&D  capital  contribute  to  productivity  growth.  However,  the 
magnitude of their contribution vary considerable across industries and on the whole 
they are not the major contributors of TFP (Total Factor Productivity Growth) in these 
industries.  Their findings,  nevertheless, show that the contributions of infrastructure is 
about twice as  large as  the contribution of publicly-financed R&D. the  magnitude of 
these contribution of  infrastructure capital proved to be however, much smaller than has 
been reported in the literature (such as  the findings  by Aschauer,  1989a;  and Eisner 
1993, quoted by Nadiri &  Mamuneas).  An even less optimistic view at this respect is 
that of  Jones (1995). See the new growth theory at the beginning ofthis chapter. 
Contradicting Aschauer, and Nadiri  &  Mamuneas findings,  a similar work by Holtz-
Eakin  &  Schwartz  (1995),  concludes  that  no  important  productivity  spillovers  was 
encountered  when  exploring  interstate  productivity  spillovers  from  state  highways. 
59 These  authors  suggest that since  the  direct  and  spillover benefits  may  significantly 
differ across industries, further  investigation may prove to  be worth,  as  well  as  dis-
aggregated analysis may be advantageous. 
Musgrave  (1990)  also  expressed his  doubts,  specially about the high ratio,  between 
infrastructure and economic performance. This author draw attention to the causality of 
the  linkage  or,  as  he pointed out,  the timing coincidence between high productivity 
growth and high infrastructure investment. Besides, as Krol (1998) points out, not only 
the investment in new infrastructure may have an impact in economic growth, lower 
investment in repair and maintenance of infrastructure as well as better programming 
and management might have a greater return. 
Gramlich (1990) identify three types of infrastructure capital. This classification, based 
on normative considerations, has to do with the range and scope of the service in terms 
of  the territorial direct and indirect effects. These are: 
Local  allocation:  This  type  of public  capital  serves  local  needs  where 
minimal  inter-jurisdictional  spillovers  and  minimal  distributional 
implications are found. Examples of these type of infrastructure would be a 
public park and a local landfill; 
Local allocation with spillover:  The same as  Local allocation except with 
benefits spillovers from one jurisdiction to another. Illustrative examples of 
these are national roads, wastewater treatment, or clear air facilities; 
Local  allocation  and distribution:  Now  public  capital  serves  goals  that 
importantly affect the distribution of income in the long run. Examples are 
local public schools, and regional university systems. 
4.3  Infrastructure and regional economic development 
As early as the decade of  the 1950s the importance of  infrastructure was identified as an 
important factor for development. Cited by Rioja (1998), Hirshman (1958) pointed out 
that "social-overhead capital investment, i.e.  infrastructure, could attract more private 
investment serving as a development strategy" (p.  338). Girard et al (1994) contradict 
this  idea arguing that is not clear how new infrastructure would benefit a particular 
location. They claim that this will depend much upon the type of infrastructure and the 
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some will be helped and some will be hurt. 
Subsequent works (Lefeber, 1964; Stain 1988; Vickerman, 1991; Biehl, 1991; Gerardin, 
1991;  Townroe  and  Mallalieu,  1991;  Krol  R.,  1995  and  1998)  have  recognised  the 
relationship  that  exist  between  regional  development  and  regional  allocation  of 
resources. Regional allocation of resources understood as public capital investment or, 
what is the same, the investment in public infrastructure. 
The ultimate purpose of economic development is to increase the standard of living of 
the masses of people in low-income group.  To  attain this  goal national income must 
growth at a faster rate then the increase in population, and the benefits of  income growth 
must be distributed equitably (Lefeber, 1964). 
The process of economic development in its  geographical  setting requires  growth at 
different rates in different areas.  Attempts to  industrialise (develop) retarded regions 
ahead of time and at the cost of slowing down the growth of more vigorous areas must 
necessarily  put  off the  date  of bringing  relief to  the  former.  Inefficient  regional 
allocation of investments results in wasting of scarce resources (Friedman and Alonso, 
1964). 
Lefeber (1964) pointed out that efficiency of regional resource allocation is crucial for 
increasing the capacity of investment and economic growth.  He,  however, recognised 
that in order to  accelerate the future  development of retarded regions the growth of 
industrially  more  advanced  areas  must  be  encouraged.  If the  latter  is  stifled  by 
insufficient  investment  the  over-all  capacity  to  save  will  be  diminished  and  the 
advancement of  retarded areas will be delayed even longer. 
Contradicting  this  assumption  Rahman  (1964)  found  out  that  "in the  presence  of 
differential regional rates of saving, the rate of growth of total national income is not 
necessarily  maximised  by  concentrating  investment  in  the  more  productive  region 
throughout the planning period" (p.  655). The simple fact that some regions are better 
endowed with natural, human and technology resources than other or that governments 
will  have  a  greater urgency in exploiting  certain resources  favouring  certain regions 
61 over  another  will,  as  a  consequence,  provide  the  ground  for  regional  differences. 
Lefeber  suggests  that  growth  in  some  areas  will  provide  surpluses  for  future 
investments and the consequential savings will release resources to be invested in other 
regions, which in tum will raise the living standard of the local population and create 
new surpluses and resources for continued development. The latter will manifest itself 
in the creation of  new growing points in previously stagnant or slowly growing areas. In 
good time the number of growing areas should increase to a density which is adequate 
to provide a satisfactory regional balance. 
At  this  respect,  Boamet (1998)  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  if public  capital  is 
provided at a particular place,  it enhance the  comparative advantage of that location 
relative to other places. Thus, one possible effect of public infrastructure investment is 
to  draw production into a relatively infrastructure-rich location at the expense of more 
infrastructure-poor locations. Working under this assumption, Boamet develops a model 
of public capital in two cities in order to  examine the location impact of infrastructure 
investment. 
There exists the risk, however, as Vickerman (1991) pointed out, of having a negative 
effect  and  instead  of enhancing  a particular place  the  contrary  may  happen.  Much 
investment in lagging regions may simply result in leading regions to enlarge the size of 
their markets, specially if  infrastructure investment is roads construction. 
5  Conclusions 
Many  theoretical  concepts  have  been  discussed  in  this  chapter.  Economic  growth, 
regional theory, the process of decentralisation and public infrastructure investment are 
all  related concepts that has to  do  with regional development.  Economic growth as  a 
necessary condition to  achieve development, regional theory as the theoretical basis to 
understand the  process,  decentralisation and  public  infrastructure  as  policy tools  for 
helping in the consecution ofthe desired objectives. 
The interlinking of  the main theoretical concepts is presented in a simple diagram below 
(Figure  2.1).  Concepts  are  grouped  into  three  categories,  i.e.  process,  that  includes 
decentralisation, regional funds, and economic growth; the territorial unit, the region, as 
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development. 
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Figure 2.1: The linkages between Regional funds and regional development 
The main interest of  this work is the study of  the regional funds and the way these may 
influence regional development. Regional funds do not act alone in the territory, on the 
contrary, they are influenced and they at a time affect other components of the process 
of  development of  the regions. In the case of Chile for example a neo-liberal strategy of 
economic development dominates  Chile's economic strategy of development.  On the 
political  side,  an  increasingly process of decentralisation is  undergoing with political 
and financial consequences for the administration of the country as a whole and for the 
regions in particular. 
On the other hand, regional funds, that have been in existence for more than twenty-five 
years in the country, are starting to playa fundamental role in development strategies of 
the regions themselves. These funds, that once distributed from the central government, 
are  used  for  whatever purpose  regional  authorities  believe  may better help  regional 
development  (within  certain  limits  that  restrict  their  use  on  specific  sectors  of 
investments and type of  projects). 
The gains in financial and political decentralisation of recent years and the continuous 
growth in the amount of resources for regional funds have raised concern on the use of 
these funds and the role they can play in regional development in Chile. Chapter 4 gives 
a detailed account on the nature and current use of  these funds. 
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Chile's Regional Development Experience 
Introduction 
This chapter gives an account of  the country's development experience in recent years. 
The  emphasis is  on the main features that concern regional development, that is, the 
evolution of Chile's administrative structure regarding its regions, and its economic and 
social  development.  The  chapter  begins  with  an  account  of the  historical  periods 
(phases) establishing processes of decentralisation and de-concentration throughout its 
history, particularly during recent years. It continues with a description of  the Regional 
Government administrative structure, in operation since the mid-nineties, and ends with 
a description and analysis of Chilean economic and social performance. 
1  The Process of  Decentralisation 
Regional  disparities  in  Chile reflect the  high degree  of centralisation of the  country 
rather than actual social or cultural differences between regions. The colonial legacy of 
centralisation  of political  power  and  the  economic  apparatus  of the  country  focus 
resources  in the  city of Santiago.  The  corollary is  a constant draining of the surplus 
produced in the rest of the regions. National policy in Chile exhibits several attempts to 
decentralise its recognised highly centralised political and administrative structure. 
Although  demands  for  decentralisation  have  regularly  emerged  throughout  Chile's 
history,  it  is  only  in recent  years  that  these  have  taken  a political  form.  Similarly, 
proposals for decentralisation from the central government, with different and dubious 
degrees of success, have also appeared from time to time, either responding to  specific 
demands  from  the  regions  or  simply  as  national  strategies  for  the  development  of 
particular regions. 
The  importance  of national  government  in  regional  development in  Chile  has  been 
largely  recognised  over time  and  can be mainly  explained by  the  role  the  state  has 
played in the process of economic development of the country. During the last century 
64 (1900s) and especially during the second half of it, the state has played an active role in 
promoting several  economic policies of national  and regional impact.  These policies 
were  directed,  essentially,  towards  the  provision  of a  social  infrastructure  and  the 
location of  basic key industries outside the capital city. 
During  the  1940s  and  1950s  the  country  adopted  the  import-substitution  model  of 
development
20
,  well known to  the rest of Latin American countries. Heavy industries 
such as oil refineries, steel and electricity were created under the close protection of the 
state.  The  national  financial  system matured in this  period and the overall economic 
growth that resulted from  these policies was  followed  by the creation of widespread 
programmes in the areas of  education, health, and housing. 
In  the  1960s  and  early  the  1970s  the  state  influence  was  used  to  promote  social 
participation.  From 1973,  under the  military government, the most important aspects 
were  the  reduction  of the  public  sector,  the  privatisation  of the  economy,  and  the 
subdivision of  the country into regions (Hernandez y Abalos, 1996)?1 
Since the early 1990s democratic governments substantially revised predecessors social 
and economic policies. Decentralisation and democratisation of the nation are now the 
main  priorities.  Despite  the  experiences  of  the  past  decades,  when  different 
governments tried to adopt measures in favour of  the development of  particular zones of 
the country, it is in this period where the most significant advances in democratisation 
and decentralisation have been achieved. 
1.1  Historic background 
The  strong  political  and  administrative  centralism  imposed  by  the  Spanish  Crown 
during colonial times did not change significantly in the first years of  republican life. In 
this sense, Chile's early years as  an independent state did not differ much from other 
20 The import-substitution model of development, adopted in most Latin Countries during the 1950s and 
1960s, is that in which technologically advanced products (refrigerators, radios, televisions, motor cars, 
etc), rather than being imported, were first assembled and then manufactured in these countries. 
21  After  one  year  in  office,  in  1974,  the  military  government  divided  the  country  into  13  regions, 
numbered  in Roman  characters from  Region  I to  Region XII  (north to  south),  plus the  Metropolitan 
Region of  Santiago (the Capital City) which for some reason was not given a number. 
65 Latin  American  countries  where  the  newly  established  governments  of reactionary 
Caudillos, as Woodward (1971) points out, were dedicated to restoring the peace of the 
colonial era.  A recent study from the  'National Office for the Promotion of Regional 
Development and Administration'  (SUBDERE) has characterised the early periods of 
republican life in Chile as  one  strongly influenced, with different degrees of intensity 
and legitimacy, by its centralism and presidentialism (SUBDERE, 2000a). 
SUBDERE points out that the first idea on decentralisation corresponds to a federalist 
attempt by  Jose  Manuel  Infante,  who  in  1826  proposed the  establishment of the  so 
called 'federalist laws', inspired by the model of  the United State of  America. 
Beginning with this episode SUBDERE's study describes several measures in favour of 
decentralisation of  the country up to the present day. These measures were grouped into 
four clearly differentiated periods in the history of  decentralisation in Chile. 
a) From the Federalist laws (1826) to the end of  the 1833 Constitution 
The Federal Republic attempt consisted of regional governors appointed by the central 
authority and cabildos to be elected by popular vote. The three original provinces of  the 
republic  were  expanded to  eight,  and regional  assemblies were created composed of 
elected members.  However,  as  a result of the political instability of the  period these 
laws were never applied, although the eight provinces scheme prevailed. 
This  'anarchic period', as  it was  called,  ended in 1833  with a new Constitution that 
would remain in force until 1924.  This charter created the presidential regime that set 
the basis for political organisation and the centralised administration known today. This 
constitutional  text  maintained  the  division  of  the  country  into  provinces  and 
departamentos headed by appointed authorities. 
The most important progress towards decentralisation made during this period was the 
promulgation of the first law for the creation of municipalities in 1854, and the law for 
the transference, from the departments to the municipalities, of several public services, 
in 1887. 
66 In  conclusion,  this  first  phase  in  Chile's  history  as  an  independent  state  was 
characterised by the establishment of  a centralised administration system. 
b) From the 1925 Constitution to 1973 (the beginning ofthe military government) 
The Constitution of 1925  includes the first explicit attempt for decentralisation. Here, 
the  functions  of 'government'  and  'administration'  are  clearly  separated,  limiting, 
therefore, any attempt for decentralisation to the simple matter of administration. This 
conception was based on the ground that the unitary nature of the Chilean state would 
reject by itself any forms of  political decentralisation. 
The  1950s saw the materialisation of several  strategies  of regional  development for 
selected  provinces,  which  involved  the  de-concentration  of the  offices  of Credit, 
Investment  Promotion,  and  Planning.  In  1967  ODEPLAN,  the  Office  for  National 
Planning, was created. ODEPLAN's primary mission was to work on the development 
of  the country from the basis of  a regional subdivision. 
In this period municipalities were led by democratically elected alcaldes (mayors), that 
functioned under the control of  each province assembly. 
Focused more on technical rather than political aspects, ODEPLAN, set up the bases for 
the  regional  subdivision  of the  country.  Stohr  (1969b)  argued  that  Chile  was  the 
prototype of a highly decentralised country. Although a formally unitary system, "there 
existed several implicit factors  of regionalism in a country of such narrow extension 
from North to South (4,200 kms) and great geographic, climatic and cultural differences 
such as Chile" (p.  124). According to this author, the implicit forms of  regionalism were 
based  on  three  factors:  differential  ecological  patterns;  different  colonisation 
background, and; regional legislation. 
•  Based  on  ecological  patterns  StOhr  identified three  zones:  'metropolitan  zones' 
Santiago,  Valparaiso  and  Concepcion;  the  'consolidate zones',  from  Aconcagua, 
right North of Santiago, to the Island of Chiloe in the South, and; the 'colonisation 
zone', that comprises the low populated peripheral parts of Chile in the North and 
South; 
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composition of the settlers and former national affiliation of territories) this author 
highlights the preponderance of Yugoslav settlers in the far South and coastal zones 
in the North of the country, the historical roots with the neighbouring countries of 
Peru and Bolivia in the North, the predominant Spanish cultural elements of Central 
Chile, the German settlers in the south, and the Indian frontier South of the Biobio 
river; 
•  Based  on  Regional  legislation,  which  refers  to  certain  legislation  that  contains 
privileges  or  incentives  for  certain  parts  of the  national  territory,  he  identifies 
attempts of the national government to tie peripheral areas more closely to national 
authorities. Examples of these have been the 'copper law' that intended to  channel 
parts of  the returns of  Chile's copper export to the copper areas of  the North, the law 
establishing the Magallanes Corporation in the far South. 
With these implicit regionalisms existing, ODEPLAN defined by the end of the 1960s 
ten regions plus a metropolitan zone21. According to StOhr (1969b), the regions were to 
serve  three  concrete  purposes:  the  regionalisation of the  national  development  plan, 
administrative decentralisation, and the elaboration and execution of  regional plans. 
This  period  established  two  key  elements  for  future  regionalisation.  One  was  the 
regional administrative framework. The other, codified by the Constitution of 1925, was 
the grafting of decentralisation onto the public agenda.  This opened wider spaces for 
democracy. 
c) The military government (1973-1989) 
At the beginning of its period, in 1974, the military government implemented what was 
called the  'process of regionalisation,22. This process consisted of a spatial re-ordering 
that sought to articulate the economic, social, geo-political and administrative features 
of sub-national  territorial  units,  for  the  purpose  of attaining  a  sustainable  regional 
21  With  further  transformation  regions  were  incremented  to  twelve  plus  the  Metropolitan  Region  of 
Santigo. The same units that exist up to these days. 
22  Which  was part of a package of measures called  'the seven modemisations'  (Rosenfeld and  Marre, 
1997) undertaken to remake Chilean politics. 
68 development (CONARA, 1974). These units, that experienced few changes until finally 
implemented, became the thirteen regions of  present day Chile. 
These  regions  were  given  a  nominated  authority,  the  intendente,  government 
institutions,  devolved public administrations,  space  for  community participation,  and 
responsibility for  the planning of their economic  and social  development.  However, 
there  were  no  funds  allocated  for  their  administration.  In  this  early  stage  of 
regionalisation the emphasis was put on the peripheral regions of the country under the 
concept of geo-political measures to reinforce the country's more vulnerable areas. 
The  former  departamentos,  subdelegaciones  and  distritos  were  suppressed,  regions, 
headed by appointed intendentes, were divided into provincias and these into comunas. 
Provinces were led by gobernadores, and comunas by alcaldes, both appointed by the 
head of  state. 
The priority attributed to regionalisation at this time, has been argued to do more with 
the  adjustment to  a  new  open  economy than to  a  real  attempt for  decentralisation 
(Boisier,  1993; Dockendorf,  1996; Martinez, 2000). According to Boisier this attempt 
could  not  survive  within  the  logical  contradiction  between  a  so  called  'policy  for 
decentralisation' and an authoritarian regime unable to open political spaces. 
Therefore,  the  process  of regionalisation,  in  this  period,  can  be  understood  as  an 
administrative devolution under a  centralised political  power, because,  rather than a 
transfer of power to  sub-national  units,  what actually  occurred was a  delegation of 
functions to regional and local institutions. Later, in 1980, this was reinforced by the 
transference of  the education and health services as a municipal responsibility. 
There were other significant actions in support of decentralisation such as the creation 
of CODEREs
23
, a body made up of  private entrepreneurs that decided on the allocation 
of  investment resources within regions, the creation of SUBDERE in 1985 as the public 
office in charge of  pushing the decentralisation process, and the setting up of  SERPLAC 
23 The exact meaning and functioning of  this body is explained below in this chapter when presenting the 
historic background of  the Institution of  the Regional Government, numeral 2.1. 
69 (the  regional  planning  offices),  located  in  each  region  and  responsible  for  the 
administration of  regional funds and planning. 
In terms of fiscal resources, the year 1974 saw the set up of the Regional Development 
Fund (FNDR) and the Fonda Comun Municipal (FCM). The FNDR fund functioned for 
ten years with national resources, but its reserves were increased in 1985 through a loan 
from  the  Inter  American  Development  Bank  (IDB).  The  FCM  is  made  up  of 
contributions  from  all  Chilean  municipalities.  Once  collected,  the  fund  is  then  re-
distributed  back to  municipalities  providing that the  poorest receive more  than they 
actually contributed to the fund.  In addition to the fiscal  changes, this period saw the 
creation of regional universities, which were  made  up  from  the regional branches of 
universities based in Santiago. 
The de-concentration process carried out in this period was seen as the way to increase 
efficiency of the delivery of certain services, with no attempt to link 'municipalisation' 
and  'regionalisation' with participation and democracy.  The level of de-concentration 
achieved in the period clearly signified a great advance for  a system of regional and 
local administration (SUBDERE, 2000a). 
d) From 1990 to the present, a return to democracy 
After  1990,  decentralisation took a different pace.  The  interest of the  newly  elected 
governments  to  improve  democracy  and  to  increase  participation  fostered  the 
development  and  application  of  a  variety  of  policy  instruments  for  increasing 
regionalisation, at both the regional and local level. Decentralisation in the  1990s was 
based on what has been called  a  'policy for  modernisation'.  Essentially, this  policy 
concentrates  on  three  areas:  Strengthen  democracy,  understood  as  the  increase  in 
opportunities  for  citizen  participation;  Effective  management,  oriented  to  the 
improvement  of the  quality  of the  services  from  the  public  sector;  and,  Increase 
budgetary efficiency, understood as the best possible use of public resources avoiding 
waste and improving allocation focusing. 
There is  evidence  of these policies in the changes introduced at the  local  level.  The 
alcaldes (mayors) started to be democratically elected from 1992, including those of  the 
70 most populated comunas of the country (such as  Santiago, Concepcion, and Valpaiso) 
which,  prior  to  the  military  government,  were  appointed  by  the  President  of the 
Republic.  To  finance  their  expenditure  and  increasing  activities  at  the  local  level 
municipalities rely now on their own resources. The main sources of revenue for local 
government are road tax, business duties, construction levies, and the FCM. 
1.2  Financial decentralisation during the democratic governments 
The process of decentralisation of the  state can not be conducted separately from the 
political, administrative and financial components, but, on the contrary, the process has 
to advance at a similar pace among all of  them. In the 1990s the main steps towards this 
end have been: 
a)  A  financial  decentralisation  with  emphasis  on  expenditures  rather  than  public 
revenues.  This  has  been  characterised  by  a  real  increase  in  the  magnitude  of 
resources available to sub-national  territorial entities, and a less important growth in 
relative terms compared to total public expenditures; 
b)  The  development  of  new  instruments  for  regional  investment  such  as  the 
'programming  documents '24,  the  'Regional  Investments  of  Local  Allocation 
(IRAL),  and  the  Ley  de  Concesiones  (Law  on  Conceding)  that  allows  the 
participation of  private contractors in the building of  roads and other civil works; 
c)  The establishment of  the Regional Governments as the main actors in the process of 
public regional investment. 
Important achievements of  this decade were: 
•  The  diversification of the  instruments for  regional investment.  Up  until  1990 the 
only  regional investment fund  was  the  FNDR,  in the  year 2000  there  were  four 
different investment instruments; 
•  FNDR Investments.  The  FNDR fund  was  responsible  for  a  55%  of the  regional 
investment in 1994, in relative terms reduced to a 36% by the year 2000, but still 
remaining as  the  most important regional fund within the IDR.  In real terms, the 
71 FNDR grew by 45% in the same period, while total public investment grew only by 
1%; 
•  ISAR funds.  The sectoral investment decided by the Regional Government grew in 
the number of sectors it covered and in the absolute amount of resources involved. 
Its  importance  in  relative  terms,  however,  decreased  from  1994  to  2000.  ISAR 
represented only a 19% of  the total IDR in the year 2000 (Figure 3.1a and 3.1b); 
•  IRAL resources. This regional fund is distributed from the Regional Governments to 
the  municipalities,  which have the final  decision  on the allocation  of resources. 
These funds have experienced a slow growth over time and by the year 2000 they 
represent 8% of  the total IDR; 
•  Programming Documents. These are agreements between one or more sectors and 
one or more regional governments for the execution of  projects that due to their size 
and  the  amount  of resources  require  the  participation  of at  least  two  partners. 
Projects  carried  out under this  scheme usually  last  for  more than one year.  The 
investment  in this  type of instrument  represented,  in  the year 2000,  26% of the 
regional-decided investment (figures 3.1 a and 3 .1 b). 
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24 Investment plans with the participation of one or more regional governments and one or more sectors 
(sectors or ministries). 
72 The presidential goal of doubling the amount of regional-decided investment resources 
announced in 1994, in order to go from a 21% in 1994 to a 42% in the year 2000 has 
been achieved. In the third Concertaci6n government the new target figure is to reach 
50% by the year 2006. 
However, despite the progress from  1989 to 2000 in the amount of resources available 
for  the regional  level  (Figures 3.2 below), funds  still  remain  strongly  conditional  on 
restrictions imposed by both the central government and by the source of finance of  the 
funds.  SUBDERE (2000a) has estimated that about 65% of  the IRD is under some kind 
of  restriction. 
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A United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) study ranked Chile 34
rd on human 
development
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,  amongst 174 nations in 1998. As an average indicator for the country as 
a whole this figure  seems  to be  acceptable.  The  reality  of many  regions within the 
country is, however, quite distant from this achievement. 
Decentralisation  in  Chile  has  certainly  played  an  important  role  in  increasing 
opportunities for regions in the areas of public administration, and the management of 
25  With and index of 0.893.  In order to  measure  Economic  development  and economic  and social 
divergences among countries, in 1990 the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) introduced 
73 investment resources. It has played a lesser role in the election of local authorities and, 
although indirectly, in the election of  the regional assemblies. 
The structural problems caused by the traditional highly centralised system persist in the 
country. There are still many things to do in terms of  the distribution and re-ordering of 
political power.  Hernandez (1994)  claimed that decentralisation is not only a way of 
conceiving the functioning ofthe state, but overall, a way of  articulating political power, 
that is, a way of  distributing political power to sub-national territories. 
The redistribution of power, although considered in the "Agenda for Decentralisation" 
of the present government, is something which has not yet been achieved in Chile. The 
greatest  achievement  in  this  area  has  occurred  in  the  amount  and  management  of 
regional resources for public investment. As these resources continue enjoying a period 
of sustained growth, Regional Governments, the bodies in charge of the administration 
of  regional funds, will certainly playa key role in Chilean regional development. 
In economic terms, the country has lost relative competitiveness compared to countries 
with  similar  characteristics.  Ulloa  (1997)  attributes  this  to  the  economic  strategy 
followed  by  the  country.  The  emphasis  on  the  exploitation  of natural  resources, 
combined with the supply of cheap labour, limits the sustainability of growth. A radical 
shift of economic expansion is  needed to  regions beyond the traditional ones  and to 
other activities with greater value added and better qualified manual labour. 
This  strategy  has  had  a  differential  impact  on  regions.  Economic  development  has 
concentrated in Santiago, although natural resources are located in regions outside the 
capital city.  The regions have been unable to  appropriate their share in the benefit of 
economic  growth  and  benefit  proportionally  with  the  overall  development  of the 
country. The incapacity of  the centre to redistribute wealth is something that needs to be 
addressed alongside with decentralisation if  the current model is to be sustainable in the 
long run. 
the  so-called human  development  index,  which  combines  various  indicators  such  as  life  expectancy, 
74 2  The Institution of  the Regional Governments 
This part of  the chapter presents the main components and describes the principal tasks 
of  the recently created institutions of  Regional Government (RG) in Chile. These public 
bodies, created by law in 1993, are responsible for the administration of the existing 
territorial units known as  'regions'. They have also been the main keepers of future 
public policies embracing de-concentration and decentralisation initiatives. As the law 
on Regional Governments established a wide-ranging number of tasks for the regional 
governments, these are acquiring an increasing number of responsibilities as they have 
been consolidating since 1993. 
The administrative territorial division of  Chile consists of: 
a)  Regions: There are thirteen (13) regions which are headed by the Intendentes. 
b)  Provinces:  There are  51  provinces. Depending of geographical factor,  population, 
and other factors, regions may have two or more provinces. Provinces are headed by 
the gobernadores (governors). 
c)  Comunas:  There are  342 comunas.  Similarly,  depending on geographical factors, 
population and other characteristics, provinces may have several comunas. Comunas 
are headed by Alcaldes (mayors). 
Comunas  are  the  only  territorial  divisions  where  the  mam  authority  is  elected  by 
popular vote. In the regions and provinces Intendentes and Gobernadores are appointed 
by the President of  the Republic, as has been the case since 1925. 
2.1  Historic background 
The  previous  section  documented  the  processes  of decentralisation  and  territorial 
administration as  far  back as  to  the nineteen century.  These concepts were included 
within  the  1814,  1818,  1822,  1828,  and  1833  constitutions,  that  to  certain  extent 
established  the  existence  of different  territorial  de-concentrated  units  (the  cabildo, 
regional assemblies, etc., and their corresponding authorities). 
educational attainment and GDP per capita in a single index (http://www.undp.orglhdro/report.html). 
75 The  1925  Constitution  (chapters  VIn  and  IX  on  Internal  Government  and 
Administrative  Regime)  established  that  Chile  was  to  be  divided  into  provinces 
administered  by  an  intendente  with  the  support  of a  Provincial  Assembly.  This 
organisation lasted until the end of  the democratic regime in 1973. 
During the Military Government, Acts  573  and  575  divided the country into  regions 
administered by an  intendente  with the  support of a Consejo  de  Desarrollo Regional 
(CODERE),  which was  a regional  council  integrating representatives of the different 
economic sectors of  the regions plus the provincial governors and representatives of  the 
different bodies of  the armed forces. One of  the most important tasks of CODEREs was 
to participate in the appointment ofthe alcaldes (the mayors oflocal councils). 
The 1980 Constitution followed the model dictated by Acts 573 and 575 but with some 
differences. The main difference was in the approach to the definition of  the concept of 
de-concentration.  In  reference  to  'regions',  the  introduction  of  article  3  of the 
constitution established that  "its  administration is  to  be territorially  and  functionally 
decentralised  ... " and not as  it was  previously stated in the Constitutional Act N°  2 of 
1976, which established "a functional and territorial de-concentrated administration,,26. 
Therefore,  the introduction of the  concept of 'decentralisation'  appeared for  the  first 
time  in  a  law  that  defined  the  establishment  of territorial  units  (regions)  for  the 
administration ofthe country. 
At  the  end  of the  military  regime,  on  August  17,  1989,  a  reform  of the  1980 
Constitution  (specifically  article  47  of law  N°  18.825)  gives  the  future  Regional 
Governments 'personalidad juridica de  derecho publico y patrimonio propio'. That is, 
it gives the  Regional  Governments legal  personality (autonomy)  and  own patrimony 
(goods, and funds delivered from the central government). 
On  12  November  1991, under President Aylwin,  the  first  elected president after the 
military government,  a new reform of the  1980 Constitution (law N°  19.027) set the 
ground for  the birth of the new public bodies  of the  regional governments.  The  law 
established  that  the  goal  of  Regional  Governments  is  to  become  the  superior 
26 Luz Burnes, La Regionalizaci6n, ppl6-l7, Editorial luridica de Chile, 1988. Cited in Tobar (2000). 
76 administrator of the  regions.  Finally,  based on these  reforms,  in November  11  1992, 
"Ley N°  19.175 Organica Constitucional sobre Gobierno y Administraci6n Regional" -
LOCGAR founded  the  Regional  Government  institution.  The  law was  published  in 
March 1993. Thus, the official birthday of the Regional Governments is considered to 
be in 1993. 
LOCGAR  stated  that  the  principal  aim  of the  Regional  Government  is  the  social, 
cultural and economic development of the region. It also provided that to  carry out its 
mission it will have to observe, as a basic principle, a balanced and stable development 
of  its territory. To perform its duties the Regional Government will have to comply with 
the  principles  of justice,  efficiency  and  efficacy  in the  allocation  and  utilisation  of 
public resources and on the supply of services; to ensure effective participation of the 
regional community and to  work for the preservation and improvement of the natural 
environment (Articles 13 and 14 of  LOCGAR). 
2.2  The structure of  the Regional Governments 
Regional  Governments (RG)  consist of two  bodies:  The Regional Executive, and the 
Regional Assembly.  The head of the  RG is  the  Intendente  Regional (the Intendente) 
who  acts  as  its  president  and  head  of the  Executive.  The  Regional  Assembly  is  a 
representative  body  with  normative,  resolution,  and  control  faculties.  LOCGAR 
provided that the  Intendente  is  appointed by the  President of the  Republic,  and  the 
Regional Assembly is elected by the councillors of all the municipalities that form part 
of  the region. 
The Regional Executive 
This  body  is  made  up  of the  Regional  Cabinet  and  the  Executive  office,  the 
administrative  service of the  Regional  Government,  which the  Intendente  has  at  his 
disposal to accomplish his role. 
The Cabinet is made up of  the governors of  the provinces of  the region and the heads of 
the de-concentrated offices of  the national ministries. Led by the Intendente, the Cabinet 
77 elaborate  and  co-ordinate  the  different  initiatives  that  are  to  be  proposed  for  the 
consideration of  the Regional Assembly. 
The Executive assists the Intendente in the accomplishment of his duties as established 
by  law,  particularly  in  the  administration  of the  FNDR  fund.  At  present,  the 
management  of the  FNDR fund  represents  almost  100%  of all  the  activities  being 
carried out by the Executive office. 
To carry out its duties The Executive Office of the Regional Government is organised 
into  departments  grouped  into  two  Divisions:  the  'Division  of  Investment  and 
Productive Promotion', and the  'Division of Finance and Administrative Affairs'. The 
number of  departments in both division varies in the different regional governments. 
The Regional Assembly 
Each  Regional  Assembly  is  constituted  by  varying  number  of members  (14  to  28 
counsellors)  dependent  upon  the  region  characteristics  (population  and  number  of 
provinces). The Counsellors are  elected by the municipal councillors, who  are elected 
by  popular vote,  thus  granting the  Regional  Assembly  a political  representation.  To 
perform their duties and responsibilities the counsellors are organised into commissions, 
similar to those of the National Parliament or the municipal councils.  The  number of 
commissions varies from  one  region to  another,  however,  the main commissions are 
found in all the thirteen regions of the country. These include: Interior Administration, 
Territorial  Management, Investment, and Productive Economic Development. 
2.3  Tasks ofthe Regional Government 
LOCGAR distinguishes between general objectives and specific tasks of the Regional 
Government (RG). 
General Objectives 
In general terms, LOCGAR establishes that the RG has to pursue an harmonious and 
balanced  development  of the  territory.  This  should be  done  under the principles  of 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation and utilisation of public resources, 
78 and in the provision of services and effective regional community participation, as well 
as in the preservation and to improvement of  the environment (Article 14). 
In doing so, the RG is to pursue the attainment ofthe following three objectives27: 
•  the economic development of  the region; 
•  the social development of  the region and; 
•  the cultural development of  the region. 
In pursuing these objectives the law identifies general tasks for the RG (Article 16). The 
most  important  responsibilities  of those  related  to  economic,  social  and  cultural 
development are: 
•  the preparation of policies, plans,  and programmes of development for the region, 
and the formulation of  the regional annual budget; 
•  to decide on the allocation of  resources delivered to the region that correspond to the 
Regional Development Fund (FNDR), and other regional funds; 
•  to decide on the distribution of  resources for regional sectoral investment (ISAR); 
•  to  assist  municipalities  in the  formulation  of their  plans  and local  development 
programmes; 
•  to co-ordinate with the Central government on the different aspects of  their action. 
Specific Tasks 
LOCGAR identifies specific tasks for the Regional Government (Arts 17, 18, and 19). 
These  tasks  are  grouped  into  three  areas  of  regional  development:  territorial 
development, productive activities, and social and cultural development
28
. The principal 
tasks for each subject area are outlined below. 
27  These  objectives  are  similar  to  those  defined  for  the  work  of the  Fondo  Nacional  de  Desarrollo 
Regional, the FNDR, and sometimes this has lead to confusion at the moment of evaluationg the results 
of  the action of  the fund.  The establishment of a clearer defmition of  the objectives of  the FNDR will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
28  There  is  not  an  exact  correspondence  between  each of the three  objectives  and the three  areas  of 
development for which specific tasks were identified. Article 14 of  LOCGAR is one single paragraph that 
states the principles on which the RG have to base its functioning, and at the same time just mentions the 
objectives with no specificity. 
79 Specific tasks on territorial management 
•  To set up policies and objectives for a balanced and integrated development of the 
system of  urban centres in the region; 
•  To participate, in conjunction with the national and local corresponding authorities, 
in the provision and improvement of  public infrastructure; 
•  To promote and support the protection, conservation and improvement of  the natural 
environment; 
•  To promote the development of rural areas and isolated urban settlements, ensuring 
an integrated action on these localities. 
Specific tasks on productive activities 
•  to  help  the  Central  Government towards  the  formulation  of productive  activities 
policies,  technical  assistance  and  development  of  employment  through  job 
qualifications and training; 
•  to  establish  priorities  on productive  investment  for  the  different  sectors,  and  to 
guarantee a rational exploitation of  resources in both the public and private sector; 
•  to encourage scientific and technological research and care for the development of 
higher education; 
•  To support the development of  tourism at the regional and provincial level. 
Specific tasks on social and cultural development 
•  to set up regional priorities to cope with poverty; 
•  to participate, with the corresponding authorities, in initiatives destined to  provide 
basic services to poor people or those who live in isolated areas within the region, in 
the areas of health, education, culture, housing, social security, sport and recreation 
and legal advice; 
•  to  make  sure  the  regional  programme  of investment  only  include  projects  that 
comply  with the  socio-economic  and  environmental  requirements  established  by 
law; 
•  to  carry out studies to  assess the level and quality of life of the inhabitants of the 
regIOn; 
•  to promote cultural manifestations, to care for the historic and artistic patrimony of 
the region, and to protect the development of  ethnic groups. 
80 2.4  Summary and conclusions 
The  current  operative  institutional  structure  that  resulted  from  the  creation  of the 
regional  governments  embodies  significant  advances  compared  to  past  decades. 
According to Boisier and Zurita (1993), one of  the main characteristics of  this new form 
of administration is its wide diversification in the offering of policies and programmes 
that intend to cope with the different problems faced by the inhabitants of  regions. 
The wide range of objectives and tasks assigned to the Regional Governments represent 
a more comprehensive conception of development, compared to previous experiences. 
This wider concept of development clearly differs, in qualitative and quantitative terms, 
from that which purely concentrate on economic growth of former decades. This new 
idea incorporates the social, cultural and economic dimensions of development as three 
inter-linked  concerns  for  the  different  territorial  bodies  in  charge  of  regional 
development, that is, the Regional Assembly and Executive, the regional-based offices 
of  the central ministries, and the provincial and local administrations. 
The attempt to reach a practical combination of these three features of development is 
evident  in  the  general  objective  and  different  tasks  assigned  to  the  Regional 
Government by LOCGAR. The existence of  regional funds, and particularly the FNDR, 
is an attempt to provide a practical tool for carrying out these tasks. 
Although the establishment of  Regional Governments in the territorial administration of 
the  country has  been said to  be a mere  act of political voluntarism from the  central 
government,  the  extent of its  principles  and  the  political  agreement  reached  by  all 
political parties in Chile for its execution, gives this initiative validation and the strong 
possibility of continuing in its  development.  The  magnitude  and  importance  of this 
event,  in  words  of Boisier  and  Zurita,  make  this  initiative  'more  than  a  mere 
administrative act, a real refunding act of the government and administration system of 
the country' (Boisier and Zurita 1993, p.  1). 
81 3  Chile's recent economic performance 
Chile's economic development is  said to be ahead of other Latin American countries. 
Internal administrative changes, the increasing degree of integration of Chile within the 
global economy,  and the country's early implementation of structural reforms of the 
first and second generation as well as its opportunity to successfully carry out reforms 
of the  third  generation
29
,  situate  the  country  in  a  leading  position  compared  to  its 
neighbours. 
The figures that support this thesis are the high growth rate ofthe economy (about 8.0% 
annually from  1990 to  1999), the growth of the per capita GDP (annually 6.4% for the 
period 1990-1999), the investment growth (102.2% between 1989 and 1999), growth in 
the level of  saving (21.6% of  the GDP in the period 1990 and 1999), and the growth of 
exports and imports, among others (data from Central bank of  Chile). 
Economic policies implemented during the last two  governments have been based on 
the following diagnosis (in a report from the Ministry of  Finance, June 1998): 
•  During the 1990s the cornerstone of  macroeconomic equilibrium has been the sound 
management of fiscal  policy.  As  the economic authorities have put it,  "this is an 
asset for the country as a whole that will not be put at risk" (Ministerio de Hacienda 
1998, p.  1); 
•  The Chilean public sector relies on an institutional framework that allows it to face 
important external shocks by having at its disposal price stabilisation funds for two 
key commodities, copper and oil. The Copper Stabilisation Fund today has amassed 
approximately US$ 1,700 million, while the Oil Fund contains US$ 130 million; 
29  Eduardo Aninat (2000), Revista Que pasa. According to this author, first generation structural reforms 
carried out by Chile refer to the liberalisation of  external trade, reduction of  tariffs, the re-ordering of the 
monetary policy, autonomy of the Central Bank, and fiscal discipline; reforms of the second generation 
were the changes in sectoral policies such de-regulation and privatisation of  sectors such as energy, water 
and sewer services, etc. Third generation reforms are those related to structural changes in education and 
higher education,  information technology, health, decentralisation or transference of power to regional 
levels.  Aninat was Minister of Finance of Chile from  1994 to  1999, at present he is  one of the deputy 
managers of  the IMF. 
82 •  These  stabilisation  funds  give  additional  degrees  of freedom  to  the  country, 
permitting  it  to  soften  some  of the  effects  of external  highs  and  lows,  in  a 
responsible and well-financed manner; 
•  With respect to  the  current account  deficit,  this  is  said that it is  not in itself an 
indicator of economic problems. It is just a signal of the rate at which the country 
borrows from the rest of the world. Chilean foreign debt is  low, representing only 
34%  of GDP  (81 %  of which  corresponds  to  the  private  sector)  and  has  a  long 
maturity (96% of  total Chilean debt is of  medium and long-term maturity). 
This structurally solid economy, according to the Ministry of Finance, would "allow the 
country to keep on growing and improving the quality of life of its people" (Ministerio 
de Hacienda 1998,  p.  2).  The main problems being, according to  some observers, the 
threat of  an increase in the current account deficit. 
Before discussing the main problems and achievements of  the economic model adopted 
by the country, and the effects this strategy has had on the country in the present and the 
consequences for its future development, it is worth looking briefly at the conception of 
the present economic model and the way it has  evolved in the country since the mid 
seventies. 
3.1  Historic background 
Chile's traditional economic model was based on industrialisation. Following the 1930s 
Great Depression, and mainly supported by the  government,  industrialisation became 
the  national  priority.  The  import-substitution  industries  became  the  key  economic 
activity in the country benefiting certain areas more than others. In the 1950s and 1960s 
heavy  industry  plus  highly  protected textile  and  pottery manufactures  accounted  for 
much of  the Chilean labour medium class. 
In  1974,  at  the  beginning  of the  period  of the  military  regime,  Chile  undertook  a 
profound  shift  in  its  economic  development  strategy  that  would  have  dramatic 
consequences  on  the  traditional  economic  and  social  structure  of the  country.  This 
process  consisted  of the  implementation  of an  externally  market-oriented  economic 
83 strategy.  As Ellison has  put it,  the  changes  began in earnest a  couple of years  after 
Pinochet took power and continued until  1990. Unproductive state-owned finns were 
auctioned off, tariffs were slashed from 94 percent to  10 percent, triple digit inflation 
was reduced to double digit and the country positioned itself for a new era of growth 
(Ellison, 1998). 
The ideologists behind these transfonnations came from a group of Chilean economists 
who had studied with free-market mentors Milton Friedman, Frederick von Hayek and 
Arnold Harberger at the University  of Chicago.  According to  Rosenfeld and Marre 
(1997),  this  link  goes  back to  the  fifties,  "in the  1950s,  the University of Chicago 
developed a 'special relationship' with the Catholic University in Chile. A systematic 
approach  to  'ideological  transfer'  was  supported  by  the  Rockefeller  and  Ford 
Foundations, and the US" (Rosenfeld and Marre 1997, p. 2). By 1975 the Chicago Boys 
(as  they  were  known)  took  position  on  Pinochet's  Cabinet  and  the  neoliberal 
counterrevolution  began.  Sympathetic  Chilean  businessmen  collaborated  with  this 
group in the design of  a free-market economic programme for Chile. 
One  of the  first  measures  implemented  to  carry  out these  transfonnations  was  the 
opening of the Chilean economy to international trade. As a result, traditional industry 
fell under the pressure of international competition, and in 1975 GDP dropped to  14%. 
The widespread crisis generated by the economic refonns gave the opportunity to the 
Chicago Boys to restructure the whole ofthe economy. From 1975 to 1981, the strategic 
banks and industries that had been nationalised under the Allende's Government were 
privatised to a small number of  economic groups fonned at the beginning of  the military 
government. These new groups became the new driving force in the Chilean economy. 
Chile's  traditional  industries  like  textile,  clothing,  pottery,  and  shoe  production 
collapsed  under  import  pressure  in the  first  years  of the  neoliberal  policies.  Many 
industrial workers lost "their decent-paying union jobs in that period, settling for lower-
paid  and  unstable  processing  jobs  in  the  fishing,  forest  and  fruit-export  sectors" 
(Rosenfeld and Marre 1997, p.  2). As a consequence many of these workers and their 
families migrated to more economically active regions, mainly to Santiago. 
84 The radical redistribution of national wealth to  a few conglomerates coincides with a 
decline in the percentage of national income going to wages, from 42.7% in 1970 to 
33.9% in 1993. This also coincided with an overall rise in poverty. In 1994, 28.4% of 
Chilean lived in poverty, compared to  17% in 1970, and the poverty rate peaked at 45% 
in 1987. As Todaro (2000) claims, "in a quarter century of almost constant 'structural 
adjustment'  in Chile, the top  10%  of the population has  gained, but the bottom 90% 
remains worse off' (p. 728). 
Traditional  class  structures  also  suffered  rapid  changes.  Historically,  Chile's middle 
class  grew  during  the  expansion  of the  state.  When  state  and  state  enterprise 
employment  was  drastically  reduced,  wages  for  teachers,  health  service  and  public 
servants and other remaining state-sector workers also  declined.  At the  same time,  a 
new middle class and upper-class of  professionals emerged in connection with the boom 
in finance and services. 
The relative  economic  success  seen in the late  1970s  and  early  1980s permitted the 
dictatorship to implement what Rosenfeld and Marre have called "its ambitious project 
to  permanently  remake  Chilean  politics,  economics  and  culture"  (1997,  p.  3).  This 
project was  called the  'Seven Modemisations'  that included:  A new constitution, the 
regionalisation  and  de-concentration  of the  state,  the  privatisation  of state-owned 
industry  and  services,  a  new  system  of labour  law,  and  the  municipalisation  and 
privatisation of  state-run health, education and social-security systems. 
3.2  Recent achievements 
Back in democracy, in 1990, the Concertacion of Parties for Democracy, a coalition of 
centre  and  left-wing  political  parties,  headed  by  the  Christian  Democrat  Patricio 
Aylwin, won the presidential elections and marked the end of 17 years of military rule 
and  the  beginning  of Chile's  transition  to  democracy.  As  Vergara  points  out,  the 
principal  motto  of the  Aylwin  administration  was  'growth  with  equity',  a  notable 
counterpoint  to  the  neoliberal  model  implemented  by  the  previous  military  regime. 
While  the  dictatorship  has  succeeded  in  achieving  high economic  growth  rates,  8% 
annually by the end of the eighties, income inequality actually worsened. The Aylwin 
85 government argued that economic growth was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for achieving greater equality in Chile (Vergara, 1996). 
Table 3.1: Chile's Main Macroeconomic Indicators (1986-1999) 
1986-97  1996  1997 
GOP growth rate (%)  7.7  7.4  7.4 
Inflation rate (%)  14.5  6.6  6.0 
Unem~loyment  rate (%)!  6.8  6.5  6.1 
Gross  fixed  capital  25.1  31.0  27.2 
formation (% of GOpi 
Gross national saving (% of  20.9  21.4  21.6 
GOP)3 
Real interes rate (%t  6.0  7.3  6.8 
Real  exchange  rate  99.0  84.7  78.2 
(1986=100) 
Average nominal tariff (%)  14  11  11 
Current  account  deficit  (%  3.2  5.1  4.9 
of  GOP) 
1 Average 1992/1997 
2 In 1986 prices 
3
A 
. 
t current pnces 
4 On 90-day Central Bank promissory notes 
Source: Banco Central de Chile (2000) 
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Figure 3.3: Chile GOP and GOP per Capita (1985-1999) 
Source: Based on data from the Banco Central of Chile (2000) 
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The Concertacion's formula  for  'growth with  equity'  has  been to embrace the free-
market, export-oriented economic model implemented during the military government, 
but  also  pays  significantly  more  attention  to  poverty  and  social  policy  than  its 
predecessors.  In pursuit  of free  trade,  the  Concertacion  has  reduced  import  tariffs, 
privati  sed many remaining state-owned enterprises, and aggressively pursued bilateral 
and  multilateral  free-trade  agreements,  including  entrance  to  NAFT  A  and 
MERCOSUR 
86 Table 3.1  and Figure 3.3 above shows the success on Chile's main economic indicators 
of  the last fifteen years. Social indicators are presented below in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 and 
Figure  3.4.  These  economic  and  social  indicators  summarise  the  country's  main 
achievements in recent years. 
Table 3.2: Reduction of  Poverty in Chile during the 1990s 
Year  Ex1:reme Poverty  Poverty 
People  %  People  % 
1990  1,659,300  12.9  4,965,600  38.6 
1992  1,169,300  8.8  4,331,700  32.6 
1994  1,036,200  7.6  3,780,800  27.5 
1996  813,800  5.8  3,288,300  23.2 
1998  820,000  5.6  3,160,10  21.7  . . 
Source: Ministeno de HacIenda, Chile (1999) 
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Figure 3.4: Chile, GDP Growth and Reduction of  Poverty (1990-1998) 
Source: From data from INE (2000) and Central bank (2000) 
Table 3.3: Income distribution in Chile (1996-1998) 
Income  Autonomous Income
l  Monetary Income
2 
Decile 
1996  1998  Sum98  1996  1998  Sum98 
1  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.4 
2  2.6  2.5  3.7  2.7  2.7  4. 1 
3  3.5  3.5  7.2  3.6  3.6  7.7 
4  4.5  4.5  11.7  4.6  4.6  12.3 
5  5.4  5.3  17.0  5.5  5.4  17.7 
6  6.3  6.4  23.4  6.4  6.4  24.1 
7  8.2  8.3  31.7  8.1  8.3  32.4 
8  11.1  11.0  41.7  11.0  10.9  43.3 
9  15.5  16.0  57.7  15.4  15.9  59.2 
10  41.6  41.3  100.0  41.3  41.0  100.0 
1 Autonomous mcome consIders self-generated mcome only 
2 Monetary income includes also monetary transfers from the state 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda, Chile (1999) 
87 The transnationalisation of the Chilean economy has also intensified since  1990.  The 
Concertacion's commitment to  free  trade and privatisation, together with the political 
stability  since  the  transition began,  has translated  into  increased  foreign  investment. 
International investment in Chile rose from US$1.5 billion in 1990 to US$2.8 billion in 
1993, and then skyrocketed to US$ 4.3 billion in 1995. Chilean investment abroad also 
rose,  financed  by Chile's private pension fund  system and yanquee bonds -corporate 
bonds sold on Wall Street. Growth has boomed at an average annual rate greater than 
7% since 1995-by far the highest in Latin America (Rosenfeld and Marre, 1997). 
In  sum,  the  transition to  democracy that began in  1990  brought a  consolidation  of, 
rather than a challenge to, the free-market model imposed during the military regime. 
The accent in the 1990s has been put, however, in overcoming the most critical social 
problems inherited from  the  crude  application of the neoliberal model of the  decade 
before. 
3.3  Problems 
This 'solid Chilean economy' is, however, extremely vulnerable. Its strong dependence 
on foreign markets with just few main trade partners, and the fact that it is just based on 
few  export  products,  leave  the  Chilean  economy  enormously  exposed  to  external 
variations. Despite the encouraging macroeconomic indicators that the country exhibits, 
a more in-depth look shows many structural problems in both, its economic model and 
the social indicators associated with. 
Londono and Szekely (1997) argue that within the Latin American context Chile does 
not differ much from the average in terms of  the general trend followed by the different 
countries. Summarising the general trends of Latin American economies during the last 
thirty  years,  they  identify  three  major  stages.  The  1970s  were  characterised  by 
macroeconomic stability and high growth rates.  The  1980s were the years of volatility 
and stagnation (for some, the lost decade in Latin America), while the first half of the 
1990s (and now we can say the whole decade ofthe nineties) has seen a return to a more 
stable macro environment and the recovery of positive growth rates.  As these authors 
argue, under the favourable scenario of  the 1990s one would expect that the numbers of 
88 poor  households  and  the  level  of inequality  would  have  been  reduced.  The  main 
findings of this study show that, with important differences among countries, this has 
not  been the  case.  Poverty  remains  in  many  regions  of South-America and  income 
distribution has worsened in many cases. 
With regard to the financial system, Caballero (2000) argues that although ahead of the 
Latin American pack, Chile still suffers from four external and internal weaknesses: (a) 
weak international financial links and excessive sensitivity to external conditions. And 
of internal origin; (b) a Central Bank mandate that, while reasonable on average, is ill-
designed  to  deal  with terms  of trade  shocks  and  their  impact  on external  financial 
conditions; (c)  a propensity to  waste scarce liquidity in the banking system; and (d)  a 
continuing limited development of financial markets, particularly for medium and small 
size firms. 
The impact of economic crises on the Chilean economy is greater as the country's trade 
links are concentrated in just few regions in the world. For example, according to the 
Ministry of Finance, Chile is the country in the Americas which trade most with Asia 
(as a proportion of  the volume of its economy). As such, the Chilean economy suffered 
greatly from the  economic downturn in those countries at the end of the  1990s, both 
from  the perspective of its  exports to  the  region and  from  the  fall  in copper prices. 
Although  a  third  of Chilean  exports  are  directed  towards  Asia,  exports  to  those 
countries (Japan and Korea) did not account for more than 25% of total exports, 16% 
and 6% respectively. 
Chile  has  a  unique  expenence  with  regard  to  the  level  and  persistence  of open 
unemployment.  Riveros  (1997)  argues  that  unemployment  skyrocketed  with  the 
financial crisis of  the 1980s because the economic reforms of  the 1970s did not prepare 
the labour market for  a more  flexible  response to  aggregated shocks.  Unemployment 
declined significantly after 1985, as a result of  more flexible labour market institutions. 
The problem, however, is still one of the main issues in Chile's economy, with around 
10% of  unemployment by the end ofthe year 2000. 
A study by Meller (2000) demonstrated that Chile is one of the countries with a worse 
income distribution in Latin America and  even in the world.  This  author argues that 
89 there  is  a recognised  direct relationship  between education and  income  distribution. 
According to this, policies should be oriented to improve the access and the quality of 
education.  Chile  already exhibits higher  education levels  compared to  countries  like 
Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico. Meller argues that for an average Latin American, 
throughout his entire life, completing his secondary studies (12 years of school) does 
not allow him to  even triple the average income of an illiterate.  The  difference  only 
materialises when this average Latin American gains a University career. Since going to 
the university is  not the answer to  this problem,  or at least not for  everyone, Meller 
suggests  concentrating  on  other  solutions.  Relative  government  expenditure  in 
education,  as  a proportion of its  GDP,  falls  in the lower third of the countries  with 
similar GDP per capita3o. 
As a result of all these weaknesses, the neoliberal model implemented in Chile, despite 
is success -mainly at the macroeconomic level- is still vulnerable. A very good example 
of the  country's  vulnerability  can  be  found  by  looking  at  the  way  its  main  export 
product  has  been  managed  in recent  years3!.  Copper,  Chile's  main  export  product, 
represents  a  40%  of total  Chilean  exports.  Total  Chilean  exports  account  for  US$ 
15,615.5 millions (that is, more that fifteen thousand millions) in 1999. 
Caputo (2000) argues that since copper is so important for the economy of the country, 
copper exports should be the main concern of economic authorities, but this does not 
seem to  be the case, judging from the way Chile has managed its export policies on 
copper. The stagnation of the value of Chilean exports since 1995 is the main cause of 
the recent economic crisis. The average armual value of exports between 1996 and 1999 
reached only US$14,750 millions (in dollars of 1995).  In 1995  exports accounted for 
US$ 16,000 millions. 
30 In a study by Engel et all (I  998) on the relative government expenditures in health and education. They 
argue that as  the GDP growths, so  should do  the expenditure in these sector (if the country is  going to 
follow the pace of  developed countries). 
31  Based on  a  newspaper article  by Orlando  Caputo  in  January  2000.  The  origin  of this  article  is  a 
response to the Ministry of Finance of Chile, that days before announced his satisfaction due to the fact 
that Chile had reached the highest historical level in its exports. For a country that found its economy in 
exports, like Chile, argued Caputo, reaching every year the highest level should not be a surprise. Exports 
for Chile should be a matter of concern rather than of 'satisfaction'. Orlando Caputo is an economist and 
researcher from Universidad ARCIS. See bibliography for complete references. 
90 The stagnation of  its exports is one of the major problems Chilean economy is suffering 
at present, and this is principally due to the importance of copper exports in the total 
national  exports,  and  not  a  consequence  of the  Asian  crisis,  as  published  by  the 
government. Caputo argues that the decline in the price of copper in the world market 
was the fault of Chile. It took 90 years for Chile to produce 1,500,000 tons of copper. 
Afterwards, in six years, the production was doubled. In ten years the production was 
tripled, reaching by the year 2000 the staggering amount of  4,500,000 tons of  copper. 
Table 3.4: Chile Main Export Products 1997-1999 
(As Eercentage of  total eXE0rts) 
1997  1998  1999 
Mining  44.6  39.5  40.7 
COEEer  41.1  36.0  37.7 
Gold  2.2  1.8  1.6 
Nitrate and iodine  1.3  1.7  1.4 
Manufacturing  16.6  17.2  17.7 
Fishmeal  3.3  2.3  1.8 
Salmon  2.8  3.5  3.9 
Wine  2.5  3.6  3.4 
PulE  4.1  4.6  4.9 
Sawn  and planed  2.6  2.4  2.8 
wood 
Methanol  1.3  0.8  0.9 
Agriculture 
Fresh fruit  7.2  8.0  7.2 
Percentage  of  68.3  64.7  65.5 
total 
Other  31.7  35.3  34.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Banco Central, 2000 
Chile is the main producer and exporter of copper in the world. It generates about 40% 
of the  world  production  and  supplies  more  than  50%  of the  total  world  exports. 
Comparatively,  all  countries  from  the  "Organisation of Petroleum Export Producers 
(OPEP) generate 37% of the world production of oil.  Saudi Arabia, the main producer 
in OPEP, contributes with 11 % of the world total, or about 28% of OPEP production 
(Caputo, 2000). 
Chilean copper production grew much more  than the  growth in world consumption, 
therefore world copper stocks grew as well. As expected, this resulted in a sharp drop in 
copper prices. In July 1995, the price was of 140 US  cents per pound of copper (cpc). 
For several months in 1999 the price reached no more than 60 cpc. The average annual 
91 price  in  1999  was  of 71.4  cpc.  As  predictable, this  downward trend has  profoundly 
impacted Chilean economy.  In dollars of the same year, exporting 2.5  million tons in 
1995  Chile got about the same earnings that those in the year 2000, but exporting 4.5 
million tons. 
Caputo points out that in the neoclasical theory of international trade, this situation has 
been called the  "impoverishing growth model", that can be  characterised by  a huge 
growth in production, and a slow down in the global revenues and the welfare levels in 
the exporter country. 
The effects in Chile of  this stagnation in copper prices meant that the state realised only 
US$2,200 millions, compared with US$4,400 millions value of copper exports in 1989; 
that is,  only 50% of the value of the total exports. In 1995, it got US$1,940 millions, 
which  corresponds to  30%  of the  total  exports.  In  1999, the state  got only US$305 
millions, representing just 5% of  the total global copper exports. 
This  a strange case where prices fall,  for  the  first time in 50  years,  while the  world 
demand has increased more rapidly than in past decades.  Against all the signals from 
the market, the response of  Chile has been to increase production. 
As  shown in table 3.4 above,  Chile's main export products, copper being the primary 
one,  are  based on the  exploitation of natural  resources,  and within these  sectors the 
country is  specialised in just few products. Table 3.5  below shows the changes in the 
relative importance of the  main sectors  in their contribution to  the GDP.  Traditional 
sectors based on the exploitation of natural resources are loosing importance compared 
to  service  sectors  such as  transport and  communications,  and  personal services.  The 
table suggests a shift from primary sectors to more advanced and labour intensive ones 
-as mining and agriculture are highly intensive in capital and technology in Chile and 
therefore use less labour.  For this to  be true in the long term, important changes will 
have to occur at the regional level, as agriculture and mining are mainly concentrated in 
just only a few regions. 
92 Table 3.5: Changes in GDP by Origin of  Economic Activity (1990-1998) 
Sector  1990 (=100)  1993  1996  1998 
Agriculture,  livestock  6.7  97  79  81 
and forestry 
Fishing  1.5  107  93  93 
Mining  12.6  45  56  33 
Manufacturing  18.5  104  103  98 
Industry 
Electricity,  gas  and  2.6  119  115  104 
water 
Construction  5.6  121  127  143 
Trade and catering  13.9  101  91  101 
Transport  and  6.7  104  106  116 
Communications 
Financial Services  9.8  104  114  115 
Housing  4.6  89  83  85 
Personal Services  8.6  124  142  158 
Public Administration  3.4  100  106  115 
Source: Banco Central de Chile (2000) 
On the other hand,  exports destinations are confined,  again, to just a few countries or 
areas of  the world (table 3.6 below). The most significant changes would be the increase 
of the importance of North America,  that goes from  15.4% to  a 19.5% in the period 
shown,  and  the  decrease  in importance  of the  Asia region.  Due to  the  short  period 
covered by these figures,  however, changes in the relative importance of each region 
destination would most probably correspond to  short time variation in the purchasing 
countries than to general trends in the world market. 
Table 3.6: Main Export Destinations 1997-1999 
(Total EXE0rts in Millions US$) 
1997  1998  1999 
~%2  ~%2  ~%2 
Latin America  21.1  23.9  21.8 
Brazil  5.9  5.6  4.5 
Argentina  4.7  4.9  4.6 
Mexico  2.2  3.4  4.0 
North America  15.4  17.4  19.5 
United States  14.6  16.4  18.4 
Euro~e  25.8  29.2  27.6 
United Kingdom  6.2  7.8  6.8 
German~  4.5  3.8  3.6 
Ital~  3.0  4.5  4.0 
France  2.7  3.0  3.1 
Asia  35.3  27.6  29.3 
JaEan  16.1  13.8  14.4 
Korea  5.9  2.8  4.4 
Taiwan  4.6  3.6  3.2 
China  2.6  3.3  2.3 
Sub-total  97.6  98.1  98.2 
Total EXE0rts  16,667.2  14,829.6  15,615.5 
Source: Banco Central, 2000 
93 3.4  Summary and Conclusions 
The  rapid  changes  experienced  in  Chile  since  in the  decade  of the  seventies  have 
profoundly  transformed  the  country's  economy  and  social  structure.  The  economic 
model imposed in the 1970s and the reordering of  the territorial management carried out 
through the past three decades have had a significant impact on economic structure of 
the country as a whole and in most regions outside Santiago. 
The greater attention given to  concerns for  equity by the democratic governments, to 
reverse the cutbacks in social spending of  the Pinochet regime, has meant a ramping up 
of efforts to  allocate more  resources to  education,  basic health care, housing,  water, 
sewage, electricity. These efforts have gone together with the main focus of  government 
policy toward giving assurance of a balanced economy while simultaneously preserving 
the main macroeconomic indicators. 
Despite the  success in raising several basic  social indicators, and achievement at the 
macroeconomic level, there still persists a series of economic and social problems. The 
economic  problems  are  associated  to  the  vulnerability  of the  model  in the  face  of 
external changes in the world economy, and in the differential impact this has on the 
regions of Chile.  The  social problems have to  do  with the level  of poverty,  income 
distribution,  and  unemployment  in  the  country  as  a  whole,  among  others  social 
indicators, and with the way these problems affect some regions more than others. 
The  accelerated changes  in the  internal  territorial  administration  and  distribution of 
power,  specially  since  the  1990s,  have  been  intended  to  cope  with  the  territorial 
manifestation of these problems. The creation of  the Regional Governments institution 
and the increasing transfer of functions and financial instruments to them is intended to 
involve regional communities in the development of  their own regions and to move the 
decision-making process closer to those directly involved in it. 
For these initiatives to succeed they have to go in the same direction as the development 
strategy of the country as  a whole. This is not completely clear for the case of Chile. 
Whether the main objectives of governmental policies intend to  cope with economic 
growth, employment or poverty; at a national scale or concentrating on particular most 
94 affected areas is something that has not yet attracted much discussion among politician, 
government authorities and other actors in Chile. 
The maturity of the economic model adopted almost thirty years ago, the experience 
gained after two decades transiting under a process of decentralisation, plus the setting 
up  of the Regional Governments institution, in the last decade,  as  a tangible body to 
carry  out  development  from  the  regions,  provide  a  new  scenario  to  conduct 
development at the beginning of  the new century. 
Some argue that there is enough experience accumulated in recent years to think of  the 
Regional Government as key players in the way economic and social development will 
be  conducted in the  future.  As  Tobar (2000)  argues,  the  country has  only  since  the 
dictation of the first laws in 1974, passed through twenty six years of regionalisation, 
seventeen under the military government and ten under democratic  governments.  He 
claims that since the  beginning we  have  seen a procession of Regional  Intendentes, 
Provincial  Governors,  Directors  of de-concentrated  offices  of ministries,  Regional 
Counsellors (appointed by the military authority first and then democratically elected) 
all  with  the  purpose  of working  for  the  development  of regions  from  a  regional 
perspective.  This  has  certainly  provided  a  substantial  basis  for  the  acquisition  of 
expertise and know-how on regional matters. Or, as Boisier (2000) puts it, the country 
possesses  at present around  10,000  people  who  are  involved in different aspects  of 
regional development. The process is not over, but on the contrary it is evolving to new 
stages. It is time now, suggests Tobar, after 26 years of trial and error to examine and 
evaluate  the  process  in  order  to  correct  it  and  deepen  it  adequately  to  face  the 
development of  regions. 
Regardless  of whether or not this  26-year  experience  is  sufficient base  on which to 
construct  significant  regional  policy  change,  it  has  certainly  opened  potential  new 
regionalisation  scenarios.  New  scenarios  may  concentrate  on  the  equally  important 
experience of regional fund development. These funds must be assessed as policy tools 
for future Regional Government transformation. 
95 4  Regional economic and social disparities in Chile 
This section presents the main economic and social differences in the regions of Chile 
in recent years. It incorporates administrative and interpretative regional descriptions. 
The former is a recapitulation of the thirteen administrative regions and the latter, after 
Stohr (1969),  proposes  dividing the  country into  three  macro  zones,  each of several 
regions.  These macro zones group regions of similar characteristics and also illustrate 
the main differences among them. The first part of the section uses actual regions (the 
thirteen regions) for data and analysis, then it uses  'zones' or 'macro zones' to group 
regions  of similar characteristics.  The  last  part introduces  the  additional  concept of 
winner and  loser regions to  group those territorial units that have performed well or 
badly under the neo-liberal economic model that has predominated in Chilean's recent 
history. Regions grouped under these categories do not necessarily present geographical 
continuity. 
4.1  Historic background on Chile's  regional development 
Despite its unique geographical features,  a narrow shape more than 4,200 kilometres 
long and  less than 200  kilometres wide  on average,  and  great physical,  climatic and 
cultural differences, Chile has been identified as  the prototype of a highly centralised 
country  (StOhr,  1969b).  Nevertheless,  although  a formally  unitary  system,  Chile  has 
several  implicit  factors  of regionalism.  StOhr  argues  that  these  implicit  forms  of 
regionalism, i.e. differential ecological patterns; different colonisation background, and; 
regional legislation permit us to identify three distinctive zones in Chile (see chapter 2 
for StOhr classification of  regions in Chile). 
The colonisation background factor, claimed by StOhr, has not been specially important 
in the determination of particular zones in Chile. No other author, known to this study, 
has ever claimed such a thing. Although small groups of immigrants settled in various 
regions in the north, centre and south of  the country during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries,  they  have  not  been  identified  as  a  determinant  in  shaping  the  country's 
96 different  regions  (except,  may  be,  by  the  Los  Lagos  Region,  colonised  by  German 
settlers by 1850). 
What have actually been much more influential in this sense are the other two factors 
identified by  StOhr,  the  territory's  characteristic  geographical  feature  (its  length and 
differential  ecological  patterns),  and  the  particular  development  policies,  'regional 
legislation', that have been implemented for specific regions (including Santiago). 
In terms of territorial administration, during the 1960s the country was subdivided into 
ten administrative regions plus a metropolitan zone  (Santiago). Later,  in 1974,  at the 
beginning of  its government, the military regime implemented the so called 'process of 
regionalisation' that basically consisted of a spatial re-ordering based on these existing 
11  regions.  This  process  sought to  articulate  the  economic,  social,  geo-political  and 
administrative features  of sub-national territorial units.  These changes resulted in the 
creation  of twelve  existing  regions  plus  the  Metropolitan  Region  of Santiago.  (See 
Appendix 2 for map of Chile with the regional subdivision). 
Using a combination of only two StOhr factors it is possible to distinguish three types of 
ecological macro zones in Chile. These three characteristic ecological zones also present 
clear differences in terms of  population density and economic performance (as it will be 
seen later). These zones are: 
•  the 'metropolitan and consolidated zone', that extends from the Valparaiso region in 
the North to Biobio in the South. This zone comprises the core urban and industrial 
centres of Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcion. More than 74% of the population 
of the country lives here, although the zone accounts for just 15% of  the territory of 
the country.  Some 74.7% of the  GNP  was  generated in this zone in 1996 (Riffo, 
1998). 
•  The 'north macro zone' extends from the Coquimbo region (Region IV) to the far 
north Region of Tarapaca (Region I). This is a thinly populated peripheral zone that 
contains  only  11.3%  of the  population  and  39.8%  of the  territory.  This  zone 
contributed 16.5% to the national GNP in 1996. 
97 •  The'  south macro zone' that extends in the north from La Araucania (Region IX) to 
the  extreme  south of Magallanes  (Region XII).  This  is  also  a sparsely populated 
peripheral  zone  having  14.3%  of the  population,  with  44.9%  of the  nation's 
territory. The contribution of  this zone to the national GNP was 8.9% in 1996. 
In order to cope with the economic and social differences amongst regions, during the 
second half of the  1900s the state started to  play an active role in promoting several 
economic policies for regional development. These policies were directed, essentially, 
towards  provision  of social  basic  infrastructure  and  location of basic  key  industries 
outside the capital city. Under the import-substitution model of  development, adopted in 
the country during the 1950s and 1960s (discussed in chapter 2 above), the government 
carried out important projects  of regional  impact for  several regions  of the  country, 
notably the case of a steel and petrochemIcal plant in the Biobio region and a motor car 
assembly plant in the Tarapaca Region during the 1960s. 
The most remarkable feature of regional economic development during the 1970s was 
the implementation, by the military government, of  the neo-liberal economic strategy of 
development discussed  above.  The  early  days  of the  application of this  model  were 
characterised  by  a  rapid  lowering  in  import  tariffs  and  an  overall  opening  of the 
economy. This had a significant impact in all regions, but particularly in those that had 
previously based their economy on  import substitution products.  These products had 
been highly protected from external competition and they could not survive in an open 
market economy. The industrial regions of Valparaiso and Biobio of central Chile, and 
Tarapaca  in  the  north,  were  among  those  most  negatively  affected.  Employment, 
economic growth and productivity in these regions were unable to  adjust to the new 
external conditions. 
Chile's rapid economic growth during the last fifteen years and specially over the last 
decade  has  left the  neo-liberal  model  unchallenged,  despite  the  economic and  social 
costs observed in several regions. The model has, in spite of  the acknowledge success of 
some macroeconomic indicators, had profound negative effects on particular territories 
within the country.  Although continuing the  same  1974 economic model,  democratic 
governments since the 1990s have introduced a more equitable approach. 
98 Thus, one of  the most significant steps in the development of  regions in recent years has 
been the deliberate decentralisation of the political and administrative structure of the 
country carried out by the successive democratic government of  the 1990s. 
4.2  Recent evolution in regional differences 
Regional  differences  are  presented  using  recent  data  on  the  performance  on  both 
economic and social indicators such as  population, employment, GNP, and economic 
growth. Data account for current social and economic divergence among regions. 
Economic Performance 
Table 3.7 below shows the economic growth by region from 1960 to 1997. The six sub-
periods that appear in this table show significant differences in the rate of growth of  the 
economy  experienced  in  the  regions  of Chile.  The  periods  1972-75  and  1982-83 
represent the two major crises experienced by the country in recent years. The first one 
reflects the enormous decline in economic activity due to the profound transformations 
that  the  economic  structure  of the  country  was  experiencing  as  a  result  of the 
implementation  of  the  new  economic  model  at  the  beginning  of  the  military 
government. The second period is associated with a world-wide recession influenced by 
the prices of oil, helped in the case of Chile by the action of emerging economic groups, 
today already consolidated, that were taking over the former state companies. 
Table 3.7: Regional Economic Growth 1960-1997 (Average annual rates) 
1960-71  1972-75  1976-81  1982-83  1984-97  1960-97 
I  Tarapaca  4.3  -0.9  8.6  -4.4  7.6  5.2 
II  Antofagasta  5.7  -0.2  7.7  3  7.3  5.9 
III  Atacama  3.9  -0.4  5.7  -2.1  10.2  5.8 
IV  Coquimbo  4.2  3.2  2.7  0.4  6.4  4.5 
V  Valparaiso  3.7  -2  3.7  -6.2  5.3  3.1 
RM  Santiago  6.2  -6.8  7.4  -8.3  7.5  4.7 
VI  O'Higgins  2.4  4.1  4.5  -2  4.8  3.6 
VII  Maule  3.5  0.8  3.7  1.1  6.8  4.4 
VIII  Biobio  4.7  -4.2  5.4  -3  4.6  3.4 
IX  La Araucania  3.2  -0.4  3.6  -2.4  6.6  3.9 
X  Los Lagos  3.2  -0.5  3.6  -3.1  7.2  4 
XI  Aysen  8.1  -1.6  3.2  3.4  5.9  5.2 
XII  Magallanes  1.8  -7.1  9.4  -1.9  2.2  2 
Country  4.7  -4.8  6.8  -8.5  7.3  4.3 
Source: Riffo, Luis (1999) 
99 Although  economically  successful  today,  the  negative  impact  of taking  over  the 
country's traditionally state-owned companies "drove Chilean economy to a deep crisis 
that  cost  Chile  around  US$  seven  thousand  million,  between  1982  and  1985" 
(Monckeberg, 2001). The impressive performance in economic growth in the 1984-97 
period shows the consolidation of these groups and the economic success of the neo-
liberal model. 
With regard to regional  differences, the  1960-71  period presents,  in  general,  an  even 
pattern of economic growth among regions, the notable exception being 8.1 % economic 
growth in  Aysen.  The period  1984-97 presents a very different  situation.  The rate of 
growth of  the economy is in general higher than in previous years and several regions of 
the centre, north and  south of the country seem to be benefiting from the new  model 
with high  rates of economic growth for  a long  period  of time,  notably the  cases  of 
Atacama, Tarapaca, Antofagasta, Santiago and Los Lagos regions.  Los Lagos (Region 
X) is the only one from the agriculture 'south macro zone', while the first three belong 
to the 'North macro zone', mainly associated with mining activity. 
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Figure 3.5: Chile Regional Economic Growth (1960-1971, 1984-1997) 
100 The  period  1984-1997, fully  under the  neo-liberal  economic  model,  shows  a  higher 
annual average economic growth for all the regions of  Chile compared to the 1960-1971 
period  (Figure  3.5).  A  distinction  can be  made  in  terms  of how  particular  regions 
performed compared to the rest.  In this  sense,  three regions,  O'Higgins (VI),  Biobio 
(VIII) and Magallanes (XII) are the ones with lower performance. Regions of  the north, 
that experienced  high  rates  of foreign  investment,  in general,  performed  better than 
those of  the centre and the south. 
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Figure 3.6: Chile, Regional Economic Growth (1984-1997) and Population Increase (1990-1998) 
In the  relationship  between  econOmIC  growth  and  population  increase  (Figure  3.6), 
although the periods do not fully coincide, there is a direct correlation between the two 
variables.  Highest rates of economic growth tend to correspond with highest rates of 
population increase, with the exception of regions VII (Maule), VIII (Biobio)  and  IX 
(La Araucania), where relatively high rates of  economic growth (more than 6% per year 
as an average for regions VII (Maule) and IX (La Araucania); and over 4% for region 
VIII (Biobio) correspond to the lowest rates of  increase of  the country. 
The  north  to  south  pattern  of decrease  in  growth  rates  in  population,  in  general, 
correspond to a similar patter in population growth. The birth rate in Chile is  more or 
less  constant among the regions,  the main  difference  being  between urban  and  rural 
101 populations.  Rural population in Chile accounted for  14.4% of the total population in 
the  year  2000
32
.  In the  'north macro  zone'  rural  population is  slightly less than the 
national  average,  thus,  what would  actually  explain  a higher population rate  in this 
period is  immigration, probably due  to  better employment opportunities that go  with 
higher economic growth. 
The  Atacama  Region  (III),  along  with  its  predominant mining  activity  (in terms  of 
product)  has  a  highly  developed  agricultural  sector  in  several  irrigated  valleys, 
particularly in grape production, both for direct consumption and for wine and spirits. 
The high growth rate in popUlation can be mainly explained by the job opportunities in 
this region, particularly for seasonal immigrants for harvest work. 
Within the industrial  'metropolitan and consolidated macro zone'  of the centre of the 
country,  the  Santiago  region has  the  highest rates  in  both economic  and  population 
growth. In the case of the 'south macro zone' the most distinctive feature is its lagging 
position compared to  the other two.  This agriculture macro zone presents the highest 
rural population of  the country with 32% of  its population living in rural areas. 
The  rate  of unemployment  for  these  three  macro  zones  tends  to  follow  an  inverse 
pattern  compared  to  the  other  two  indicators  (Figure  3.7).  The  picture  for  1990  in 
unemployment presents  a diverse  configuration with regions of the  north,  centre and 
south performing both well and badly. The year 1998, on the other hand, shows higher 
variations  in  the  rates  of unemployment  in  the  north,  where  the  highest  rates  of 
economic growth were observed, and lower variations in the centre. The south exhibits, 
in general, a more even performance in the variation of  the rate of  unemployment. 
32  Since  1996  the  National  Statistical  Office  (INE)  started to  define  urban  areas  as  localities  with  a 
population over 2,000 inhabitants, or between 1,001  and 2,000 people where at leat 50% of  the economic 
active population is  enrolled in secundary and tertiary activities. A rural locality is that with more than 
1,000 inhabitants, or between 1,001 and 2,000 where less than 50% of  the economic active  population is 
enrolled in secundary and tertiary activities (INE 2000). 
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Figure 3.7: Chile, Variation in the rate of  Unemployment (1990-1998) 
"Winner" and "loser" regions in economic terms 
Table 3.8 below presents the performance of  regions in three economic indicators: gross 
regional product (GRP), and both employment and productivity growth in a period of 
eleven years,  from  1986 to  1996.  Beside the comparative analysis that can be made 
amongst regions by looking at the differences in the individual performance on each of 
the three variables, an informative comparison can be made by combining these three 
factors to see how regions perform in all of  them combined. 
Table 3.8: Regional Economic Growth, Employment and Productivity. 
Annual variation rate (1986-1996) 
Region  GRP  Employment  Productivity 
I Tarapaca  7.1  4.2  2.8 
II Antofagasta  8.1  3.7  4.2 
III Atacama  12.1  4.6  7.1 
IV Coquimbo  7.0  3.6  3.2 
V Valparaiso  6.4  2.6  3.7 
RM Santiago  8.2  3.9  4.2 
VI O'Higgins  4.8  2.3  2.4 
VII Maule  7.2  2.4  4.7 
VIII Biobio  4.6  2.8  1.8 
IX La Araucania  7.2  2.0  5.2 
X Los Lagos  6.8  3.5  3.2 
XI Aysen  5.6  3.2  2.3 
XII Magallanes  2.1  1.8  0.3 
Country (regionalised  7.9  3.3  4.5 
GNP) 
Source: Riffo, 1998 
Figure  3.8  below groups  regIOns  in term  of their  performance  in the  three  factors 
combined. Cell 1,  to the left of the figure,  groups the regions that in all the variables 
103 performed below the national  average,  cell  2  (the  one in the middle)  comprises the 
regions that in one variable were above the average. Cell 3 (the last to the right) groups 
the regions with at least two of the variables above the average. In cell 3, only Region 
III, Atacama, is above the average in the three variables. 
The Metropolitan Region of  Santiago (RM), that represents almost 45% of  the country's 
GNP as an average for the period 1985-1996, is also a highly diversified region in terms 
of  its economic structure. The other two regions, II (Antofagasta) and III (Atacama), are 
mostly dedicated to  mining activities.  The high investment on mining as  well as  the 
level of  technology utilised in this activity would explain their performance on the three 
variables  presented.  Part  of the  Atacama  success  can  also  be  explained  by  the 
tremendous development in vineyard plantation, mostly oriented to export, during the 
last twenty years. 
Figure 3.8: Regions grouped by Economic Performance 
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The three economic indicators are: gross regional product, employment and productivity growth 
Regions  I  (Atacama),  IV  (Coquimbo),  VII  (Maule),  IX (La Araucania)  and  X  (Los 
Lagos), in cell 2, had just one variable above average. Of these, regions I and IV are 
located in the 'north macro zone', region VII belongs to the consolidated zone, and the 
other two, regions IX and X are located in the 'south macro zone'. The main economic 
activity  of these  last  three  regions  is  agriculture  and  none  of them  exhibited  an 
economic growth rate above the national average. 
104 The group of regions in cell 1 in Figure 3.8, are the ones that performed the worst in 
economic terms. None of them had any indicator above the  national average. Three of 
these  regions  are  located  in  the  'metropolitan  and  consolidated  zone'  regions  V 
(Valparaiso), VI (O'Higgins) and VIII (Biobio). Of these, regions V, and VIII were the 
traditional protected industrial regions that immediately after the military coup suffered 
the  most  with  the  opening  of the  economy  to  the  world  market.  Region  VI  is  an 
agriculture,  mining,  and  industrial zone right north of Santiago,  but with agriculture 
providing  most  of the  employment.  The  other  two  regions,  XI  (Aysen)  and  XII 
(Magallanes),  are  located  in the  extreme  south of the  country  and  performed really 
poorly on these three economic indicators. Both regions combined, with around 250,000 
inhabitants, represent only 1.6% of  the country's population. Main productive economic 
activities of  Aysen and Magallanes are mining, agriculture and fishing. 
These three economic indicators seem to be very illustrative about the way regions are 
coping with the economic conditions imposed by the economic model pursued by the 
country.  However,  when looking  at  another  significant indicator of how regions  are 
performing  within the  model,  it is  interesting  to  note  that things  are  not  as  straight 
forward as  they appear. Take poverty and income distribution for example. High rates 
of GNP  growth alone offer the chance to expect good performance, or at least not bad 
performance, in these two social indicators. Even more, a combination of high rates of 
growth  in  GNP,  employment  and  productivity  would  suggest  optimism  on  the 
performance of related social indicators  such as  poverty and income distribution.  As 
discussed below, this has been the case. 
Social Performance 
Poverty and  income  distribution  (ID)  is  still  a matter of profound concern in Chile. 
Despite the relative success in several economic indicators the country has been unable 
to translate this economic performance into social improvements. For example, nation-
wide distribution shows almost no improvement during the last ten years. 
Chile's Ministry of Planning measures poverty levels and income distribution.  It uses 
the  'income method',  also  called the  'direct method',  to  estimate  levels  of absolute 
poverty. This method measures the level of household living conditions with reference 
to a poverty line expressed in the cost of a minimum basket. This basket is supposed to 
105 satisfy  the  family  basic  needs.  A  household  is  considered  poor  where  income  is 
insufficient to satisfy the basic food and non food-related needs of  the family members. 
In operational terms, a family is considered poor when its per capita income is below 
double the value of  a basic basket in urban areas, and 1.72 times for the rural area33. 
For income  distribution,  data  at  both the  national  and  regional  level  are  presented 
below. For the first case, the method of measurement employed is the distribution of 
'earned  and  self-employment  income'  and  'total  household  income,34  and  for  the 
regional level the Gini Coefficient has been used. 
The  autonomous  income  is  defined  as  the  sum  of all  the  payments  received  by  a 
household as  a result of the ownership of productive factors,  it includes all forms of 
income. The monetary income of a household is defined as the sum of the autonomous 
income and the monetary transfers that a household receive from the state (Table 3.10 
below). 
National level 
Poverty reduction is  a  significant achievement of the  democratic government (Table 
3.9), though the level of poverty still remains high and the security of jobs for those 
above the poverty line appears to be very unstable. Anyway, poverty has been reduced 
by almost a half in ten years since the return to democracy. 
Table 3.9: Evolution of  Poverty in Chile (1990-1998) 
Number of Poor  % 
1990  4,965,600  38.6 
1992  4,331,700  32.6 
1994  3,780,000  27.5 
1996  3,288,300  23.2 
1998(a)  3,160,100  21.7 
(a) Preliminary figure 
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1999a 
33  In November 1998, the value of  the poverty line was equivalent to an income per capita ofUS$ 82 per 
month in urban areas, and US$55 per month in rural areas. In US$ of  that year. Source: Ministerio de 
Hacienda (1999). 
34 Ingreso autonomo and Ingreso monetario in Spanish  .... 
106 In contrast, income distribution has hardly improved under these governments. There is 
a  slight difference when comparing  autonomous  and monetary income  (the  last one 
includes transfers from the public sector). Table 3.10 below shows a high concentration 
of income and a tendency to  remain unaltered through time.  The first  income  decile 
received  1.2%  compared  to  41.3%  of the  richest  income  decile.  This  distribution 
slightly improves when looking at the monetary income, in this, the first decile reached 
1.5% while the last decile had 41 % of  the national income. 
Table 3.10: Income Distribution (Earned and self-employment and Total household) 
per capita (1990-1998) 
Earned and self-em121oyment Income (%) 
Tenth  1990  1994  1998  Accum 98 
Lowest income 1  1.4  1.3  l.2  l.2 
2  2.7  2.7  2.5  3.7 
3  3.6  3.5  3.5  7.2 
4  4.5  4.6  4.5  1l.7 
5  5.4  5.5  5.3  17.0 
6  6.9  6.4  6.4  23.4 
7  7.8  8.1  8.3  3l.7 
8  10.3  10.6  1l.0  42.7 
9  15.2  15.4  16.0  58.7 
Highest income 10  42.2  4l.9  41.3  100.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Total household Income (%) 
Tenth  1990  1994  1998  Accum 98 
Lowest income 1  l.6  1.5  1.5  1.5 
2  2.8  2.8  2.6  4.1 
3  3.7  3.6  3.6  7.7 
4  4.5  4.6  4.6  12.3 
5  5.4  5.6  5.4  17.7 
6  6.9  6.4  6.4  24.1 
7  7.8  8.1  8.2  32.3 
8  10.3  10.5  10.9  43.2 
9  15.1  15.3  15.9  59.1 
Highest income 10  4l.8  4l.6  4l.0  100.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1999a 
"Winner" and "loser" regions in social terms 
Poverty and income distribution affect regions in very different manners, as  expected. 
This is due to the regions' different economic structure, and to the ways by which they 
have coped with the neo-liberal model.  The surprise comes from the fact that the way 
regions are doing in terms of their performance in social indicator has apparently little 
107 to  do  with their performance in the economic indicators. Table 3.11  below shows the 
number or poor per region in absolute and relative terms. 
Table 3.11: Poverty by region (Approximately by the year 2000) 
(Index from National Average = 100) 
Total  % of  Poverty 
POEulation  Poor  Index 
I  TaraEaca  398,947  16.0  79.53 
II  Antofagasta  468,411  13.1  65.13 
III  Atacama  273,576  28.4  141.23 
IV  Coguimbo  577,881  25.1  124.49 
V  ValEaraiso  1,561,406  18.8  93.49 
RM  Santiago  6,102,211  15.4  76.60 
VI  O'Higgins  788,814  23.2  115.10 
VII  Maule  915,246  28.1  139.49 
VIII  Biobio  1,936,271  29.6  147.04 
IX  La Araucania  874,245  31.6  156.98 
X  Los Lagos  1,061,496  24.8  121.26 
XI  Aysen  95,035  14.1  75.11 
XII  Magallanes  157,769  11.9  58.97 
Country  15,211,308  20.1  100.00 
Source: Population: Est 2000, INE; Poverty: Mideplan, Casen 1998 
Table 3.12 below uses the  Gini  Coefficient to  show regional differences in terms of 
distribution  of income.  This  coefficient  is  an  indicator  of inequality,  where  values 
ranges  between  0.0  and  1.0.  A  value  of 0.0  (zero)  would  indicate  that there  is  no 
inequality  in  income,  that  is  to  say,  all  households  and  individuals  have  the  same 
income  level.  On the  contrary,  1.0  (one)  expresses  a maximum inequality where  all 
income is concentrated in just one household or individuaes. 
Table 3.12: Evolution ofIncome Distribution by regions using Gini Coefficient (1990-1998) 
Region  1990  1994  1998(a) 
I  TaraEaca  0.55  0.53  0.49 
II  Antofagasta  0.53  0.52  0.53 
III  Atacama  0.55  0.48  0.50 
IV  Coguimbo  0.54  0.51  0.55 
V  ValEaraiso  0.55  0.51  0.53 
RM  Santiago  0.57  0.56  0.58 
VI  O'Higgins  0.52  0.53  0.53 
VII  Maule  0.61  0.56  0.53 
VIII  Biobio  0.58  0.55  0.59 
IX  La Araucania  0.60  0.59  0.63 
X  Los Lagos  0.61  0.57  0.55 
XI  Aysen  0.52  0.53  0.59 
XII  Magallanes  0.54  0.45  0.55 
Total  0.58  0.56  0.58 
(a) Preliminary data 
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1999a 
35 See Mideplan 1999a for a complete description of  the methodologies used in the calculation of  poverty 
and income distribution. 
108 Although there are no extreme values, significant differences can still be seen between, 
for  example,  Region  I  (Tarapaca)  in  the  north  macro  zone,  and  Region  IX  (La 
Araucania)  in the  south macro  zone.  Tarapaca has  (by  1998) the most equal income 
distribution and La Araucania with the least. 
Figure 3.9 below summarises the performance of  regions below or above the average in 
terms of the number of poor as  a proportion of their population, and in terms of their 
income distribution index, also compared to the national average. The national average 
of  20.1 %, for the median national level of  poverty is used as an index base value of 100 
(for 1998) to which the regional averages in the same indicator are compared with (see 
last column in Table 3.12). Regions were ordered into three groups, each representing 
their position and distance when compared to the national average. 
For poverty,  regions  were  grouped into  cell  6 if they  performed below the  national 
average  -abbreviated  'NA'  - (they  presented an average  number  of poor below the 
national average), in the centre, cell 5, if they performed not more than 20% above the 
NA,  and  in the left,  cell 4,  if they were  more than 20%  above the NA.  For income 
distribution  (ID),  cell  6  groups  regions  that  performed  below  the  national  average 
(regions with better ID  than the national average), regions whose ID  was the same as 
that of  the NA (cell 5), and regions whose ID was over the NA (regions with the worst 
ID) appear in cell 4 (Figure 3.9). 
Figure 3.9: Regions grouped by Social Performance 
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The two social indicators are: Poverty and Income distribution 
109 Comparison between the performance of  regions in economic and social indicators: 
There is  not a clear correspondence between the performance in economic and social 
indicators.  Several regions that either performed well or poorly in the three economic 
indicators analysed in Figure 3.9 have not performed well in the reduction of  poverty of 
income  distribution.  That is,  the  relationship  is  not necessarily positive and  in most 
cases  is  even  negative.  For  example,  region  III  (Atacama)  is  the  one  with  the  best 
performance in economic indicators,  showing an average rate of increase in all  three 
variables well above the national average.  However, in terms of poverty is  one of the 
worst ranked. Atacama did well in ID and therefore was able to keep itself in the cell of 
the centre, cell 5, for social performance (see Figure 3.9 above). 
Something similar occurred with Magallanes (XII),  which in the economic indicators 
was  grouped  among  those  of worst  performance.  In the  social  indicators,  however, 
Region  XII  has  an  average  number  of poor  below  the  NA  and  an  income  better 
distributed than the NA. These two conditions place Magallanes among the regions with 
the best performance in social indicators. These regions represent the two extreme cases 
with  the  highest  negative  correlation  between  the  selected  economic  (GNP, 
unemployment  and  productivity)  and  social  (poverty  and  income  distribution) 
indicators. 
4.3  Summary and conclusions 
Table 3.12 and Figure 3.10 below summarise the overall performance of  regions in both 
types of indicators, economic and social. Regions II  (Antofagasta) and RM (Santiago) 
on the right cell (cell 9)  can be said to  be the "winners" under the neo-liberal model 
implemented in Chile.  On the contrary, the region in cell  7,  that groups the  absolute 
losers of  the model, has performed below the average in the five indicators selected. 
110 Table 3.13: Winner and Loser Regions grouped by Economic and Social Performance (1986-1998) 
Absolute loser  Loser regions  Winner 
regions  regions 
Economic  I, IV,  n, III, 
indicators  V, VI, VITI,  VII,  RM 
XI, XII  IX, X 
Social  III, IV,  I, II, 
indicators  VITI,  VI, VII,  V,RM, 
lX  X, XI  XII 
Overall  I,m,IV,  II, 
performance  VITI  V, VI, VII,  RM 
lX, X, XI, XII 
Figure 3.10: Winner and Loser Regions grouped by Economic and Social Performance (1986-1998) 
Cell 7  Cell 8  Cell 9 
Of all  regions of Chile, Biobio (region VIll) is the one that suffered the most with the 
implementation  of this  economic  model  in  the  mid  1970s.  A  heavily  industrialised 
region, Biobio has been unable to recover from the shock of  the opening of  the markets 
to foreign  competition. Many distinctive  characteristics,  i.e.  its  reliance  in  industrial 
activities with low value added and mostly based on the processing of raw material, its 
large number of people employed in coal mining activities (closed down at the end of 
the 1990s) and its large amount of natural resources seem contrary to its potential as the 
second most populated region of  the country. 
Regions grouped in the cell  8 were labelled as the "loser" regions.  All  have no  more 
than three indicators (out of five)  above the national average and at least six of them 
performed poorly in at least one of  the social indicators. These regions are encountered 
in the three macro zones identified in Chile. In the case of the south macro zone, all its 
four regions belong to this category of losers, while in the other two macro zones,  at 
least one region in each of  them could be placed in the group of  the winner regions. 
111 Persistent  absolute  growth  differential  between  regIOns  ultimately  leads  to  the 
concentration of jobs,  inhabitants  or  production  in the  few places that have  gained 
through  application  of the  model.  The  way  public  policies  have  dealt  with  these 
differences,  and particularly the  action  of the  Regional  Development Fund of Chile 
(FNDR) is analysed next in an attempt to link the action of this fund and the needs of 
regions for achieving a more sustainable development. 
112 Chapter 4 
The Regional Development Fund of  Chile (FNDR) 
This chapter defines and characterises the FNDR in its historical and present context. It 
also highlights the problems the fund faces in its future development. The chapter has 
been divided into three parts. The first part concerns the historical context and specific 
circumstances that permitted the creation of  the fund.  The second, describes the FNDR 
as  it  is  today,  providing  information  on  its  importance  within  the  overall  public 
investment, the type of investment carried out, and the importance of the fund within 
regions.  In order to  provide additional information for the understanding of the fund, 
this part includes an analysis and discussion of three studies which have addressed the 
problems of the FNDR. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter identifies the questions 
that arise after analysing the performance of  the fund and the main problems addressed 
by specific studies at this respect. 
Introduction 
The Fondo  Nacional de  Desarrollo Regional [Regional Development Fund of Chile] 
(FNDR) was created by law (Decreto Ley N.  573 of 1974) in order to complement the 
process of regionalisation initiated by the Military Government at the beginning of its 
mandate.  Article  240  of this  law specifies the  origin and amount of resources to  be 
devoted to the fund. Since then, the FNDR has constituted the main source of  funding to 
the newly created regions of Chile. The fund was primarily conceived as an instrument 
for regional economic growth, according to priorities set up at the national level, in the 
areas  of basic  social  infrastructure  (Boisier,  1992)  however,  soon  the  geopolitical 
interest of  the military rule overtook the regional growth objective. 
Later, article 104 of  the new Constitution of  the country (1980) gave constitutional rank 
to  the  FNDR and  pointed  out  that  "the  government  and  its  administration  ....  ,  will 
observe,  as  a  basic  principle,  the  search  for  a  balanced  and  harmonious  territorial 
development. ..  incorporating the  principle  of solidarity  amongst regions  and  inside 
them in matters related to  the distribution of public funds".  (Ministerio de Hacienda, 
1997). 
113 The  availability  of resources  for  the  FNDR became  significant  in  1984,  when  the 
amount of money involved was drastically increased as a result of a loan from the Inter 
American Development Bank (IDB  or the  Bank,  as  will be used subsequently).  Since 
then  the  fund  has  become  the  most  important  regional  policy  instrument  for  the 
development of regions in Chile.  From that time up until the present there have been 
three  consecutive  loans  from  the  IDB,  which  has  become  known  as  the  'Local 
Development  Programme  FNDR-IDB'  or  simply  FNDR-IDB.  The  total  FNDR  is 
therefore made up  of two interrelated parts:  The FNDR-IDB  and the FNDR-National 
Resources. 
At the beginning of  the democratic government, in the 1990s, and as a consequence of  a 
long  process  of decentralisation  and  democratisation  of the  local  institutions  (See 
chapter 3), the new government passed a law to  create the Regional Governments in 
Chile (Law N.  19.175  of March  1993  on  'Government and Regional Administration' 
LOCGAR).  This  law redefined the  FNDR fund  and  its  objectives,  it transferred the 
responsibility for its administration and the decision making process to the new regional 
administrative institutions, the Regional Governments, and created new instruments for 
its administration. 
1  Definition and main purpose 
LOCGAR defines the FNDR as a programme of public investment set up for territorial 
compensation through the financing of social and economic infrastructure of  the regions 
(Subdere,  1993)37.  The  overall  aims  of the  FNDR,  from  the point of view of public 
policies,  point to  three  main  areas:  'territorial  compensation',  'social  and  economic 
infrastructure', and at the end ofthe period, 'strengthen the Regional Governments'. 
In practical terms the FNDR can be described as a multi-sectoral public investment fund 
administered at both the regional and central level. The main attributes associated to the 
fund are its 'regional character', that is, the responsibility for the allocation of money 
lies entirely within regions; its great 'flexibility' in terms of  the kind of  projects that can 
37 A complete definition is given in the analysis of  the objectives of  the FNDR below in this chapter. 
114 be financed; and the 'expertise' of  the public bodies in charge of its administration after 
more than 25 years of  experience running the fund. 
The problems associated with these attributes, especially with the last two ones are that 
its  'flexibility' causes difficulties related to the intersectoral co-ordination of projects, 
the  'expertise' has meant a continuation of the same (same kind of projects although 
needs might have changed, same procedures and resistance to incorporate new ways of 
doing things). The fact that the fund has not experienced any important transformation 
during the last fifteen years is a clear demonstration of  this. On the other hand, although 
the fund considers the carrying out of different types of actions, the actual execution of 
the programme has widely favoured the infrastructure dimension. 
Since  1985  the  fund  is  made  up  of two  interrelated parts,  the  FNDR-IDB,  and  the 
FNDR-National Resources.  The  FNDR-IDB'  share has varied in time changing from 
90% in the first loan to  15% in the current one (1995-1999). Table 4.1  shows the total 
appropriation of  the FNDR in the three programmes so far. 
Table 4.1: FNDR-Total, IDB and Chilean Resources (1985-1999). 
FNDR  Period  IDB Loans  National  Total FNDR  IDB share 
Programmes  Resources 
1411IC-CH  1985-1989  125,000,000  146,000,000  271,000,000  46% 
578/0C-CH  1990-1994  210,000,000  90,000,000  300,000,000  70% 
853/0C-CH  1995-1999  75,000,000  425,000,000  500,000,000  15% 
Source: Reglamentos Operativos. Subdere, 1985, 1990, 1995 
Note: In US$ of  beginning of  periods 
The FNDR-National Resources represents the national counterpart of the FNDR-IDB. 
These  resources  come  from  a  variety  of  sources  (see  table  below)  known  as 
'provisions'.  The  amount  of resources  available  to  the  provisions  has  consistently 
increased over the last years due to the increasing number of 'provisions' incorporated 
since  1994,  and  an  increase  in  the  amount  of funds  in  all  of them.  By  1998  the 
provisions of the  FNDR accounted for  36% of the total FNDR (Universidad Austral, 
1999). Education infrastructure is by far the most important, representing in 1998 more 
than 50% of  the total funds from the provisions (or FNDR-National Resources). 
115 Table 4.2: FNDR-National Resources (Provisions) and FNDR-IDB 
Provisions  1998 
M$  % 
Efficienc~  4,572  3.14 
Emergency  4,572  3.14 
Mining Levies  2,318  1.59 
Education Infrastructure  28,594  19.62 
Rural Electricity  4,769  3.27 
Drugs  10  0.01 
Pre-Investment  1,055  0.72 
Productive Investment  2,900  1.99 
Compensation  Fund  for  4,000  2.74 
Water & Sewer Systems 
FNDR-Nat. Resources  52,790  36.21 
FNDR-IDB+Inv.  92,979  63.79 
Menores 
Total FNDR Investment  145,768  100.00 
Source: Adapted from Universidad Austral (1999) 
Note: Millions of  Chilean pesos of 1998 
For  1998  the  FNDR total  (IDB+National-Resources+Provisions)  reached the  sum  of 
M$145,768,251  (Chilean pesos) or US$  289,128,902 (almost two hundred and ninety 
million dollars
38
), expressed on 2000 prices. The FNDR is intended to  benefit around 
40% of the Chilean population, that is, about 5,928,680 (almost six million people by 
the year 1998
39
). On this ground the FNDR investment per capita for this proportion of 
the population is ofUS$48.77. 
In sum, the FNDR is an important source of financing for local infrastructure projects. 
The  availability of resources has  increased and  diversified throughout time,  with the 
FNDR-IDB as its main component. Nevertheless, the importance of the FNDR-IDB in 
the total FNDR fund has decreased in relative terms due to the increase in the number of 
provisions input into the FNDR and the amount of money involved in it.  The FNDR-
Total has grown in absolute terms by almost 12% annually over the last 4 years. Given 
the decentralised character of the FNDR, the regions have, at present, a stronger policy 
tool to tackle development problems from a regional perspective. 
Two  studies consider that despite the growing importance of the fund,  the extremely 
diverse  aims  of the  FNDR  has  lead  to  significant  discussion  about  whether  the 
38  1  US$ = 540 Chilean pesos 
39 Out of 14,821,700 (Estimated to the year 1998 by the Chilean Statistical Office, INE 2000) 
116 objectives contradict each other in pursuing their goals  (DIPRES,  1997; Universidad 
Austral, 1999). The findings of  these studies are presented later. 
2  How the FNDR works 
The financing of all projects funded by public resources in Chile is carried out under the 
Sistema  Nacional  de  Inversiones  (National  Investment  System)- SNI.  This  system 
establishes the  procedures for  the design of the projects, the technical  and  economic 
appraisal,  and  the  timetable  all  projects  have  to  follow  to  apply  for  public  funds. 
Projects  seeking  FNDR funds  have  to  follow  and  comply  with  all  the  requirement 
defined by the SNI. 
The way the FNDR-Programme of investment is constructed and approved within the 
Regional  Government is  presented below.  The presentation includes the  main stages 
and the time schedule. The same process is then presented from the point of  view of an 
individual project seeking FNDR funds. 
2.1  The approval of  the budget 
The approval of the FNDR Programme of Investment can be divided into three main 
stages.  These  stages  are  not  formally  established  in  the  FNDR  administrative 
procedures  and  not  all  regions  follow  exactly  the  same  steps,  however,  specific 
deadlines  exist at  the national  level  for  the  main phases.  The whole process  can be 
summarised as follows. 
117 Stage 1: 
Strategy and Priorities Discussion, Formulation of  Projects 
Date: January - May 
Although general deadlines have to be followed by the Regional Governments in Chile, 
the process itself differs from one Regional Government to another. The process begins 
with  the  Executive  and  Assembly  discussion  on  strategies  and  priorities  for  the 
following year. According to this, local authorities (Municipalities) and public spending 
bodies (Education, Health, Public Works, etc) seeking FNDR funding for the following 
year submit their investments proposal (projects) to the Executive's technical office. In 
this  stage  they  also  participate  in the  process  of decision  making  by informing  the 
Regional Government of  their own priorities. 
Stage 2: 
Preliminary Draft budget and the discussion of  Projects and Priorities 
Date: End June - End July 
At the end of  June the Executive hands over a draft proposal to the Regional Assembly. 
The Assembly analyses the proposal and returns it back to the Executive suggesting any 
changes that they consider should be made to the final proposal. The size of  the budget 
under consideration is  an estimated figure  based on the  latest budget amount, plus a 
twenty percent. The exact amount available is provided by the Central Government at 
the end of  December each year. 
Stage 3: 
The Final Proposal 
Date: Mid August - End December 
By mid July the Executive presents the final budget proposal for  Regional Assembly 
consideration.  The  Assembly  has  one  month,  by  law,  to  approve  or  reject  the 
Executive's proposal. At this stage what usually takes place is an agreement on the final 
proposal in such a way that the Assembly members are able to make minor changes on 
the Executive proposal. The experience of recent years is that the Regional Assembly 
modifies  the  Executive's  proposal  in  about  25%  to  30%.  It is  of the  executive 
responsibility to try to  avoid changes that will pose technical problems in carrying out 
of  the budget. Once accepted, the proposal is presented to the Executive at the National 
Level (Ministry of  Finance) in September each year for final approval. 
118 2.2  A project seeking FNDR financing 
For an individual project seeking FNDR funds,  the whole process takes at least two 
years from the first draft of a project to the final completion of works. For this project, 
usually presented by the municipalities, the FNDR represents an offer of  resources from 
the regional level. The FNDR process of investment is part of the 'National System of 
Investment' (SNI). This system requires that there must be a group of projects seeking 
funds  for  every public source of investment, like the FNDR. Accordingly, the FNDR 
have its own set of  projects to chose from. Normally, the sum of  the costs of all projects 
applying for FNDR funds every year exceeds by 3 to 1 the available resources. 
Table 4.3: Administrative Procedures utilised in the administration of  the FNDR 
Step  Participant  Time 
Pre-Investment  Eight months, 
January- August 
*  Project formulation 
1  Outline/proposals of ideas of projects  Local communities,  Throughout the 
Sectors, Municipality  year 
2  Using pre-established methodologies (developed by the Ministry of  Sector, Municipalities  Three months 
Planning) sectoral offices and municipalities write down the projects  January to March 
3  Projects are input into the 'Sistema Nacional de Inversiones' a national  Sectors,  One month, 
computerised system containing all projects seeking public funds  Municipalities  March 
4  Social-economic assessment of  projects  Serplac, Ministry of  Three months, 
Planning  March to May 
*  Selection of  projects for investment (Prioritisation) 
5  Construction of  the programme of  investment. Projects are selected from  Regional Executive  Two months, 
those that were recommended after the evaluation  June-July 
6  Discussion about the projects selected and changes to the final list  Regional Assembly  30 days, July-
August 
7  Agreement of  the final list ofprojects to be financed the following year  Regional Government  August 
(the FNDR Programme ofInvestment) 
Financial Execution of Projects 
Throughout the 
year 
*  Financial creation 
8  Start of  the new budgetary year. A budgetary code is assigned to each  Regional Governm,  Throughout the 
projects. This process is done by selecting groups of  projects through out  Subdere, Ministry of  year Starting in 
the year (considering the best moment for investment)  Finance, Contraloria  January 
9  Regional Government-Technical Units (TU) Agreement for the  Regional  Throughout the 
execution of  works (Technical Department of Sectors and municipalities  Government, Sectors  year 
act as the TU ofFNDR projects)  and Municipalities 
Physical Execution of  Works 
Throughout the 
year 
10  * Contract of  Works and  payments 
Technical Units contract the works with private contractors  Sectors and  Throughout the 
Municipalities,  year 
Private contractors 
11  Money in advance and payments (Projects are paid as work progresses)  Regional Government  Throughout the 
year 
12  Final payment and reception of  works  Regional Government  Throughout the 
year 
13  Hand over of  completed works to the institutions responsible for it  Sector and  Throughout the 
operation  Municipalities  year 
14  *  No ex-post evaluation of  projects is carried out, apartfj-om isolated cases in afew regions. 
119 In addition to  the general obligations and steps to  be  followed by all projects in the 
FNDR, the projects to be financed by the FNDR-IDB part of the programme have also 
to comply with special requirements in order to be accepted by the Banle These are: 
The  validation  of  documents  (costs  of  projects,  public  auction  procedures, 
contracts). 
Parallel accounting by Subdere. 
When  the  cost of a  particular project exceeds  MUS$  3  (three  million US$)  for 
infrastructure works and US$  0.35  (three hundred and fifty thousand US$) for the 
acquisition  of  furniture  and  equipment  for  schools  and  health  centres40
,  the 
execution of projects has  to  be contracted through international auctions with the 
participation of  IDB member countries. 
These tasks are carried out by Subdere and its regional offices (the UCRs). 
Figure  4.1  summarIses  the  different  steps  followed  by  a  FNDR  project,  from  the 
moment the first draft of the project is  done by a public body or a municipality and 
included  into  the  National  System  of Investment,  to  the  moment  the  works  are 
contracted  with private  contractors.  The  entire  process takes  at  least two  years  and 
includes the participation of the three levels of territorial administration in Chile, the 
local level (municipalities), in the making of the projects; the regional level (Regional 
Government), as the administrator of  the fund; and the central level, through Subdere, in 
the  administration,  and the Ministry  of Finance and  Contraloria (the  national public 
body that  control  all  public  administrative  acts  in  Chile)  in the  conformation of the 
investment within the national policies and administrative procedures. 
The skills acquired after a relatively long experience of  the administration of  the FNDR 
have permitted the public institutions involved in its management to conduct the process 
in  a  reputedly  efficient  manner.  Nevertheless,  two  distinctive  problems  have  been 
identified in relation to  the  management of the  fund.  The  first  concerns the  lack of 
written instructions for various aspects of its management, especially those related to 
the communication between the institutions that are part of the process. The second is 
the  lack  of regular  information  from  the  Regional  Government  to  the  regional 
community on the progress and achievements of  the fund. 
40 Threshold costs for the last IBD credit 1995-1999. 
120 Figure 4.1: Steps followed by a FNDR Project for its fmancing 
.  Sectors 
Mw.ncij,alities· 
. submit prqlects (1 ) 
. F~  works are handed out to . 
municipalities and sectors . 
(Education. Health; etc.) 
(1)  Elaboration of  projects based on pre-existing methodologies 
(2)  Input of  projects to the National System of Investment for Technical Evaluation 
(3)  Evaluation  of Projects.  If Yes  can be  selected  for  investment If Not  project  can be 
presented the following years 
(4)  Regional Govermnent begins the process of  financial creation of  projects 
(5)  Subdere creates the projects 
(6)  Conformation of  financial creation 
(7)  Conformation of  financial creation 
(8)  Contract Regional Govermnent-Technical Unit for the implementation of  projects 
(9)  Technical Unit-Contractors Agreement for the execution of  works 
(10) Execution of  works 
121 3  The FNDR within public investment 
In order to  obtain a clear understanding of the  role that the FNDR plays in Chilean 
public  investment,  the  fund  will  be  presented  in  terms  of its  importance  to  public 
investment and in terms of  the kind of  investment it carries out. 
The FNDR is the principal source of investment decided at the regional level due to the 
degree of autonomy in its  use,  and  because of its magnitude compared to  the rest of 
regional  investment  funds.  Table  4.4  below shows  the  three  existing regional  funds 
ISAR, IRAL and the FNDR. Together these funds represent the total public investment 
decided at the regional level. 
Table 4.4: Participation of  the FNDR in total Regional Investment (%) 1994-1996 
Regional Investment  1994  1995  1996 
ISAR (a)  41. 73  47.57  42.55 
IRAL (b)  3.13 
FNDR  58.27  52.43  54.32 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Subdere, 1999 
(a)  ISAR stands for Inversiones Sectoriales de Asignacion Regional. Sectoral funds where the power of 
decision on investment lies with the Regional Government while its administration is carried out by the 
regional offices of national ministries. It includes sectors such as housing, water and sewer system, sport 
and recreation, rural roads, urban roads, rural household water supply systems, and health. 
(b)  IRAL,  Inversiones  Regionales  de  Asignacion  Local.  Sectoral  funds  distributed  by  the  Regional 
Governments to the city councils, where the councils have the responsibility for their final use. It includes 
two funds, one for urban restoration, and the other for rural investment. 
Although important within the regional funds, the FNDR accounts for only a 10% of  the 
total regional public investment, with little variation during the period 1994-1996, as 
shown  in  Table  4.5.  Regionalised  sectoral  investment,  controlled  at  central  level, 
represents over 70% of the total in this period. This situation changed after 1996 due to 
a presidential mandate on increasing public investment decided at the regional  level. 
The policy target increased from 27% in 1994 to 40% by the end of  that decade. 
Table 4.5: Participation of  the FNDR in total public investment (%) 1994-1996 
Public Investment  1994  1995  1996 
Municipalities  8.22  7.70  9.03 
Social Fund  0.25  0.25  0.24 
Sectoral Investment  72.23  74.60  71.90 
ISAR (aJ  8.05  8.30  8.01 
lRAL (6)  0.00  0.00  0.59 
FNDR  11.24  9.l5  10.22 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Subdere, 1999 
122 The constant growth of  the resources of  the FNDR, amounting to 12% a year from 1994 
to 1998 (going from $95,499 to $145,768 million Chilean pesos in the period) is not as 
impressive when the weight of the  FNDR is  viewed at the  national level.  Table 4.5 
illustrates  the  importance  of each  regional  fund  in relative terms.  Little variation is 
observed  in the  relative  weight  of each  of the  funds,  which  means  that,  given  the 
upward trend maintained by the FNDR, the rest of the funds have grown at almost the 
same pace. Since the ISAR and IRAL funds did not exist before 1994, what has actually 
grown is the total investment decided at the regional level. Like the FNDR, these two 
funds  are  managed  within  the  structure  of the  regional  governments,  which  has 
facilitated the co-ordination of an  important part of public investment at the regional 
level. 
4  A review of  three studies on the FNDR 
Although several studies have been carried out in Chile on the FNDR fund
41
, only a few 
of  them have focused on more detailed aspects of  the fund such as the role the fund has 
played in the process of decentralisation of the country, its use as a development policy 
tool  or  the  level  of efficiency  in  terms  of its  management  and  performance  in  the 
allocation of resources  within regions.  A  critique  of three  selected  studies  on these 
different aspects is provided below. The purpose of this review is to  be familiar with 
studies  developed  on  this  subject  and  with  the  many  questions  that  arise  on  the 
functioning of  the FNDR fund. 
The aim and scope of  these studies varied depending on the purpose and institution that 
had undertaken the task.  The first  study,  commissioned by SUBDERE, focuses on an 
analysis of the second FNDR Programme finished in 1994. The study consists of an ex-
post evaluation of the performance of the FNDR in the period 1990-1994. The second, 
from  the Ministry of Finance, comprises a more  general  evaluation of the fund.  This 
study was part of  a wider programme of evaluation of  all public investment programmes 
in Chile. The third study, completed by a regional university of southern Chile, focused 
on the variables used for the distribution ofFNDR funds. 
41  Boisier (1982) and (1992), SUBDERE (1995), Rosende (1997- memo), Angulo (1997), MIDEPLAN 
(1999). 
123 In order to provide a comprehensive account of these studies I summarise each of them 
in terms of  the following aspects: 
•  the study's aim 
•  the main contents 
•  its methodology 
•  main findings and conclusions 
Later, more specific features of these studies are considered and discussed in order to 
help with the definition and analysis of the specific questions the present study aims to 
answer. 
4.1  Study 1: Evaluaci6n Ex-post FNDR 1990-1994' 
(SUBDERE, 1997) 
Study's aim 
The  main  purpose  of this  work  was  to  identify  the  fund's  main  achievements  and 
weaknesses in order to  enhance its administration as well as to provide information for 
improving the focus  of its activity within the regions.  The study evaluates the FNDR 
performance on a period of four  years,  from  1990 to  1994, which corresponds to  the 
second FNDR Programme (IDB credit 578/0C-CH). 
Specific Objectives 
a)  Analyse the relationship between the expected focus  (on low-income groups) and 
the  degree  to  which  this  segment  of  Chilean  population  has  actually  been 
incorporated to development 
b)  Verify the socio-economic impact of  the action of  the FNDR on low-income people 
c)  Study the links between pre-investment (basic studies and engineering design) and 
the quality and functioning of  the finished works 
d)  Evaluate the  state of conservation of the public infrastructure financed by FNDR 
funds,  the operation and maintenance actions of the premises, and the relationship 
between  the  actions  schedule  for  maintenance  and  the  state  of conservation  of 
works. 
124 Main contents 
Based on the analysis of qualitative data,  chapter 2 of the study describes the general 
performance of  the FNDR, including the results of  the regional distribution of  funds, the 
sectoral  appropriation,  and  the  level  of execution  of the  annual  budget.  Chapter  3 
analyses  the  social-economic  and  territorial  focalisation  of FNDR resources  at  the 
regional and local level. Chapter 4 reviews the operational stage, once the works have 
been  completed  and  delivered  to  the  beneficiaries  institutions.  This  was  done  by 
selecting a representative group of projects from different sectors. Chapter 5 provides 
information on the management and performance of the FNDR from the point of view 
of the people directly involved in the administration of the fund.  This part covers two 
aspects: it first deals with public policies and the decision making process; the second 
focuses on the problems related to the administrative procedures ofthe FNDR. 
The final  chapter presents the results of an ex-post evaluation of 18 projects executed 
during the period 1990-1994. The analysis highlights the most relevant aspects of the 
different phases during the execution of a project and the relationships amongst them, 
i.e.  the  links  between the  pre-investment and execution stage,  the  implementation of 
projects,  and  the  degree  of utilisation  of the  resulting  infrastructure.  More  specific 
aspects such as the characteristics of the designs, their functionality, the quality of the 
works, the maintenance,  and the operation and  conservation of the premises are  also 
covered in this chapter. 
Methodology 
The  study  comprises  two  types  of analysis.  One  carried out through the  analysis  of 
quantitative data, and the other, of qualitative origin related to the information provided 
by the people directly involved in the administration of  the fund. Four instruments were 
used in the collection of  information: 
•  Data from the National System of  Investment (SNI) 
•  Interviews to high ranking officials at central, regional and local levels 
•  Questionnaires to a selected sample of  projects currently in operation 
•  The documentation of  a representative group of  projects throughout their life cycle 
125 The method prioritised the information supplied by people most directly involved in the 
management of the fund,  from the all  three levels of administration (central, regional 
and local). For this purpose a sample of seven regions was selected. Regional and local 
authorities were interviewed and a questionnaire was sent to 349 projects in different 
stages of  development. Eighteen projects were analysed throughout their duration. 
Representatives from SUBDERE, Department of Investment ofMIDEPLAN, and from 
the Ministry of Finances were interviewed to gain a national perspective of  the process. 
The work was structured in seven chapters plus an annex containing statistical data. 
Study's main findings and conclusions 
* FNDR action in the period 1990-1994 
Most of the  resources  of the  FNDR were  directed  to  the  financing  of basic  social 
infrastructure in order to  satisfy the needs of the poorest people of the regions. More 
than 50% of the investment projects were directed to Education and Health. The IDB 
eligible sectors:  Education, health, Drinking Water,  Sewer Systems, Urban and Rural 
Roads, and Rural electricity absorbed more than 90% of  the resources in the period. Of 
that 90%, half of the money was directed to  investment in new constructions and the 
expansion of existing infrastructure. 
* Dispersion of  investment and the supremacy of  the territorial compensation objective 
The final  distribution of resources for the  1990-1994 period prioritised the peripheral 
and  less  densely  populated  regions  of  the  country.  The  regions  of  Tarapaca, 
Antofagasta, and Atacama (I,  II,  and III respectively) of the north, and the regions of 
Aysen and  Magallanes  (XI  and  XII)  of the  southern most tip  of the territory were 
favoured  over  those  of central  Chile.  Although  the  latter  contained  the  highest 
population density,  such as  the regions Valparaiso,  Santiago,  and Biobio (regions V, 
RM, and VIII). 
* Lack of  co-ordination 
After asserting that "The FNDR is  the main financial  instrument for the process of 
decentralisation  ...  ",  this  study  argues  that there  is  an  evident  lack of co-ordination 
amongst  the  different  public  offices  that  run  the  regional  funds.  This  lack  of 
126 coordination, as well as the differences in the timing process of each fund,  limited the 
regional  government's  possibilities  of implementing  a  programme-based  strategy  of 
investment. 
* Low impact and administrative procedures burden 
The 1990-1994 Programme was characterised by investment in a large number of small 
projects of local influence. The problems associated with this type of investment rested 
in the low impact that they had on regional development and consequently the great 
effort and energy involved in their administration. According to SUBDERE, this posed 
an unnecessary burden in the still weak regional administrations. 
* Focusing of  investment 
The results of this study show that per capita intra-regional distribution of funds tended 
to benefit the less densely populated areas of  the regions. Therefore, within the regional 
level,  the FNDR is  also  responding to  its role as  a fund  for territorial compensation. 
However, at the aggregated level of all the municipalities within regions, there is not a 
clear association between the components of the FNDR (or sectors of investment) and 
the poverty indicator for them.  That is,  distribution of funds  within regions does not 
follow the same patterns as that of  the interregional level. 
* Type of  projects that can be financed are limited by the eligibility criteria 
The wide range of possibilities offered by the FNDR (as stated by law), in terms of the 
type of actions and projects that can be  financed,  is  limited by the conditions of the 
credit from the IDB. This study concludes that the IDB credit restricts the flexibility of 
the FNDR of incorporating new sectors of action. On the contrary, the FNDR-National 
Resources  offers  a  wider range  of possibilities  to  the  regions.  This  two  approaches 
within the same fund is an important contradiction and constraint for the development 
of  the fund. 42 
42 This contradiction was partially overcome in the last credit from the IDB. The door was opened for new 
sectors of  regional interest to be included in the Programme under the compliance ofthe development of 
the corresponding methodologies for the elaboration and evaluation of  projects by MIDEPLAN. 
127 * Lack of  feedback in the stages of  pre investment-execution-operation 
The  study  identifies  a  lack  of co-ordination  and  therefore  of feedback  amongst  the 
different institutions that participate in the process of investment of the FNDR within 
regions. The municipalities, the main bodies in the drawing up of the projects, do  not 
have a say in the physical execution of  works. Once the works have been completed the 
resulting public infrastructures are handed out to these same bodies, that afterward will 
have the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the premises. The lack of 
feedback imply, amongst other things, an increase in the costs of operation for the local 
governments. A similar situations is observed in the lack of co-ordination between the 
office in charge of  the evaluation of  projects and the regional government. 
4.2  Study  2:  'Programa  de  Evaluacion  de  Proyectos  Gubernamentales: 
Programa FNDR' (DIPRES, Ministry of  Finance, 1997) 
In 1997 the Chilean Executive, through the Budgetary Office (DIPRES) of  the Ministry 
of Finance, implemented the Programa de  Evaluacion de Proyectos Gubernamentales 
(a  governmental  project  for  the  evaluation  of all  Public  Investment  Programmes 
currently  being  carried  out  in  the  country).  During  the  first  year,  in  1997,  twenty 
programmes being financed by public funds were evaluated, fourty in 1998, and twenty 
more were expected in 1999. 
Programme's aim 
The  Programme  aims  to  contribute  to  the  process  of  'State  Modernisation'  by 
improving the overall performance of  the programmes and in particular the allocation of 
resources delivered through these programmes.  This initiative also  intends to  provide 
reliable and updated information on the results of the application of these programmes. 
Once the evaluation has been concluded, the corresponding public institutions, in charge 
of these programmes, is suppose to incorporate the recommendations suggested by the 
'panel of evaluators' of  this programme. (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1997). 
The FNDR Programme evaluation 
The FNDR was  one of the  firsts  programmes to  be evaluated under this initiative in 
1997. The main objectives in the evaluation of the fund are those mentioned above for 
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department of the Ministry of Finance in charge of the budgetary bill for  all sectors of 
the economy. 
Specific objectives 
a)  Identification of  the explicit and implicit objectives of  the programme 
b)  Analysis of: 
•  the continuity and justification of  the programme 
•  the overall design of  the programme 
•  the organisation and carry out of  the programme 
•  the aspects related to the efficacy and efficiency ofthe programme 
•  the sustainability ofthe programme 
•  the experience acquired during the execution of  the programme 
c)  Recommendations on each of  the aspects mentioned before 
Main Contents 
The evaluation of the FNDR Programme includes a number of topics that are  general 
for all the programmes considered in this initiative, and therefore for the analysis of  the 
FNDR fund. The themes included are: 
a)  The identification of the  explicit and  implicit objectives of the Programme and  a 
discussion on whether they are  being achieved at the lower cost and  at the most 
efficient manner, 
b)  Discussion on the relevance and continuity of  the Programme, 
c)  Discussion on the way the Programme was designed and the implications of  this on 
its efficacy and efficiency 
d)  Analysis on the organisation and carry out of the programme, considering all  the 
public bodies that take part in the process, 
e)  Analysis and conclusions on the sustainability of  the Programme and the experience 
acquired along its administration, 
Recommendations,  suggested  by  the  'panel  of evaluators',  on  each  of the  aspects 
analysed on the study. 
129 Methodology 
The  methodology  used for  the  evaluation  of the  programme is  the  so  called Marco 
L6gico. The analysis is carried out by several groups of experts or 'panel of evaluators'. 
These panels are  integrated by  professional evaluators from  outside the public sector 
and selected for their knowledge and experience on the subjects. 
Study's main findings and conclusions 
* About the validity and pertinence of  the Programme 
According to this study, the FNDR's primary objective was to  support the creation of 
the  new  administrative  regions  in  the  mid  seventies  in  order  to  assure  that  their 
development  were  harmonious  and  well-balanced,  at  both  the  interregional  and 
intraregionallevel. This objective had two dimensions, one was to support the process 
of regionalisation, and the other to improve the quality of  life of  the poors living outside 
the  capital  city  of Santiago.  These  two  goals  have  continued  to  be  central  for  the 
governments of the last decade until the present. In conclusion, the study argues that the 
FNDR Programme appears to  be strongly justified and appropriated under the current 
public policies on regional development. 
* About the assumptions on the execution of  the Programme 
There  exist  a number  of assumption  under the  existence  of the  FNDR Programme. 
These assumptions are related to the existence of: 
•  Financial  capacity  in  the  public  bodies  that  have  the  responsibilities  for  the 
administration of  the final works financed by FNDR funds, 
•  Adequate co-ordination amongst the different bodies that participate in the carry out 
of the Programme (Regional Executive and Assembly, SERPLAC, regional offices 
of  sectoral ministries, and municipalities), 
•  Adequate  technical  capability  and  administrative  skills  to  successfully  run  the 
Programme, 
•  Allocation  of resources  is  done  according  to  objective  criteria based  on  SOCIO-
economic priorities, as stipulated on the region's Strategy of  Development, 
•  The existence of a large enough group of projects seeking resources from the FNDR 
fund. 
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entirely satisfy the requirements set up for this evaluation. Based on the 1990-1994 ex-
post evaluation of  the FNDR, this study demonstrated that the public bodies that receive 
the final works for their operation are not given the resources to adequately maintain the 
various premises (building, roads, bridges, etc.). Out of  the 348 projects evaluated in the 
period  1990-1994,  44.2%  of them  are  not  receiving  enough  resources  for  their 
appropriated functioning, 40.3% do not receive enough resources but that this does not 
affect the normal functioning of  the premises. 
- Based on the same evidence, DIPRES shows that people who is directly involved in 
the administration of the fund recognise a lack of co-ordination amongst the different 
institutions that take part in the process: the municipalities that draw the projects, the 
regional office that assess the projects, and the technical units that carry out the physical 
execution of works.  Lack of personnel,  poor quality  of projects, amongst others,  are 
mentioned as the main problems in this aspect. 
- The objective criteria for the allocation of the resources are,  according to  DIPRES, 
again  not  adequately  met.  The  variables  utilised  are  extremely  diverse,  not  always 
explicit, and with no direct correspondence to the socio-economic conditions of regions 
or the objectives proclaimed in their Regional Strategy of  Development. 
- Finally, the assumption of a sufficient group of projects applying for resources from 
the FNDR is not fully met due to the same problems mentioned before, that is, the lack 
of co-ordination  among  institutions.  This  problem  is  aggravated  by  the  way  the 
programme  actually  functions.  The  FNDR  financing  requires  that  the  cost  of the 
elaboration of projects and the financing of engineering designs has to  be assumed by 
the institution that is  applying for funds, normally the municipalities. These bodies, in 
the majority of  cases, do not have enough money to invest in an expenditure that only in 
the case the project is financed, the municipality recuperates the costs of  investment, the 
chance being one in three in a given year. 
* About the definition and accomplishment of  the objectives of  the Programme 
According to DIPRES the objectives of  the FNDR can be found in LOCGAR and in the 
contract of the third IDB  credit for  the FNDR Programme. DIPRES argues that these 
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differential priority depending on the different institutions involved. This originates a 
confusion  at  the  moment  of evaluating  the  results  of the  action  of the  FNDR, 
particularly  with  respect  to  the  beneficiaries  and  the  focalisation  of the  resources. 
According to DIPRES these objectives are: 
•  To support of  the process of  regionalisation and territorial compensation 
•  To improve the living conditions oflow-income groups 
•  To foster the institutional development of  regional governments 
A more detailed analysis of  the objectives and the apparent contradiction amongst them 
is presented in chapter 5. 
* About the Efficacy and Efficiency of  the Programme 
- The  investment of the  FNDR has  been clearly  oriented to  the financing  of a large 
number of small infrastructure projects. According to DIPRES, this can be interpreted 
as  a mechanism for compensating the lack of investment from the local or municipal 
level. For DIPRES, this is an indication of the deviation of the original objective of the 
FNDR as a regional policy instrument. 
- DIPRES argues that in order to increase the efficacy of  the Programme a new strategy 
of investment should be developed. What they propose is a programme-based approach 
of  investment instead of  the projects by projects one currently in use. The existence ofa 
net  of interconnected  projects  would  also  make  easier  the  implementation  of the 
Regional  Strategy  of Development  in  each  region.  Beside,  this  would allow  to  co-
ordinate the action ofthe FNDR with the others regional funds in existence. 
* Regarding the efficiency of  the Programme 
DIPRES  highlights  several  aspects,  among them:  shortage of resources  for  operation 
and maintenance of the buildings and other premises financed by the FNDR, the urgent 
need of incorporating new sectors of investment and the increase in the flexibility of its 
management,  and  the  lack  of co-ordination  amongst  the  different  institutions  that 
participate in the process, 
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DIPRES  argues  that the Provisions  have,  instead  of increasing the flexibility  of the 
fund, tended to complicate and constraint its management due to the increasing number 
of projects associated to the process. This is specially true at the regional level. In fact, 
the Provisions and the resources associated to them are decided at the central level and 
the regions' role has been just to  absorb the administrative burden and to expend the 
money within the shortest possible time. 
4.3  Study 3: 'Diagnostico de las Variables del FNDR' 
(Universidad Austral de Valdivia (UA), 1999) 
The  third  study:  Informe  Final  Investigacion  y  Diagnostico  de  las  Variables  de 
Distribucion del FNDR - final report on the investigation and diagnosis of  the variables 
of distribution of the FNDR fund,  was carried out in 1999 by Universidad Austral de 
Valdivia, Chile (UA). It corresponds to  a detailed study that analyses the variables of 
distribution of  the FNDR fund at the national level and proposes an alternative method 
of  distribution of  resources. 
Study'S aim 
The aim of the study is to propose a new model for the distribution of  the resources of 
the FNDR fund from the central level. The model bears implicit the proposal of a new 
set of indicators for the calculation of  the weight of  the different variables utilised in the 
distribution of funds.  The proposal includes two models, one inside LOCGAR, and the 
other outside the law. The proposition outside the law eliminate the restrictions on the 
number and type of variables considered for the distribution of funds.  The study also 
analyses  the  variables  of distribution for  the  'Provision of Efficiency'  and  proposes 
several innovations for its allocation to regions. 
Main Contents 
The study contains a description of the FNDR that features the main characteristics in 
terms of  the kind of investment it finances, the sectors covered, and the type of projects 
carried out. The study also includes a revision of  the main facts under the fund, such as 
the country's public policies on regional development and decentralisation, the history 
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of the study is dedicated, however, to the analysis of the variables and indicators used 
for the distribution of the FNDR from the central level to the regions. Finally, the work 
includes an extensive set of tables containing statistical data about the fund as well as 
the questionnaire and interview models used in the survey. 
Study's Methodology 
Quantitative  Methods Analysis 
The  study used information supplied for  SUBDERE and that contained in the Banco 
Integrado de  Proyectos - the computerised data base (BIP) of the National System of 
Investment (SNI). The first set of  information has to do with the variables and indicators 
used  for  the  interregional  distribution  of FNDR funds  and the amount of resources 
involved.  The  second set of data consists of statistics about the costs and number of 
projects financed by the FNDR as well as the typology of  projects financed by sector. 
Qualitative Methods Analysis 
The use  of qualitative methods for  the  gathering of information was utilised for  two 
central themes of the research, i.e. futures  scenarios for the process of decentralisation 
and present and future role of the FNDR. The instrument utilised for this purpose were 
Questionnaires,  Focus  Group  work,  and  Interviews  applied to  national, regional  and 
local authorities. 
The specific objectives are: 
Evaluation of  the performance of  the current FNDR fund, 
Future  challenges  for  regional  development  and  expected  scenarios  for  the 
application ofthe FNDR, 
Opinions on the variables and indicators utilised for the distribution of  the fund. 
Study's main findings and conclusions 
* About the regional heterogeneity of Chile 
- The  analysis  of the  variables  utilised  in  this  study  permit  to  visualise  important 
regional disparities in Chile.  These disparities  are mainly  explained by the economic 
structure of  the regions. Regions with the highest level of poverty are associated to their 
concentration on the primary sectors of the economy, i.e. agriculture, fishing, etc. This 
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force.  This condition is supposed to negatively influence the competitiveness of  regions 
and their capacity to achieve sustainable economic growth. 
- According to this study the regional disparities caused by these circumstances justify 
the use of the compensation criteria in the distribution of the FNDR.  For that reason, 
and given the current process of decentralisation that is undergoing in the country, the 
national authorities would have the ground to  look at the potential of the FNDR as  an 
instrument for regional compensation. 
- Regional  disparities  are  mainly  observed where  the  State  has  few  possibilities  of 
intervention,  for  example the  geographical  circumstances, the  market,  and the  socio-
economic  conditions  of  regions.  UA  points  out  that,  in  the  opinion  of people 
interviewed in the  survey,  the  FNDR can  do  little to  contribute  to  the  reduction of 
regional disparities, mostly due to the small amount of resources involved, and because 
of the project by project approach, among other reasons. The FNDR, hence, could not 
pretend to playa significant role in the reorientation of  territorial differences. 
* About the objectives and impact of  the FNDR 
- The original conception of the FNDR,  as  a 'programme for territorial compensation 
designed to  stimulate  regional  development',  was  modified with the  loans  from  the 
IDB.  This was done by understanding/transforming the 'interregional compensation of 
inequalities' concept contained in the original objective of  the fund with that of 'supply 
of basic social services to  provide equal access to  opportunities' that is being applied 
from the beginning of  the FNDR-IDB Programmes. 
The amount of resources involved in the period 1994-1997 for both, the 90% of the 
FNDR and the 'Provisions', shows that the FNDR represented only a small share in 
the total regional-decided investment. Its importance in the total public investment 
in the regions was, hence, even less significant. 
The interregional  distribution of the  FNDR has,  since  1985,  mostly benefited the 
peripheral and less densely populated regions of the country over those that exhibit 
the  highest  levels  of poverty.  UA  argues  that  territorial  compensation  has  been 
understood as  compensation for  regions located at long distances from the capital 
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regions show a higher standard of life, above the national average. This behaviour in 
the distribution of the  FNDR would  betray the  compensation attribute  originally 
stated for the fund. 
The  distribution  of the  'Provisions'  of the  FNDR  has  mainly  been  based  on 
popUlation  variables.  This,  plus  the  fact  that  the  'Provisions'  are  distributed  in 
conjunction  with  the  FNDR  but  using  different  parameters,  has  distorted  the 
objective  of territorial  compensation  of the  fund.  Based  on  this  argument,  VA 
suggests that the distribution of  the 90% of  the FNDR has little chance of  producing 
compensation effects amongst regions. 
* About the future scenarios of  the FNDR 
Two areas of interest are  identified as  the most important challenges that regional 
and national  authorities  will  have  to  face  in the  future  of regional  development. 
These  are,  the  'Answer to  social  deficits'  in infrastructure  and  services,  and  the 
'Productive  development'.  VA  argues  that  the  way  regional  authorities  most 
probably are going to  cope with these problems in the near future will be through 
the use of  the FNDR fund, due to the unavailability of  other instruments. 
VA suggests that the FNDR will have to  become more and more an instrument to 
orient public and private investment under a regional strategy approach. This can be 
achieved,  according  to  this  study,  through  the  implementation  of the  Regional 
Strategies of  Development. 
* About the indicators and model of  distribution of  the 90% of  the FNDR 
The methodology of distribution of the 90% of the FNDR -as it was in application in 
1998- consists of a group of  procedures that combine a total of 18 indicators grouped in 
two  dimensions:  a)  a  socio-economic,  and;  b)  a territorial  dimension.  In the  socio-
economic dimension the indicators are grouped within five variables: economy, health, 
education, housing, and access to basic services. The territorial dimension comprises six 
indicators grouped in just one category. Even when the indicators used by SVBDERE 
for  the  distribution  of the  FNDR  take  into  consideration  interregional  differences, 
principally on the  relative level  of development of regions,  the  information some  of 
them provide is redundant. For example: 
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the  territorial  indicators  have  a  greater  weight  compared to  those  in the  SOCIO-
economic dimension due to the larger number of  indicators in the latter one. 
Indicators  in  use  are  basically  of quantity.  No  qualitative  indicators  are  being 
employed. 
The highest correlation in the socio-economic dimension is  encounter between the 
indicators of 'overcrowding', 'GNP', and 'poverty'. 
In the territorial dimension the highest correlation corresponds to the indicators of 
costs (among themselves and with other indicators). 
Several of  the indicators of the socio-economic dimension present a high correlation 
with  that  of  'rurality',  of  the  territorial  dimension.  When  correlating  both 
dimensions  there  is  also  a  high  correlation  between  the  indicator  'distance  to 
Santiago' and the indicator 'unemployment'. 
The indicator of 'territorial dispersion' do  not comply with what has been stated in 
LOCGAR, because population density and dispersion are two different phenomena. 
In addition to  these  problems,  UA  suggests  that the  distribution  of the  90%  of the 
FNDR is  not  being  determined  by  the  indicators  utilised  at  present,  which  are  not 
sufficiently relevant in the definition of the sums received for each region, but, instead, 
by the functional specificity of  the model and , specially, by the control of  the variance. 
5  Empirical  evidence  on  the  mam  purpose  of  the  FNDR 
(Questionnaire) 
A field study was conducted in Chile to  complement the information supplied by the 
three studies  analysed above.  It assessed  changes noted by some  of the main Fondo 
Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) actors from the end of the military regime to 
the start of democratic governments,  during the transition period from the end of the 
1980' up to the beginning of  the 1990'. 
A semi-structured questionnaire gathered information using four closed and one opened 
questions  about  the  future  role  of  the  FNDR.  Seven  relevant  actors  in  both 
academic/theoretical and empirical/practical aspects of  the existence and main objective 
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financing,  were  contacted.  These  seven people had worked directly  with the  FNDR 
during the transition period, at the national and regional level. Five questionnaires were 
received back - three from the national level;  and two from people from the regional 
level. 
The main idea in the use of the questionnaire was to find out the opinion of the people, 
who  had been directly  involved with the  FNDR in that period,  about what they had 
anticipated and had been working for, with respect to what was going to be the new role 
of the FNDR under a democratic  government. It was  generally agreed that the  fund, 
despite  its  objective  for  regional  development  and  overcoming  poverty,  had  been 
mainly used for the hard and solid line of infrastructure.  The idea was to find out to 
what extent these key actors had anticipated something different. 
The first question was about the FNDR and the process of decentralisation that was in 
the  agenda of the  democratic  alliance;  the  second  addressed the  type  of action  and 
sectors of investment to be accomplished; the third to the financial and administrative 
procedures involved; and the fourth referred to the relationship between the FNDR and 
the task of regional development at the regional level.  The fifth question was open in 
order to  encourage  the  interviewees to  add  anything  else  not covered by the  fourth 
structured questions. 
With respect to the relationship between the FNDR and the process of decentralisation 
the representatives of the regions were more optimistic about the role the fund could 
play under a democratic government. In both cases, they saw the FNDR as one of the 
main tools to make sure decentralisation would become a reality. They felt that, due to 
the FNDR multisectoriality, the fund could playa role to coordinate the different public 
offices  and  sectoral  budgets,  particularly  at  the  regional  level.  For the  regions,  the 
FNDR  should  become  the  main  instrument  to  realice  the  regional  strategies  of 
development. This could be achieved if  the fund was to become more decentralised with 
real decision power transfered to the regions. 
Other opinions pointed to  the role  the  FNDR should play to  overcome the negative 
impact that the National Government's economic model had had on some of the less 
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of  regional actors suggested in the DIPRES (1997) and UA (1999) studies. 
The main criticism to the sectors of investment carried out by the FNDR is that from 
1985, the first year in which the IDB started to participate in financing the program, the 
basic social infrastructure sectors selected were those that were already being financed 
by sectoral funding.  In this sense the FNDR just replaced what was already been done 
by other means. All those interviewed agreed in their wish to transform the fund into a 
more comprehensive, regional oriented development fund. 
Two opinions specifically pointed to the role the FNDR should have played at the pre-
investment stage, that is, in the financing of studies and engineering designs to improve 
physical  investment  and  focusing.  The  territorial  aspect  of the  investment  is  also 
mentioned.  According to  one  of the representatives  of the regional level,  the  FNDR 
should  have  concentrated  in  particular  territories  within  regions  to  accomplish  one 
territorial problem in a multisectoral way. 
It is interesting to note that none of the three studies presented before argued in favour 
of this option. In fact, the three studies, and particularly those by DIPRES and UA, the 
more  critical  ones,  identified  many  weaknesses  and  inconsistencies  between  the 
objectives of  the fund and the way this is being actually run, but, at the end, they do not 
progress in presenting and evaluating new alternatives. 
With the beginning of the democratic  governments in Chile in 1990, and particularly 
with the establishment of  the Regional Government institution in the thirteen regions of 
the  country  in  1993,  the  FNDR  achieved  its  major  step  towards  a  decentralised 
administration.  Although this  is  true  in one  sense,  because the regional governments 
effectively became responsible for the financial  administration of the fund,  the many 
restrictions imposed from the central level severely limited the range of action of these 
decentralised and democratically elected bodies. 
The explanation for this is shared by most of the interviewees. The fear of the central 
government was that the regions were  not technically prepared to  carry out the new 
range of regional responsibilities. That was certainly true for the first years of operation 
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experience. The FNDR itself has considered funds to enhance the administrative skills 
required  to  run  the  fund.  On  balance,  after  a  decade  of operation  a  high  level  of 
centralisation is still present in the operation of  FNDR funds in Chile. 
In the same line, both the central and the regional level respondents recognise the lack 
of leadership by  regional government to  produce a break at this respect and validate 
themselves as capable, trust-worthy institutions to lead their own development and fully 
administer their main policy tool which is the FNDR. 
Following  this  line,  the  last two  questions  referred  to  the  relationship  between the 
FNDR and the  development of the  regions  in Chile.  All  interviewed recognised the 
direct  link  between  the  action  of the  fund  and  its  effect  on regional  development. 
However, they disagree in terms of  the degree of intensity of  this relationship. For some 
of them the  central preoccupation on basic social infrastructure,  specially in the less 
populated  peripheral  regions,  has  had  a  significant  impact  on  local  economies  by 
providing the basic environment for  productive investment to arrive.  Furthermore, the 
simple  provision  of  basic  infrastructure  was  said  to  be  a  contribution  for  the 
development of region at this stage of  development. 
On the  other  hand,  the  FNDR has  permitted  the  development  of groups  of public 
officials, politicians, local leaders and professionals who  directly and indirectly have 
worked in the administration of these funds.  This has created the necessary expertise 
within regions to accept new and more complex responsibilities for the management of 
their own development. 
Finally,  the FNDR has  not been able  to  stop the permanent process of political and 
economic  concentration  in  Chile,  but  has,  certainly  played  a  fundamental  role  in 
slowing it down. 
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There are  many questions that arise after looking at the way the FNDR fund  is been 
used, first, with respect to the objectives and variables employed in the distribution of 
fund to regions and its consequential impact on particular sectors, and, second, and in a 
broader  aspect,  from  the  theoretical  point  of view  of regional  development  in  the 
country.  The  description  of the  way  the  fund  has  been  structured  and  the  way  it 
functions together with a review of academic works done in recent years on the fund 
permit us to get closer to the type of  questions that have been asked and the answers that 
have been proposed to the many problems identified in the functioning of  the fund. The 
revision of these three  studies has  permitted to  define more  precisely the  scope  and 
boundaries of  this research. 
The main conclusions and question derived from this revision are summarised below. 
These  were  ordered  according  to  two  categories:  1)  those  that have  to  do  with the 
distribution of funds and with the technical and operational aspects of the process; and 
2)  those related to  more general aspects related to  the impact of the fund on regional 
development and economic growth. 
1)  Conclusions/questions on the distribution of  funds and the technical and operational 
aspects of  the process: 
a)  The redundancy in the use of variables and indicators for the distribution of funds 
from the central government to regions, 
b)  The questionable share regions get from the distribution of funds, despite the weight 
of  population and other social indicators, 
c)  the reduction of the flexibility of the fund due to the introduction and subsequent 
growth ofthe 'Provisions' as a way to increase the availability of  resources, 
d)  the project-by-project approach rather than a more comprehensive programme-based 
strategy in the financing of  projects, 
e)  the  technical  and  administrative  expertise  gained  by  the  responsible  of the 
management of  the fund at the national and regional level, 
f)  the lack of  participation of  the different actors that take part in the process, 
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the different stages of its administration and to the people of the region about its 
management and its action and impact on regions, 
h)  the lack of co-ordination between the FNDR and the rest of  the regional investment 
funds and national sectoral public investment funds, 
i)  Lack of  feedback in the stages of  pre investment-execution-operation of  projects, 
j)  Lack of  resources for operational purposes on projects financed with the fund. 
2) Conclusions/questions on aspects related to regional development 
a)  Contradiction among the objectives of  the fund, 
b)  The  restrictions  imposed  by  IDB  bank  that  limit  the  implementation  of new 
initiatives, 
c)  the  limited number of actions  defined  for  the  fund  in from  of the  wider  set of 
possibilities that may be used to have an impact on regional development (only three 
type of investments: infrastructure, basic studies, and programmes, and in a lesser 
extent pre-investment studies, technical assistance and designs), 
d)  the limited number of sector covered by the action of  the FNDR (90% of  the fund is 
being utilised in just seven economic sectors), 
e)  the unchangeable character of  the fund, or the poor adaptability to new realities, 
f)  Multiplicity of small proj ects and therefore low impact of  regions, 
g)  the  neglected  relationship  between  the  FNDR  and  the  social  indicators  of 
development in certain regions, 
k)  the achievement on the reduction of particular needs (the best example being the 
reduction of  the deficit of domestic electricity supply in rural areas from 50% to less 
than 20% in the last decade), 
1)  Little chance for the FNDR to  contribute to the reduction of regional disparities, 
mainly due to the small amount of  resources available for the fund, 
m) Doubts about the future role of  the FNDR as a regional development fund. 
Several  of the  questions  mentioned  above  have  been addressed  in the  three  studies 
analysed and others in recent years. Although some works have analysed the FNDR in 
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some time only technical, aspects of  the functioning of  the fund. 
Despite the valuable contribution these works have made to the overall understanding of 
the fund,  they have suffered from  several limitations. Among these limitations can be 
mentioned: 
a)  the concentration on rather technical and specific characteristics of  the fund than on 
more general aspects related to regional development, 
b)  Most studies  have  limited themselves to  the  restrictions  imposed by law for  the 
functioning  of the  FNDR,  and  therefore  have  limited  their  findings  to  this 
circumstances, 
c)  Very few studies have trespassed the boundaries of the country to  carry out their 
analysis.  As far  as  it is  known until the completion of this work, no  comparative 
studies have confronted the FNDR with other experiences of  regional funds. 
In  this  sense,  the  present  study  focuses  its  attention  to  the  problems  of regional 
development and the action of  the FNDR. This study goes beyond the limits imposed by 
law for the development of the fund,  and it will use the comparative analysis for the 
study of the main questions or aspects that it intents to address. The next two chapters 
(chapters 5 and 6)  are dedicated to  answer the questions posed in chapter 1 about the 
relationship between the FNDR and regional development in Chile, and to present and 
critically  discuss  on  the  experience  of a  similar  fund  (The  European  Regional 
Development Fund). This will set the ground for comparison between the Chilean case 
and the selected example. 
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Key elements of a well/badly working system. The action of the 
FNDR 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the way the Fondo Nacional de  Desarrollo Regional [Regional 
Development Fund of Chile]  (FNDR)  works.  The analysis considers five  aspects that 
cover most of the action of the fund.  The first part discusses the concept and overall 
objectives of the FNDR as a regional development fund, the second has to  do with the 
specific objectives of the fund; the third assesses the way funds are being allocated to 
the regions;  the fourth describes the type of action and sectors of investment; and the 
last one explores the possible further actions for regional development that arise from 
the presence of a regional fund in the regions. The approach to these five elements is 
made in the form of questions that link each particular element with the overall notion 
of  regional development. These questions are: 
•  Question 1:  What  is the overall aim or concept underpinning the  operation 
of  the FNDR and how has this concept evolved during its twenty-jive years of 
existence?  The  FNDR fund  was  created under a very  different context in 
1974,  compared to  today's political  and  economic  environment.  After  10 
years of operation the fund experienced a significant growth due to  a loan 
from  the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) that,  at the  same time, 
introduced several modifications in the way the fund was to be run  43. 
•  Question 2:  What are  the  objectives of  the  FNDR and how they are  linked 
with regional development? Under this question this work critically discusses 
the objectives of the FNDR and the way the fund has actually been used in 
order to stimulate regional development. 
43 As established by Ley 19,175, Organica Constitucional sobre Gobierno y Administracion Regional 
(LOCGAR), the law that created the Regional Government Institution and set up the objectives and tasks 
for the FNDR fund. 
144 •  Question  3:  Do  the  methods  of allocation  of FNDR funds  all  serve  the 
specific objectives set up for the fund?  This  section explores the different 
methods, variables and indicators employed for the allocation to the regions 
of  the various parts of  the fund. 
•  Question  4:  What  are  the  types  of action  and the  sectors  of investment 
financed by the FNDR? This question accounts in detail for the type of  action 
and  sectors  of investment financed  by the FNDR.  It also  discusses  their 
relevance for regional development.  Data for FNDR investment by sectors 
and regions is presented. 
•  Question 5:  What kind of  actions,  beyond the mere physical investment,  are 
being pursued by the  FNDR  that may contribute to  regional development? 
This question examines whether unanticipated actions and results of FNDR 
action leverage investment and builds institutional and social capacity. Two 
particular examples, currently in use in other funds, are presented. 
The  identification of these particular aspects  of the  running  of the  FNDR fund  will 
provide the key elements that this study intends to compare with those that exist in the 
European Regional Development Fund. This comparison appears in Chapter 7. 
1  The concept of  the FNDR 
Within the  action  of the  public  sector,  the  Fondo  Nacional  de  Desarrollo  Regional 
(FNDR) is  an instrument of at least three public policies:  Regional Development and 
Decentralisation  policy;  Public  Policy  for  Overcoming  Poverty,  and;  Basic  Social 
Infrastructure Supply (DIPRES, 1998). Some ofthese policy objectives of  the FNDR go 
back to  1974, when the  fund  was  set up.  In its  beginnings the fund  was  intended to 
support the development of the newly-created regions of the country. The aim was to 
ensure a balanced and harmonious equilibrium at the intra regional and inter regional 
level.  According  to  DIPRES  (1998),  this  objective  comprised  two  dimensions:  the 
supporting of the process of regionalisation, by strengthening regions as  an alternative 
145 to  the metropolitan region of Santiago, and the improvement of the quality of life of, 
particularly,  poorer people  living  in regions.  The  increase  amount  of investment  in 
regIOns  were  supposed  to  attract  people  looking  for  a  better  quality  of life  and 
environment. 
1.1  Historic account on the concept of  the FNDR 
The concept of the FNDR has experienced several changes since it was created.  The 
fund was primarily conceived as an instrument for regional economic growth, according 
to priorities set up at the national level, in the areas of  basic social infrastructure. In this 
sense, the FNDR was originally directed to  the peripheral regions of the country and 
within them to those identified as such by the national policy for regional development, 
and, as Boisier as pointed out, following either the economic or the geo-politic rationale 
of  the time (Boisier, 1992). 
During the eighties the development strategy adopted by the military government again 
influenced the  objectives of the  FNDR.  Boisier (1992)  suggests out that the export-
oriented economic model pursued by the government had a significant negative effect 
on  the  population  of the  regions.  In  fact,  the  differential  success  in  competing 
internationally left many regions lagging behind in term of their relative development. 
This had severe effects,  specially on the  poorest areas  of the regions.  Since then the 
FNDR began to be  used as  an instrument for  social policy as a way to overcome the 
negative social effects of the economic crisis and the structural adjustment of regions, 
abandoning the fund's original objective (Boisier, quoted in Universidad Austral, 1999). 
This new orientation of  the fund was reinforced in the contract with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB)  for  the  first  FNDR Programme of 1985-1989.  The  second 
FNDR Programme,  1990-1994, is  even more  specific  in addressing that policy.  The 
contract  with  the  IDB  endorses  this  orientation  pointing  out  that  the  Programme's 
objective is to finance investment projects designed to improve the living conditions of 
the  poors.  This was  to  be  achieved  through  of the  execution of investment projects 
intended  to  overcome  the  deficit  or  to  rationalise  the  operation  of basic  services. 
DIPRES  (1998)  suggests  that  the  contracts  with  the  IDB  for  the  three  FNDR 
programmes  have  not  always  been consistent with the  initial  objective  of the  fund, 
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emphasised  its  orientation  to  the  improvement  and  enlargement  of  the  social 
infrastructure supply for the poorest sectors of  the country. 
Another shift in the objectives of  the FNDR is pointed out by Universidad Austral, 1999 
(UA, 1999) after SUBDERE44 created the new 'Provision' for Productive Investment in 
1998.  UA  (1999)45  argues  that  although  the  amount  of resources  destined  to  this 
'Provision' is not very significant, there is a clear re-orientation of the overall objective 
of  the fund.  SUBERE itself, when declaring the objective of  the 'Provision', refers to it 
as a 'transformation' of  the fund. It is argued that the creation of  this 'Provision' implies 
the delivery of additional resources to the Regional Governments. The overall idea is to 
transform this  instrument into  a real territorial  development tool to  allow regions to 
build up and carry out their own regional development strategies (SUBDERE,  1997; 
quoted in UA, 1999). 
This  shift  is  further  sustained  in the  specific  objectives  behind the  creation of this 
'Provision'. SUBDERE declared that the launching of the  'Provision'  for  Productive 
Investment guarantees the existence of a minimum amount of resources for productive 
investment,  eliminating  so  the  competence  with  resources  destined  to  social 
infrastructure.  Although the distribution of this  'Provision' amongst regions  does  not 
include elements for economic compensation, SUBDERE points out that in the future 
these may be well taken into account (UA, 1999). 
1.2  Problems/Controversies about the concept of  the FNDR 
Several controversies have been raised about the way the FNDR has been understood 
and utilised in Chile. UA (1999) identifies four controversies about the concept of the 
FNDR during the last -1995-1999-Programme (see also DIPRES, 1998). 
44 Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo (SUBDERE). SUBDERE is the public office in 
charge of  the allocation ofFNDR funds to the regions of  Chile. 
45  Universidad  Austral  (1999)  is  the  most  recent  critical  study  on  the  variables  of allocation  and 
performance of  the FNDR fund. This study, along with that by DIPRES (1998), are presented in detail in 
chapter 4. 
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decentralisation  vis  the  FNDR  as  a  policy  instrument  for  territorial 
compensation; 
the second discusses on the impact of  the Provisions on the FNDR; 
the third deals with the objectives ofthe fund, and; 
the fourth discusses on the dichotomy people vis territory. 
The third  and  fourth  contradictions  identified  by  UA,  as  they  have  to  do  with the 
obj ectives of  the FNDR and with the method of allocation of funds, will be analysed in 
the next sections of  this chapter. The first two controversies are presented below: 
a)  The  FNDR as  a  policy instrument for  decentralisation vis the  FNDR as  a policy 
instrument for territorial compensation. 
UA (1999) argues that this question arises due to the fact that the FNDR is, in praxis, 
the investment budget of regions. The main characteristic of the fund is that decisions 
on the  allocation  of resources  and  sectors  of investment  are  taken  entirely  within 
regions.  This  characteristic  differentiates  the  FNDR  from  the  rest  of the  existing 
regionalised investment funds. 
This  study  confronts two  different views  on the  subjects.  The first  one  by DIPRES 
(1998),  and the  other from  a statement of a former  director of the  Subsecretaria de 
Desarrollo  Regional y  Administrativo  (SUBDERE)  -the national  office  for  regional 
development. According to DIPRES, the FNDR constitutes the most important financial 
instrument for the process of  decentralisation and regionalisation of  the country, without 
which such a process would just be an empty discourse. For Universidad Austral, this 
statement contradicts those who maintain that the relationship between decentralisation 
and regional development is not always a straight forward relation. 
Gonzalo  Martner,  by then director of SUBDERE,  argued that there was not a clear 
distinction between decentralisation  and  deconcentration,  with all  its  budgetary  and 
financial consequences, and the making of a regional development policy in favour of 
the less developed regions. With regard to FNDR, Martner declares that although many 
have suggested that this fund should be used as a deconcentration and decentralisation 
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p. 38 and 39). 
As it will be seen when looking at the distribution of funds to regions, the FNDR is a 
fund used primarily for regional compensation. What one might question is whether the 
variables  utilised  for  the  distribution  actually  correspond  to  regional  compensation 
measures, or, put in other words, what type ofterritorial compensation is being favoured 
with the actual allocation of resources. FNDR allocation tends to benefit peripheral low 
populated  regions  against  more  populated  and  poorer  regions.  Thus,  territorial 
compensation is  understood as  an  actions  in favour of the  most distant regions with 
respect to the capital city of Santiago (which is geographically located in the centre of 
the territory). 
b) The impact of  the 'Provisions' of  the FNDR 
As presented in chapter 4,  the 'Provisions' of the FNDR are:  Efficiency, Emergency, 
Mining Levies, Education Infrastructure, Rural Electricity, Drugs, Pre-Investment, and 
Productive Investment.  Important from  the second half of the  1990s, the  'Provisions' 
have made the FNDR to grow considerably compared to the rest of regionalised funds. 
In its study, UA highlights two aspects that cast doubts on the actual contribution of  the 
'Provisions'  to  the  FNDR  as  a  regional  fund.  The  first  suggests  that  since  the 
'Provisions'  are  pre-determined in terms  of the type of investment they can actually 
finance, the actual contribution of  them as a regional-based decision making investment 
is  strongly  questioned  because  they  reduce  the  flexibility  of the  fund  as  a  whole. 
According to Angulo"  ...  such constraint would not exist due to the fact that the regions 
spend more in these sectors than the total of  the money actually supply for them through 
Provisions". (Angulo, 1997; quoted in UA 1999, p. 39). 
Nevertheless,  although  it  is  true  that  regions  actually  spend  more  money  than  the 
amounts provided in the  'Provisions' in sectors that already count with a 'Provision' 
(which means that they take money from other 'free' resources of the FNDR to direct 
them to sectors where 'Provisions' do exist), this would in any case limit regions in the 
sense that they do  not have  at their entire  disposal  the  grand total of resources  that 
constitutes the FNDR.  'Provisions'  accounted for a 36% of the total resources of the 
FNDR in 1998. 
149 2  The specific objectives of  the FNDR 
The specific objectives of the FNDR can be found in two official documents, the Law 
of Regional  Government,  Ley N  19,175  Organica  Constitucional sobre  Gobierno y 
Administracion  Regional,  (LOCGAR);  and  the  Regulation  (853/0C-CH)  established 
between the  Government of Chile  and the  Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
Reglamento  Operativo  Prestamo 853/0C-CH Programa de  Desarrollo Local FNDR-
BID 1995-1999" (Reglamento Operativo 1995) that sets up the objectives of the fund, 
the sectors to be financed and the procedures to be followed in the operation of  the IDB 
part of  the funds. 
2.1  Objectives according to the Law 
Article 73 of  LOCGAR defines the FNDR as: 
"a programme of  public investment,  intended for territorial 
compensation  destined  to  the  financing  of the  social  and 
economic  infrastructure  of regions,  whose  purpose  is  to 
attain an harmonious and balanced territorial development". 
The law also establishes that the FNDR fund is to be made up of a portion of the total 
public investment expenditure as set up annually by the national budget bill, and a loan 
from the IDB. Resources are distributed to regions in specific fractions to each of  them 
according to a methodology designed by SUBDERE. 
Article  74  points  out that the  infrastructure  projects,  studies  and  programmes  to  be 
financed by the fund will have to be assessed and authorised by the national or regional 
offices  of the  Ministry  of Planning
46
.  This  approval  will  be  based  on  a  technical-
economical appraisal and, if  the projects were to be financed by an external credit, they 
will  have to  follow the  indications and requirements  established by the terms  of the 
contract of the loan between the Chilean Government and the international counterpart 
(the IDB in this case). 
46 The decision whether a project is assessed at the regional or central level is based on the cost of  the 
project. The central level reserves for itself the analysis of  the largest and most expensive projects. 
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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has participated co-financing the FNDR 
from 1985 in three consecutive loans (148/0C-CH of 1985-1989, 578/0C-CH of 1990-
1994; and 853/0C-CH subscribed in 1995 for the period 1995-1999). The terms of the 
contract  of the  last  loan  between  the  IDB  and  the  Chilean  Government  and  the 
Regulations  for  the  operation  of the  fund  are  contained  in  the  working  document 
Reglamento Operativo 1995. This document contains the rules as to the use and scope 
of  the loan as well as the tasks ofthe FNDR-IDB, the areas in which the IDB part ofthe 
fund  can  be  used  for,  and  the  responsibilities  of the  public  bodies  involved  in  its 
management. 
For the 1995-1999 period, the Reglamento Operativo 1995 establishes that: 
"the  aim  of the  Programme  (FNDR-IDB)  is  to  increase 
social welfare of  the less favoured portion of  the population 
by  improving  and  widening  the  supply  of  existing 
infrastructure  in  the  areas  of Health,  Education,  Drinking 
Water  Supply and Sewer Systems,  Rural and Urban  Roads, 
Domestic  Electricity  in  rural  areas  and other  sectors  that 
might  eventually  be  incorporated  into  the  Programme. 
Beside,  the  Programme  will  also  help  to  foster  the 
development of Regional  Governments".  It then  adds  that, 
" ... it  is  also  the  Programme's  aim  to  contribute  to  the 
consolidation  of the  process  of decentralisation  of the 
country  by financing  projects  conceived  at  the  local  and 
regional level". 
Projects  financed  by  FNDR  resources  are  to  be  designed  under  the  procedures 
established by  the  National  System of Public  Investment  (SNI)  and  selected by the 
corresponding  regional  authorities  (SUBDERE,  1995  Reglamento  Operativo  1995-
1999). 
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Total FNDR 
FNDR-Nat Res 
(60%) 
FNDR-IDB 
(40%)(a) 
Main characteristics 
Funds are allocated to the  13  regions of Chile by 
SUBDERE, based on objective parameters, 
It  basically  finances  Infrastructure  projects 
submitted by the Municipalities and  other public 
bodies in the regions, 
Municipalities  and public  bodies  apply for funds 
through projects, 
Projects are  assessed by the Ministry of  Planning 
and  SERPLAC  (the  regional  offices  of  this 
ministry), 
Works are carried out by Private Contractors, 
Allocation  decision  within  regions,  and  the 
financial  responsibility  lies  on  the  Regional 
Governments, 
When  finished,  the  Works  are  transferred  to  the 
municipalities  and  other  public  responsible 
institutions. 
(a) IDB average participation in the three loans so far (from 1985 to 1999) 
* FNDR total  in 1998 (IDB+National-Resources+Provisions) 
$145,768,251,000 (Chilean pesos) 
Or, US$ 289,128,902 (slightly over two hundred and eighty nine million dollars
47
). 
*  People benefited 
The  FNDR is  intended to  benefit  around  40% of the  Chilean  population,  that  is,  about 
5,928,680 (in the year 1998
48
). FNDR investment per capita = US$48.77!year. 
Considering as beneficiaries only the people living under the line of poverty in the country, 
to which the fund is supposed to be directed (21.7% of  Chilean population) =  US$ 89.9!year. 
2.3  Problems/Contradictions amongst the objectives ofthe FNDR 
Apart  from  the  changes  in  direction  of the  concept  of the  FNDR  discussed  earlier, 
several contradictions have been also identified in the objectives of the FNDR as they 
appear  in  the  two  official  documents,  i.e.  LOCGAR and  the  Reglamento  Operativo 
1995. 
47 1  US$ = 540 Chilean pesos in December 1998 
48 Out of 14,821,700 (Estimated to the year 1998 by the Chilean Statistical Office, INE 2000) 
152 DIPRES (1998), and UA (1999) have recently evaluated the ambiguities, and by some, 
the contradictions that exist amongst the objectives of  the FNDR (and consequently the 
need of  developing appropriate mechanisms for the evaluation of  the overall functioning 
of  the fund and the consecution of its objectives). On the other hand, it is also not clear 
whether the emphasis of  the action of  the FNDR should be put on people or territories. 
These two contradictions are discussed below: 
Problem/Controversy (a) 
Ambiguity  and  contradiction on the  definition  of objectives  for  the  FNDR,  as  they 
appear in the two official documents, LOCGAR and Reglamento Operativo 1995. 
By looking at the objectives of the FNDR as  stated in LOCGAR, these are really not 
explicitly  enunciated,  although  they  can  be  deduced  from  the  statement of Art.  73 
presented above.  It is  appropriate to  say that no  other part in LOCGAR refers more 
explicitly  to  the  specific  objectives  of the  FNDR.  They  do  appear  more  clearly 
established in the Reglamento Operativo 1995 (the IDB Regulations for the 1995-1999 
period), but again they are necessarily consistent with those stated in LOCGAR. 
According  to  UA  (1999),  the  definition  of the  overall  objective  of the  FNDR,  by 
LOCGAR, comprises two elements that constitute the keystones of  the fund:  'territorial 
compensation'  and  'territorial and balanced development of regions'. UA argues that 
the second of these directives represents the primary purpose of the fund and the basic 
principle that must guide the government and administration of  the state. 
The  first  problem  on  the  understanding  of the  specific  objectives  of the  FNDR, 
according  to  DIPRES,  come  from  the  wording of the  objectives  in the two  official 
documents set for this purpose. 
DIPRES  argues  that there  is  no  logic  in the  structuring of the  objectives nor in the 
language utilised. There is  a confusion on the  'means' and the  'goals' as they appear 
mixed on the declaration of objectives.  This can be  clearly observed in the objective 
stated for the third phase of the credit from the IDB  (Reglamento Operativo  1995). In 
fact,  the  objective  stated  makes  equivalent  the  'institutional  development'  and  the 
'financing of investment proj ects' that should be considered as  'means', and the 'social 
153 and economic development', and in particular the  'improvement of the conditions of 
living of  the poorest' that should be considered 'goals'. 
Another  important  aspect  highlighted  by  DIPRES  is  the  lack  of  corresponding 
indicators for  the evaluation of the  achievement of the objectives of the  FNDR.  The 
measure of  the success of  the Programme have been, therefore, mostly based on the way 
the fund is being administrated, and especially in the level of the total expenditures at 
the end of each financial year, rather than in its actual impact as a regional development 
tool. 
Many interpretations have been drawn from these two statement in terms of  the possible 
number of objectives and the specific meaning of  them. DIPRES argues that by looking 
at the objectives stated in LOCGAR and in the Reglamento Operativo 1995, there are 
clearly three objectives. According to DIPRES, these objectives have been treated with 
differential emphasis in the official documents concerning the subject. 
The objectives identified by DIPRES (1998) from these two sources are: 
Objective 1:  to support the process of  regionalisation and territorial compensation, 
Objective 2:  to improve the living conditions of  low-income groups 
Objective 3:  to foster the institutional development of  Regional Governments 
At this  point,  it  is  important to  make  clear that these  three  objectives  are  the  ones 
utilised in this study to carry on the subsequent comparisons, testing and analysis on the 
objectives of  the FNDR. Having stated this, let's look at the second contradiction of  the 
objectives of  the FNDR fund. 
154 Problem/Controversy (b) 
Territorial  compensation vis  improving  the  living  conditions  of low-income  groups 
(objective 1 vis objective 2). 
From Chapter 3 we know which were the regions that exhibited the worse and the best 
economic and social indicators. These regions were labelled as the loser and the winner 
regions of the current strategy of development of the country (see reproduction of table 
3.12 from chapter 3, below). 
From Chapter 3 
Table 3.12: Winner and Loser Regions grouped by Economic and Social Performance 
(1986-1998) 
Absolute loser  Loser regions  Winner regions 
regions 
Economic  I, IV,  II, III, 
indicators  V, VI, VIII,  VII,  RM 
XI, XII  IX, X 
Social  III, IV,  I, II, 
indicators  VIII,  VI, VII,  V,RM, 
IX  X, XI  XII 
Overall  I, III, IV,  II, 
performance  VIII  V, VI, VII,  RM 
IX, X, XI, XII 
The last row of this table summarises the overall performance of regions in these two 
sets of indicators.  If FNDR funds  were to  be  distributed according to  the  'territorial 
compensation'  objective  (objective  1),  there  are  plenty  of regions  to  choose  from, 
starting  with  region  VIII  (Biobio).  However,  whether  the  allocation  of funds  has 
followed this patter is not clear, as it will be demonstrated below. 
In fact, it has been argued (DIPRES,  1998) that the social justification in the action of 
the  FNDR,  i.e.  the  emphasis  on  poverty,  and  the  search  for  a  balanced  economic 
development of regions (a concept that has traditionally been associated with territorial 
development), which have been the two most important justifications in the distribution 
of funds, bears an implicit contradiction. The reason for this is that in Chile the major 
concentration of population occurs in the central regions of the country (the ones that 
also  concentrate  the  greater  amount  of poverty),  which  contrary  to  the  objectives, 
receive the lowest per capita allocation ofFNDR funds (see table 5.1 below). 
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used in the investment of social and economic infrastructure projects developed at the 
regional level, the emphasis has actually been placed in the support of the process of 
regionalisation and in the concept of territorial compensation.  According to  DIPRES, 
this means that there is total correspondence between objectives 1 and 2.  However, the 
participation  of the  IDB  co-financing  the  FNDR,  has  significantly  modified  the 
emphasis on these objectives. 
Table 5.1  shows the allocation of FNDR resources per capita for all regions of Chile in 
1994 and 1998 (at the end of the previous FNDR-IDB Programme and during the last 
Programme in operation).  The third column presents the income distribution and  the 
fourth the level of  poverty compared to the national average. 
Table 5.1: FNDR distribution, Income Distribution (Gini) and Poverty by region 
(Poverty: Index Average = 100) 
Region  FNDR per inhabitant  Income  Poverty 
(Country = 100.00)  Distributi  (Country 
on  = 100.002 
1994  1998  1998(a)  1998 
I  TaraEaca  268.42  275.00  0.49  79.53 
II  Antofagasta  234.21  233.93  0.53  65.13 
III  Atacama  347.37  401.79  0.50  141.23 
IV  Coguimbo  226.32  212.50  0.55  124.49 
V  ValEaraiso  68.42  62.50  0.53  93.49 
RM  Santiago  13.16  14.29  0.58  76.60 
VI  O'Higgins  147.37  132.14  0.53  115.10 
VII  Maule  136.84  133.93  0.53  139.49 
VIII  Biobio  60.53  62.29  0.59  147.04 
IX  La Araucania  155.26  146.43  0.63  156.98 
X  Los Lagos  118.42  121.43  0.55  121.26 
Xl  Aysen  1536.84  1,528.57  0.59  75.11 
XII  Magallanes  726.32  714.29  0.55  58.97 
Count!):  100.00  100.00  0.58  100.00 
(a) Preliminary data 
Source: Mideplan 1999a, and Mideplan Casen 1998 
Table 5.2 below summarises the correlation between the allocation of the FNDR fund 
from  1994 to  1998 with the level of poverty by region as  in 1998. Poverty per region 
has  changed  during  this  five  year  period,  with  poverty  for  1998  having  decreased 
significantly from  that of 1994.  FNDR allocation,  on the other hand,  and  except for 
1994  where  a  different  methodology  was  being  used,  has  not  changed.  The  most 
important  feature  of the  correlation  indices  is  the  figure  for  1998  that recorded  the 
156 highest negative value. This means that funds were allocated in greater amounts to less 
poor regions. 
Table 5.2: FNDR per Capita and Poverty per Region Correlation 
Correlation  Significance 
Coefficient  (2-tailed) 
1994  -0.396  0.181 
1995  -0.352  0.239 
1996  -0.308  0.306 
1997  -0.385  0.194 
1998  -0.434  0.138 
Figure 5.1 a and 5.1 b, below group regions above or below the national average in terms 
of the three  indicators presented in Table  5.1  (figures  for  1998  were used in FNDR 
allocation data). In both cases, the most populated regions of central Chile, Valparaiso, 
Santiago  and  Biobio  are  below  the  national  average  in  the  share  of FNDR  funds 
allocation.  These  regions  are  the  ones  that  concentrate  the  largest  number  of poor 
people, although in some cases they are above average in terms of income distribution 
(Santiago and Biobio) or below average in poverty levels (Valparaiso and Santiago). 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
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~ 
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J:J. 
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Valparaiso,  Biobio,  bJI 
~ 
10. 
Q,j 
:> 
-< 
~  (Santiago)  Santiago 
oS 
Q,j 
~ 
Figure 5.1a: FNDR and Income distribution 
157 The peripheral regions of the north and south macro zones are all above the average in 
FNDR per capita allocation. Some of these regions are also above the national average 
in  income  distribution  and  below  the  average  in  poverty  level,  which  means  that 
although they are not problem regions in terms of these two indicators they still get a 
greater share in FNDR allocation. 
Thus,  FNDR  allocation  is  clearly  more  oriented  to  territories  than  to  low-income 
groups. Regional allocation of funds benefits more, therefore, peripheral less populated 
regions with less disperse income distribution and with less  severe poverty problems 
than those of central Chile that exhibit the greater economic and social problems. 
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Figure 5.lb: FNDR and Poverty 
Problem/Controversy (c) 
Fostering  the  institutional  development  of  Regional  Government  vis  territorial 
compensation and improving the living conditions of low-income groups (objective 3 
vis objectives 1 and 2). 
In the previous Programmes I and II,  DIPRES noticed an emphasis in favouring  the 
poorest areas of the  country.  On the  third programme,  however,  a fundamental  shift 
158 could be recorded. In the III Programme, The IDB Regulation for the FNDR stated that 
another objective of  the fund was to foster the institutional development of  the Regional 
Governments'  (Objective  3),  as  well  as  to  continue  supporting  the  previous  two 
objectives,  with emphasis,  this  time,  on  the  investment in projects  originated  at the 
regional and local level. 
The introduction of this new objective by the IDB added a new preoccupation for the 
FNDR. According to DIPRES (1998), this is a change where the FNDR would not just 
be a fund for social investment, where the beneficiaries were the people who  actually 
use the resulting infrastructure of these investments. Under this new objective the fund 
would also  have the objective of strengthening regional public institutions where the 
final beneficiaries would be the institutions that are the object of  this initiative. 
The supply of basic social infrastructure, which can be said to  be consistent with the 
objectives of improving the living conditions of low-income groups (Objective 2), has 
largely dominated over the other two objectives. What is not clear is the compromise of 
the  FNDR with the  objective of institutional  development,  which seems  to  be  much 
more addressed in the last FNDR Programme (period 2000-2005). See Appendix 4. 
2.4  Summary and conclusions 
On Problem/Controversy (a) 
- As there are no clear indicators or goals associated to  the  different objectives of the 
FNDR, assessing their achievement is a difficult task. According to DIPRES (1998) the 
first  objective,  'regionalisation  and  territorial  compensation',  has  been  successfully 
achieved during the years of existence of the FNDR fund.  The fact that the amount of 
resources has experienced a real increase over the years and that these have been mainly 
allocated to the peripheral regions of  the country is a clear indication of  this success. 
As it has been suggested by several studies before (DIPRES, 1998; Universidad Austral, 
1999;  Boisier,  2000),  it  is  necessary  to  re-draw  and  re-phrase  the  objectives  of the 
FNDR in order to differentiate, correctly, the 'means' and the 'goal' declared in the two 
official documents mentioned.  By  doing  so,  it will be  easier to  increase the level of 
159 efficiency and efficacy of  the fund, and, at the same time, to facilitate future evaluations 
on the performance of  the fund. 
On Problem/Controversy (b) 
- The question whether the FNDR is oriented to  territories rather than to low-income 
groups  is,  however,  not  a  real  controversy.  It is  true  that  the  fund  is  oriented  to 
peripheral  less  densely  populated  regions,  but within  these  regions  the  FNDR does 
benefit the poorest segments of  the region's population. 
- Therefore, according to DIPRES, the objective of focusing investment on poor people 
has been achieved. The study found that the goods and services associated to the actions 
of the  Programme  have  actually  reached  the  less  favoured  people  of the  regions. 
Nevertheless, DIPRES questions whether this money could have been used to benefit a 
larger number of people by focusing its action on more densely populated areas of the 
country, that is, the central regions of  the country instead of  the peripheral ones. 
For  this  reason,  the  allocation  of funds  from  the  central  government  (SUBDERE) 
should  be  re-directed  in  either  of  these  two  directions  in  order  to  avoid  the 
contradictions that still remain. If  the main interest is people, funds would be better used 
by focusing its action where the larger amounts of poverty exist (the most populated 
regions of  central Chile). 
Regions  of central  Chile,  although  receiving  smaller amounts  of resources  from  the 
FNDR, enjoy of much larger amounts of resources through other public funds  on the 
areas  of housing,  health,  etc.,  together  with  more  private  investment.  This  is  an 
influential argument in favour of the idea of allocating FNDR funds  preferentially to 
peripheral regions, as it occurs today. 
On Problem/Controversy (c) 
- With  regard  to  the  third  objective,  'institutional  development',  although  several 
programmes have been financed to improve the technical skills of  the public servants of 
the Regional Government and other public offices involved in the administration of the 
FNDR,  there  are  no  clear  indications  as  to  whether  these  programmes  have  been 
successful or not.  Given the short period of time since this objective was set up, more 
160 specific goals will have to be pursued in order to facilitate futures evaluations. DIPRES' 
study highlights the importance of this  objective for  regional development due to  the 
increasingly number of  responsibilities that are being given to Regional Governments. 
With respect to the disagreement of the objectives of the FNDR, a similar controversy 
existed  in  the  case  of the  Fondo  de  Compensacion  Interterritorial  [the  Regional 
Development Fund of Spain]  (FCI), before this fund were assimilated to the ERDF at 
the beginning of the  1990s.  According to  Castells (1992a),  the two  objectives of the 
FCI: a) the reduction of  the imbalances in economic wealth among the Spanish regions, 
and  b)  the  financing  of the  services  that  were  transferred  from  the  central  to  the 
autonomic  communities,  were  not  correlated  and  therefore  not  able  to  appropriately 
satisfy  both  aims  at  the  same  time.  The  reform  of the  FCI  of 1990  overcame  this 
controversy  by  explicitely  subdividing  the  fund  into  two  interrelated  parts,  each  of 
which  was  assigned  an  specific  amount  of resources  in  the  budget  of each  year 
(Castells, 1992b). The law that accounted for these changes also established the method 
of  allocation of  resources among the eligible regions. 
3  Method of  allocation of funds to regions 
Contrary to  the  case of the FCI, the  FNDR is  allocated to  all the thirteen regions of 
Chile. For allocation purposes the FNDR is  divided into two main groups: the FNDR-
IDB  Programme (FNDR-IDB plus FNDR-National Resources), and the Provisions of 
the  FNDR.  The  FNDR-IDB  Programme  is  allocated to  the thirteen regions  of Chile 
according to  two  different criteria.  First,  90%  of the  fund  is  distributed according to 
socio-economic  and territorial  parameters.  Second,  the  remaining  10%  is  distributed 
according to the concepts of Efficiency and Emergency (both concepts will be defined 
below in this  section).  This  general  division is  established  by  the  Law of Regional 
Governments  (LOCGAR).  Article  75  of this  law  establishes  that the  amounts  to  be 
allocated to the regions that correspond to the 90% of  the FNDR are to be stated in the 
public  budget  bill  of every  year  and  its  distribution  will  be  made  considering  two 
aspects:  the  socio-economic dimension and the territorial  dimensions of each region 
161 with regard to the national context. According to LOCGAR, the methodology to be used 
for these purposes is to give these two dimensions the same weight. 
The Provisions of  the FNDR: Education infrastructure, Rural electricity, Mining, Drugs, 
Pre-investment, Productive Investment and the Compensation fund for Water and Sewer 
systems  are  allocated  by  SUBDERE  in  conjunction  with  the  interested  ministry 
(Education, Energy, Mining, etc.). The methods of allocation of the Provisions are not 
examined in this work, although the overall effects of the existence of the Provision is 
discussed on the analysis of  the allocation of  the FNDR. 
3.1  Methods of  allocation 
•  Allocation of  the 90% of  the FNDR 
•  Allocation of  the 10% of  the FNDR 
- Allocation of  the Provision of  Efficiency 
•  Allocation of  the other Provisions 
3.1.1  Allocation ofthe 90% of  the FNDR 
Dimensions and Variables utilised 
a)  The socio-economic dimension of the region is to be measured using variables that 
will, at least, consider the infant mortality rate, the percentage of  people living under 
the poverty line, the per capita regional product, and others conditions related to the 
quality oflife, health, education, and environment of  the regions (Art 75); 
b)  The territorial dimension is to be measured through out variables that will consider, 
at least, the population dispersion, rurality, ecological deterioration, differences in 
the cost of  road construction, and the distance from the region to Santiago (Art 75). 
Data to be utilised in the different variables employed in the methodology of allocation 
of resources will be that supplied for  the  corresponding Ministries and the National 
Institute of Statistics  (INE)  , or,  if appropriated,  these  will be taken from  recognised 
international institution. 
162 The current methodology (in operation in 1999) was designed by SUBDERE in 1995 on 
the basis of LOCGAR directions. This methodology considers the utilisation of eleven 
variables for the Economic and Social Dimension and six for the Territorial Dimension 
with data dis-aggregated at the regional level. 
Economic and Social dimension (Variables) 
1)  Infant mortality rate 
Number of  death amongst children under one year of  age over one thousand born alive; 
2)  Poverty level 
Percentage of  population under the line of  poverty (measured in term of  income per 
head according to the methodology of  the Ministry of  Planning). 
3)  Unemployment 
Annual average unemployment in percentage 
4)  GDP per capita 
Regional GDP/region's population (lIGDP per capita) 
5)  Professional attention at birth 
Percentage of  birth attended by professionals (1 OO-professional attention) 
6)  Inhabitants per physician 
Total population/number of  physicians (Tot pop/phys*1000) 
7)  Inhabitant per beds in hospital 
Total population/number of  beds in hospitals 
8)  Infant malnutrition 
Nutritional state of  children of  less than 6 years of  age. Based on the indicators weight 
and height, according to the WHO standards 
9)  Education 
Attendance to Primary and Secondary education in percentage (lOO-Attendance) 
10)  Access to Basic Services 
Percentage of  households with access to drinking water, sewer systems and electricity 
(100- Access to Basic Services) 
11)  Overcrowding 
Percentage of  households with three or more persons per single room in each house 
Territorial Dimension (Variables) 
1)  Population dispersion 
Inhabitants/square kilometres 
2)  Rurality 
Percentage of  people living in rural areas 
3)  Ecological Deterioration 
Deterioration of the natural resources,  of the  social environment,  and environmental 
pollution. 
4)  Costs of  Road Construction 
The actual cost of constructing a kilometre of road utilising the same standard for  all 
regions 
5)  Costs of  Building Construction 
Total cost/total surface constructed, including the cost ofland (cost/m2) 
6)  Distance to the Capital City 
Distance from the capital's regions to Santiago in kilometres 
163 Based on the use of  these variables, table 5.3 below shows the share each of  the thirteen 
regions  of Chile  received  in  the  annual  allocation  of resources  in  1997.  The  least 
populated region of the  country,  Aysen,  received the greatest proportion of the  fund 
compared to  Santiago, the most populated region, that received the lowest amount of 
resources in absolute terms. 
Table 5.3: Distribution of  90% of  the FNDR, 1997 
Region  Distribution 
of90% 
I  Tara2aca  7.02 
II  Antofagasta  7.22 
III  Atacama  7.01 
IV  Coguimbo  8.14 
V  Val2araiso  6.50 
RM  Santiago (b)  6.07 
VI  O'Higgins  7.21 
VII  Maule  8.24 
VIII  Biobio  8.22 
IX  La Araucania  8.38 
X  Los Lagos  8.60 
XI  Aysen  9.59 
XII  Magallanes  7.80 
Country  100.00 
Source: Universidad Austral (1999) 
3.1.2  Allocation of  the 10% of  the FNDR 
The allocation of the remaining 10% is  subdivided into two Provisions: Efficiency and 
Emergency. Article 76  states that these are to  be allocated according to the following 
criteria: 
a)  5%  will be allocated as  an stimulus to  efficiency,  considering,  at  least,  the  ratio 
between  the  actual  expenditure  of the  region  and  the  total  cost  of the  projects 
(considering  only those  with  positive  evaluation  for  the  current year,  or  the  RS 
projects
49
); 
49 RS project is  a project already assessed and approved by the Ministry of Planning (at the regional or 
central level). 
164 b)  5% is to be kept by SUBDERE ( at the national level) for emergencies5o. This part 
of the  fund  can be  delivered any  time through out the  year  as  a response  to  an 
emergency in any of  the regions. There is no methodology to allocate this Provision. 
Allocation of  the Provision of  Efficiency 
According to  Article 76  of LOCGAR the  distribution of the 5%  corresponding to the 
Provision of  Efficiency has to include at least: 
•  the  ratio  between the  actual  expenditures  of a  current year  and  the  total  FNDR 
budget of  the previous year; 
•  the sum of the costs of all the projects that show a positive evaluation for the given 
year (the RS projects) 
Beside this minimum requirements  established by law,  SUBDERE has  considered a 
number of other variables. The number of variables considered have experienced few 
changes over the years. Table 5.4 below present the variables considered for the years 
1996, 1997, and 1998. 
Table 5.4: Variables used in the distribution of  the Provision of  Efficiency 
1996  1997-1998 
Percentage  of  accumulated  expenditures  -
measured every three months (50%) 
Percentage  of funds  allocated  to  the  poorest  -
municipalities (15%) 
Projects in the category of RS  as a percentage  -
of  the initial budget of  the region (15%) 
RS Proj ects, total cost (10%) 
Percentage of resources employed to  finance 
Basic  Studies,  Pre-investment,  and-
Engineering Designs (10%) 
Source: Universidad Austral, 1999 and SUBDERE 
Total expenditure at the  end of the year as  a 
ratio of  the final budget (30%) 
Final  actual  expenditure  as  a  ratio  of the 
Programme cash flow (20%) 
RS  projects (in  costs)  as  a percentage of the 
initial budget (20%) 
Actual  monthly  expenditure  as  a ratio  of the 
Programme monthly cash flow (15%) 
RS projects (total cost) 
Regularity in the expenditure flow 
50  Emergencies  are  qualified as  such  by SUBDERE.  Projects  fmanced  by this  Provision  go  from  the 
construction of schools or health premises that have collapsed due to fire or other natural disasters to the 
acquisition of  supplies for these same sectors (Education, Health) or others eligible sectors by the fund. 
165 Table 5.5: FNDR, Distribution of  funds for Efficiency 
Region  1996  1997 
I  Tarapaca  6.93  7.88 
II  Antofagasta  12.46  5.94 
III  Atacama  10.14  11.00 
IV  Coquimbo  9.29  8.69 
V  Valparaiso  8.44  9.22 
RM  Santiago  7.43  6.28 
VI  O'Higgins  4.99  8.79 
VII  Maule  1.47  8.14 
VIII  Biobio  3.75  3.45 
IX  La Araucania  7.17  9.72 
X  Los Lagos  9.71  6.97 
XI  Aysen  9.39  6.84 
XII  Magallanes  8.83  7.07 
Total  100.00  100.00 
Source: Adapted from Universidad Austral, 1999 
The  amounts  of resources  can  differ  greatly  year-over-year  in  the  allocation of this 
Provision because of the nature of the variables utilised and the technical expertise of 
the  regional  personnel  in  charge  of the  administration  of the  fund.  Main  variation 
between 1996  and  1997  occurred in  Antofagasta,  O'Higgins and Maule  (Table  5.5). 
The indicators considered in the allocation of this Provision are so clearly indicated and 
known by all regions that achieving a poor performance is the entire responsibility of 
the region affected. 
3.1.3  Allocation of  the other Provisions of  the FNDR 
The  rest  of the  Provisions  of the  FNDR  (apart  from  Efficiency  and  Emergency) 
altogether  account  for  over  36%  of the  total  FNDR investment  in  1998.  Education 
infrastructure and Rural electricity represent almost two third of  this percentage. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  allocation  of the  Provisions,  other  than  Efficiency  and 
Emergency,  is  done  by SUBDERE and the  interested ministry that supply the  funds 
(Education, Energy, Mining, etc). Sectoral rather than regional criteria are utilised. 
The most interesting feature  on the  existence of the  Provisions, to  the  effects of this 
work, is their growing importance within the FNDR fund.  Table 5.6 below illustrates 
the increasingly importance of the Provisions, both in term of their number and their 
166 importance in the total resources of  the FNDR. In 1994 four Provisions accounted for a 
little over 18% ofthe total budget while in 1998, having more than double their number, 
they represented over 36% of  the total fund. 
Table 5.6: FNDR-National Resources (Provisions) and FNDR-IDB 
Provisions  1994  1996  1998 
MM$  %  M$  %  M$  % 
Efficienc~  3,883  4.07  4,140  3.72  4,572  3.14 
Emergenc~  3,883  4.07  4,140  3.72  4,572  3.14 
Mining Levies  494  0.52  1,385  1.24  2,318  1.59 
Education Infrastructure  9,902  10.37  16,057  14.42  28,594  19.62 
Rural Electricity  3,197  2.87  4,769  3.27 
Drugs  11  0.01  10  0.01 
Pre-Investment  1,055  0.72 
Productive Investment  2,900  1.99 
Compensation  Fund  for  4,000  2.74 
Water & Sewer Systems 
FNDR-Nat. Resources  18,162  19.02  28,928  25.98  52,790  36.21 
FNDR-IDB+Inv.  77,338  80.98  82,435  74.02  92,979  63.79 
Menores 
Total FNDR Investment  95,499  100.00  111,363  100.00  145,768  100.00 
Source: Adapted from Universidad Austral (1999) 
Note: Millions of  Chilean pesos of 1998 
3.2  Final allocation to regions 
As a result of  the application of  the methodologies describe above, the regions of Chile 
received  the  following  amounts  of resources  in  recent  years.  Table  5.7  shows  the 
differences  between  the  initial  allocation  of the  90%  and  the  final  outcome  after 
including the other 10% and the rest ofthe Provision of  the FNDR. 
Table 5.7: 90% ofFNDR allocation and final outcome ofFNDR-total (1997) and population per region 
Region  Allocation  Final allocation  % Population (aJ  FNDRIPop 
of90%  (FNDR-Total)  per regions  (in %) 
I  Tarapaca  7.02  9.26  2.62  3.53 
II  Antofagasta  7.22  8.33  3.08  2.70 
III  Atacama  7.01  7.29  1.80  4.05 
IV  Coquimbo  8.14  6.92  3.80  1.82 
v  Valparaiso  6.50  6.16  10.26  0.60 
RM  Santiago (b)  6.07  8.79  40.12  0.22 
VI  O'Higgins  7.21  6.79  5.19  1.31 
VII  Maule  8.24  6.66  6.02  1.11 
VIII  Biobio  8.22  10.25  12.73  0.81 
IX  La Araucania  8.38  7.27  5.75  1.26 
X  Los Lagos  8.60  9.83  6.98  1.41 
XI  Aysen  9.59  6.85  0.62  11.05 
XII  Magallanes  7.80  5.60  1.04  5.38 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  1.00 
(aJPopulation (Estimated 2000) INE, 2000. 
Source: Universidad Austral, 1999 
167 The first column shows the FNDR resources that would have correspond to each region 
by the  simple distribution of funds  according to  the  law (90%).  The second column 
presents the final  distribution of resources after including the  10% and the rest of the 
Provisions. Thus, the difference between these two first columns show the impact of  the 
Provisions in the final allocation of funds.  Table 5.7, above, also presents the share of 
population of each region (column 4) and the ratio between the regions shares in FNDR 
funds  (final  distribution)  and  population  with  respect to  the  country's total  in each 
variable (column 5). 
Figures in column 5 are calculated by dividing the FNDR final allocation (column 3) by 
the percentage of  population of each region with regard to the national total (column 4). 
As the total for each of these two column sums 100 (100.00 per cent), the result for the 
country is 1.00 (one). Thus, figures for each regions in column 5 represent the regional 
variance  respect  to  the  national  average.  Three  regions  present  figures  below  1.0, 
Valparaiso, Santiago and Biobio which indicate a below average availability of FNDR 
funds. The larger the figure in this column indicates a greater per capita FNDR. 
The  way  the  'Provisions'  impact  on  the  final  distribution  of  the  FNDR  was 
demonstrated by  Universidad Austral  (1999)  by  analysing the  variation between the 
initial distribution and the final allocation after including all the Provisions. 
In Table 5.8 below, the distribution of 90% according to the methodology is equalled to 
1 for each region. Thus, the figures for the four years represent the variations from the 
initial to the final distribution. For 1997, the regions of Santiago, Tarapaca, and Biobio 
(RM,  I and VIII) for example exhibit the most significant gains, while the regions of 
Aysen,  Magallanes,  and Maule  (XI,  XII  and  VII)  are  the  less  favoured  for  this  late 
outside methodology distribution. It is possible to  say that, in general, the introduction 
of  the Provisions tend to benefit the most populated regions of  the country. 
168 Table 5.8: Increase in the final distribution of  the FNDR 
after including the Provisions, 1994-1997 (90% = 1.00) 
Region  1994  1995  1996  1997 
I  Tarapaca  2.02  2.24  2.32  2.08 
II  Antofagasta  1.82  2.10  2.12  1.83 
III  Atacama  1.59  1.52  1.83  1.65 
IV  Coquimbo  1.62  1.33  1.95  1.35 
V  Valparaiso  1.50  1.48  1.69  1.50 
RM  Santiago  2.15  1.56  1.82  2.29 
VI  O'Higgins  1.38  1.48  1.54  1.49 
VII  Maule  1.24  1.36  1.49  1.28 
VIII  Biobio  1.64  1.77  2.08  1.97 
IX  La Araucania  1.30  1.36  1.57  1.37 
X  Los Lagos  1.59  1.55  1.90  1.81 
XI  Aysen  1.13  1.17  1.43  1.13 
XII  Magallanes  1.40  1.38  1.44  1.14 
Country  1.53  1.56  1.82  1.58 
Source: Universidad Austral, 1999 
3.3  Importance of  the FNDR within regions 
The total public investment in regions varies considerable depending on their size and 
population.  The  importance of the FNDR within total  public  investment in regions, 
therefore also varies considerably from one region to the other (Table 5.9). For the less 
populated regions of  the 'north and south macro zones' of  the country, for example, the 
FNDR represents over a fourth, and even a third, of  the total public investment. For the 
regions of the centre the FNDR becomes less important, with Valparaiso and Santiago 
showing figures of7 and 3 per cent of  their total investment respectively. 
There is not much variation in the period shown with some regions gaining or losing a 
point in the  importance of the  FNDR within total  public  investment.  As the FNDR 
allocation provides almost the same absolute amounts of resources to all the regions of 
the country (see Table 5.7 above), the enormous differences in the weight of  the FNDR 
within  regions,  compare  to  each  other,  come  from  the  difference  in  term  of their 
population and size and therefore in the total amount of public investment devoted to 
them. 
169 Table 5.9: ParticiEation ofFNDR in total Regional Investment (%) 1994-1996 
Region  1994  1995  1996 
I  TaraEaca  22.80  19.48  22.11 
II  Antofagasta  25.38  20.65  22.39 
III  Atacama  23.31  20.68  26.35 
IV  Coguimbo  22.35  12.14  17.70 
V  ValEaraiso  7.09  5.40  7.85 
RM  Santiago  3.00  2.58  3.17 
VI  O'Higgins  15.36  10.89  11.44 
VII  Maule  11.94  12.25  11.98 
VIII  Biobio  7.85  7.01  6.99 
IX  La Araucania  13.23  13.59  12.10 
X  Los Lagos  12.84  9.18  10.01 
XI  Aysen  34.35  28.02  37.05 
XII  Mas;allanes  26.61  2l.95  23.47 
Source: Subdere, 1999 
The central regions of Santiago, Biobio and Valparaiso (VIII and V) are the three most 
populated  of the  country,  while  the  peripheral  regions  of Aysen,  Magallanes,  and 
Antofagasta (XI, XII and II) are the least densely populated. Santiago, in which there is 
a concentration of  40.1 % of  the population of  the country attracts most of  the public (as 
well as private) investment. Therefore, the FNDR represents only a small proportion of 
that total. In contrast, for Aysen (with only 0.6% of the population of Chile) the FNDR 
represents more than a third of  its total public investment. 
3.4  Summary and conclusions 
Problems with the methods of  allocation of  FNDR funds 
- The objectives stated by law vis the allocation ofthe Provisions 
This  problem  arises  because  the  resources  of the  'Provisions'  are  not  allocated  to 
regions  according to  the  variables  and  indicators  established for  the  FNDR by  law. 
These variables represent the social, economic, and territorial differences among regions 
that the fund intends to  precisely tackle.  As  the  'Provisions' are incorporated into the 
FNDR after this has been allocated to  regions according to the methodology, the final 
amount each region receives is therefore significantly different of that intended by the 
methodology.  In real terms, this means that the  '90%' of the FNDR that is  allocated 
using the objective socio-economic and territorial variables is actually only a 63.79% of 
the total FNDR fund (figure for 1998. See Table 5.6 above). 
170 Quoted by UA (1999), Angulo (1997) rejects the existence of  this contradiction arguing 
that the 'Provisions' more than been part ofthe FNDR should be understood as parallel 
mechanisms  for  regional  investment,  assimilated to  the FNDR but not an  integrated 
parts of  it. 
- The decentra1ised character of  the FNDR vis the Provisions 
It is a fact that the existence of  the Provisions restricts the capabilities of regions to use 
the FNDR fund as they wish. This occurs because the Provisions have to be used in the 
economic sectors for which they have been designed. As the Provisions represent over 
36% of the total  FNDR (figures  for  1998)  this  is  a matter of great  concern for  the 
Regional  Governments  who  have  seen  the  FNDR  actually  grow  but  on  the  more 
restricted funding side of  the Provisions. 
Angulo argues that this restriction is not real due to the fact that regions actually spend 
more in the economic sectors served by the Provisions than has in fact been allocated to 
each of  them (Angulo 1997, quoted in UA,  1999). This may be true, but the restriction 
for the Regional Governments still exist, and this would be proved if they decided to 
used FNDR fund for a different purpose. 
- The dichotomy people vis territory 
The fact that the less populated regions of  the country receive more funds than the most 
densely populated ones has been a matter of long discussion in Chile. An example from 
UA  (1999)  reports  SUBDERE  arguing  that  this  apparent  contradiction  is  justified 
because the allocation method allows the regions a new social actor into the political 
arena.  "The  important thing  is  to  consider  regions  not in terms  of their  number  of 
inhabitants, but in terms of  the territory they represent" (SUBDERE, 1991 )51. 
- The poor definition of  the variables used 
This problems was pointed out by UA (1999)  and has to  do  with the following three 
aspects about the variables and indicators utilised in the method of allocation of FNDR 
funds. 
51  Quoted in Universidad Austral (1999). 
171 The fact that the two dimensions (socio-economic and territorial) have the same weight 
within the  method  of distribution  of funds  (50%  each)  means  that each  of the  six 
variables of the territorial dimension have a relatively higher weight compared to  the 
eleven variables considered in the socio-economic dimension. This is, therefore, a clear 
bias in favour of  the territorial dimension. 
This  is,  however,  not a problem when looking  at  one of the  main objectives  of the 
FNDR. The overall objective of  the FNDR, defined in LOCGAR, states that the fund is 
"intended  for  territorial  compensation"  which  would  explain  its  marked  orientation 
towards territories rather than towards socio-economic or population indicators. 
The  second  concern  expressed  by  UA  (1999)  is  that  the  indicators  used  in  the 
methodology primarily refer to  quantity rather than to  quality.  What actually explain 
this is that availability of  quantitative data at the regional level is limited. 
Redundancy  in the  use  of indicators  is  the  third  problem  identify  by  Universidad 
Austral. UA demonstrated, through factorial analysis, that the first three factors on the 
socio-economic variable explain an 80.3% of the variance, and 91.2% on the territorial 
variable respectively.  A closer look at  the  indicators  in use would eliminate the  less 
significant ones and propose others that would better explain the differences amongst 
regions. 
4  The types of  action and the sectors/areas of  investment 
This  section presents  and  critically  discusses  the  type  of actions  and  the  sectors  of 
investment of the FNDR.  The type of actions and the sectors financed by the fund,  it 
will  be  argued,  pose  a serious  limitation to  the  overall  objective  of the  FNDR as  a 
regional development fund. 
172 4.1  Types of  actions 
The FNDR is  used to finance,  basically, four types of action, of which infrastructure 
investment is by far the most important. These actions are: 
•  Infrastructure; 
•  Studies; 
•  Programmes; 
•  Others (pre-investment studies, engineering and designs, acquisition of land, 
technical assistance and supervision). 
Infrastructure investment involves the construction, replacement, and upgrading and 
rehabilitation of  public buildings, roads, and other public facilities; 
Studies, includes studies of a general nature concerning regional development such 
as natural resources surveys, evaluations and analysis of  variables affecting regional 
growth and development, etc; 
Programmes, corresponds to  the  financing  of long term  'programmes'  on sectors 
such as  agriculture  and fishing.  These  programmes  do  not include  investment in 
infrastructure, but equipment and the acquisition of vehicles can be included under 
this item; 
Others, includes the financing of plans and designs for the construction of building 
and other facilities, technical assistance, acquisition of grounds for the location of 
infrastructure projects, and supervisions. 
Table 5.10 below, shows the expenditures by type of action for the period of four years 
from  1994  to  1997.  The most distinctive  aspect in these  series  is  the  overwhelming 
domination of the category Infrastructure and Programmes investment. Although there 
was no dis-aggregated data available for  Infrastructure and Programmes, which appear 
together in the figures, infrastructure alone accounts for more than 90% of each of  these 
173 figures52.  Studies  and  Pre-investment,  and  Engineering  Designs  have  grown  more 
slowly  than  expected  growing  from  1.24%  to  2.49%,  and  from  1.01%  to  1,79%, 
respectively  in  the  period  shown.  A  larger  investment  in  Studies  and  Engineering 
Designs  by  a  region  means  a  greater  share  in  the  distribution  of the  Provision  of 
Efficiency53. 
Table 5.10: FNDR, Participation per type of  action (%) 1994-1997 
T,ree of Investment  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Projects (Infrastructure) and  96.43  94.54  93.53  92.76 
Programmes 
Studies and Pre-investment  1.24  1.99  2.32  2.49 
Engineering Designs  1.01  1.68  1.69  1.79 
Other Investments(a
j  1.32  1.79  2.47  2.96 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Universidad Austral, 1999 
<alar Inversiones Menores (Minor Investments): Corresponds to a maximum of 2% of  the total budget of 
one year that the Intendente, the president of the Regional Government, in agreement with the Regional 
Assembly, may assign to a variety of small projects or basic studies that do not follow the timetable than 
the rest of  the projects. 
Within the category of 'Other investments', which is fixed at a maximum of 2% of a 
region  total  FNDR  budget,  only  small  scale  infrastructure  projects,  acquisition  of 
vehicles for health and security (police and fire fighters) sectors, as well as studies can 
be financed. Some regions have, however, managed to provide money from this item to 
technical assistance and supervision, which has largely been seen as a serious lack in the 
projects of  the FNDR. The rapid growth of this item in the period shown in the table is 
explained by its importance as a handy tool for the Regional Executive and Assembly to 
allocate money to  small projects of great impact amongst voters,  particularly in pre-
electoral years. 
4.2  Sectors/areas of  investment 
The main economic sectors on which the FNDR resources can be utilised for are mostly 
determined by the terms of  the agreement with the IDB for the FNDR-Programme. 
52 The reason for this is that Projects and Programmes are registered under the same identification number 
in the accountant bill. Separating these two items is, therefore, a matter of manual work. The number of 
programmes financed are in a 1 to 20 ratio to Infrastructure Projects. 
53  SUBDERE encourages regions to  increase the  investment  in  these actions  in  order to  improve  the 
quality of  infrastructure projects. 
174 Altogether,  the  FNDR can finance  any  project in almost any  sector as  long as  there 
exists a methodology for the evaluation of such a project. As will be shown below (see 
Table 5.11) the economic sectors eligible by the FNDR-IDB account for most of the 
investment of  the FNDR. For this reason, the analysis of  the sectors of investment of  the 
FNDR will be limited to the sectors eligible by the IDB. 
The  FNDR-IDB  can  be  used  in  three  of the  type  of actions  identified  above: 
Infrastructure investment, Studies plus all the actions under the category Others. Thus, 
the FNDR-IDB finances the construction of civil works, acquisition of equipment, the 
costs of  technical studies, environmental impact studies, designs, and it also includes the 
services of  supervision and consultation for the following economic sectors. 
•  Education; 
•  Health; 
•  Drinking Water; 
•  Sewer systems; 
•  Rural Roads; 
•  Urban Roads; 
•  Rural Domestic Electricity; 
•  Other  sectors  (domestic  rural  drinking  water,  construction  of new  roads, 
generation  and  distribution  of electricity  in  peripheral  rural  areas,  flood 
deterrents, rural telephony, and small fishing ports). 
These sectors have been present in the three consecutive FNDR-IDB Programmes since 
1985, when the first loan from the IDB was signed. The category 'Other sectors' that 
appears at the end of the list was introduced in 1995, although little has been done in 
this area. 
Economic sectors and eligible type of  investment: 
a)  Municipal Education facilities: 
Construction,  replacement,  upgrading,  expanSIOn,  outfitting,  rehabilitation,  and 
acquisition of equipment for  public primary and  secondary  schools.  It also  finances 
libraries  in schools  and accommodation for  Head Teachers in isolated rural  schools. 
175 Since  1996  the  programme  has  financed  comprehensive  rehabilitation  programmes 
rather than individual projects. 
b)  Health 
Construction,  replacement,  upgrading,  expansIOn,  outfitting,  rehabilitation  or 
standardisation of primary health care; and acquisition of equipment for public health 
facilities oriented to primary attention in urban and rural areas. It is also permitted the 
acquisition of  ambulances, and other motor-transportation vehicles for rural areas. 
c)  Water and Sewer Systems 
Construction,  expansion,  service  level  improvement  and  rehabilitation  of integrated 
drinkable water supply and sewage disposal systems for urban communities, as well as 
civil works and equipment for systems to collect and dispose of  household solid waste. 
d)  Roads 
The  improvements  of  general  standard  of  roads  including  the  rehabilitation  of 
secondary, communal or regional rural roads, provision of paved roadways, pavements, 
kerbing, bridges, tunnels, traffic lights and signage on secondary urban streets, and the 
construction of  new roads. 
e)  Rural domestic electricity 
Construction of new grids or expansion of existing ones to  supply low-income rural 
communities with electricity,  as  well  as  the  installation of means for  electric power 
generation and equipment for the distribution of energy for isolated communities. 
f) Other sectors and types of  projects 
Equipment for public telephones in rural communities; 
Construction and expansion or upgrading of flood protection work in low-income 
residential  areas,  as  well  as  work  for  channelling  rivers,  streams  and  canals, 
including lateral protection works, dikes and retaining walls; 
Protection works, docks, ramps storage facilities, services, repair shops and areas for 
the sale of  products for small-scale fishing coves. 
176 g) Other activities to be financed by the FNDR-IDB 
Pre-investment studies: Pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, diagnostic studies and 
environmental impact assessment, 
Engineering and design: Final design of  projects and engineering consultancy, 
Lands: Acquisition of  pieces of  land to provide buildings for educational and health 
projects, etc. 
Supervision: The FNDR-IDB also finances the services of consultancy to help the 
Technical Units (usually municipalities and regional offices of national ministries) 
and the Regional Government in the supervision of  works. 
Table 5.11  below shows the investments per sector for a period of four years from 1994 
to  1997.  Overall, there is  a steady decline in the amount of resources devoted to the 
FNDR-IDB in favour of the FNDR-National Resources. Education is by far the most 
important sector of  the FNDR in which almost a total of38% of  the investment in 1994 
is concentrated, and just over 30% in 1997. The second most important sector is Health, 
which  attracted  20%  of the  total  investment  in  1994,  although  there  is  a  drastic 
reduction to 8% in 1997. A similar situation is evident with reference to the investment 
in Urban Roads, where investment fell from 13.41 % to 8.31 % in the same period. 
Table 5.11: Importance of  the Economic Sectors financed by the FNDR (%) 1994-1997 
Sector  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Education  37.91  30.87  33.68  30.37 
Health  20.00  11.72  9.72  8.01 
Urban Roads  13.41  15.61  14.25  8.31 
Rural Domestic Electricity  4.31  12.17  9.25  12.51 
Rural Roads  3.43  4.76  6.42  13.29 
Sewer systems  6.70  5.82  5.61  5.57 
Water SUEEly  3.26  3.38  3.87  3.11 
Engineering Designs  1.01  1.68  1.69  1.79 
Total FNDR-IDB  90.04  86.01  84.49  82.95 
Justice  1.96  1.29  1.38  1.84 
Basic Studies  1.24  1.99  2.32  2.49 
Agriculture  0.94  1.41  1.19  2.24 
Police and Security  0.87  1.61  2.59  1.92 
Other sectors\a)  2.61  1.66  1.01  1.45 
'Inversiones Menores'  1.32  1.79  2.47  2.96 
'Multisectoral'  1.01  4.25  4.55  4.15 
Total FNDR-National Resources  9.96  13.99  15.51  17.05 
FNDR-Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Source: Adapted from Universidad Austral, 1999 
(a) This item groups other sectors that individually represent less that 0.7% of  the total. It includes Mining, 
Fishing, Communication, Housing. 
177 There are other significant changes in investment in Rural Electricity and Rural Roads, 
although these are in increase rather than in decline. These sectors tripled in importance 
from  1994  to  1997,  increasing  from  4.31%  to  12.51%,  and  3.43%  to  13.29% 
respectively. The Sewage Systems and the Water Supply sectors had little change in the 
level of  investment and maintained their relative importance within the FNDR. 
In the FNDR-National Resources section, the most significant change in investment was 
within the  Multisectoral  sector.  The  remaining  sectors  present important  changes  in 
relative terms but still attracted a very  low percentage of the total investment of the 
FNDR. 
Unfortunately dis-aggregated data were not available after 1997, because in 1998 a new 
Provision was created that, although still very limited, has profoundly transformed the 
historic  'infrastructure character'  of the  FNDR.  This  is  the  Provision on  Productive 
Investment (which is  part of the  FNDR-Nationa1  Resources)  that in its  first  year of 
operation amounted for almost 2% of  the total FNDR. 
Table 5.12 summarises the changes from 1994 to  1997 by source of fund and by sector. 
Apart from  the  downward trend  observed in the  FNDR-IDB  and the upward in the 
FNDR-Nationa1  Resources,  as  a compensation for the  loss in the first  one,  the most 
remarkable features of these variations are the big changes in only a few sectors. The 
explanation  for  this  break  with  the  traditional  trend  comes  from  the  differential 
behaviour amongst regions that have directed FNDR resources to sectors different to the 
traditional ones. This concentration on particular sectors represents a new understanding 
of  the FNDR by the regions, and consequently in the use they make of  the funds. 
178 Table 5.12: Changes per sector 1994, 1997 (1994 = 100) 
Sector  1997 
Education  80.11 
Health  61.97 
Urban Roads  40.05 
Rural Domestic Electricity  83.13 
Rural Roads  290.26 
Sewer systems  387.46 
Water SUEEly  95.40 
Engineering Designs  177.23 
Total FNDR-IDB  92.13 
Justice  93.88 
Basic Studies  200.81 
Agriculture  238.30 
Police and Security  220.69 
Other sectors(aj  55.56 
Inversiones Menores(6j  224.24 
Multisectoral  410.89 
Total FNDR-National Resources  171.18 
Source: Universidad Austral, 1999 
(alIt contains sectors such as Fishing, Mining, Communication, Housing, Culture, etc. that individually are 
below a 0.7%. 
(b)It groups a large number of  actions from construction of  small facilities to acquisition of  equipment and 
vehicles. 
4.3  Main sectors of  investment by region 
Regions tended to follow similar patters in terms of the preferred sectors of investment 
in 1994.  This  situation has,  however,  changed in recent years.  Table  5.13  shows the 
changes of  the relative importance of the three main sectors of investment from 1994 to 
1997  (Education and  Health plus Urban Roads  or  Sewer Systems,  depending  on the 
region). At the beginning of this period, 71.32% of the investment was concentrated in 
three  sectors  in the  country as  a whole,  with two  regions  (Valparaiso  and  Santiago) 
spending over 80% in just three sectors. In 11  out of 13  regions Education is the most 
important sector in 1994. 
179 Table 5.13: FNDR  Changes in the three main sectors of  investment by region (1994-1997)  , 
Region  1994  %  1997  0/0 
I  Tarapaca  Education, Health, Urban Roads  77.26  Education, Rural Roads,  64.09 
Health 
II  Antofagasta  Education, Health, Urban Roads  68.70  Rural Roads, Education,  70.56 
Urban Roads 
III  Atacama  Education, Health, Urban Roads  66.70  Water Supply,  61.65 
Education, Multisectoral 
IV  Coquimbo  Education, Health, Sewer  69.79  Education, Rural Roads,  60.11 
Systems  Sewer Systems 
V  Valparaiso  Education, Health, Sewer  86.11  Education, Urban Roads,  72.38 
Systems  Health 
RM  Santiago  Education, Health, Water  96.75  Education, Health,  75.08 
Supply  Multisectoral 
VI  O'Higgins  Education, Sewer Systems,  70.05  Education, Rural Roads,  62.87 
Urban Roads  Sewer Systems 
VII  Maule  Education, Health, Sewer  73.67  Education, Rural  66.88 
Systems  Electricity, Rural Roads 
VII  Biobio  Education, Health, Rural  72.66  Education, Rural  79.51 
I  Electricity  Electricity, Health 
IX  La Araucania  Education, Health, Rural Roads  65.09  Rural Electricity,  67.90 
Education, Rural Roads 
X  Los Lagos  Education, Health, Urban Roads  78.46  Rural Electricity,  77.68 
Education, Rural Roads 
XI  Aysen  Urban Roads, Education, Health  76.59  Rural Roads, Education,  72.98 
Urban Roads 
XII  Magallanes  Urban Roads, Education, Health  76.81  Urban Roads, Sewer  68.60 
Systems, Education 
Country  Education, Health, Urban  71.32  Education, Rural  56.17 
Roads  Roads, Rural 
Electricitv 
Source: Subdere 1999 
By the  end of the  period,  only  56.17%  of the  total  investment of the  country  was 
concentrated  in  the  3  most  important  sectors.  Only  three  regions  increased  their 
concentration in three sectors, Antofagasta, Biobio and La Araucania (II, VIII and IX), 
in the remainder there was significant decline. An important feature of  these changes is 
the decline in the importance of  Education in four regions, in favour of  sectors that were 
apparently more closely related to the regions specific problems. Education is replaced 
by Rural  Roads  and Rural  Electricity in the  more urban northern and rural  southern 
regions of  the country. 
This shift can be explained by the fact that by 199470% of  the FNDR- Programme was 
being financed by the IDB loan (Credit 578/0C-CH 1990-1994) while in 1997, under a 
subsequent credit  (loan IDB 853/0C-CH 1995-1999) the IDB share accounted for only 
15%. However the  same restrictions were  imposed by the IDB  in the last credit, the 
regions  felt  they  should  explore  different  alternatives  although  keeping  themselves 
180 within the overall framework of sectors eligible by the FNDR-IDB. Another reason for 
the  changes is  that by 1997 regional priorities of investment were  set up by the just 
created Regional Governments, in full operation at that time, following the demands of 
local  governments  and  community  rather  than  set  by  the  national  policies  of the 
authorities in Santiago, as it was before 1995. 
This period saw the emergence of  sectors, that although they had existed through out the 
three IDB loans, had never been so important before. This was the case for Rural Roads 
and Rural Electricity. Rural Roads was one of  the three main sectors of investment in 8 
regions in 1997, compared to  one in 1994, La Araucania.  Similarly, Rural Electricity 
was  most important in four  regions  in  1997  compared to  one,  Biobio,  in  1994.  The 
urban regions located in the desert territory of  the north saw the opportunity to improve 
the quality of city roads, while the southern rural regions used the FNDR resources as a 
mean for providing domestic electricity to the scattered households of  the temperate and 
cold plains and mountains of  the Lake District. 
4.4  Summary and conclusions 
Summary about the type of  action carried out: 
Only four actions are carried out by the FNDR. Of these, Infrastructure investment 
represents over 90% of  the total FNDR investment; 
The  preference for  Infrastructure  investment is  a response to  the  kind of sectors 
eligible for the fund. The kind of sectors and the preference for infrastructure has to 
do with the time in which the FNDR-IDB Programme began in the mid 1980s. The 
1980s started to  see the impact of the neo-liberal economic model both in terms of 
its success in macroeconomic indicators and in the deterioration of social indicators. 
The  FNDR,  thus,  started to  play  its role  in compensating the  social  costs  of the 
economic model implemented in the country, and the IDB, on the other hand, that 
wanted  to  make  sure  that  its  money  was  to  be  used  in  something  noticeable 
(infrastructure projects); 
The type of Infrastructure investment of  the FNDR is not infrastructure to stimulate 
productive investment or competitiveness.  The infrastructure projects financed by 
181 the fund is said to be related to the concept of 'equal opportunities', in this case by 
providing the access to basic services on education, health, and other basic needs; 
Although  the  category  'Others'  includes  various  actions,  these  are  not  very 
important due to the small amount of  resources devoted to them (less than 3% of  the 
total FNDR); 
About the sectors of investment: 
This,  again,  small number of economic  sectors,  basically seven,  financed by the 
FNDR  is  a  direct  consequence  of the  agreement  with  the  IDB  for  the  FNDR-
Programme. These seven principal sectors have been present in the FNDR since the 
first credit (1985-1989); 
The category 'Other sectors' has not attracted much resources, mainly due  to  the 
high amount of  money destined to the 'traditional sector' (the seven sectors); 
The marked preference for  investing in the  sectors of Education and Health is  a 
response to  the  deficit generated  after the  transference  of these  sectors  from  the 
central  (ministerial)  level to  the  local  (municipal)  administration.  In this  process 
responsibilities were transferred, but not resources; 
The  IDB  represented  only  15%  in  the  FNDR-Programme  of  1995-1999, 
nevertheless, the fund  as  a whole has continued to be mainly used ( over 80% in 
1997) to financed IDB eligible sectors; 
The  tendency  for  many  years  in  the  regions  was  to  follow  the  same  pattern of 
investment in terms of  the sectors to which resources were mainly devoted. In recent 
years,  however,  regions  have  started to  see  the  FNDR a real  instrument for  the 
development of their most precarious areas.  This can be seen for  example in the 
northern and southern regions that have started to  direct the action of the fund to 
other sectors rather than to Education and Health; 
Special attention has to  be given to the 'Productive Investment' sector. This sector, 
introduced in 1998, although attracting only 2% of the total FNDR investment, is a 
complete change of direction of what have been the traditional sectors of  the FNDR. 
After this,  the  FNDR can not  be  considered exclusively a fund for  infrastructure 
investment. 
182 The main problems with regard to the type of action and sectors of investment of the 
FNDR, as a fund for regional development, can be summarised as follows: 
Reduced number of  actions carried out, 
Overwhelming  weight  of infrastructure  investment  within  the  already  limited 
number of  possible actions, 
Infrastructure investment exclusively oriented to the supply of social services 
Reduce number of economic sectors eligible by the fund, 
Restrictions for exploring new initiatives of  investment for regional development, 
Regional governments cannot dispose of the whole amount of FNDR resources for 
regional development initiatives because of the lack of resources in other sectors it 
has to oversee, basically Education and Health. 
The wide range of possibilities offered by a regionalised fund like the FNDR is limited 
by the problems exposed above.  Some of these problems, as it has been shown above, 
have their origin in restrictions imposed by the terms ofthe contract with the IDB Bank, 
but the majority of them have more to  do  with a certain incapacity to  respond to  the 
challenges that the present state of  development of  the country poses on regions. 
5  Further actions for regional development 
One of the greater success of the FNDR has been the investment in the construction of 
electricity  projects.  Electricity  projects  consist  of the  construction  of grid  or  the 
expansion  of existing  ones  to  supply  low-income  rural  communities  with  electric 
energy.  These projects also  consider the installation of electric power generation and 
distribution of  energy for isolated communities. The success of  these projects have to do 
not only with the provision of a basic and necessary service but also with the way these 
.  . d  54  projects are carrIe  out  . 
54  Apart from  the  fact  that due  to  the action of the  FNDR fund  in  this  sector the  deficit in  domestic 
electricity supply in rural areas has gone down, going from around 50% to less than a 25% in ten years, 
from  1990 to the year 2000. 
183 Electricity projects are financed by three parties: the FNDR, the Electricity Companies 
and the Interested Local Communities. As a result:  a)  funds for regional development 
have multiply; b) public and private sector have come together after a common interest 
and  objective;  and,  c)  Communities  have  learnt  to  organised  themselves  to  face 
common  problems.  No  other  sector  of the  FNDR is  handled  in  this  way.  On  the 
contrary,  FNDR fund finances  single isolated sectoral projects where no  other major 
value added is generated because of  this action. 
A  similar recent  experience,  although not yet evaluated,  is  that of the Convenios  de 
Programacion, a programming document between a Regional Government and one or 
more  ministries  for  a  project  or  group  of projects  that  for  the  magnitude  of its 
investment require the co-financing of more than one party. These type of actions have 
permitted to accomplish tasks that otherwise would have been impossible to pursue by a 
single fund  or party.  These multiparty actions have,  at the same time,  stimulated co-
operation and co-ordination amongst sectors and Regional Governments. 
As the FNDR action is based on a sectoral project-by-project approach, the chance of 
having  an  unexpected relevant  outcome  is  lower that  if fund  were  used  in  a  more 
comprehensive manner. Other actions that may be associated to the use of investment 
funds  could  stimulate  regional  development,  beyond  that of the  single  benefice  of 
counting with a specific infrastructure project. The assumption behind this argument is 
that, indeed, a regional fund can provide more for regional development than the mere 
results if  its physical results. 
The question whether a regional fund can contribute to regional development, beyond 
the  mere  action  of its  investment  in  physical  or  other  type  of investment,  will  be 
answered in Chapter 7, when comparing the action of  the FNDR with that of  the ERDF. 
One of the  expected outcomes of that chapter is  to  see to what extent the  European 
Structural Funds are being used in a way that may favour regional development through 
actions that stimulate the regions own capacities and potentialities. 
184 Chapter 6 
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
Introduction 
This  chapter  describes  and  analyse  the  mam  features  of the  European  Regional 
Development  fund  (ERDF)  of the  European  Union.  The  analysis  of this  fund  will 
provide the basis for carrying out the comparison with the Regional Development Fund 
of Chile (FNDR). 
The chapter comprises five major parts. The first, corresponds to an introduction of the 
European Union (EU), its institutions and the main bodies that deal with regional policy 
and  the  administration of the  ERDF.  The  second part presents and discusses  on the 
European Union Regional Policy with emphasis on the latest development on regional 
policies and instruments. The third part presents the main policy instrument for regional 
development,  i.e.  the  Structural  Funds  and  particularly  the  European  Regional 
Development Funds (ERDF). This section presents the main objectives and tasks of  the 
ERDF, the type and sectors of investment, and the way funds are allocated to regions. 
Part fourth  presents a critical  analysis  on the  achievements of regional  policy  in the 
regions of Europe. Finally, part fifth summarises the main contents of previous sections 
and  draws  some  conclusions  on  the  main  features  of EU  regional  policy  and  the 
operation of  the funds. 
1  The European Union Institution 
The  European Union (EU)  is  the  result of a process  of co-operation and  integration 
which began in 1951 with a treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) between six countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands).  The  1951  Treaty  was  the  first  major  step  into  an  increasingly  wider 
process of integration taken short after the end of  the Second W  orId War. In fifty years, 
the  EU  has  had  four  waves  of accessions  (1973:  Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  United 
Kingdom;  1981:  Greece;  1986:  Spain  and  Portugal;  1995:  Austria,  Finland  and 
Sweden). At present, the EU has fifteen Member States. For the 2000-2006 period the 
185 European Union is  preparing for  its  fifth  enlargement to  incorporate six Eastern and 
Southern  European  countries.  The  total  population  of the  fifteen  European  Union's 
countries is of  around 374 million citizens
55
. 
1.1  Purpose of  the European Union 
The European Union's mission is to organise relations between the Member States and 
between their peoples on the basis of solidarity. The main objectives ofthe Union are: 
to  promote  economic  and  social  progress  (the  single  market  was  established  in 
1993; the single currency was launched in 1999 and will be implemented in 2002 
for 12 member states, excluding the UK, Sweden and Denmark); 
to  assert  the  identity  of the  European Union on the  international  scene  (through 
European  humanitarian  aid  to  non-EU  countries,  common  foreign  and  security 
policy,  action  in  international  cnses;  common  positions  within  international 
organisations); 
to  introduce European citizenship (which does not replace national citizenship but 
complements  it  and  confers  a  number  of civil  and  politic  rights  on  European 
citizens); 
to  develop an area of freedom,  security and justice (linked to  the operation of the 
internal market and more particularly the freedom of  movement of  persons); 
to  maintain and  build  on  established  EU  law  (all  the  legislation adopted  by the 
European institutions, together with the founding treaties). 
1.2  The institutions of  the European Union 
The European Union is  built on an  institutional system.  The Member States  delegate 
sovereignty for certain matters to  independent institutions which represent the interest 
of the Union. There are five  institutions involved in running the European Union: the 
European  Parliament  (elected  by  the  peoples  of the  Member  States),  the  Council 
(representing the governments of the Member States), the Commission (the executive 
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186 and  the  body having the  right to  initiate  legislation),  the  Court of Justice  (ensuring 
compliance  with  the  law),  and  the  Court  of Auditors  (responsible  for  auditing  the 
accounts). 
* Other bodies 
These institutions are supported by other bodies: the Economic and Social Committee 
and  the  Committee  of the  Regions  (advisory  bodies  which  help  to  ensure  that  the 
positions of the ED's various economic and social categories and regions respectively 
are taken into  account); the European Investment Bank (EU financial institution) and 
the European Central Bank (responsible for monetary policy in the euro-area) and; the 
European  Ombudsman  (dealing  with  complaints  from  citizens  concemmg 
maladministration at European level). 
1.3  European Union' bodies dealing with regional policy 
* Directorate General (DG XVI) for Regional Policy 
The  Directorate-General  for  Regional  Policy  is  the  department  of the  European 
Commission that is responsible for European action in support of the socio-economic 
development of the least-favoured regions of the European Union (in accordance with 
Articles 158 and 160 of  the Treaty). 
Regional development policies and programmes make an essential contribution towards 
stability in the European Union.  They aim to promote a high level of competitiveness 
and employment by helping regions that are less prosperous or suffering from structural 
problems  to  generate  sustainable  development  and  adapt  to  new  conditions  on  the 
labour market and to global competition. 
The main responsibilities of the DG for Regional Policy are the management of three 
major funds: 
the  European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) , which operates in all  fifteen 
Member States; 
the Cohesion Fund, which contributes to environmental and transport projects in the 
four Member States whose GNP is less than 90% of  the Community average (Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland); 
187 the  Instrument for  Structural  policies  for  Pre-Accession (ISP A),  which helps  the 
central  and  eastern  European countries  applying  for  membership  to  improve  the 
environmental situation and develop transport networks. 
* The Committee of  the Regions 
The  Committee was created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.  The Maastricht Treaty 
states that the Committee of  the Regions must be consulted as a matter of course on all 
areas likely to have repercussions at local or regional level. The responsibilities of the 
Committee were  initially limited to  five  areas:  economic  and  social  cohesion, trans-
European infrastructure networks, health, education and culture. The Commission and 
the Council are obliged to consult the Committee before taking measures in those areas. 
* Committee on Regional Policy Transport and Tourism (of  the European Parliament) 
The Committee on Regional Policy is one of  the seventeen permanent committees of the 
Parliament.  It has  59  members  and  is  responsible  for  matters  relating  to:  Cohesion 
policy,  the  relationship  with  regional  and  local  authorities,  the  common  policy  on 
transport, and the community action on tourism. 
The  main  issues  on  the  cohesion  policy  have  to  do  with:  structural  policy  for  the 
convergence of national economies, the economic and social cohesion, the balance and 
sustainable development of  the Union and the reduction ofregional social and economic 
imbalances. 
1.4  The Resources of  the European Union 
The Revenue of  the European Union 
The financial system of the EU has passed through several stages since the founding of 
the ECSC in 1951. From 1952 the ECSC has had its own resources. Subsequent reforms 
have  transformed  and  defined  the  Community's  own  resources.  As  agreed  at  the 
Edinburgh  European Council,  a new Decision on  the  system of own  resources  was 
adopted on October 1994. Finally, the new resources Decision entered into force with 
effect from 1 January 1995 after had been ratified by all the Member States in 1996. 
188 The Community's own resources are: 
- Agricultural duties and sugar and isoglucose levies 
Agricultural duties have replaced agricultural levies. Agricultural duties are imposed on 
imports  products  coming  from  non-member countries  and  are  designed to  offset the 
difference between world prices and the price levels which it has been agreed to apply 
within the Community (principle of Community preference). 
- Custom duties 
These derive from the application of the Common Customs Tariff to the customs value 
of goods imported from non-member countries. 
- V  AT resources 
These derive from the application of a uniform rate to each Member State's VAT base. 
Since  1988,  the uniform rate  is  found  in applying a  1.4%  rate to  the V  AT  base  and 
deducting the gross compensation paid to the United Kingdom.  A Member State base 
must not exceed 55% of its GNP.  Under new regulations VAT rate has been gradually 
reduced to 1.0% and the capping rate to 50% in 1999. 
- the Fourth resource 
This category of revenue was also created in 1988. This resource is based on GNP and 
is  derived from  the  application of a rate to  the sum of the GNPs of all  the  Member 
States. 
Table 6.1: Financing of  the General Budget by Member State (1997) 
Country  % 
Belgium  3.8 
Denmark  2.0 
Germany  28.7 
Greece  1.5 
Spain  6.9 
France  17.8 
Ireland  0.9 
Italy  12.4 
Luxembourg  0.2 
The Netherlands  6.2 
Austria  2.6 
Portugal  1.2 
Finland  1.4 
Sweden  2.8 
United KiJ:~gdom  11.4  .. 
Source: European Commumtles (1998) 
189 The expenditure of  the European Union 
The expenditure of the European Union has considerably increased and diversified in 
the course of the European integration (European Communities,  2000).  For the  year 
2000  the total  expenditures  of the  Union  (preliminary  data)  reached  the  amount  of 
EURO million 93,323. Of this figure, EURO million 32,678 (35.02%) corresponds to 
the action of  the Structural Funds (see figure below)56. 
European Union Expenditures, 2000 
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Figure 6.1: European Union Expenditure in the Year 2000 
Source: European Communities, 2000 
2  Regional Policy in the European Union 
The Problems 
There exist considerable regional economic disparities in the European Union, in terms 
of GDP  and  GDP  per  capita,  employment,  and  in  particular  declining  areas.  As 
Armstrong and Taylor (2000) have stated, in 1996 GDP per capita ranged from 193  per 
cent of  the EU average in Hamburg (Germany) to only 44 per cent in Ipeiros (Greece). 
A similar situation appears when looking at the rate of  unemployment of different areas 
in the Union.  In 1997,  unemployment rates ranged  from  a  massive 32.0 per cent in 
Andalusia (Spain) to a mere 2.5 per cent in Luxembourg. 
56 EURO 1 = US$ 0.89 (March 2001) 
190 On the other hand, a wide variety of different types of areas with severe problems are 
encounter  in  the  EU.  These  areas  with  severe  problems  correspond  to  depressed 
industrial areas,  areas  of severe urban poverty and decline,  border areas which have 
suffered  as  a  result  of the  dismantling  of frontier  controls,  and  depressed  rural 
communities. In terms of spatial distribution, the territorial unit (countries, regions) in 
the European Union tend to present similar patters to those found in other parts of the 
world. 
In  order to  cope with these regional imbalances, from  its establishment the European 
Union has tried to  adopt measures in favour of a more integrated Europe.  In fact,  the 
emergence and development of the EU has had significant effects on individual regions 
in  the  Community,  both  from  particular  policies  designed  to  deal  with  particular 
problems,  and  from  the  effects  of major macroeconomic  measures  intended  for  the 
Union  as  a  whole.  The  first  case  would  correspond,  for  example,  to  the  action  of 
specific funds  such as  the ERDF and the Structural Funds in more general terms. The 
second case has to do  with the effect that measures such as the adoption of the Single 
European  Market  (SEM),  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  and  the  Eastern 
Enlargement (EE) have on the patterns of  regional disparities. 
Since the interest of this study is  focused  on regional policy and in particular on the 
action of regional funds, only this area will be presented and discussed in detail ahead. 
For this reason, the emphasis will be put on the specific regional policies of the EU, as 
stated in Agenda 2000, and in the action of the Structural Funds on the regions of the 
Community. 
EU Regional Policy 
Although regional policy was not recognised as  a distinct policy area in the founding 
treaties of  the European Community, as European integration progressed regional policy 
instrument  were  developed  to  complement  the  Member  States'  efforts  on  regional 
matters  at  European level  (EU  Committee of the  Regions,  1999).  Initially  European 
regional policy meant co-ordinating the Member States' regional policy measures at the 
European level. 
191 Williams  (1996),  suggests  that  regional  policy  is  most  directly  associated  with  the 
accession of the UK in 1973, although in a sense this can be traced back to the original 
foundation  of the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC).  Nevertheless,  "the 
approval  in  principle for  a regional  policy  as  part of the  accession  agreement was 
reached at the Paris Summit in 1972, and the ERDF was set by the Council of  Ministers 
in  December  1974  with the  'objective of correcting the  principal  imbalances  in  the 
Community resulting from agricultural preponderance, industrial change and structural 
employment'"  (p.  69).  "One specific budgetary reason for  creating the  ERDF  was  to 
encounter the acknowledge imbalance arising for the UK from the arrangements for the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  which  were  expected  to  give  Britain  limited 
benefits (Shackleton, 1993, cited in Williams, 1996, pp 69-70). 
In  order  to  ensure  compatibility  of regions  competing  with  each  other  in  regional 
policies and the development of specific instrument for promoting their own regional 
policies the European Commission developed the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics  (NUTS)  which  it  uses  to  manage  its  regional  policy  activities.  In  1986, 
Regional policy was given a treaty basis in the Single European Act (Art.  130a of the 
EC  Treaty).  Under this  article the  Community undertook to  strengthen economic and 
social cohesion by narrowing differences in level of development between the different 
regIOns. 
The first regional policy instrument adopted to cope with the increasing involvement in 
regional matters was the European Regional Development Fund in the mid 1970s. Since 
then a large number of different instruments have been developed, with the Structural 
Funds  playing a pivotal role.  The introduction of the partnership principle in 1988  is 
said to  be  a decisive turning point on regional policy implementation, because it has 
enable to local and regional authorities to be directly involved in developing this policy 
area (EU Committee of  the Regions, 1999). 
The need for regional policy in the EU 
As it may be expected, the accession of  the poorest countries from the periphery into the 
European Union has led to a widening in regional disparities. This has been reinforce in 
a period of rapid structural changes due to the differential impact that SEM, EMU and 
EE have had on the different regions of  the EU. 
192 Armstrong and Taylor (2000)  argue that the  creation of the EU has  given raise to  a 
number of serious regional problems.  Discussing on the argument for  and against the 
involvement  of an  EU  regional  policy,  these  authors  highlight  four  as  the  main 
arguments in favour of  a role for the EU. 
The EU can ensure that regional policy spending by member states is more closely 
matched to the severity of  the problem faced, 
The EU can greatly improve the co-ordination of  regional policy, 
An  EU  regional  policy  offers  a  mean  by  which  anyone  member  state  can 
legitimately  become  involved  in  solving the  regional  problems  of other member 
states, 
EU regional policy is necessary if further integration is to be sustained
57
. 
Arguments against EU  involvement in regional policy have to  do  with the  degree  to 
which the EU should involve in member countries own regional policies. No arguments 
are presented against the EU participation in regional policy but only in the intensity of 
its involvement. 
2.1  EU Regional Policy in 2000-2006. The 5
th Reform of  the Structural Funds 
The  reforms  for  the  period  2000-2006,  contained  in  the  Agenda  2000  package, 
correspond to the 5
th reform of  the Structural Funds. After the setting up of  the ERDF in 
1975 the Structural Funds have undergone five structural reforms. 
the  1  st  reform  was  carried  out  in  1979  and  covered the  operational period  1980-
1983. This reform saw the introduction of  the seven Community scheme; 
the 2
nd  reform,  for the period  1984-1987 stated that the aim of the fund  was "the 
correction  of the  principal  regional  imbalances  within  the  community  through 
participation  in  the  development  and  structural  adjustment  of regions  whose 
57 Armstrong and Taylor argue that this is one of the weakest arguments for EU involvement in regional 
policy because there is little evidence that regional problems have prevented member states for agreeing 
to further development of  the EU (p. 323). 
193 development is lagging behind and in the conversion of  declining industrial regions" 
(Committee of  the Regions, 1999 p.  1); 
the  3
rd  reform  of the  Structural  Funds  (period  1988-1993)  introduced  the  four 
principles: additionality, partnership, co-ordination and, programming; 
the  4th  reform (1994-1999) saw the extension of the Structural Funds with broader 
range of  resources and the setting up of  the Cohesion Fund; 
the  5th  reform  -Agenda 2000-,  for  the  period  2000-2006,  IS  drawn  under  the 
prospects of  enlargement and greater concentration of  assistance. 
The General Regulations 
The  new  Regulations  for  the  2000-2006  period  have  been  developed  around  the 
following principles: 
* the  need  to  maintain financial  solidarity  and  greater  cost-effectiveness  in  the  new 
programming period, 
* the  desire  for  a new partnership between the  Commission and the  Member States, 
comprising a clear division of responsibilities between the two parties, 
* the promotion of  four basic Community priorities: 
sustainable economic development 
competitiveness and innovation 
employment and human resources 
equality of opportunity between men and women 
At  a more specific level the General Regulations set up  a series of guiding principles 
which underpin the overall context of  all Structural Funds. These are: 
* Greater Concentration 
Fewer  objectives,  (3),  than previous  periods,  when  there  were  5.  Of these,  two  are 
region-based  (Objectives  1 and  2),  while  the  third  is  horizontal,  a  human  resource-
focused measure. 
* Simplification and decentralisation 
this has to  do  with a)  the expansion of the partnership principle beyond national  and 
regional authorities to include local authorities and social and economic partners; and b) 
with a clearer division of responsibilities of the different actors. Decentralisation plays, 
194 under this principle, an important role as decentralising as much as the Structural Fund 
programmes as possible. 
* Improved efficiency 
Clarifying responsibilities and decentralisation should lead to greater efficiency 
* More effective controls 
Improved  procedures  for  checking  Structural  Fund  assistance  and  more  reliable 
financial inspection are to be put in place in this new programming period. 
Agenda 2000 
Agenda  2000  IS  an  action  programme  whose  mam  objectives  are  to  strengthen 
Community policies and to give the European Union a new financial framework for the 
period 2000-2006 with a view to  enlargement.  The Agenda 2000  legislative package 
was conceived at the Madrid European Council in 1995 and it was launched in 1999 in 
the form of  twenty legislative texts relating to four priority areas: 
Continuation of  the agricultural reforms; 
Increasing  the  effectiveness  of the  Structural  Funds  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  by 
greater thematic and geographic concentration of projects on specific objectives and 
geographical areas and thus improving management; 
Strengthening the pre-accession strategy for applicant countries, and; 
Adopting a new financial framework for the period 2000-2006 in order to meet the 
challenges of enlargement and budgetary discipline. 
Of  all four priority areas, this study will focus on the Structural Funds measures (second 
priority area). The Berlin European Council stressed that improving the effectiveness of 
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund was the cornerstone of the Agenda 2000 
reforms (EU, Agenda 2000). Before introducing the Structural Funds, and in order to set 
up  the context under the use  of these funds,  the main features  of the regional policy 
reforms of Agenda 2000 will be presented. 
195 3  The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund 
The term Structural Funds covers a system of four distinct, inter-linked funds,  each of 
them fulfilling a specific role. They are the European Social Fund (ESF), the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section, the Financial 
Instrument for  Fisheries  Guidance  (FIFG),  and  the  European Regional  Development 
Fund (ERDF). 
The  Cohesion  Fund  was  created  by  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  1993  for  strengthen 
economic and social cohesion. It is intended to help the least prosperous countries of  the 
Union.  The four beneficiary countries for the 2000-2006 period (as before) are  Spain, 
Portugal,  Greece and Ireland.  The  Cohesion Fund's budget for 2000-2006 is  EUR 18 
billion. 
The importance given to  the  role of the  Structural Funds in pursuing the objective of 
economic and social cohesion in the  Union means  ensuring that structural  assistance 
will  be  more  concentrated both in  geographical terms  and in terms  of the  object of 
assistance. It also means improving the management of  the funds. The structural policy 
measures of  the Agenda 2000 package aim to meet two challenges (objectives): 
* to improve the effectiveness of  the structural policy instruments so that economic and 
social cohesion can be achieved; 
* to  ensure  that  structural  policy  plays  a  continuing  role  III  the  Union's  future 
enlargement. 
The  prospect  of Union  enlargement,  one  of the  main reasons  for  the  Agenda 2000 
reforms, considers the inclusion of eleven countries of central and eastern Europe. The 
countries  applying to  join the  EU  are:  Bulgaria,  Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  plus  Cyprus,  from  the 
Mediterranean.  The  inclusion of these  countries is  said to  raise  serious problems for 
economic and social cohesion, given the considerable development lag in their regions 
compared to the current 15 Member States. 
196 Enlargement will  therefore  pose  some  problems  of adjustment for  both regions  and 
sectors that will require adequate preparation. As part of  Agenda 2000, the Commission 
included recommendations on reinforcing the applicant countries' preparations. The six 
countries considered in the first wave of accession:  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovenia  will  have  EURO  21.84  billion  through  various 
instruments for this purpose. 
In  all,  the  new  regulations  of the  Structural  Funds  make  the  Community  aid  to 
concentrate on three priority objectives: 
Objective 1 (lagging regions
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)  promotes the development and structural adjustment of 
regions whose  development is  lagging behind,  i.e.  whose average per capita GDP  is 
below 75% of  the European Union average (including the French overseas departments, 
the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands).  The per capita GDP to  be measured in 
purchasing power parities and calculated for the last three years available on 26 March 
1999 (CR 1260).59 
• 
- Two thirds ofthe Structural Funds operations come under this objective, 
- Around 20% of the Union's total population is covered from measures taken 
under objective 1. 
The strict application of  the new Objective 1 eligibility criteria excluded former regions 
eligible under the previous objectives 1 and 6 from the period 1994-1999. Some ofthese 
regions were  considered by additional  allocations for  'particular situations'  in the  so 
called Objective 1 phase-out regions. 
58 The identification of 'regions' and areas, in the context of  the European Union, is based on the common 
system of classification of the regions,  referred to  as  the  'Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units 
(NUTS'  established  by  the  Statistic  Office  of the  European  Communities  in  co-operation  with  the 
national institutes for statistics. 
59  As  an  indication, the average GDP of the European Union by the year 2000 is  of around US$ 22,000 
EU,2000). 
197 Table 6.2: Objective 1 coverage 2000-2006 period (% of  population) 
Country  Period  Phase-out 
2000-2006  2000-2005 
Belgium  0.0  12.7 
Denmark  0.0  0.0 
Germany  17.3  1.6 
Greece  100.0  0.0 
Spain  58.5  1.3 
France  2.7  1.9 
Ireland  26.6  73.4 
Italy  33.6  0.6 
Luxembourg  0.0  0.0 
The Netherlands  0.0  1.8 
Austria  3.4  0.0 
Portugal  66.6  33.4 
Finland  21.0  0.0 
Sweden  5.1  0.0 
United Kingdom  8.6  3.5 
TOTAL (EUI5)  22.2  3.4 
Source: Adapted from Wlshlade (1999) 
•  Objective  2  (economic  and  social  conversion  of regions  in  structural  crisis) 
contributes to the economic and social conversion of  regions in structural difficulties 
other than those eligible for objective 1. It covers areas facing the need for economic 
diversification (areas undergoing economic change, declining rural areas, depressed 
areas dependent on fisheries and urban areas in difficulty). 
- Around  18%  of the  Union's  population  will  be  covered  by  this  objective. 
Indicatively 10%  in industrial areas,  5% in rural areas,  2%  in urban areas  and 
1  % in areas dependent on fishing; 
The most important change observed in the designation of objective 2, compared to the 
former  objectives  2  and  5b  of the  previous  period,  have  to  do  with changes  in the 
emphasis  in  concentration  through  the  application  of population  ceilings  from  the 
outset. In consequence, in the new programming period the coverage for Objective 2 is 
essentially centred around restricting overall coverage whilst ensuring that the proposed 
cutbacks were distributed equitably (Wishlade, 1999). 
198 Table 6.3: Objective 2 coverage 2000-2006 period (% of  population) 
Country  Period  Objective 1 
2000-2006  Phase-out in 
Objective 2 in 
2006 
Belgium  12.4  5.7 
Denmark  10.2  0.0 
Germany  12.6  0.0 
Greece  0.0  0.0 
Spain  22.2  1.3 
France  31.3  1.9 
Ireland  0.0  10.8 
Italy  12.9  0.6 
Luxembourg  28.3  0.0 
The Netherlands  15.0  0.0 
Austria  24.7  0.0 
Portugal  0.0  4.6 
Finland  30.9  0.0 
Sweden  13.8  0.0 
United Kingdom  23.5  0.1 
TOTAL (EU 15)  18.2  0.9 
Source: Adapted from Wish  lade (1999) 
•  Objective 3 (development of  human resources) gathers together all the measures for 
human resources development outside the regions eligible for  objective 1.  It is the 
reference framework for all the measures taken under the title on employment in the 
Treaty of  Amsterdam and under the European Employment Strategy. 
In  all,  the  Structural  Funds  eligibility  will  fall  from  51  per  cent  of the  Community 
population of the previous period to  a 35-40 per cent in the 2000-2006 period.  Other 
major changes had to  do  with grater concentration in terms of the proportion of the 
territories covered, and on the coherence of  national and Community assisted areas. 
The main characteristics of the 2000-2006 period (or the fifth structural reform) are the 
new responsibilities of regional and local partners, the redefinition of the Community's 
role  in  various  stages of the  process,  and  the  decentralised  character of the  decision 
making process on the spending of  the money. 
With respect to financial management, the 1999 reforms have established a wider range 
of types  of financial  assistance  in  the  form  of  'venture  capital  holdings',  'loan 
guarantees', 'interest rate subsidies', and other types of  financial arrangements. 
199 The new regulations also provide for four Community Initiatives (a reduction from the 
previous  13  to 4 new Community Initiatives).  Such a reduction is not that impressive 
because  many  of the  previous  Community  Initiatives  are  contained  in  the  4  new 
proposed.  Anyhow,  Community  Initiatives  complement  priority  objectives  and  help 
provide a solution to  problems that have a particular impact on the EU.  Programmes 
have to be drawn up on the basis of guidelines set out by the Commission. Funding for 
these programmes is divided between all the Structural Funds, except the fisheries fund 
(FIFG): 
INTERREG  III  consists  of  three  sections:  1)  crossborder  co-operation,  i.e. 
promoting integrated regional development between border regions; 2) transnational 
co-operation, contributing to  an integrated and harmonious territorial development 
across the EU; 3) reinforcing interregional co-operation and improving the policies 
and techniques of  interregional economic development; 
LEADER encourages and supports integrated strategies for local rural development. 
According to  EU guidelines there  is  a  strong  emphasis  on co-operation between 
rural areas; 
EQUAL provides  for  the development of new ways of combating discrimination 
and inequality as regard access to the labour market; 
URBAN has two major objectives: 1) to promote innovative strategies for the social 
and  economic  regeneration of small  and  medium-sized  towns  and  villages,  and 
urban areas in crisis in larger conurbations; 2) to reinforce and exchange knowledge 
and experience on regeneration and sustainable urban development in the EU. 
3.1  The ERDF, the main component of  the Structural Funds 
What follows is a detailed presentation of the ERDF operations and the main stages in 
the preparation of programmes. This presentation includes: the definition of the fund, 
the principles under its operation, the specific objectives the fund pursues and the main 
tasks it has to  accomplish.  Then, it is presented the way through which the fund  are 
allocated to the selected regions, and ends up with a description of the way the ERDF 
works at the pre-investment stage. That is, the procedures followed by the national and 
regional authorities when applying for funds to the Commission. 
200 Definition of  the ERDF 
Set  up  in  1975,  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  was  the  first 
regional  policy  instrument to  cope  with the  European  Community's  involvement  in 
regional matters. At present the ERDF is a component part and interact together with 
the rest of  the Structural Funds. 
Article  160  of the  Treaty  provides  that  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF)  is  intended to help redress the  main regional  imbalances in the Community. 
The ERDF therefore contributes to reducing the gap between the levels of development 
of the  various  regions  and  the  extent  to  which  least-favoured  regions  and  islands, 
including  rural  areas,  are  lagging  behind  (European  Communities  Official  Journal, 
Regulation [EC] N.  1783/1999).  Under numeral (4) of the same Regulation it is stated 
the  preoccupation  of the  ERDF  in  the  context  of its  task  of promoting  regional 
development, harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activity, 
competitiveness, employment, equality between women and men and,  protection and 
improvement of  the environment. 
The 2000-2006 EU regional policy reforms give directions as to the use of all Structural 
Funds  and  the  Cohesion  Fund.  Activities  under  the  ERDF  are  governed  by  the 
Structural Funds Regulations and implementation principles (programming; partnership; 
additionality  and;  management,  monitoring  and  evaluation).  Resources  are  allocated 
under on the basis of programming periods. The present programming period runs from 
2000-2006. 
Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) N.  1260/1999 provides that the main task of the 
ERDF is to contribute to the attainment of Objectives 1 and 2; whereas Articles 20 and 
21  of the same Regulation provide that the ERDF also contributes to  financing cross-
border, transnational and interregional co-operation as  well as to  economic and social 
regeneration  of cities  and  urban  neighbourhoods  in  crisis  under  the  Community 
Initiatives.  Articles  22  and  23  state  that  it  is  to  support  innovative  measures  at 
Community level and technical assistance measures. 
201 3.1.1  Principles under the operation of  the ERDF 
Since 1989 the work of the Structural Funds has been based on four principles, which 
were  strengthened by the  revised regulations  adopted in  1993  and again revised and 
specified in greater detail in the Agenda 2000 reforms. For the 2000-2006 period these 
principles are Programming; Partnership; Additionality;  and Management, monitoring 
and evaluation. 
- Programming 
Programming involves the preparation of  multi  annual development plans. The plans are 
undertaken through a partnership-based decision-making process, in several stages, until 
the measure are taken over by the public or private bodies entrusted with carrying them 
out.  According to  Williams (1996), the idea of programme funding was a response to 
the perceived needs both to Europeanise the ERDF as  well as  to  ensure that its funds 
were used to pursue a properly thought-out strategy for regional economic development 
rather than to support an ad-hoc selection of  individual projects. 
Under the provisions of  the general Regulation on the Structural Fund, the programming 
period covered is  7 years for all the objectives (2000-2006), although adjustments will 
be  possible  depending  on  the  mid  term  review  considered  to  the  effect.  The 
programming period for the current period began on 1 January 2000. 
The  development and conversion plans are  first submitted by the Member States.  The 
plans are based on national and regional priorities and include: 
•  A precise description of the current situation in the region (disparities, lags, 
development potential); 
•  A  description  of the  most  appropriate  strategy  for  achieving  the  stated 
objectives; 
•  Indications as to the use and form of  the contribution from the funds. 
Content of the programming 
For Objectives 1,2 and 3 (1  and 2 correspond to the operation of the ERDF), the plans 
submitted shall be based on national and regional priorities and take into account the 
202 indicative  guidelines  on  relevant  and  agreed  Community  policies  published  by  the 
Commission.  The  guidance  is  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of the  European 
Communities. The plans should include: 
•  a description, quantified when it corresponds, of the  current situation with 
regard  to  disparities,  gaps  and  potential  for  development  in  the  regions 
covered by Objective  1,  or in terms of conversion in the areas covered by 
Objective 2.  It should also  include a description of the financial  resources 
deployed  and  the  main  results  of operation  undertaken  in  the  prevIOus 
programming period with regard to the evaluation results available; 
•  a description of an appropriate strategy to  attain the Objectives  1,  2 and 3 
and the priorities selected for the sustainable development and conversion of 
regions and areas, and the related development of human resources and the 
adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems for education, training 
and  employment.  Member  States  should  demonstrate  that  activities 
programmed area co-ordinated with other Funds and consistent with the ex-
ante evaluation relating to human resources and employment; 
•  an indication of the planned use and form of the financial contribution from 
the Funds and, where appropriate, information on the use of other financial 
instruments, apart from the Structural Funds; the expected requirements for 
technical assistance and, an indication as regards to additionality; 
•  an account of arrangements made to consult partners. 
For regions covered by Objective  1, the plans should include all relevant measures for 
economic  and  social  conversion,  the  development  of human  resources  and,  rural 
development and  fisheries  structures.  Member States have to  indicate the  particulars 
relating to each Fund, including the amount of the financial contribution requested and 
an outline of  the operational programmes planned with particular regard to their specific 
aims and the main types of  actions planned. 
The programmes are then produced, either in the form of: 
•  Single programming documents  (SPDs):  that comprise a single  document, 
approved by the Commission and gathering together the data contained in a 
Community support framework  and  an operational programme  (integrated 
203 regional  programme  containing  the  programme's  priorities,  a  short 
description of  the proposed measures and an indicative financing plan); 
•  Community support framework (CSFs):  These are documents approved by 
the Commission in agreement with the Member State concerned, containing 
both the Member State's and the Funds'  strategy and priorities for  action, 
their  specific  objectives,  the  contribution  from  the  Funds  and  the  other 
financial resources. 
- Partnership 
This principle implies the closest possible co-operation between the  Commission and 
the appropriate authorities at national, regional or local level in each Member State from 
the preparatory stage to  implementation of the measures.  In the programming period 
1994-1999  this  principle  already  considered  input  from  national,  regional  or  local 
partners,  at all  programming stage.  The new Regulations  continues this  approach by 
extending  partnership  to  the  regional  and  local  authorities,  the  economic  and  social 
partners and other competent bodies and by involving the partners at all stages from the 
approval of  the development plan. 
In  designating  the  most  representative  partnership  at  each  level,  the  Member  State 
should create a wide and effective association of all  the relevant bodies,  according to 
national rules and practice, taking account of  the need to promote equality between men 
and  women  and  sustainable  development  through  the  integration  of environmental 
protection and improvement requirements. 
Partnership  should  cover  the  preparation,  financing,  monitoring  and  evaluation  of 
assistance. Member State have to  ensure the association of the relevant partners at the 
different stages of  programming, considering the time limit for each stage. 
204 In application of  the principle of subsidiaritlO, the implementation of assistance should 
be the responsibility of the Member State, at the appropriate territorial level according 
to the arrangements specific to each Member State. 
- Additionality 
This principle requires Community assistance to be additional to the contributions of  the 
Member State  and  not  to  replace  them.  For  each  objective  the  Member State  must 
maintain their public expenditure at least at the level it was at in the preceding period. 
Between 2000 and 2006, the geographic level at which additionality is checked will be 
simplifies in comparison to the previous period (in the case of Objective 1 the totality of 
eligible regions, and for Objective 2 and 3 combined the entire country). The Member 
States have to supply the necessary information to the Commission upon adoption of  the 
programmes, halfway through them and at their end. 
The  requirement for  a  national  counterpart for  the  resources  provided by the  EU is 
intended to achieve a greater economic impact by increasing the amounts to be invested 
in a particular region.  The Commission and the Member State determine the level of 
public or equivalent structural expenditure that the Member State is to maintain in the 
sum of its regions covered by Objective 1.  For Objectives 2 and 3 taken together, the 
Commission and the member State concerned determine the level of expenditure on the 
active labour-market policy and, other actions designed to make it possible to achieve 
the goals of  those two objectives. 
Additionality is verified at three points during the programming period: 
•  an  ex-ante  verification,  to  provide  a  frame  of reference  for  the  whole 
programming period; 
•  a mid-term verification no later than three years after approval of  the CSF or 
the SPD, and as a general rule no later than 31  December 2003. Having done 
60  The principle of subsidiarity implies that public authorities do not take action when this can  be done 
adequately  and  effectively by  citizens  (Committee of the  Regions,  1995).  Article  3b  of the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht  contains  a  definition  of the  principle  of subsidiarity.  The  clause  in  full  states  that,  'The 
Community  shall  act  within  the  limits  of the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  this  Treaty  and  of the 
objectives  assigned  to  it  therein'.  'In  areas  which  do  not  fall  within  its  exclusive  competence,  the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of  the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community' (Federal 
Trust Conference, background paper, 22 May 1996). 
205 this, the Commission and the Member State may agree to revise the level of 
structural expenditure to be attained if  the economic situation has resulted in 
developments  in  public  revenue  or  employment  in  the  Member  State 
concerned significantly different from those expected at the time of the ex-
ante verification; 
•  a verification by 31  December 2005. 
The Member State has the responsibility of providing the necessary information, first 
when the plans are submitted, and when the mid-term and the one before 31  December 
2005 are made. 
- Management, monitoring and evaluation 
This principle was introduced as such by the Agenda 2000 reforms instead of  the former 
principle of concentration of Community aids into the six former priority areas (period 
1994-1999). Under the new Structural Funds Regulations, the Member State for  each 
programme  appoints  a  managing  authority.  The  tasks  of these  bodies  cover  the 
implementation,  correct  management  and  effectiveness  of  the  programme  (the 
collection  of statistical  and  financial  data,  the  preparation  and  transmission  to  the 
Commission of annual reports, the organisation of  the mid-term evaluation, etc). 
Monitoring Committees have also been established. These Committees are chaired by a 
representative  of the  managing  authority  to  ensure the  efficiency  and  quality  of the 
implementation measures. The Committees are the responsibility ofthe Member States. 
Evaluation is carried out at three levels, as  previously done, but the 2000-2006 period 
specifically  identifies  who  is  to  take  responsibility  for  each.  Thus,  the  ex-ante 
evaluation is the responsibility of the competent authorities in the Member States; the 
mid-term evaluation must be carried out by the authority managing the programme in 
collaboration  with  the  Commission,  and;  lastly,  the  ex-post  evaluation  is  the 
responsibility of  the European Commission, in collaboration with the Member State and 
the managing authority. The evaluation reports must be made available to the public. 
206 Monitoring Committees 
Each  CSF  or  SPD  and  each  operational  programme  have  to  be  supervised  by  a 
Monitoring Committee. These committees are set up by the Member State, in agreement 
with  the  managing  authority  after  consultation  with  the  partners.  The  partners  are 
responsible for promoting a balanced participation of women and men. The Monitoring 
Committee acts  under the  authority and  within the legal jurisdiction of the  Member 
State. 
The Monitoring Committee has to satisfy itself as to the effectiveness and quality of  the 
implementation of assistance.  To that end it has to  confirm or adjust the programme 
complement, including the physical and financial  indicators to  be use to  monitor the 
assistance;  approves  the  criteria  for  selecting  the  operations  financed  under  each 
measure;  reviews  the  progress  made  towards  achieving  the  specific  objectives  of 
assistance; approves the annual and final implementation report before they are sent to 
the Commission; it may propose to the managing authority any adjustment or review of 
the assistance likely to make possible the attainment of  the objectives. 
3.1.2  Fund's objectives and tasks 
Objectives 
As a component of the Structural Funds, the ERDF is to finance four type of actions: i) 
the priority objectives 1 and 2 (Art 1); ii) Community initiatives a and b (Art 20); iii) 
Innovative  actions  (Art  22),  and;  iv)  Technical  Assistance  (Art  23),  according  to 
Council Regulation (EC) N. 126011999 (CR 1260). 
Thus, the ERDF contributes to the attainment of  the six following objectives: 
(i) Priority Objectives: 
1) Objective 1 
2) Objective 2 
(ii) Community Initiatives: 
3) Interreg 
4) URBAN 
207 (iii) Innovative Actions 
5) Innovative Actions 
iv) Technical Assistance 
6)  Technical  Assistance.  The  ERDF  may  finance  the  preparatory,  monitoring, 
evaluation  and  checking  measures  necessary  for  implementing the  Structural  Funds. 
These include: 
- studies, including studies of a general nature, concerning the operation 
of  the Funds, 
- measures  of technical  assistance,  the  exchange  of experience  and 
information aimed  at  the  partners,  the  final  beneficiaries of assistance 
from the Funds and the general public, 
- the installation, operation and interconnection of computerised systems 
for management, monitoring and evaluation, 
- improvements in evaluation methods and exchange of information on 
practices in this field. 
The tasks of  the ERDF 
The tasks of the ERDF are defined in Arts  1 and 2 of Regulation (EC) N.  1783/1999 
(Reg  EC  1783) of the  European Parliament of 12  July  1999.  According to  this,  the 
ERDF contributes towards the financing of assistance to promote economic and social 
cohesion  by  correcting  the  main  regional  imbalances  and  participating  in  the 
development and conversion of regions. To that end, the ERDF should also contribute 
to promoting sustainable development and the creation of sustainable jobs. 
As part of  its tasks, the ERDF should contribute towards the financing of: 
•  Productive investment to create and safeguard sustainable jobs, 
•  Investment in infrastructure: 
In regions  covered  by  Objective  1,  to  help  to  increase  the  economIC 
potential,  development,  structural  adjustment  and  creation  or 
maintenance of sustainable jobs, including  investment in infrastructure 
contributing  to  the  establishment  and  development  of trans-European 
networks  in  the  areas  of transport,  telecommunications,  and  energy 
infrastructure; 
208 In regions and areas covered by Objective 1 and 2,  and the Community 
Initiatives  (as  defined  before)  concerned  to  the  diversification  of 
economic sites and industrial areas suffering from decline, the renewal of 
depressed urban areas  and the revitalisation of and improved access to 
rural areas, and areas dependent on fisheries; instrument in infrastructure 
where modernisation or regeneration is a pre-requisite for the creation or 
development of  job-creating economic activities, including infrastructure 
links on which the development of  such activities depends. 
•  The development of endogenous potential by measures which encourage and 
support local development and employment initiatives and the  activities of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. In particular: 
assistance towards  services for  enterprises,  in particular in the  field  of 
management,  markets  studies  and  research  and  services  common  to 
several enterprises, 
financing  the  transfer of technology  between enterprises  and  research 
establishments  and  financing  the  implementation  of  innovation  in 
enterprises, 
improvement of access by enterprises to  finance  and loans, by creating 
and developing appropriated financing instruments, 
direct aid to investment as  non repayable direct assistance, as repayable 
assistance, as  an interest-rate subsidy, a guarantee, an equity holding,  a 
venture-capital holding or another form of  finance, 
the  provision  of infrastructure  on  a  scale  appropriate  to  local  and 
employment development, 
aid for structures providing neighbourhood services to create new jobs. 
•  Technical assistance measures at the pre-investment stage, for the making of 
plans  (programming),  the  preparation of innovative  actions  and  technical 
assistance, the preparation of major projects (as defined in Art 25, CR 1260), 
209 global  grants
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,  and  at  the  initiative  of the  Commission  for  technical 
assistance. 
In  regIOns  designated  under  Objective  1,  the  ERDF  may  contribute  towards  the 
financing  of investment  in  education  and  health  that  is  beneficial  to  the  regions' 
structural adjustment. 
In  application  of the  preceding  tasks,  the  financial  contribution  of the  ERDF  shall 
support, among other things,  the following: 
•  the  productive  environment,  in particular to  increase  competitiveness  and 
sustainable  investment  by  firms,  especially  the  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises, and to  make regions more attractive, particularly by improving 
the standard of  their infrastructure; 
•  research  and  technological  development  with  a  View  to  promoting  the 
introduction of new technologies  and innovation and  the  strengthening of 
research and technological development capacities contributing to  regional 
development; 
•  the development of  the information society; 
•  the development of  tourism and cultural investment, including the protection 
of cultural and natural heritage, provided that they are creating sustainable 
jobs; 
•  the  protection  and  improvement  of the  environment,  in  particular  taking 
account of the principles of precaution and preventative action in support of 
economic development, the clean and efficient utilisation of energy and the 
development of  renewable energy sources; 
•  equality between women and  men in the  field  of employment, principally 
through the  establishment  of firms  and  through  infrastructure  or  services 
enabling the reconciliation of  family and working life; 
•  transnational,  cross-border  and  inter-regional  co-operation  on  sustainable 
regional and local development. 
61  Global grant: assistance which may be entrusted to one or more approved intermediaries (see complete 
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As stated in Art 3 of (Reg EC 1783), the ERDF shall contributed to the implementation 
of the  Community  initiative  for  cross-border,  transnational  and  inter-regional  co-
operation intended to encourage the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development 
of  the  whole  of  the  Community's  territory  (INTERREG),  as  well  as  to  the 
implementation of the Community initiative for  economic and  social regeneration of 
cities and urban neighbourhoods in crisis with a view to  promoting sustainable urban 
development (URBAN). 
Innovative measures 
The ERDF may also contribute to financing: 
•  studies  initiated  by  the  Commission  to  identify  and  analyse  regional 
development  problems  and  solutions,  particularly  with  a  view  to  an 
harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable  development  of the  whole  of the 
Community's  territory,  including  the  European  Spatial  Development 
Perspective; 
•  pilot projects to identify 0: test new regional and local development solutions 
with  a  view to  their  inclusion  in  assistance  after  demonstration  of their 
feasibility; 
•  exchanges of experience relating to  innovation with the  aim  of turning to 
account  and  transferring  experience  gained  in  the  regional  or  local 
development field. 
3.1.3  Allocation of  funds to the regions 
With respect to the allocation of fund to the eligible region for the 2000-2006 period, 
article  7  of  Regulation  EC  1260  states  that  'Using  transparent  procedures,  the 
Commission shall make indicative breakdowns by Member State of the  commitment 
appropriations for the programming based on the geographical coverage and  ...  taking 
definition at the beginning of chapter) 
211 full  account, for  Objectives 1 and 2,  of one or more objective criteria) similar to those 
covered by Regulation EEC N. 2052/1988) namely: 
eligible population, 
regional prosperity, 
national prosperity and, 
the  relative  severity  of  the  structural  problems,  especially  the  level  of 
unemployment. 
In  practice,  however,  as  Wishlade  (1999)  notes,  the  Commission  proposed  very 
different  methods  for  allocating  funding  under  each  objective.  The  same  author 
describes  the  methods  used  for  the  allocation  of resources  for  Objectives  1 and  2, 
summarised below: 
Financial allocation for Objective 1 
The principle under the financial allocation for Objective 1 is that the level of assistance 
should be related to  the  size of the regional development disparity in relation to  the 
Community  average,  whilst  taking  account  of national  prosperity  and  the  level  of 
unemployment. The methodology used for determining the amounts entailed four steps: 
the  difference  in  GDP  per  head  of the  Objective  1  eligible  regions  and  the 
Community average  is  measured.  In  poorest region this  gap  is  greater while  for 
richer regions this is reduced. As a result, resources concentrate on poorest regions; 
The amount of  resources per head of eligible population per annum is calculated as a 
percentage ofthis adjusted 'GDP per head gap'. The percentage applicable (3, 4 or 5 
per cent) varies according to levels of national prosperity expressed in terms of GDP 
per head as a proportion of  the Community average; 
An additional  allocation  is  made  in  all  Objective  1  reglOns  where  the  rate  of 
unemployment exceeds  the  Objective  1 regions  average.  According  to  Wishlade 
(2000),  this  is  £100  per annum  for  each unemployed person over and  above  the 
average unemployment rate for Objective 1 regions; 
Separate, but similar provisions are made for the Objective 1 phase-out regions, the 
key difference being that resources levels declined from 2001  to reach Objective 2 
levels by 2004. 
Apart  from  the  adjustment  factor  in  favour  of the  poorest regions,  these  provisions 
followed the methodology originally proposed by the Commission. The exception is a 
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demands from Member States. 
Financial allocation for Objective 2 
Objective 2 allocation of resources was made on the basis of the population covered by 
this Objective, adjusted for levels of unemployment. As a result, countries with higher 
levels of unemployment received a larger share of Objective 2 funding than the share 
that  would have  correspond to  them according  to  their population.  On the  contrary, 
lower  unemployment  rates  in  other  Objective  2  regions  meant  that  these  regions 
received a smaller share than the one that would have correspond to them by looking 
only at their population. As a result, per capita allocation of resources for  Objective 2 
regions varies widely between countries. 
According to  Wishlade  (2000),  the  new  Structural  Funds  Regulation  favours  poorer 
regions at the expense of poorer countries. This is particularly true when looking at the 
allocation of funds for these two objectives. Furthermore, this orientation is reinforced 
through the  adjustments  made under the  consideration of the unemployed number of 
persons in regions eligible for Objectives 1 and 2. 
This  is  even  more  significant  considering  the  amount  of resources  that  these  two 
objectives attract. The total allocation for  Objectives  1 and 2 regions account for 81.2 
per cent (69.7% for Objective 1 and 11.5% for  Objective 2)  of the total appropriation 
for  the  Structural  Funds,  including transitional  assistance,  the  Community  Initiatives 
and Innovative actions, that in total sum up  to EURO  195  billion. The two objectives 
combined cover 43.8 per cent of the Community population in the period 2000-2005, 
falling to 41.3 per cent in 2006. 
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(Million Euro) 
Country  Objective  Transitional  Objective  Transitional  Objective  Fisheries  Total 
1  Support for  2  Support for  3  Instruments 
former  former 
Objective 1  Objective 2 
areas  and 5b areas 
Belgium  0  625  368  65  737  34  1,829 
Denmark  0  0  156  27  365  197  745 
Germany  19,229  729  2,984  526  4,581  107  28,156 
Greece  20,961  0  0  0  0  0  20,961 
Spain  37,744  352  2,553  98  2,140  200  43,087 
France  3,254  551  5,437  613  4,540  225  14,620 
Ireland  1,315  1,773  0  0  0  0  3,088 
Italy  21,935  187  2,145  377  3,744  96  28,484 
Luxembourg  0  0  34  6  38  0  78 
The  0  123  676  119  1,686  31  2,635 
Netherlands 
Austria  261  0  578  102  528  4  1,473 
Portugal  16,124  2,905  0  0  0  0  19,029 
Finland  913  0  459  30  403  31  1,836 
Sweden  722  0  354  52  720  60  1,908 
United  5,085  1,166  3,989  706  4,568  121  15,635 
Kingdom 
TOTAL  127,543  19,733  24,050  1,106  183,564 
Total  of  SF  69.7%  11.5%  12.3%  0.8% 
budget 
Reserve  for  4.3%  1.4% 
transitional 
sUpjJort 
Source: EUR-OP News, 112000 RegIOnal PolIcy, June 2000 (web). 
Table 6.5: Financial Allocation of  the Community Initiatives, 2000-2006 (Million Euro) 
Country  INTERREG  EQUAL  LEADER  URBAN  Total 
Belgium  104  70  15  20  209 
Denmark  31  28  16  5  80 
Germany  737  484  247  140  1,608 
Greece  568  98  172  24  862 
Spain  900  485  467  106  1,958 
France  397  301  252  96  1,046 
Ireland  84  32  45  5  166 
Italy  426  371  267  108  1,172 
Luxembourg  7  4  2  0  13 
The Netherlands  349  196  78  28  651 
Austria  183  96  71  8  358 
Portugal  394  107  152  18  671 
Finland  129  68  52  5  254 
Sweden  154  81  38  5  278 
United Kingdom  362  376  106  117  961 
Networks *  50  50  40  15  155 
TOTAL  4,875  2,847  2,020  700  10,442 
Source: InforegIO News, No 69/99:; RapId Press Release, IP/991744 (Web) 
*  Networks: establishment of  observatories which will promote exchanges of  experience and good practice. 
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213 billion, broken down by year as follow: 
Table 6.6: Structural Funds resources by Fund, 2000-2006. EURO Billion 
Year  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Total 
Structural Funds  29,430  28,840  28,250  27,670  27,080  27,080  26,660  195,010 
Cohesion Fund  2,615  2,615  2,615  2,615  2,515  2,515  2,515  18,005 
Total  Structural  32,045  31,455  30,865  30,285  29,595  29,595  29,170  213,015 
Measures 
Source: EU,  1999. Structural Pohcy Reform (web) 
For the EURO 195 billion appropriation for the Structural Funds (including transitional 
assistance, the Community Initiatives and innovative actions) the breakdown for the 3 
objectives and Community Initiatives is as follow: 
Table 6.7: Structural Funds resources y Objective, 2000-2006. EURO Billion 
Objective/ Community  EURO  % 
Initiative  Billion 
Objective 1  135.90  69.70 
Objective 2  22.50  11.50 
Objective 3  24.05  12.30 
FIFG outside  l.l0  0.50 
Objective 3 
Community Initiatives  10040  5.35 
Innovative action and  1.30  0.65 
Technical Assistance 
Source: EU, 1999. Structural Pohcy Reform (web) 
3.1.4  How the ERDF works at the pre-investment stage 
Summary of  main stages 
All  activities under the ERDF are  governed by the  Structural Funds Regulations  and 
implementation  principles  (Concentration,  Programming,  Additionality  and 
Management,  monitoring  and  evaluation).  Resources  are  allocated  on  the  basis  of 
programming periods (the present period runs from 2001  to 2006). Financial assistance 
is in the form of  non-refundable grants channelled in three ways: Objective Programmes 
(94%), Community Initiatives Programmes (5.35%) and, Innovative Measures (0.65%). 
Programmes  are  managed  by  designated  authorities  in  the  Member  States  while 
Innovative Measures are managed by the Commission. 
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The term "programme" corresponds to a Single Programming Document (SPD) and an 
Operational  Programme  (OP).  These  are  prepared  by  the  national  and  regional 
authorities  and  approved  by  the  Commission.  An  OP  can  be  prepared  only  in  the 
context of a  Community Support Framework (CSF).  The two  programming  systems 
work as follow: 
CSFs and Ops usually concern a country or a group of regions in a country, eligible 
under  Objective  1.  CSFs  describe  the  social  and  economic  background  of the 
countries  or  regions  targeted  by  the  Structural  Funds,  present  the  development 
priorities and the objectives to be attained, and set out the arrangements for financial 
management, monitoring and supervision. OPs, on the other hand, provide details of 
the  various  priorities  in  a  CSF  at  the  level  of a  specific  region or  development 
priority (transport, support for businesses, etc). 
SPDs contain the same information as  both the CSF and an OP.  They are  usually 
related to operations to which the Structural Funds are contributing less than EURO 
1 billion in Objective 1 regions, to operations in Objective 2 regions, and to national 
operations under Objective 3 and in the fisheries sector. 
Together with these two  documents  (the  SPD  and  CSF),  the  2000-2006  period  also 
includes a further document, the Programme Complement, which gives  details of the 
programme at the level of the measures and projects financed.  It is  drawn up  by the 
programme managers (or managing authority) who also choose the projects. To  them 
actors from the economic and social areas have to apply for funding from the Structural 
Funds. 
Implementation of measures and projects is  overseen by the Monitoring Committees. 
The  Committees  are  composed of representatives  of regions,  the  Member State,  the 
bodies involved and the Commission. The Committees also assess the implementation 
of  the programmes and propose adjustments to the assistance. 
Community Initiative Programmes 
These programmes are prepared by the Member States on the basis of Guidelines drawn 
up  by  the  Commission.  Each  country  appoints  an  authority  responsible  for 
implementing each initiative. 
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These  measures  are  an  exception to  the principle of programming and  are  design to 
allow  the  Commission,  on  its  own  initiative,  to  finance  pilot projects  or  innovative 
strategies for co-operation and exchange of experience between those involved in local 
and  regional  development.  The  Commission  organises  the  calls  for  proposals  and 
selects the projects. 
The making of  the programmes of investment 
As  it  is  the  Member  States  primary  responsibility  to  define  their  priorities  for 
development, the part-financing of programmes by the EU requires that account has to 
be  taken  of  Community  priorities.  According  to  this,  Article  10(3)  of Council 
Regulation  (EC)  1260199 the Commission has to publish "broad, indicative guidelines 
on relevant and agreed Community policies in relation to the objectives ... to help the 
competent national and regional authorities to  draw up development plans and to  carry 
out any revision of  the assistance". With respect to the Community initiatives, article 21 
establishes  that  the  Commission  has  to  "lay  down  guidelines  describing,  for  each 
initiative,  the  aims,  scope  and  the  appropriate  method  of implementation".  Both 
guidelines are published in the 'Official Journal of  the European Communities'. 
In  respect  of Objectives  1,  2  and  3,  Member  States  have  to  submit  a  plan  to  the 
Commission. The plan is to be drawn up by the competent authorities designated by the 
Member State at national, regional and other level. 
For Objective 1,  Community Support Framework (CSF) have to  be  employed for  all 
regions  covered  by  Objective  1.  When  Community  allocation  is  less  than  a  certain 
amount  (EUR  1000  million)  the  requirement  is  of a  draft  Single  Programming 
Document (SPD).  For Objectives 2 and 3,  SPDs are employed. Member States may 
chose to draw up a CSF instead. 
Plans  have  to  be  submitted to  the  Commission  after  consultation with the  partners. 
These  plans  should be  submitted no  later than  four  months  after the  list of eligible 
regions have been drawn up. 
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with  the  aims  stated  in  Regulation  (EC)  1260/99,  and  other  relevant  Community 
policies. The Commission also have to appraise each Objective 3 plan proposed to see if 
it is consistent with the measures envisaged with the national plan under the European 
employment strategy. 
The Commission has to take decision on the contribution from the Funds no later than 
five  months  after  receiving  the  relevant  plan or  plans  provided they  contain  all  the 
features  listed  in  article  16  of the  referred  regulation.  That  is,  the  contents  of the 
programming for Objectives 1,2 and 3. 
The Commission has also to  appraise the proposed operational programmes submitted 
by the Member States in order to determine whether they are consistent with the aims of 
the  corresponding CSF  and other Community policies.  The earlier submission of the 
operational programmes by the  Member States  help the  Commission to  examine the 
CSF and.  So, when adopting its decision on a CSF, the Commission also approves the 
operational programmes submitted. 
The  Commission  takes  a  decision  on  a  SPD  in  agreement  with the  Member  State 
concerned. The European Investment Bank (EIB) may be involved in the preparation of 
the  SPD.  The decision taken by the Commission on a SPD and on the contribution of 
the Funds not later than five months after receiving the plan. 
The Member States have to send the 'programme complement' to the Commission in a 
single  document  for  information  within  three  months  of the  Commission  decision 
approving an operational programme of SPD. 
The Commission decisions on a CSF or SPD is published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities.  At the  request of the  European Parliament, the  Commission 
have  to  submit to  it,  for  information,  these  decisions  and  the  CSF  and  SPD  it  has 
approved. 
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The  key  priorities  for  the  European  Union  regional  policies  for  the  2000-2006 
programming  period,  i.e.  sustainable  economic  development,  competitiveness  and 
innovation,  employment  and  human  resources,  and  equality  of opportunity  between 
men and women continue to attract the Union's preoccupation due to the big problems 
still encountered across Europe. 
- Economic Development 
The  European  Commission  (1999)  argues  that  evaluations  contained  in the  periodic 
reports  on the situation of regions  in the  EU have  seen evidence on convergence of 
lagging regions in Europe.  The evidence presented in the 'The Sixth Periodic Report on 
the social and economic situation and development of regions in the EU', that analyses 
data for the 1986-1996 period, had confirmed this results, the GDP, or output per head 
of  poorer regions is converging towards the EU average. This period saw the following 
changes: 
•  In  the  25  poorest  regions  GDP  per  head  rose  from  52%  to  59%  of EU 
average, 
•  GDP  per head in the four Cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece)  went up  from  65%  of the  EU  average to  76.5%  in this period of 
eleven years. 
These results  have been driven by closer European economic  integration,  where  the 
Structural Funds have played an important role.  One of the  reason that explains this 
performance is the increase in trade between European countries, as an example, export 
and  imports  between  the  Cohesion  countries  and  other  EU  Members  States  have 
doubled in real terms over a decade (European Commission, 1999d). 
This  study  shows  that  despite  these  achievements  trend  towards  convergence, 
significant differences still remain.  In  fact,  although most regions are  experiencing at 
least  some  convergence,  their  performance  varies  considerably.  The  most  favoured 
lagging regions, particular capital regions, are catching up more rapidly than their rural 
hinterland. 
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regions remain very significant. In terms of overall wealth, the 25 poorest regions of  the 
EU present a per capita GDP equivalent to 60% of  the Community average. For the case 
of  the most prosperous regions, this ratio is of 160%. 
- Sustainability 
Action carried out through the Structural Funds has to comply with the environmental 
requirements of all involved levels and authorities to where funds are directed. The link 
between  economic  development  of regions  and  the  measures  for  environmental 
protection is  recognised as  a key consideration in the EU regional policy. It is  clear, 
however  (Guersent,  2001),  that  the  programmes  of the  Structural  Funds  are  not 
environmental policies, "what they are first and foremost is development policies" (p. 
165). With respect to the action of  the funds during the 2000-2006 period, five elements 
are considered: 
•  an assessment of  the environmental situation in the recipient region, 
•  an evaluation of  the environmental impact of  the programme, 
•  the involvement of the relevant environmental authorities in the preparation 
and implementation of  the programme, 
•  conformity with Community law on the environment, 
•  respect for the polluter pays principle. 
- Competitiveness and Innovation 
The  Commission  states  that  Competitiveness  has  two  dimensions:  productivity  and 
employment.  The  EU  is  performing  reasonably  well  on  productivity  but  badly  on 
employment.  Income and  output  growth of just over 2%  over the  last  decade  came 
mainly  from  increased  productivity,  which  grew  by  almost  2%  a  year,  while 
employment rose by less than 0.5% a year. Lagging regions face the double challenge of 
catching up with the present, as well as  adapting to the future (European Commission, 
1999). 
Citing the Commission Sixth Report (European Commission,  1999), Guersent (2001), 
points out that the disparities between regions in the fields of innovation and research, 
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the gap in the GDP per capita) present on of  the main challenges that regional policy is 
facing during the current programming period. Just as an example, "jobs involving high 
technology  skills  in  the  25%  most  advanced  regions  account  for  14.6%  of total 
employment in Europe, against barely 4% in the least developed regions on the Union" 
(Guersent, 2001  p.  166). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Commission  (1999)  argues  that  an  unfavourable  sectoral 
structure, together with a lack of innovative capacity seems to  be the most important 
factors underlying lagging competitiveness. Other factors are: 
•  Technology.  Although  differences  have  narrowed  III  recent  years, 
technological  divergence  (measured  by  indicators  such  as  the  request  for 
patents  and  research  expenditure)  has  been  noted  to  exceed  by  far  the 
divergence recorded for the per capita GDP. 
•  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises  (SMEs).  SMEs  play  an  important  role  in 
employment  creation  and  the  development  of lagging  regions.  SMEs  are 
specially important in Southern member States of the EU, in addition, these 
enterprises tend to concentrate in lagging regions within these countries. 
•  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI).  The  Commission  suggests  that  FDI 
contributes  to  regional  development  by  increasing  capital  stock  and  by 
introducing  new  products  and  techniques.  In  relation  to  GDP,  Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain have benefited from above average inflows of  investment 
from countries both, within and outside the EU. 
•  Transport  infrastructure.  Despite  the  progress  in  recent  years,  significant 
problems still remain between the EU average and the Cohesion countries. 
Significant  progress  have  been  made  in  reducing  disparities  III 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
•  Investment in energy infrastructure.  This  is  necessary to  reduce  disparities 
among regions due to its close link with economic growth and development. 
•  Educational levels of the work force. Disparities in human capital have been 
reduced  in  EU  regions,  though  significant  differences  still  remain  in  the 
relative  number  of  young  people  without  vocational  training  beyond 
compulsory schooling. 
221 •  Institutional factors.  These  include the  endowment of social  capital in the 
form  of the  business  culture  and  shared social norms of behaviour which 
facilitate  co-operation and enterprise, which is  of particular importance for 
regional development. 
•  The efficiency of public administration. Two elements can be highlighted as 
having  a  significant  impact  on  recent  years  in  the  sphere  of  public 
administration:  a)  changes  in  the  principles  governing  public  sector 
management,  a  key  feature  being  emphasis  on  performance  evaluation. 
Lessons  learn  from  the  past can be  fed  into  decision-making  to  improve 
policy in the future, and; b) the shift toward decentralisation and partnership, 
enabling  different  levels  of government  as  well  as  the  private  sector  to 
participate  in  the  policy  process  and  bring  their  own  expertise  and 
experience.  According  to  the  Commission  (1999),  the  delivery  system 
introduce  for  the  administration  of the  Structural  Funds  has  made  an 
important contribution to  the institutional endowment of lagging regions. A 
work by Smith (1998)  centred on the  Structural  Funds at  the  sub-national 
level demonstrates how,  after the  1988  structural reform,  new actors have 
gained relevance as a result of  the administration of  these funds. 
- Employment and equality of  opportunity between men and women 
The  Commission  has  recognised  that,  although  output  in  converging,  the  situation 
regarding unemployment is  less positive.  Unemployment in the EU still stood at just 
under 10% in late  1998. The 25  regions with the lowest rates of unemployment are at 
about the same level in  1998 as  ten years ago and their rates have remained steady at 
around 4%.  By contrast, rates in the most affected regions have climbed from  20% to 
24% (European Commission, 1999). According to Guersent (2001), the Commission is 
thinking of ways to  more effectively translate GDP growth into job creation, at least in 
the most affected regions. 
A particular concern is the importance of long-term unemployment.  Figures from  the 
1997 Sixth Periodic Report show that 49% of the unemployed have been out of work 
for  a year or more, and 30% for  at least two years.  Another problem is the exclusion 
from  the  labour  market  of social  groups  such  as  women  and  young  people.  The 
Commission  (1999)  argues  that  these  forms  of  unemployment  are  particularly 
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the 25  regions with the highest unemployment rates, long term unemployment account 
for  60%  of total  unemployment,  against  30%  in  the  25  regions  with  the  lowest 
unemployment. In regions with the highest unemployment rate, only 30% of women of 
working age actually have ajob and youth unemployment rates reaches 47%. 
Former works encountered significant differences in term of regional wealth among the 
regions  of Europe.  Using  data  up  to  1992  on  comparative  economic  performance, 
Dunford (1998) demonstrates that there is a strong tendency towards greater social and 
territorial inequality in the European Union
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.  He  argues that in most Member States 
strong regions have achieved faster rates of growth than weaker regions. Lower rates of 
growth of certain regions have occurred specially on GDP and employment.  Some of 
the  factors  that  would  explain  these  problems,  according  to  Dunford,  is  that  the 
widespread restructuring in the EU has occurred without a reintegration of  the displaced 
workforce  in the world of work.  Institutional factors  are  also  critical  determinants of 
success, as the experience of  a number of strong regions suggests. 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
The European Union is a continental scale institution with a wide variety of functions 
and responsibilities. EU is composed of consolidated institutions that undertake multiple 
tasks,  in  particular  on  economic,  social  and  regional  matters  related  to  all  Member 
States. 
Regional policy is a central preoccupation within the EU and in all the Member States 
and regions of the Community. The main instrument to  cope with EU regional policy 
are the Structural Funds. Along their existence the Structural Funds have undergone five 
structural transformations, each of  them trying to cope with the changeable condition of 
regional problems and with the accession of new members and new regional realities. 
The most important institution in the administration of  the existing regional funds is the 
European Commission. 
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programme to  strengthen the Community policies to  adapt them to  a larger Union, for 
assessing  countries'  application  for  accession,  and  to  provide  the  EU  with  a  more 
comprehensive  financial  framework.  Overall,  the  Agenda  2000  package  aims  to 
contribute  to  the  objective  of economic  and  social  cohesion  in  the  EU  by  greater 
concentration  of the  financial  programme.  The  decentralised  character  of the  new 
programme and the inclusion of new regional and local partners, public and private, is 
an important characteristic of  the new period. 
The  Structural  Funds,  with  its  four  inter-linked  funds,  is  to  play  a  central  role  in 
achieving economic and social cohesion in the Union. Each fund plays a distinctive  but 
co-ordinated role in pursuing this objective. 
The main component of the  Structural Funds  is  the European Regional Development 
Fund  (ERDF).  The  fund  main aims  are  to  promote  development  in  regions  lagging 
behind the EU average as well as to contribute to the economic and social conversion of 
regions  with structural  difficulties.  The ERDF  represents two  thirds of the  structural 
operation in the period 2000-2006 and it works under the same regulations of  the rest of 
Structural  Funds.  Four  principles  rule  the  operation  of the  ERDF:  Programming, 
Partnership, Additionality, and Management, monitoring and evaluation. 
The ERDF finances  a large number of actions through out the two objectives and  the 
Community  Initiatives.  This  actions  include  infrastructure  investment,  productive 
investment, employment, technical assistance,  and  investment for the development of 
endogenous  potential.  Financial  allocation  differ  from  objective  to  the  other.  The 
variables employed for the  allocation of resources consider the population,  economic 
strength, and employment in the regions. 
The  way national  and regional  authorities  get access to  the  ERDF resources  is  done 
through three ways:  In the first one the corresponding authority,  national or regional, 
62  Similar  results  were  presented  by  Perrons  (1992)  using  1988  statistic.  She  argues  that  regional 
inequalities revealed a clear centre-periphery pattern with the  richer regions concentrated  in  the  centre 
and the poorer regions in the periphery, especially in the south and west. 
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previously established by the Commission. The second path, the Community Initiative 
Programmes, also requires the preparation of a programme, this time by the  Member 
State, again on the basis of guidelines from the Commission. The third way correspond 
to the so called Innovative Measures. These are design by the Commission itself under 
its own initiative. The measures are proposed by the Commission which also keeps the 
responsibility for selecting the projects from those presented by the national authorities. 
It  is  interesting  to  see  the  many  transformations  that  the  Structural  Funds  have 
experienced over the years (against non in the Chilean FNDR). This can be understood 
as a response to the changeable condition of  the Union and can be thought as a desirable 
behaviour for coping with new scenarios on regional problems. 
The  emphasis  on  poorer regions  rather  on  poorer  countries  it  is  also  an  interesting 
feature  of the  new programme.  This  concept  have  to  do  with  a  long  discussion  in 
regional development theory, and in practical terms with the focusing of  resources. 
The  allocation  or  resources  is  done,  basically,  in two  stages,  with the  Commission 
having the main responsibility. The first by selecting the regions for assistance, and the 
second when defining the variables for determining the amount of  resources that will be 
allocated to each region or area within a region. Both decisions are taken at a centralised 
level. The member countries are given the responsibility for selecting the kind of action 
to carry out with the aid from the Commission. This indicates an top down direction in 
the planning process. 
The long planning period (seven years) it is also something that can be discussed in the 
light  of other  experiences  with  shorter  planning  periods.  Probably  one  of the  main 
reasons for doing it this way is the level of stability of the economy and the political 
circumstances of  the European region. 
The heavy work at the pre-investment stage (much is set up at the programming period, 
before any physical action starts) would facilitate the carrying out of subsequent stages 
in  the  process  of investment.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  this  can  be  thought  as 
restricting regional and local initiatives and own solution to particular problems. 
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2000-2006 investment period.  This is  done at the different stages of the programming 
period and at the different level of authorities and other bodies that participate in the 
process, as well as to the community in general. 
Whether regions of Europe and converging or not due to  the action of the  Structural 
Funds and more generally due to the action of European regional policy is still a matter 
of discussion since results of several studies have presented contradictory information. 
The European Commission (1999) argues that evaluations contained in the last report 
(the 1997 Sixth periodic report) on the situation of  regions in the EU shows evidence on 
the convergence of lagging regions in Europe. However, although the GDP output per 
head of poorer regions is  converging towards the EU average,  significant differences 
still remain. Technological divergence has been noted to  exceed by far the divergence 
recorded for the per capita GDP. 
The Commission has also recognised severe problems regarding unemployment. Long 
term unemployment and the exclusion from the labour market of social groups such as 
women and young people will continue to  be a matter of great concern for  regional 
policy.  The way how to  translate GDP  growth into job creation,  at  least in the  most 
affected regions is a challenge that requires immediate action. 
226 Chapter 7 
Main  Similarities  and  Differences  between  the  FNDR  and  the 
ERDF 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 above identified some key elements of the Regional Development Fund of 
Chile (FNDR) that were not working properly for a correct use of  the funds in terms of 
its  performance and overall  objective of regional  development.  Following,  chapter 6 
presented  a  detailed  account  of the  similar  regional  fund,  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), emphasising those aspects previously noticed in the FNDR 
as not working appropriately. 
This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  the  mam  similarities  and  differences  in  those 
aspects between the Regional Development Fund of Chile (FNDR) and the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The chapter is organised in six sections, each of 
them focusing on those particular aspects of the two funds.  The analysis begins with a 
presentation  of the  main  features  of the  two  funds;  Second,  the  presentation  and 
discussion of the  'concept of regional development'  behind the two  funds;  the Third 
part focuses in the specific objectives of the funds  and the way these impact regional 
development;  Fourth,  a  presentation  and  comparison  on the  main  elements  of the 
method  of allocation  of funds;  Fifth,  the  identification  of the  type  of actions  and 
sectors/areas  of investment  and  their  relevance  for  regional  social  and  economic 
development; the Sixth section explores on the possibility of finding other actions that 
due  to  the  existence of the  fund  may contribute to  regional  development.  Finally,  a 
summary  of the  main findings  of this  comparison  as  well  as  some  conclusions  are 
presented. 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  reading  and  understanding  of the  mam  elements  that 
characterised both funds  as  well as  the comparison between them, the presentation is 
done  in a two-column table that permits a  clear visualisation of these features.  This 
presentation  is  followed  by  a  general  description  and  a  discussion  on  the  main 
similarities and differences amongst these particular elements of  both funds. 
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The  Regional  Development  Fund  of  Chile  (FNDR)  and  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) of  the European Union were both set up more than 25  years 
ago,  by the mid  1970s.  The two  funds  were  designed to  support the  development of 
regions and,  apart from the principal aim of both funds  on regional development, and 
the  obvious  differences  in  terms  of the  territories  they  cover  and  the  amount  of 
resources involved, they present several other differences and similarities that are worth 
exploring. 
The FNDR is the most important regional fund of Chile. The fund is used on an annual 
basis and it is mainly directed to the investment in basic social infrastructure of projects 
designed at the regional level. The fund is allocated from the central level to the thirteen 
regions of Chile. The central level also has the responsibility of authorising the kind of 
projects  proposed  by the  regions  as  well  as  the  aggregated  accounting  of the  funds 
investment. The sectors/areas of investment and the particular projects are designed and 
prioritised at the regional level, although they have to fall within the category of  eligible 
sectors and type of  investment authorised by the FNDR Programme. 
The  ERDF,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  multi-national,  multi-annual  programme  of 
investment for  the  development of lagging  regions  within the  European Union.  The 
fund does not benefit all regions in the Community. The main body responsible for the 
administration of the  fund  is  the European Commission,  which among other tasks  is 
responsible for preparing the method of distribution of  funds to the different regions and 
objectives covered by the ERDF. Once funds have been allocated, it is the responsibility 
of each  national,  regional  and  local  government  and  partners  the  corresponding 
investment of  the resources. 
The  main type of activity financed  by both funds  is  infrastructure investment,  but  a 
number of other activities are also financed with more or less significance depending on 
the funds different approach to regional development and the problems regions in each 
case face. 
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years  the  fund  has  been in  operation,  the  amount of resources  involved,  and  people 
benefited.  The comparison ends  up  with a discussion on one of the most remarkable 
differences of  both funds which is the fact that while the FNDR has not experienced any 
major  reform  during  over twenty  five  years  of existence  (apart  from  that  when  the 
FNDR started to  be co-financed by the IDB), the ERDF has undergone five  structural 
reforms in all  its years of operation.  Finally, an example of a third regional fund,  the 
Interterritorial Compensation Fund of Spain (FCI), is presented to illustrate the reasons 
that may contribute for a fund to adapt to new scenarios. 
Table 7.1: Main features of  the FNDR and the ERDF funds 
F N D R  (Chile) 
•  Primary objective of  the fund:  Regional 
Development 
•  Set up ofthe fund:  1974 
•  A verage amount of resources per year 
(2000-2003) = EURO Million 125.0 (a) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
E R D F (European Union) 
Primary  objective of the  fund:  Regional 
Development 
Set up of  the fund:  1975 
Average  amount  of resources  per  year 
(2000-2006) = EURO Million 30,430.7(e) 
•  People  covered:  40%  of  Chile's 
population (b) = 6,084,523 
People  covered:  35-40%  of  EU 
popUlation (40%)(d) = 146,000,000  ~ 
S· 
'"Ii 
(l) 
•  Per capita annual investment 
= 20.54 EUROS 
•  Main type of investment: Infrastructure 
projects  in  the  areas  of  Education, 
Health,  Urban  Roads,  Rural  Roads, 
Water  Supply,  Sewer  Systems,  and 
Rural Domestic Electricity 
•  Dynamic/adaptability of the fund:  Few 
changes in the last 15 years 
• 
• 
• 
Per capita annual investment 
(40% of  pop) = 208.43 EUROS 
Main  type  of investment:  Objective  1 
'Lagging regions- of average GDP below 
75%'  =  A  69.7% of the total  Structural 
Funds resources fall into this objective 
Dynamic/adaptability  of the  fund:  Five 
structural reforms in the last 21 years 
laJ Total amount of  FNDR resources for the perIod 2000-2003 - 500 US$ MIllIon 
(b) Out of 15,211,308 estimated for the year 2000 
(e) For the whole of  the Structural Funds plus the Cohesion Fund (EURO Million 213,015) 
(d) Out of  the 365,000,000 estimated for the year 2000 
Main Similarities and Differences 
~ 
(l) 
'" 
As  seen in Table 7.1  above,  the  funds  present significant differences in terms of the 
amount of resources, territory and population they cover. However, both funds are very 
similar  in  terms  of the  main  aims,  their  objectives  and  the  type  of actions  and 
sectors/areas of  investment (as it will be seen in the section that follows). 
The most remarkable difference, however, appears when looking at the capability of  the 
funds to adapt to new realities and new challenges. The FNDR, for example, was set up 
in  1974,  in  the  year  1985  the  fund  became  important  due  to  a  loan  from  the  Inter 
229 American Development Bank (IDB) that significantly increased its amount of  resources. 
Since then the fund has been used to finance infrastructure projects in basically the same 
sectors  of investment (Education,  Health,  Urban Roads,  Rural  Roads,  Water  Supply, 
Sewer Systems, and Rural Domestic Electricity). In this period of sixteen years, three 
IDB  loans have co-financed the FNDR, a fourth one has just started to  operate in the 
year  2000  for  five  more  years,  and  again  no  important  transformation  have  been 
introduced to the fund. 
The  aim  of the  fund,  'regional  development',  is  supposed  to  remain  the  same,  but 
nothing has been done to redefine the specific objectives, or the method of allocation of 
fund, or the type of actions and sectors of  investment, etc. The FNDR has been basically 
doing the same thing for sixteen years, and in the same way. 
The problem with this  is  that it  is  widely felt  among politicians, regional  authorities, 
scholars, and public officials in Chile that changes are urgently needed if the fund is to 
playa more important role in Chile's regional development. The main justification for 
these changes can be grouped in three categories. First, the traditional sectors that have 
attracted much ofthe FNDR resources (Education, Health, etc.) will continue to do so if 
the corresponding economic sectors (ministries) do  not take full  responsibility of their 
duties  in  infrastructure  supply  for  these  areas.  Therefore,  if the  FNDR  continues 
financing  exclusively  these  sectors,  little  will  be  achieved  with  respect  to  regional 
development. 
Second, the impact on regional development of not only the type of projects the fund 
finances  (infrastructure  in  these  seven  sectors),  but  also  in  the  way  this  is  done  (a 
myriad of  small isolated projects spread out over the territory) will be little or inexistent 
at all. 
Third, Chile's economic and social development ofthe last fifteen years, and especially 
over the last ten years, poses new challenges and demands new ideas from the regions 
to  succeed  in  an  increasingly  changeable  economic  environment.  The  FNDR  as  a 
decentralised investment fund,  with resources that have been increasing over the time, 
may  play  an  important  role  at  this  respect  if its  action  is  reoriented  to  more 
development-oriented initiatives. 
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of  them widening the range of operation of  the fund, focusing its actions and adapting to 
new realities.  Each new programme has take  advantage of a new beginning and  has 
introduced  changes.  The  first  reform  saw the  introduction  of the  seven  Community 
Scheme;  the  second  reform  aimed  at  correct  the  principal  regional  imbalances 
concentrating  on  regions  whose  development  was  lagging  behind  and  in  declining 
industrial  areas;  the  third  structural  reform  introduced  the  four  principles  of 
additionality, partnership, co-ordination, and programming; the fourth reform broadened 
the range of resources and set up the Cohesion Fund; and the fifth structural reform has 
been  drawn  up  under  the  prospect  of enlargement  and  greater  concentration  of 
assistance. 
Another example at this respect is what happened to the [Regional Development Fund 
of Spain]  Fondo  de  Compensaci6n Interterritorial (FCI).  Before being assimilated to 
the ERDF63  the FCr had also faced the problem of rigidity.  Since its creation, in 1978 
(article  158  of the  1978  Constitution,  and  Law  811980,  article  16),  the  FCI  did  not 
experienced any change until  1989, when a reform was initiated. The main causes of 
this  reform  were:  a)  Law 8/1980  had  initially  considered  a  reform  after  5  years  of 
operation of the  fund,  which actually began in  1984;  the  problems  associated to  the 
system of allocation of  funds and the bias in favour of  the most developed regions of the 
Basque Country and Catalonia;  and c)  the need to  co-ordinate with the  ERDF (Ruiz-
Huerta J,  1992; Melguizo A,  1992). The resulting 'structural reform' (Castells,  1992b) 
subdivided the Fcr into two areas:  a)  An interterritorial compensation fund,  aimed to 
territorial  equilibrium that provide  resources  for  nine  (out of nineteen)  Autonomous 
Communities,  and  b)  Compensatory  or  sufficiency  financing  fund  that  allocate 
resources to all the Autonomous Communities of Spain. 
In the case of Chile neither internal nor external conditions have been able to forced the 
FNDR to  adjust to  new realities. The most important political event of the country in 
recent years,  the  transit from  an  authoritarian regime to  a democratic  government in 
1990, was not sufficient to change the basic structure of the FNDR, despite the critique 
63  At present, the Fe! is distributed to the regions of Spain according to the same procedures defined for 
the ERDF, and the fund itself constitutes the national counterpart for addressing the objectives of  the 
Structural Funds. 
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contract with the IDB for the fourth successive FNDR loan, in 2000, although reported 
as  a  'second  generation'  type  of programme  by  the  IDB  (IDB,  Perfil  II  CH-0161: 
http://www.iadb.org/search97cgi/s97is.dll) the new programme did not introduced any 
structural  changes  on what has  been  doing  since  1985  (see  description  of this  new 
FNDR Programme in Annexe III). 
2  The concept of  the FNDR and ERDF 
The  'concept of the FNDR', or the overall aims of the fund,  are found in three official 
documents:  a)  the  Chilean  Constitution,  Article  104;  b)  the  Law  of  Regional 
Governments -LOCGAR Article 73;  and, c)  the Reglamento Operativo  1995  (the IDB 
Regulation). An interpretation of these general objectives also appears in an evaluation 
study of  the FNDR carried out by the Ministry of  Finance (DIPRES, 1998). 
The 'concept of  the ERDF', on the other hand is also found in three official documents: 
a)  The  Treaty  of the  European  Union,  Article  160;  and  b)  The  Regulation  (EC) 
178311999  and  the  Regulation  (EC)  126011999.  However,  since  the  ERDF  is  a 
component part of the  Structural Funds, which at a time are part of the more general 
framework of the European Union Regional Policy, there are a number of other basic 
principles that have to be considered when defining the overall aims of  the ERDF. With 
regard to the EU Regional Policy, for the period 2000-2006, these basic principles are: 
1)  financial  solidarity  and  greater  cost-effectiveness;  2)  a  clear  division  of 
responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States;  3) the promotion of 
four basic  Community priorities:  sustainable  economic  development,  competitiveness 
and innovation, employment and human resources, and equality of opportunity between 
men and women. 
In  the  case  of the  Structural  Funds  Regulations,  the  guiding  principles  for  the 
management of all  three interrelated funds  (i.e.  the ERDF, the ESF  and the EAGGF) 
are:  1)  greater  concentration;  2)  fewer  objectives  -3  instead  of 5 as  in  the  previous 
232 period;  3)  simplification  and  decentralisation;  4)  improved  efficiency;  and,  5)  more 
effective controls. 
Within this general setting, the ERDF is regulated by its own general objectives, which 
were first established in Article 160 of the Treaty and then specified in more detail in 
the  Council Regulation (EC)  1783  of 1999,  and  (EC)  1260 of the same  year.  These 
objectives are the ones considered for the comparison with those of  the FNDR of Chile. 
Thus, the 'concept of  the FNDR and the ERDF, or the overall aims of  both funds can be 
summarised as follows: 
Table 7.2. The concept overall aims of  the FNDR and the ERDF 
F N D R  (Chile)  E R D F (European Union) 
Article 104 of  "Constituci6n Politica de 
Chile"  provides  that  the  FNDR  is 
intended to: 
1)  Ensure  an  harmonic  and balanced 
territorial development, 
Article 73  of LOCGAR states that the 
FNDR is intended for: 
2)  Territorial compensation, 
3)  The Overcoming of  poverty, 
Regulation  (IDB)  -"Reglamento 
Operativo  1995", states that the FNDR 
intents to: 
4)  Increase  social  welfare  of  low-
income groups, 
5)  Support  and  Consolidate  the 
process of  regional is at ion. 
General description 
Article  160  of the  Treaty provides  that the 
ERDF is intended to: 
1)  Help  redress  the  main  regional 
imbalances in the Community, 
Regulation  (EC)  178311999  (numeral  4) 
establishes that the ERDF contributes to: 
2)  Promote  regional  development, 
harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable 
development of  economic activity, 
3)  Promote  competitiveness,  employment, 
equality between women and men and, 
4)  Protection  and  improvement  of  the 
environment. 
Five overall aims define the concept of the FNDR as a fund for regional development 
(Table  7.2).  These  objectives  address  three  types  of question regarding to  Territory 
(objectives  1  and  2);  Poverty  (objectives  3  and  4);  and  Regional  Administration 
(objective 5).  The objective regarding the fostering of regional governments (Regional 
Administration objective) was introduced in 1995 with the 1995-1999 loan. The aim of 
this initiative was to consolidate the process of regionalisation initiated in the country at 
the end of  the 1960s and definitively pushed forward at the beginning of  the 1990s. 
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also  address  basically three types of questions.  First,  Territory  (objectives  1 and 2); 
second, Economy, (objective 3); and third, Environment (objective 4). 
Main Similarities and Differences 
The FNDR and the ERDF coincide in just one of the three main aspects that define the 
overall concept of both funds.  In each case territorial  development (Territory)  is the 
main preoccupation of the funds, in the Chilean case aiming at territorial compensation 
and  development  and  in  the  European  case  in  order  to  overcome  the  regional 
imbalances  in  the  Community  (the  majority  of the  resources  are  destined  to  this 
objective in both cases). 
Within the FNDR, low-income groups (Poverty) and the consolidation of the Regional 
Government institution in its administrative aspects (Regional Administration) complete 
the central preoccupation of the action of the fund.  In the case of the ERDF, the other 
two  aspects  are  economic  development  (Economy)  that  considers  the  economic 
performance of regions,  employment and equality between women and men, and the 
protection of the  environment (Environment)  that has to  be considered in all  actions 
pursued by the fund. 
Thus,  the  emphasis  in  the  ERDF  is  placed  in  economiC  development,  against  the 
preoccupation in increasing the social welfare of low-income groups of  the FNDR. This 
different emphasis determines the kind of specific objectives (discussed in the following 
section) that each fund will pursue. 
A  recent  report  on Chile's future  development  by the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  (IDB,  2001),  discusses  on the  country's  medium-term  challenges.  The  report 
identify four major challenges, of which two of them,  'reconciling economic growth 
with equity concerns' and,  'modernising the State and deepening democracy', have to 
do  with the existence of the FNDR fund.  As the FNDR is a direct consequence of the 
IDB policy in Chile, these challenges have to be taken into account when analysing the 
final objective of  the fund. 
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(objectives 3 and 4) and consolidating the process of  region  ali  sat  ion in Chile (objective 
5) will continue to be central for the action of the FNDR. These central preoccupations 
in the FNDR will, however, overshadow those for economic development, also stated as 
main objectives in the FNDR. 
If the FNDR is to  concentrate on lesser objectives in the coming period its action may 
be  expected to  be more focused and to have a greater impact than in previous periods. 
By focusing on the consolidation of the process of regionalisation of the country, that 
for the FNDR has meant improving the efficiency of  Regional Governments, the overall 
results can be expected to be even greater. More concentration of FNDR assistance and 
with more qualified personnel and expedite administrative procedures will end up  in a 
more efficient use of  the resources. 
The  experience of the  last two or three years  in the  administration of the FNDR has 
showed  a  shift  in  the  discourse  of regional  authorities.  While  before  the  stress  was 
placed on the actual results of  the investment, that is the number of  school or kilometres 
of roads constructed by the FNDR, now the emphasis is put on the number of people 
that is being employed due to the action of the fund, both during its operation and as a 
consequence of the  increase in infrastructure and the  number of places of permanent 
jobs it generates. 
3  Specific objectives of  the funds 
3.1  Specific objectives 
Beyond the overall concepts of harmonious and balanced territorial development,  the 
overcoming of poverty, and the fostering of the process of regionalisation pursued by 
the FNDR, and those of regional development, employment, and equal opportunities of 
the  ERDF,  each fund  is  directed to  more  specific  objectives designed to  attain these 
more  general  aims.  The  specific  objectives  of both  funds  are  summarised  below  in 
Table 7.3. 
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F N D R  (Chile)" 
Objective I 
•  Supporting  the  process  of 
regionalisation  and territorial 
compensation, 
Objective 2 
•  Improving  the  living 
conditions  of  low-income 
groups, 
Objective 3 
•  Fostering  the  institutional 
development  of  Regional 
Governments. 
E R D F (European Union) 
i)  Priority Objectives 
Objective I 
•  Obj  1.  Promoting  the  development  and  structural 
adjustment of  regions whose development is  lagging 
behind, 
Objective 2 
•  Obj  2.  Supporting  the  economic  and  social 
conversion of areas facing structural difficulties (in 
the  industrial  and  service  sectors,  declining  rural, 
urban and those dependent on fisheries areas), 
ii) Community Initiatives 
Objective 3 
•  Cross-border,  transnational  and  interregional  co-
operation  intended  to  encourage  the  harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of the whole 
of  the Community area ('Interreg'), 
Objective 4 
•  Economic  and  social  regeneration of cities  and  of 
urban  neighbourhoods  III  cnsls  with  a  view  to 
promoting  a  sustainable  urban  development  ~ 
('URBAN'),  g 
iii) Innovative Action  ~ 
Objective 5  0  g 
•  Finance  innovative  actions  at  Community  level  g 
(studies, pilot projects and exchange of  experiences).  ~. 
These  shall  contribute  to  the  preparation  of  ~ 
innovative  methods  and  practices  designed  to 
improve  the  quality  of  assistance  under  The 
Structural Funds Objectives 1,2 and 3, 
iv) Technical Assistance 
Objective 6 
•  The ERDF may finance the preparatory, monitoring, 
evaluation  and  checking  measures  necessary  for 
implementing the Structural Funds. These include: 
a)  studies, 
b)  measures  of  technical  assistance,  the 
exchange  of  experience  and  information 
aimed at the  partners, the final  beneficiaries 
and the general public, 
c)  the installation, operation and interconnection 
of computerised  systems  for  management, 
monitoring and evaluation, 
d)  improvements  in  evaluation  methods  and 
exchange of information on practices in this 
field, 
(a) These three objectIves correspond to those Identified by DIPRES (1998) 
General Description 
In the case of the FNDR fund, there are three specific objectives. Although understood 
as the 'specific' objectives of  the FNDR, they are of a very general nature. In fact, these 
three objectives are not defined as  such by any of the three official documents that set 
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Regulation (Reglamento Operativo, 1995). Each one of these objectives addresses each 
one of the three overall aims that define the concept of the fund (discussed in previous 
section). For the ERDF, on the other hand, there are six specific objectives grouped in 
four  areas  of action:  Priority objectives  (objectives  1 and 2);  Community Initiatives 
(objectives  3  and  4);  Innovative  Actions  (objective  5);  and,  Technical  Assistance 
(objective 6), that comprises four even more detailed actions. 
Main similarities and differences 
Two big differences appear at first sight ofthe specific objectives of  the two funds.  The 
first is the difference in terms of the number of objectives in each of them, many more 
in the case of  the ERDF. This characteristic leads to the second and more important one 
that is the degree of focusing that can be accomplished in each case due to the number 
and specificity of  the objectives. A larger number of objectives in the case of  the ERDF 
fund means less concentration but higher focusing of its action due to the specificity in 
which they have been drawn (at least some of  them). The problem with the objectives of 
the  FNDR, at this respect,  is  that although they are fewer in number, they have been 
stated in such general terms that they, in most cases, are not able to  achieve a greater 
concentration and focusing.  Thus, these objectives are not only difficult to pursue, but 
also very difficult to evaluate in order to find out to what extent they are addressing the 
problems they intended to solve. 
In  this  sense,  the  three  very  general  and  vague  objectives  of the  FNDR  are  only 
comparable to the first  'Priority Objective'  of the ERDF  (objective 1:  to promote the 
development  and  structural  adjustment  of regions  whose  development  is  lagging 
behind).  This objective is  also of a very general nature and almost any kind of action 
may fall  within it.  The rest of the  objectives of the ERDF point out to  more specific 
aspects of  the economic and social development of  the regions of  the ED. 
A third important aspect that differentiates the specific objectives of  the two funds is the 
scope of each fund.  Although very general and vague, the three specific objectives of 
the FNDR have been mainly used to address the social component of the development 
of regions  in Chile.  The ERDF,  on the  contrary,  covers very different aspects of the 
development of ED regions, including: economic and social aspects, the industrial and 
237 service sectors, interregional co-operation, the financing of innovative action, exchange 
of experiences and technical assistance to improve the quality of  the assistance from the 
fund. 
3.2  Evaluation of  objectives 
In order to measure the effectiveness of  the funds assistance and the achievements of  the 
objectives stated in each case, both cases contemplate periodic evaluations of the action 
of the  funds.  In  the  case  of the  ERDF,  article  40  of Regulation  EC  126011999 
establishes that Community structural assistance have to be subject of ex-ante, mid-term 
and ex-post evaluation designed to appraise its impact with respect to the objectives set 
out for the different funds and to analyse its effects on specific structural problems. 
In the case of the FNDR, LOCGAR does not mention anything about an evaluation of 
the action of the FNDR.  The Reglamento Operativo  1995-1999 do  requires an annual 
report with regard to  the operation of the projects constructed with FNDR-IDB funds. 
The report is based on a sample of projects for different sectors and regions. The aim of 
this evaluation is to identify those beneficiary institutions (Health, Education sector, etc) 
that  do  not  comply  with  the  requirements  (compromise  to  maintain  the  facilities) 
established by the Bank at the moment of  approving a project. 
Nevertheless,  SUBDERE  has  carried  out  periodic  evaluations  (at  the  end  of each 
programming period) for the whole of the action of the FNDR fund, the last one being 
that of 1997 for the FNDR Programme of 1990-1994. 
The  11 th  Annual Report from the Commission evaluated the  1999 performance of the 
action  of the  Structural  Funds.  This  correspond to  the  most recent evaluation of the 
funds, which has been carried out since 1989. The 1995 evaluation (i
h Annual Report) 
introduced the modality of  concentrating on a special theme. In the 11 th report the theme 
is  "measures to  promote equal  opportunities  for  men  and  women".  The  main  aspect 
covered in this evaluation can be  grouped into two categories. The first category deals 
with aspects related to administrative facts and the co-ordination of  the Structural Funds 
with other funds and includes: a) the budget implementation, b) the co-ordination with 
other financial instruments, c) the compatibility with other Community policies, and d) 
the communication with other institutions involved in the process. The second category 
238 has to do with the actual impact of  the funds in the regions of Europe. This includes: e) 
the  implementation of the programme  in the  member states,  including a  country by 
country  survey,  and  f)  and  evaluation  and  analysis  of the  impact of the  funds  by 
objective and themes (sectors) such as transport, job creation, etc. A description of the 
main  aspects,  and  their  description,  considered  for  the  evaluation  of the  Structural 
Funds is presented below in numeral 6. Further Actions for Regional Development. 
For the FNDR, the last evaluation was carried out in 1997 and corresponds to the FNDR 
Programme  of 1990-1994
64
.  The  main  aspects  covered  in  this  evaluation  were:  a) 
allocation of resources  (by  sector and territories),  b)  the  focusing  of the  investment 
(main  social  groups  benefited  and  areas  most privileged),  c)  the  functioning  of the 
works financed by FNDR funds (in terms of the quality of their infrastructure, state of 
conservation) and to what extent this facilities have benefited the expected population, 
d)  the  opinion of the  authorities  and  public  servants  involved in the  process  on the 
technical and administrative procedures of the FNDR, and e) the relationship that exist 
among the different stages of the process, from the first draft of a project to  the final 
execution of  works. 
The results of the evaluations are summarised below in table 7.4. Although the themes 
of  the evaluations do not have an equivalent for each fund, the two column presentation 
is  used  to  allow  for  a  rapid  understanding  of the  main  results.  Four  aspects  were 
considered to present the way evaluation is  carried out as well as the main results of 
these  evaluations:  co-ordination  with  other  financial  instruments,  information  and 
communication of the  activities  related  to  the  management of the  funds,  results  of 
specific actions by objective, and budget implementation. 
64 This study was presented and critically analysed when defining the FNDR in chapter 4. 
239 Table 7.4: Evaluation of  the FNDR and ERDF funds 
F N DR (Chile) 
•  Co-ordination  with  other  regional 
funds is considered in LOCGAR. Co-
financing (FNDR and sectoral funds) 
has  been applied  in  the  FNDR since 
1995. 
•  Because  all  public  investment  IS 
carried  out  in  one  computer-based 
system  in  Chile,  double  financing  is 
difficult to occur. 
•  As  sectoral  investment  (not 
regionalised)  is  still  the  main  source 
of public funding  in  the regions,  co-
ordination  at  all  levels  remains  a 
difficult task. 
•  Only  the  most  directly  involved 
parties are informed or invited to hear 
on the implementation of  projects and 
programmes. 
•  An  internal  document containing the 
fund's regulations circulates. 
•  The webpage of SUBDERE does not 
yet include a site on the FNDR fund. 
•  FNDR  regulation  has  not  yet 
considered  (therefore  not  funds  are 
available for this) to give publicity to 
the existence/action of  the FNDR. 
Objective  2  (Improving  the  living 
condition oflow-income groups). Period 
1990-1994. 
•  Because  the  FNDR  is  allocated  to 
territories  (regions  and  then 
comunas),  the  1997  study found  out 
that  less  populated  comunas,  and 
therefore  with  less  poor  population, 
attracted more funds  than those with 
larger poor population. The same was 
recorded by the 1985-I 989 evaluation 
of  the  FNDR65.  Objective  2  is 
therefore not being fully achieved. 
•  Commitment in 2000 = 100% 
•  Payments in 2000 = 97% (a) 
E R D F (European Union) 
•  Cohesion  Fund.  Has  provided  assistance  to 
phases  of  projects  where  other  Structural 
Funds  have  not  contributed.  No  cases  of 
double  financing  have  been  detected  by  the 
evaluators. 
•  The European Investment Bank (EIB). 61 % of 
loans went to disadvantage regions. Loans for 
Objectives  1  regions  accounted  for  45%  of 
that  total.  EIB  has  contributed  directly  to 
Priority Objective 1 (see table 7.3 above). 
•  The  European Investment Fund (ElF).  These 
funds  do  not  necessarily  focus  on  lagging 
regions.  Loan  volume  guaranteed  for  small 
fIrmS is one of  the funds main destinations. 
•  Seminars  and  other  events  with  interested 
parties  and  the  public  to  inform  on  the 
implementation of  programmes. 
•  Publishing of the funds regulations and of the 
evaluations. 
•  Implementation  of  website  pages  on  the 
regional policy (regularly updated). 
•  Regulation EC  126011999  includes an  article 
(art 46) that specifies that member states have 
to  ensure  that  publicity  IS  given  to 
development  plans.  Informing  the  final 
beneficiaries, the_general ~ublic, etc. 
Objective  1  (Promoting  the  development  and 
structural  adjustment  of  regions  lagging 
behind). Year 1999. 
•  Hainaut (Wallonia, BELGIUM). Investment in 
tourist  infrastructure,  cleaning  up  industrial 
and urban wasteland, promotion of the use of 
new  information  and  communication 
technology  in  secondary  education  and  job-
seekers, teacher training.  These measures and 
others  III  Research  and  Technology 
Development have fostered the potential of  the 
regional economy (11 th Report, p 49). 
•  Commitment in 1999 = 95% 
•  Payments in  1999 = 89%66 
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(a)  For budget implementation  is  better to  look at the  payments  rather to  the  commitments 
indicator because the system used for committing the money may be different in each case. 
Payment is the actual disbursement of  money and should be equivalent in both cases. Due to 
65  Greene y otros. Evaluation of  the 1985-1989 FNDR Programme. Cited in SUBDERE, 1997 p 58. 
66 In May 2001, the Council and the European Parliament approved plans to distribute over the five years 
from 2002 to 2006 Structural Funds appropriations not committed in 2000 nor carried over to 200 I. The 
funding in question is worth EUR 6, I 52 million (Inforegio News 86. Date: Wed, 30 May 2001). 
240 a  lack  of other indicators  to  measure  the  efficiency  in  the  use  of the  funds,  the  FNDR 
administration has  specialised in  expending most of the money available per year.  Beside, 
regions are rewarded or punished depending of the level of expenditure they achieve at the 
end of  each year. 
Despite the relative success on the financial and co-ordination aspects achieved by both 
funds,  the  impact of the  FNDR and  the  ERDF  on  the  overall  objective  of regional 
development  can be,  however,  questioned  when  looking  at  the  social  and  economic 
indicators that show the regions progress or decline. 
Although the Commission's evaluations of the  Structural Funds show optimist results 
about convergence in the European Union (growth of per head GDP from 52% to 59% 
in the 25  poorest regions, or the increase of GDP per head in the Cohesion Countries 
from  65%  of the  EU average  to  76.5%  in  eleven  year,  or the  success  of particular 
programmes in some countries) other studies have encountered significant differences in 
terms of wealth among the regions of Europe. The centre-periphery patterns in regional 
equalities,  with the  richest  regions  being  those  of the  centre  and  the  poorest of the 
periphery,  revealed  by  Perrons  (1992),  and  the  tendency  towards  greater  social 
inequality because stronger regions achieve faster rates of growth than weaker regions 
(Dunford, 1998). 
With respect to the FNDR, it is even harder to tell to what extent the fund assistance has 
had any impact on the regions development. What seems to be clear is the impact of  the 
FNDR  in  the  infrastructure  endowment  of specially  the  peripheral  less  populated 
regions  of the  country  that,  because  of the  method of allocation  of resources,  have 
greatly benefited with the existence of  the FNDR. 
Whether the growth or decline of a region's development can be associated to the action 
of a particular policy or the application of a particular programme is  something that is 
not easy to  establish. At this respect is  better to  look at the evidence and impact of a 
particular measure at the local  level.  It is  here where the  effects of an action can be 
better observed and assessed in order to determine its success, at least in the short run. 
241 4  Method of  allocation of  funds 
The method of allocation of FNDR funds in Chile was a matter of a detailed analysis in 
a recent study by Universidad Austral (1999)67.  This study focused its attention in the 
variables utilised in the distribution of funds to regions. The main findings of the study 
pointed to the quality and pertinence of  the variables utilised, to the excessive weight of 
the  territorial  dimension,  and  to  contradictions  among  some  of the  variables.  The 
discussion in the present work focuses,  instead,  on the set up and the main concepts 
behind the distribution and use of the FNDR (and of the ERDF). This approach has, 
thus, more to do with the rationale under the allocation of funds and its relationship to 
regional development than with the specific variables utilised in the distribution. 
Table 7 5· Main elements of  the method of allocation of  the FNDR and the ERDF  .. 
F N DR (Chile)  E R D F (European Union) 
General Criteria  General Criteria 
•  Funds are allocated by territorial  •  Funds are allocated by objective and then 
units (regions). Once in the regions,  by region 
funds are allocated by smaller  •  Funds are allocated in a seven-year period 
territorial units and by sectors.  •  Not all regions (out of  the 211 NUTS-2 
•  Funds are allocated in an annual basis  level regions in the EU) receive funds 
•  All 13 regions of  the country receive  •  Funds allocation is done in a 
funds  'programme-based approach' 
•  Funds allocation is done in a 'project-
by-project approach' 
Variables used in the Allocation of Funds:  Variables used in the Allocation of  Funds:  2:: 
•  Regional socio-economic prosperity  •  Eligible population  0 
(that includes 11  variables)  Regional prosperity 
(") 
•  a 
•  Territorial characteristics (includes 6  •  National prosperity  o· 
::l 
variables)  •  Severity of  structural problems (specially  0  ...., 
unemployment)  'Tl 
~ 
::l 
0.. 
Carry out of Projects  Carry out of Projects 
on 
•  Regional Programme ofFNDR  •  Programmes of investment (SPD and 
investment (or the list of individual  CSF) are approved by the Commission at 
projects) are approved at the central  the central level 
level  •  Investment Programmes are drawn after 
•  Individual projects are first drawn up  funds have been allocated to the 
then apply for FNDR funds from the  objectives and regions 
Regional Government  •  Unused funds are redistributed over the 
•  Unused funds are used on the  rest of  the period among all eligible 
following financial year (less than  regions (10,6% of  unused funds in the 
3% of  the funds are not used as an  year 2000 and 2001  combined) 
annual average from 1995 to 1999) 
67 This correspond to another of  the studies analysed in detail in Chapter 4. 
242 Table 7.S above presents the main elements and criteria utilised for the distribution and 
actual use of the FNDR and ERDF funds.  These elements have been grouped in three 
categories: general criteria, variables used in the allocation of funds, and main elements 
in the actual carry out of  projects. 
Main Similarities and Differences 
The most obvious aspect in the methods of distribution of resources of  both funds is the 
big difference in the rationale behind the two approaches. The FNDR is distributed in a 
territorial  ground  to  all  regions  of  Chile  (and  within  regions  to  almost  all 
municipalities). The distribution is done in an annual basis and resources are used under 
a project-by-project approach.  Once allocated to  regions the FNDR is  redistributed to 
smaller territorial units (the  comunas). The way this redistribution is  done  is  of great 
importance to the overall aim of  regional development, as it will be argued below. 
The ERDF, on the other hand, is  allocated only to certain regions in the EU,  its funds 
are  allocated  first  by  objectives  and  then  by  region.  Use  of funds  is  done  under  a 
programme-based approach for a period of seven year. 
In the  case of the FNDR, the specific projects that will receive FNDR funds  are first 
drawn up and then, once assessed and positively evaluated, they can apply for resources. 
Allocation of FNDR resources to the regions occurs once these projects have been put 
together to make what is called 'the regional programme of investment'. In the ERDF 
case, funds  are first allocated to  the different objectives and regions selected and then 
the countries and regions benefited prepare and submit the programmes of investment 
for the whole seven-year period (as in the 2000-2006 period). 
The  fact  that  funds  are  allocated  in  these  two  different  ways  means  that  regional 
development is understood and carried out also in two different manners. In the case of 
the FNDR funds are split among numerous municipalities and sectors, the large number 
of small individual projects are not linked to each other, have little impact on regional 
development and the whole system end up being an offer of  resources to satisfy sectoral 
and local governments interests. 
243 5  The type of  actions and sectors/areas of  investment 
Table 7.6 below presents the type of actions and sectors of investment of  the FNDR and 
the  ERDF  as  to  the  year  1999  and  2000  respectively  (the  end of the  third  FNDR 
Programme and the beginning of  the 2000-2006 programming period for the ERDF). 
In the  case of the  FNDR both,  the  type  of actions  and the  areas  of investment are 
grouped in two categories, each corresponding to the main actions and the main sectors 
of investment and the secondary type of actions and sectors of investment. This is an 
important differentiation because the FNDR is in fact almost exclusively dedicated to 
the main actions and sectors of  investment presented in this table. 
For the ERDF this differentiation was not made because although some of the actions 
and sectors of investment attract comparatively much less investment than for example 
infrastructure (as a type of  action) or regional development (in the areas of  investment), 
all types of actions and sectors of investment in this fund receive financing and form 
part, in many cases, of  programmed actions by the regions that receive assistance. 
See Table 7.6 next page 
244 Table 7.6: FNDR and ERDF. Types of  Action and Sectors/areas ofInvestment 
F N D R  (Chile)  E R D F (European Union) 
Main types of actions  •  Infrastructure 
•  Infrastructure  •  Studies 
•  Studies  •  Programmes 
•  Programmes  •  Technical assistance  ~ 
'0 
•  Research, Technology, Innovation 
(1) 
'"  Secondary types of  actions  Transference of  Experiences and 
0  •  ....., 
•  Engineering and designs  Innovation 
;J> 
(")  ..... 
Acquisition of grounds  •  •  Direct aid as non repayable assistance  o· 
:::s 
•  Technical assistance  •  Direct aid as repayable assistance, as an 
•  Supervision  interest-rate subsidy, 
•  Grants (to assist local development 
initiatives) 
Main sectors/areas of  investment  •  Regional Development 
IDB Eligible  •  Sustainable jobs 
•  Education  •  Industrial areas 
•  Health  •  Urban areas 
•  Drinking Water  •  Rural areas dependent on fishing 
•  Sewer systems  •  Endogenous potential 
•  Rural Roads  •  Small and medium-sized enterprises 
•  Urban Roads  •  Education 
r/) 
(1) 
Domestic Rural Electricity  Health 
(") 
•  •  ..... 
0  ..., 
•  Research and technological development  '"  -- Secondary sectors/areas of  investment (a)  ;J> 
•  Development of  the information society  ..., 
(1) 
Non IDB Eligible  Tourism and cultural investment 
1'0  •  '"  •  Domestic rural drinking water  Environment 
0 
• 
....., 
Construction of  new roads 
....., 
•  •  Clean and efficient utilisation of energy 
:::s 
< 
Flood deterrents 
(1)  •  •  Development of  renewable energy sources  '"  ..... 
•  Rural telephony  Equality between women and men in the  S  • 
(1) 
Small fishing ports 
:::s  •  field of  employment  ..... 
•  Trans-national, cross-border and 
•  Justice  interregional co-operation 
•  Agriculture  •  Economic and social regeneration of  cities 
•  Police and Security  and urban neighbourhoods 
•  Other sectors (mining, fishing,  •  Transference of  experiences and 
housing, etc)  innovation gained at regional and local 
level 
Notes: 
(a) The first group correspond to sectors included for the first time in the 1995-1999 IDB part of  the FNDR 
Programme,  of which no  much  was  done  in  the  period.  The second group  correspond to  the  sectors 
financed  by the National Resources  part of the FNDR Programme.  17.5% of the  FNDR was  used  to 
finance National Resources eligible sectors in 1997. 
Type of  actions 
General description 
As  seen  in  table  7.6  above,  the  FNDR  is  used  basically  in  three  types  of actions: 
infrastructure,  studies  and programmes  (multi-annual  programmes  in the  agricultural 
245 and fishing sectors). The other four actions are  of less importance and are carried out 
only as  complementary actions for infrastructure investment.  The ERDF,  on the other 
hand,  finances  nine types of actions  of diverse nature,  and not necessarily related to 
infrastructure investment, such as: research and technology, transference of experiences 
and  direct  aid  and  grants.  All  these  instruments  are  directed  to  help  regional 
development beyond infrastructure supply. 
Main differences and similarities 
Almost all type of actions carried out in the FNDR are also encounter in the ERDF. The 
main  similarity  within  these  actions  is  the  importance  given  to  infrastructure 
investment. This type of action attracts much of the investment in both cases. With the 
ERDF presenting a more diversified range of activities than the Chilean fund, the main 
differences  lie  therefore  on the  scope  of the  ERDF.  While  in the  FNDR almost  all 
activities are focused on infrastructure investment (cement and concrete) in the ERDF 
actions  are  of  at  least  three  different  types:  infrastructure  investment,  research 
technology and innovation, and direct aid and grants. 
These last two concepts of research and technology and direct aids and grants are  not 
considered within the FNDR, although research, technology and innovation have started 
to be financed in a joint programme with regional universities in Chile. The importance 
of these types of actions is that they are intended to  help regions to generate their own 
capacity to face development problems in the long term. 
Sectors/areas of  investment 
General description 
Out of the sixteen sectors of investment in the FNDR, seven have attracted most of the 
investment ofthe fund during the period 1995-2000. Education, Health, Drinking Water 
Supply,  Sewer  Systems,  Rural  Roads,  Urban Roads,  and  Rural  Domestic  Electricity 
concentrated over 82% of the FNDR investment in 1997. The rest of  the fund in mainly 
concentrated in non-IDB eligible sectors. 
The ERDF presents nineteen areas of investment that cover a wide range of activities, 
such  as  sectoral  investment  (Education,  Health);  urban  and  rural  areas  (urban 
neighbourhoods,  industrial  and  fishing  areas);  research  and  technology;  small  and 
medium size enterprises; environment; transference of  experiences, etc. 
246 Main similarities and differences 
When looking at the wide range of sectors/areas of investment covered by the ERDF 
(which can be explain among other things due  to  the enormous amount of resources 
involved and the immense territory, diverse economic structure and cultural background 
of  the regions of the Union) it is interesting to know of the many possibilities available 
for regional investment. The main difference with the FNDR at this respect is that while 
the FNDR is primarily a sectoral fund, the ERDF is multi-dimensional fund. 
First,  the  ERDF  is  territorial  because it is  focused  on regions whose  development is 
lagging  behind;  second  it  is  problem-oriented  because  it  invests  in  urban  areas  in 
decline and in fishing/rural areas; third, it is  also  sectoral, since it finances education, 
health  and  the  tourism  sectors;  fourth,  it is  a productive-investment fund  because  it 
finances Small and Medium-sized enterprises; Finally, the ERDF also finances activities 
related to the development potential of specific region within the European Union i.e. 
Sustainable  jobs,  Endogenous  potential,  Research  and  Technology,  Environment, 
Energy,  etc.  The  investment  in  infrastructure  in  the  ERDF  is  just one  of the  many 
activities carried out by the fund. 
Apart from the quantitative difference in the number of areas and objectives covered by 
the two funds, there also exist a big contrast in the complexity associated to the kind of 
investment carried out.  In  the  case  of the  FNDR,  the  investment in infrastructure  in 
mainly  seven  sectors  has  become  quite  simple  after  several  years  of experience 
administrating  the  fund.  All  the  administrative  procedures  in  the  formulation  and 
evaluation  of projects  (the  pre-investment  stage)  and  in  the  execution  of them 
(investment stage) are pre-established and controlled by the national and regional level 
and already well known to all those involved in the different stages of  the process. 
The  investment in these  particular sectors  is  a direct consequence of the  agreements 
with the IDB Bank for the three loans so far.  The reason for the selection of these seven 
sectors of investment was clear for a country with deficit in all of them by 1985 and on 
the ground of  the political and economical circumstances of that period (the trespassing 
of the education and health sectors to the local government as  well as compensation to 
regions who failed to benefit from the export-oriented economic strategy implemented 
during the military government). At the same time, by doing it this way,  it was easier 
247 for the central government to control the expenditures carried out at the regional level. 
The type of sector selected and the type of  investment -infrastructure- made sure for the 
central government that the regional investment would not distort the macro-economical 
equilibrium that the new economic model needed. 
6  Further actions for regional development 
Due  to  the  FNDR's particular characteristics,  such as  those  analysed in the  previous 
section,  especially the vagueness of the fund's objectives and the type of investment 
(mainly  infrastructure)  and  the  sectors  of investment  (Education,  health,  Water  and 
Sewer Systems, Roads and Rural Domestic Electricity), as well as the way investment is 
carried  out  (the  project-by-project  approach)  the  impact  of the  fund  on  regional 
development was  argued to  be very limited.  Apart from the physical outcome of the 
fund's action:  the number of schools and medical facilities constructed, or the amount 
of kilometres  of electric  grid  installed  or  roads  constructed,  etc.  (or  the  number  of 
people  actually  benefited  with  each  of these  projects)  it  can  be  said  that  no  other 
anticipated or unanticipated actions are building or leveraging regional development due 
to the existence of the FNDR. 
The main argument here in that there are  a number of other actions, associated to  the 
existence  of a  development  fund  that  may  also  play  an  important  role  on  regional 
development, beyond the sole benefit of increasing infrastructure capital. These actions 
refer not only to the final  results that can be achieved with a particular fund,  but also 
with the way the entire process is conducted. Two different cases will be provide the 
ground  for  comparing  analysing  these  aspects:  the  first  are  'the  principles  of the 
Structural Funds', and the second 'the process of decision-making in the allocation of 
resources  in  the  Scottish  Executive'.  Both  cases  will  be  compared  to  the  Chilean 
experience with regard to the FNDR. 
248 6.1  The principles of  the Structural Funds 
The  principles  of the  Structural  Funds  (Programming,  Partnership,  Additionality  and 
Management,  monitoring  and  evaluation)  can  be  understood  as  'the  operational 
objectives' of the funds, as they contribute to the achievement of  the specific objectives 
and to the overall aim of  the funds. In their role as 'operational objectives' they favour a 
clear and easier management of the  funds  by providing the necessary guidance to  all 
interested  parties.  They  also  ensure  wider  participation  and  actually  increase  the 
availability of resources by requesting third parties financial participation. Finally, the 
'operational objectives' also ensure the necessary feedback of the overall management 
of the funds by permanently monitoring and evaluating the running out and the outcome 
of  the funds. 
As it will be argued in this section, these 'operational objectives' contribute a great deal 
to  the overall objective of regional development by,  amongst other things,  leveraging 
investment and building institutional and social capacity within regions. 
What follows is a brief presentation of  the four Principles of  the Structural Funds
68
. The 
presentation concentrates on the main features of each principle and discusses to  what 
extent these principles are  found  in the  operation of the  FNDR fund  of Chile.  Since 
'evaluation'  constitutes  an  important part for  the  self-improvement of the  funds  and 
because this is  a very weak component in the  case of the regional fund of Chile, the 
ERDF experience on evaluation (within Management, monitoring and evaluation) will 
be more extensively presented. 
Programming 
Programming involves the preparation of  multi  annual development plans. The plans are 
undertaken through a partnership-based decision-making process, in several stages, until 
the measures are taken over by the public or private bodies entrusted with carrying them 
out.  For the 2000-2006 period the programming period covers seven years for  all  the 
objectives, with mid-term adjustments.  The  development plans are  based on national 
and regional priorities and include: 
68 A more detailed presentation ofthe Principles of  the Structural Funds was done in Chapter 6 above. 
249 A  description  of  the  current  situation  III  the  regIOns  (disparities,  lags, 
development potential), 
A  description  of  the  most  appropriate  strategy  for  achieving  the  stated 
objectives, and 
Indication as to the use and form of  the contribution from the funds, 
An account of arrangements made to consult partners. 
By  doing it this  way EU  Structural Funds  are  used to  pursue a properly thought-out 
strategy for regional economic development rather than to  support an ad-hoc selection 
of individual projects (Williams, 1996). 
Formally,  'Programming'  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of the  FNDR. 
Every  year  regions  submit  to  the  Ministry  of Finance  the  list  of 
individual projects they want to carry out in the following year. After 
the approval of  this list, this office authorises the budget corresponding 
to the FNDR. This presentation is not accompanied by a development 
plan  and  the  decision  on  the  approval  of projects  is  based  almost 
exclusively  upon  the  technical  assessment  and  eligibility  of  the 
projects  as  established  in the  loan  from  the  IDB,  and  the  National 
Ministry of Planning  (MIDEPLAN).  Only  recently,  and for  specific 
sectors  such  as  Education  and  Health,  programming  is  required  to 
accompany the presentation of  the individual projects. 
Partnership 
This principle implies the closest possible co-operation between the  Commission and 
the appropriate authorities at national, regional or local level in each Member State from 
the  preparatory stage to  implementation of the  measures.  Apart from  the  input from 
national,  regional  or  local  partners,  at  all  programming  stages,  the  2000-2006 
Regulations extended partnership to the regional and local authorities, the economic and 
social partners and other competent bodies and by involving the partners at all stages 
from the approval of  the development plan. 
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FNDR. Each region in Chile has developed its own way of preparing 
the investment programme of each year.  In some cases, this includes 
the  participation  of  local  and  provincial  authorities  as  well  as 
representatives of the  involved sectors  (Education,  Health,  etc).  This 
form  of co-operation  between  the  Regional  Government  and  these 
local  and  provincial  and  regional  instances  has  been,  however, 
criticised by these partners because this attempt for partnership do not 
always constitutes a real space for participation. 
Additionality 
This principle requires Community assistance to be additional to the contributions of  the 
Member  State  and  not  to  replace  them.  For  each objective  the  Member  State  must 
maintain their public expenditure at least at the level it was at in the preceding period. 
Between 2000 and 2006, the geographic level at which additionality is checked has been 
simplified (in the case of Objective 1 the totality of  eligible regions, and for Objective 2 
and 3 combined the entire country).  The Member States have to supply the necessary 
information  to  the  Commission upon adoption of the  programmes,  halfway  through 
them and at their end. 
As the FNDR action is based on a sectoral project-by-project approach, 
the chance of having an unexpected relevant outcome is lower that if 
fund  were used in a more comprehensive manner.  Other actions that 
may  be  associated  to  the  use  of investment  funds  could  stimulate 
regional development, beyond that of the  single benefice of counting 
with  a  specific  infrastructure  project.  The  assumption  behind  this 
argument is that, indeed, a regional fund can provide more for regional 
development than the mere results if  its physical results. 
There  are  two  occaSIOns  where  the  principle  of  additionality  IS 
formally applied in the case of  the FNDR: 
251 a)  In  the  projects  of Rural  Domestic  Electricity.  Electricity  projects 
consist of the construction of grid or the expansion of existing ones to 
supply  low-income  rural  communities  with  electric  energy.  These 
projects also consider the installation of electric power generation and 
distribution of energy for isolated communities. Electricity projects are 
financed  by  three  parties,  to  know:  the  FNDR,  the  Electricity 
Companies and the Interested Local Communities. As a result: 
1)  funds for regional development multiply, 
2)  public and private sector come together after a common interest 
and objectives, 
3)  Communities  have  learnt  to  organised  themselves  to  face 
common  problems.  Experience  that  have  permit  them  to 
succeed when developing and implementing other community 
projects. 
No other sector of the FNDR is handled in this way.  On the contrary, 
FNDR fund finances  single isolated sectoral projects where no  other 
major value added is generated because of its action. Here, apart from 
the resources from the Regional Government (the FNDR) the project 
has to  include input from the  electrical company that will operate the 
lines, and the people who will be benefited with the projects (more or 
less in a 70-20-10 proportion respectively)69. 
b)  In the "Convenios de  Programaci6n" (Programming documents). The 
Convenios  de  Programaci6n are  programming documents between a 
Regional Government and one or more ministries for the financing of  a 
project or group of projects that for  the magnitude of its  investment 
require the co-financing of more than one party. These type of actions 
have  permitted to  accomplish tasks  that otherwise would have  been 
impossible  to  pursue  by  a  single  fund  or  party.  These  multiparty 
69  The electrical projects have been one ofthe greatest successes of the FNDR, bringing down the deficit 
of rural household electricity supply from  around a 50% to  less than a 25% in  rural areas  in  ten years, 
from  1990 to the year 2000. 
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ordination amongst sectors and Regional  Governments. Nevertheless, 
no private co-financing is contemplated in this case yet. 
Apart from these two  examples  of additionality,  which are  the  only 
formally defined to operate that way, there are a number of other cases 
where  FNDR  projects  receive  co-financing  by  the  beneficiary 
institution (normally the municipalities).  This may occur because not 
enough funds were allocated to that particular municipality that year, 
or because an increase in the  costs of the works occurred during its 
execution. This procedure has however not been formally established, 
and only few cases occur every year. 
Management, monitoring and evaluation 
Under  the  2000-2006  Structural  Funds  Regulations,  the  Member  State  for  each 
programme  appoints  a  managing  authority.  The  tasks  of these  bodies  cover  the 
implementation,  correct  management  and  effectiveness  of  the  programme  (the 
collection  of statistical  and  financial  data,  the  preparation  and  transmission  to  the 
Commission of annual reports, the organisation of  the mid-term evaluation, etc). 
Monitoring Committees have  also  been established.  These Committees, chaired by  a 
representative  of the  managing  authority,  ensure  the  efficiency  and  quality  of the 
implementation of  the structural measures. The Committees are the responsibility of  the 
Member States. 
Evaluation is carried out at three levels: the ex-ante evaluation is the responsibility of 
the  competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States;  the  mid-term  evaluation  must  be 
carried  out  by  the  authority  managing  the  programme  in  collaboration  with  the 
Commission,  and;  lastly,  the  ex-post evaluation is  the  responsibility of the European 
Commission, in collaboration with the Member State and the managing authority. The 
evaluation reports must be made available to the public. 
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by the different public offices that manage the FNDR they do not exist 
formally as a co-ordinated aim to improved the efficiency of the fund. 
The  ex-post evaluations of the FNDR,  carried out at the  end of the 
programming  period,  especially  the  most  recent  one  carried  out  in 
1997 for the  1990-1994 programming period, have provided valuable 
information on some  critic aspects  of the  administration of the  fund 
and of its effectiveness. Evaluations of this nature are pioneers studies 
in Chile that,  according to  SUBDERE (1997),  still  lack of sufficient 
recognition among the interested parties. 
For  this  kind  of studies  to  develop  and  further  contribute  in  the 
improvement of the  overall  process  of investment of the  FNDR the 
first thing to  do  is  to  actually include them as  an integral part of the 
process.  The  attention,  in  the  case  of the  FNDR,  has  been  largely 
placed  on the  financial  aspects  of the  process.  Effectiveness  of the 
FNDR  has  been  understood  as  the  percentage  of expenditure  in 
relation to  annual commitment. This has meant a lack of attention on 
other aspects such as the physical outputs or the actual impact of the 
fund on regional development. 
Evaluation activities in the ERDF 
For the programming period 2000-2006, the Commission has prepared three guides to 
support evaluation activities (European Commission, 1999): 
The  ex-ante  evaluation  of the  Structural  Funds  interventions.  The  ex-ante 
evaluation is intended to provide assessments and recommendations on a policy 
or programme by expert, independently of  the planners. 
Indicators  for  monitoring and  evaluation.  Under these  indications, monitoring 
will not be  purely financial,  as  it used to  be.  Existing monitoring, control and 
evaluation procedures are to be developed and improved. 
Implementation of the performance reserve. Performance is to be assessed on a 
limited number of monitoring  indicators  reflecting effectiveness,  management 
and financial implementation. 
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Criteria  Description 
I  Physical outputs  •  Comparison of  actual and planned values for a 
group of  measures (covering at least half of  the  tr1 
>-tl 
2  Results  value of  the programme) 
(J(jji 
a·  a.  •  Comparison of  actual and planned results for  g.  ~ 
employment (temporary/permanent jobs created  I'll  ::s 
(I) 
or maintained) or employability of  target groups 
CIl 
CIl 
3  Quality of monitoring system  •  Percentage share of  the programme measure (in 
terms of  value) covered by annual financial and 
monitoring data compared with target  ~ 
4  Quality of  financial control  •  Percentage of  expenditure covered by annual 
I'll  ::s 
financial and management audits compared with 
I'll 
(Jq 
(I) 
target  i3 
(I) 
5  Quality of  project selection  •  Percentage of  commitments on projects selected  ::s - using clearly identified selection criteria or 
(J 
::l. 
appraised through cost-benefits analysis  CD 
6  Quality of  evaluation system 
.... 
compared with target  ;:;;. 
•  Availability of independent intermediate 
evaluation of  acceptable quality (predetermined 
quality standards) 
7  Absorption of  Funds  •  Percentage of  expenditure reimbursed or 
'Tj 
Er 
requested receivable in relation to annual 
I'll  ::s 
commitment (standards: expenditure 
() 
[ 
8  Leverage effects  corresponding to 100% of  commitments in first  (J 
two years) 
.... 
::;.' 
(I) 
•  Percentage of  private sector resources actually  ....  ;:;;. 
provided compared with target 
Source: European CommIssIon (1999). Annual EvaluatIon ReVIew. 
Two challenges have to face the FNDR with respect to "evaluation". The first one is to 
actually carry out more frequent evaluations in one or several of the aspect presented 
above,  i.e.  the  effectiveness  of its  action,  the  efficiency  of its  management  and  its 
financial administration, or other matters that may be of  interest for the fund to evaluate. 
The  second  one  is  to  become  more  flexible  to  incorporate  the  recommendations 
proposed as a result of  the evaluations. The current every-five-years evaluation has to be 
complemented with annual studies on more specific aspects that are always arising from 
the different regional government or from other involved actors in the process. 
In conclusion, and as  a result of the  comparison between the activities carried out by 
ERDF  under  the  name  of "principles  of the  Structural  Funds"  or  the  "operational 
objectives  of the  Structural  Funds",  the  only  operational  objectives  formally  in 
operation in the case of  the FNDR fund is that of Additionality and, into a lesser extent, 
that of Evaluation (of Management, monitoring and evaluation).  In the  first  case two 
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documents, and in the second the evaluation of  the FNDR commissioned by SUBDERE 
every five years. 
Table  7.8  below summarises the  existence of these actions in both funds.  These and 
other  actions  can  be  implemented  to  make  the  most  of  regional  funds.  Other 
mechanisms, that will come from  the particular experience of different countries, can 
also be used to contribute to regional development. In the case of the Structural Funds 
these  have  used  to  incorporate  the  private  sector,  to  build  social  and  institutional 
capacity, and to learn from the experience. 
Table  7.8:  Further  actions  for  Regional  Development.  The  Principles/Operational  Objectives  of the 
Structural Fund and their counterpart in the Chilean experience. 
F N D R  (Chile)  E R D F  (European Union) 
•  Programming  0 
'1:l 
CD 
'"'! 
Partnership  a  •  o· 
::l  e. 
•  Additionality:  Electricity  projects  •  Additionality  0 
and the programming documents.  g 
CD 
•  Evaluation  (every  five  years).  •  Management,  monitoring  and  ~  :;:::. 
Financial control (more frequent)  evaluation 
CD 
[Jl 
6.2  The process of  decision-making in the allocation of  funds 
The  way  funds  are  allocated  to  specific  objectives,  territorial  units,  and  particular 
projects is of special importance for the entire process of public investment to function 
and to attract all the support of interested parties and the public in general. Apart from 
the theoretical and methodological aspect involved, it is very important also to take care 
of formal aspects such as the procedures, the participation of interested parties, and the 
transparency and clarity of  the process. 
The  procedures  for  financial  management set  up  for  the  Structural  Funds  provide  a 
detailed  framework  to  look  at.  Another  example  at  this  respect  is  the  financial 
framework for the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Parliament. 
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Scottish Parliament. The same year the government introduced a Public Finance and 
Accountability,  setting  out the  financial  framework for  the  Scottish Parliament.  This 
framework  was  based  on  the  recommendations  from  the  Financial  Issues  Advisory 
Group (FlAG) report. 
In  order  to  meet  the  requirements  of providing  opportunities  for  the  Parliament to 
comment  on  expenditures  priorities  and  to  influence  the  Executive's preparation  of 
Budgets,  as  well  as  to  provide  the  opportunity  for  the  public  to  participate  in  the 
process, a three-stage framework was proposed. 
This  three-stage  framework  summarises the entire  process of decision making  in  its 
structure  and  timing.  What  follows,  it  is  a  comparison  between  this  three-stage 
framework  with that utilised  in the  approval  of the  regional  budget by the  Regional 
Governments  in Chile.  A two-column,  similar to  that of previous comparisons,  have 
been utilised in order to  facilitate the reading of the main differences and similarities 
that exists in the two processes. 
See two-column comparison in next page 
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SCOTTISH CASE 
Stage 1: Strategy and Priorities 
Discussion 
Date: April - August 
The  process  should  begin  when  the 
previous year's process is  concluded in 
March or April.  In this first part of the 
stage  the  discussion  should  be  about 
future  strategy and priorities,  based on 
the  forward  plans  for  years  two  and 
three.  It  should  include  public  input 
through  subject  committees.  Local 
authorities  and  public  spending  bodies 
should have the opportunity to comment 
as part of  this process. 
The  Executive  should  publish  and 
Annual  Report  by 20  April  each  year, 
setting  out  the  final  proposals  for  the 
year  immediately  ahead,  and  the 
provisional plans for the two following 
years. The Report should include policy 
objectives  and  some  assessment  of 
performance against past objectives. 
Stage 2: Preliminary Draft Budget 
Date: Mid September - End December 
This  stage  begins  in  mid-September 
with the publication,  by the  Executive, 
of a  Preliminary  Draft  Budget  for  the 
year ahead.  It is  more detailed than the 
earlier plans, but still provisional due to, 
a)  The  Cabinet  in  London  may  take 
decisions  which  will  affect  the  total 
budget,  b)  some  demand-determined 
programme  projections  may  change  or 
some unforeseen pressures may appear 
(opportunities  for  saving),  c) 
Government  in London may  decide  to 
change tax  rates  in ways  which would 
influence  the  Scottish  Parliament's 
decision on its own tax varying power. 
CHILEAN CASE 
Strategy and Priorities Discussion 
Date: March - May 
Even though general deadlines have to 
be  followed  by  the  Regional 
Governments in Chile, the process itself 
differs  from  one Regional  Government 
to  another. The process begins with the 
Executive and Assembly discussion on 
strategies  and  priorities  for  the 
following year.  According to this, local 
authorities  (Municipalities)  and  public 
spending  bodies  (Education,  Health, 
Public Works, etc)  seeking funding  for 
the  following  year  present  their 
investments  proposal  (projects)  to  the 
Executive's  technical  office.  In  this 
stage they also participate in the process 
of  decision  making  by  telling  the 
Regional  Government  their  own 
priorities. 
Preliminary Draft budget and discussion 
of Strategies and Priorities 
Date: End June - End July 
At  the  end  of  June  the  Executive 
presents a draft proposal to the Regional 
Assembly.  The  Assembly  has,  by law, 
one month to  analyse the proposal  and 
give it back to the Executive suggesting 
any  change  they  consider it  should  be 
made to  the final proposal. The size of 
the  budget  under  consideration  is  an 
estimated  figure  based the  last  budget 
amount  plus  an  estimated  twenty 
percent.  The  exact available  amount if 
given by the Central Government at the 
end of  December each year. 
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Date: Mid January, Mid February. 
The Executive publishes, by 20 January, 
a complete set of Budget Proposal. The 
proposal  should  include  how  it  has 
responded  to  the  Parliament's  earlier 
reports  and  the  latest  development  in 
London.  A  debate  is  held  on  the 
proposal. During this stage, committees 
should be able to seek clarification from 
officials.  They  should  not however be 
able  to  vote  on  individual  budget 
proposal  made  by  the  Executive.  No 
more  than  30  days  after  the  proposal 
have been tabled,  the  Parliament votes 
on the  Executive's proposal  for  use  of 
the  tax  raising or diminution power (if 
there  is  any  proposals  to  exercise  this 
power).  If  the  Executive's  proposal 
prevail,  the  Parliament  then  vote 
immediately  on  whether  to  accept  or 
reject  the  Executive's proposal  for  the 
expenditure budget (mid February). 
Final Proposal 
Date: Mid August - End December 
By mid July the Executive presents the 
final  budget  proposal  to  the  Regional 
Assembly. As mentioned, the Assembly 
has one month to approve or reject the 
Executive's proposal. At this stage what 
it usually takes place is an agreement on 
the final proposal in such a way that the 
members  of the  Assembly  are  allowed 
to  make  minor  changes  on  the 
Executive  proposal.  The  experience  of 
the  last  4  years  exercise  is  that  the 
Regional  Assembly  changes  the 
Executive's  proposal  in  about  25%  to 
30%.  It is  the  Executive duty to  try to 
avoid  changes  that will  pose  technical 
problems on the carry out of  the budget. 
Once  accepted,  the  proposal  is 
presented to  the  Executive  approval  at 
the National  Level,  in September each 
year. 
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There  exist  several  differences  between  the  process  of investment  In Chile  and  in 
Scotland, however a similar framework underlies both processes. The main differences 
and similarities are presented below. 
a)  For the case of Chile, the process is not formally divided in stages, even though a 
similar procedure, as the one followed by the Scottish Parliament, is used. 
b)  To  approve the  annual budget the  Executive and Regional Assemblies follow the 
general  indications  stated  in  LOCGAR.  No  specific  or more  detailed  procedures 
exist in the case of  the FNDR. 
c)  The main difference with the  Scottish Parliament's procedure of budget allocation 
with that  of the  Chilean Regional  Governments  is  that after the  approval  of the 
regional budget (by the Executive and Assembly in the regions), the final proposal 
goes to the approval of the Executive at the National Level. From the Executive, the 
proposal goes to the approval of the National Parliament. At this stage, the National 
Parliament rather than looking at individual projects or lines of actions, focuses its 
attention in the amount of resources that the proposal involves. 
d)  The time allotted for the first stage is  considerably less in Chile than the one that 
exist  for  the  Scottish  Parliament.  Beside,  no  Annual  Report  is  presented  by  the 
Executive to initiate the discussion. 
In the case of the FNDR, instead of focusing the discussion between the Assembly and 
the  Executive  on policies,  strategies  and  priorities,  the  fact that the  members  of the 
Assembly  represent  particular  district  within  regions  and  because  final  decision  is 
usually delayed due to the final adjusting changes that have to be done to  approve the 
budget, discussion tends to concentrate on individual projects. 
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This  chapter  has  summarised  the  five  mam  features  that  define  the  existence  and 
functioning  of the  Regional  Development  Fund  of Chile  (FNDR),  and  that  in  the 
previous  chapter  were  identified  as  the  main  weaknesses  of the  fund.  Prior  to  the 
presentation of the  five  aspects  (the  concept of the  fund,  the specific objectives,  the 
method of allocation, the type of action and sector of investment and the existence of 
further  actions  for  regional  development)  this  chapter  has  also  includes  a  general 
presentation of  the fund. 
The  chapter  also  presented the  way  these  five  features  revealed  in  the  case  of the 
European  Regional  Development Fund  of the  European  Union  (ERDF).  In  order  to 
compare how these elements manifest in each fund a two-column table was introduced 
that permitted to put the characteristic features of  the FNDR in front of  their counterpart 
in the ERDF. 
The main results of  this comparison are summarised below: 
a)  Under the 'main features of both funds' the principal difference between the two 
was the tendency of the FNDR to  do  the same kind of things and in the same 
way  during  almost  all  its  existence,  while  the  ERDF,  on  the  contrary,  had 
experienced five structural transformations that have permitted the fund to adjust 
to new realities and face new challenges. 
b)  The 'concept/main aim of the funds' resulted to be quite similar in many ways. 
Both funds  aim to  promote regional  development  and  to  compensate  regions 
lagging behind.  The  main differences  at this respect lies  on the  emphasis  on 
particular  aspects  such  as  on  the  territory,  on  poverty  and  on  regional 
administration,  as  in the  case  of the FNDR;  and on the economy,  and on the 
environment in the case of  the ERDF. 
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The main differences were: 
•  The  few  number  of objectives  in  the  FNDR  against  a  larger  and  more 
specifically designed number of  objectives in the case of  the ERDF, 
•  The low degree of focusing in the FNDR, mainly due to the poorly design of 
the objectives. All three objectives are very general and almost all  kind of 
action can fall within them. On the contrary the ERDF tend to be much more 
specific  in  terms  of its  specific  objectives,  but  presenting  a  much  larger 
number of specific objectives. 
d)  In  the  'method of distribution  of funds'  the  discussion  centred  on the  main 
factors under the distribution of  resources. Here the main differences were: 
•  FNDR  funds  are  allocated  to  region  while  the  ERDF  are  allocated  to 
objectives, 
•  FNDR resources  are  allocated in  an  annual  periodicity  and  used  under  a 
projects-by-projects  basis,  against  the  multi-annual  programme-base 
approach of  the ERDF, 
•  FNDR resources  are  split  into  a  large  number  of small  isolated  projects. 
ERDF assistance goes to interlinked projects that have to be part of a wider 
programme of  investment, 
•  The financial management of  the FNDR, because of its unchangeable nature 
(the fund has been doing the same for the last sixteen years), has become an 
easy task for  the regional  governments.  Almost all  funds  (over  97%)  are 
committed and carried over during the expected period of execution. On the 
other hand, 10% of  ERDF resources were not committed/carried over during 
the first two years of  operation in the 2000-2006 period. 
e)  The 'type of actions and sectors of investment' of both funds present significant 
differences. The most important of  these are: 
•  The overwhelming importance of infrastructure investment in the case of the 
FNDR against the wide variety of  actions carried out by the ERDF, 
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(Education, Health, etc.) versus the multi-purpose action and the wide range 
of  activities and instruments included in the ERDF. 
f)  In 'further actions for regional development' this work focused on the principles 
of  the Structural Funds and explored to what extent these principles (understood 
as  the operational objectives of the Structural Funds) were found in the FNDR 
case. Only "one and a half', out of  four, of  these actions were encountered in the 
Chilean  case.  The  importance  of these  guiding  principles  is  that,  as  it  was 
discussed  above  in  this  chapter,  they  contribute  to  built  social  capacity  and 
leverage regional development. 
In sum, the FNDR has much to do to clarify its own objectives and procedures in order 
to  became a real actor in Chile's regional development. To do  so the FNDR has to be 
redefined in several  aspects that at  present restrict the  fund  possibilities  to  leverage 
social  and economic development.  The  final  chapter "Conclusions and  Consideration 
for Further Research" presents and discusses on some preliminary elements that should 
be  considered  in  order to  transform  the  FNDR in  a  more  active  player  in  regional 
development in Chile. 
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Conclusions and considerations for further research 
Introduction 
This thesis has analysed the role and performance of  the Regional Development Fund of 
Chile (FNDR), in particular its relationship with the process of regional development. 
The  research focused upon the process of investment and upon overall results of the 
fund on regional development. 
Two  different empirical approaches evaluated the action of the  FNDR.  The  first  was 
concerned  with  the  analysis  of particular  aspects  of the  fund  labelled  as  the  "key 
elements"  in  the  running  of the  FNDR.  The  second  presented  and  compared  the 
experience of a similar fund for regional development. The fund selected to  carry out 
this comparison was the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
The  empirical  analysis  addressed  five  key  elements  of the  administration  and  actual 
performance  of the  FNDR.  This  analysis  unveiled  important  features  about  the 
relationship between the action of  the fund and regional development in Chile and about 
some  operational  aspects  of the  fund.  It also  set  out the  role  the  fund  may  play  in 
regional development in terms of contemporary growth theory and policy making. 
The comparison suggested further elements for the analysis of these five key elements 
and also  introduced other aspects to  be considered for the improvement of a regional 
fund. Because of its tremendous magnitude and scope, the ERDF provides and effective 
comparative example for the FNDR of Chile. 
The most significant findings of each chapter are outlined below. Chapters 2, 3,4 and 6 
are  presented separately.  Because they complement each other,  chapters  5 and  7 (the 
key elements of  the FNDR and the comparative analysis) are presented together. 
264 1  Summary of  results 
Concluding comments on chapter 2 
Chapter  2  set  up  the  theoretical  background  for  the  analysis  of regional  funds  and 
development. Three aspects were covered in this section: economic growth and regional 
theory,  the  process  of  decentralisation,  and  the  relationship  between  economic 
development and infrastructure investment. 
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between regional funds  and regional 
development relates to the role regional funds may play in development as a source of 
infrastructure  capital.  According to  the  'new growth theory'  -which seeks to  explain 
growth through advances in the level of technology, infrastructure and human capital-
regional funds may constitute a potential endogenous force for sustained growth. 
The  process  of decentralisation  in  Chile,  of which  the  creation  of the  Regional 
Governments has been the most important step, is expected to have a great impact on 
the  development  of regions.  As  a  complement,  regional  funds,  the  main  policy 
instrument  at  Regional  Governments'  disposal,  have  been  increasing  over  the  last 
decade. The overall effects of these funds on regional development in Chile, however, 
remain unstudied. 
So far, infrastructure investment has been the most common mode of investment of the 
funds  studied.  As  it was  argued,  infrastructure investment plays  an  important role  in 
regional  economies  by  providing  the  basis  for  the  development of most,  if not  all, 
economic activities.  However, whether it contributes to  economic growth in the long 
run is still a matter of  considerable debate. Nevertheless, what is clear, nowadays, is that 
the  potential  returns  to  investment in infrastructure is  higher in  developing countries 
than in developed countries. 
Concluding comments on Chapter 3 
Chapter  3  dealt  with  the  regional  development  expenence  of Chile.  This  section 
reviewed  the  historical  context  under  the  countries'  development  as  well  as  the 
evolution of its  administrative  organisation.  These  features  were used to  explain the 
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economic and social indicators permitted us to introduce the present regional disparities 
in Chile. The opinions expressed by selected key informers in the interviews carried out 
for  this  purpose  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  FNDR  on  the  process  of 
decentralisation.  It is  normally  said  that  decentralisation  has  helped  the  FNDR  to 
increasingly become a regions'  fund,  however some pointed to  the fact  that the  very 
existence of a fund  such as  the FNDR reinforced the need for decentralisation. More 
that a question of what was  first,  the  importance of this assertion is  that without the 
FNDR the process of  decentralisation would have been empty. 
Nevertheless,  although  the  action  of the  FNDR  and  decentralisation  in  Chile  have 
certainly played an important role in increasing opportunities for regions, especially in 
the areas of public administration and the management of investment resources, and to a 
lesser extent in the  election of local  and  regional  authorities, the  structural problems 
caused by the traditional highly centralised administrative system seem to persist. 
It was  demonstrated that the  economic  model  pursued by  Chile  in  recent  years  had 
differential impact on regions. Economic development has clearly been concentrated in 
Santiago. The incapacity of  regions to appropriate their share in the benefit of economic 
growth, or of the centre to redistribute wealth, is  something that needs to be addressed 
to the light of  the process of decentralisation in Chile if  the model is to be sustainable in 
the long run. 
Redistribution of power, although considered in the Agenda for Decentralisation of the 
present government,  is  said to  be  something that has not yet been achieved in  Chile. 
Nevertheless, the administrative institutional structure that resulted from the creation of 
regional  governments  embodies  significant  advances  compared to  past decades.  The 
wide range of objectives and tasks  assigned to  the Regional Governments embrace a 
much more comprehensive approach to development compared to previous experiences. 
It was  argued that this new approach incorporated the social,  cultural and economic 
dimensions as three inter-linked objectives for regional development. 
The maturity exhibited by the economic model adopted more than two decades ago in 
the  country,  the  experience  gained  after  two  decades  of an  increasing  process  of 
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to drive national and regional development at the beginning ofthe new century. 
Concluding comments on Chapter 4 
By reviewing several aspects of the functioning of the FNDR plus a discussion on the 
results  of evaluations  carried  out  on  the  FNDR  by  three  recent  studies,  chapter  4 
highlighted  several  problems  associated  with  the  fund  functioning.  The  main 
conclusions  of this  work were  analysed together with the  results  of a  questionnaire 
applied to key relevant political actors of  the transition period in Chile. 
The problems identified had to do  with the way funds were being allocated, with some 
technical and operational inconsistencies among the specific objectives and with respect 
to  the relationship between the fund and the overall objective of regional development 
and  its  changes over time.  With particular emphasis in the transition period from  the 
military regime to the democratic governments. 
Among the first group, the most relevant observations related to the redundant use of 
variables and indicators for the distribution of resources and with the reduction of the 
flexibility of the fund due  the creation of the  'provisions'. Other problems had to  do 
with the  lack  of well  defined  procedures  for  the  process  of decision-making  in the 
allocation of funds, and the insufficient amount of information passed to other relevant 
actors and the public in general. 
With respect to the second group of observations (those related to impact of  the fund on 
regional development), the most significant aspects were the contradiction among the 
objectives  of the  fund  -discussed in  greater  detail  in  chapter 5- and the  restrictions 
imposed by the IDB on the type of actions and sectors of investment carried out by the 
fund  since  1985.  The incapacity of the fund to  adapt to new realities after more than 
twenty-five  years  of operation  is  being  strongly  sustained  by  scholars  and  public 
officials in recent years. 
Many of these problems were also  addressed by the interviewees, who  introduced an 
additional element in the analysis. That is the difference that exists among regions in the 
management of the fund.  There is a chance to  do  things beyond to  what has been the 
267 common practice, for example in the use of regional funds,  where some regions have 
utilised this chance with significant results for their own development. 
With respect to  the three studies about the FNDR presented in this chapter, the main 
conclusions  point  to  the  methodological  aspects  of them.  First,  the  studies  were 
developed in an empirical-type analysis and did not explore further in the theoretical 
aspects about the significance of a regional fund in regional development. None of the 
studies used of a comparative analysis to test the FNDR, which would have permitted to 
learn from possible differences and similarities. 
The field study work assessed changes noted by some of the main Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) actors during the transition period (from the end of the 
1980' up to the beginning of the 1990'). The purpose of this field work was to find out 
to what extent these key actors had planned or anticipated something different in the use 
of FNDR funds compared to what has actually occurred in recent years. 
In general, the representatives of the regions were more optimistic than those from the 
central level about the role of the fund under a democratic government.  They felt the 
FNDR  could  play  a  significant  role  to  coordinate  the  different  public  offices  and 
sectoral budgets at the regional level.  They anticipated the significant role the FNDR 
would playas the  main instrument to  attain  the  regional  strategies  of development. 
After 12 years this is a reality in all regions. 
One of the main outcomes after a decade of operation of the FNDR under democratic 
governments is one not anticipated by the interviewees. This is the fact that, despite the 
many restrictions imposed from the centralleve1 (and the IDB) in terms of political and 
administrative constraints, after ten years of progressive regional experience, regional 
governments  have  became  major  actors  in regions  development,  and the  FNDR  its 
major policy instrument. 
... Comments on chapter 5 are presented together with those on chapter 7 ahead. 
Concluding comments on Chapter 6 
The  study  of the  Structural  Funds  of the  European  Union,  and  in  particular  of the 
European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF),  the  subject  matter  of this  chapter, 
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policy,  about  new methods  of allocation  of resources,  administrative  and  budgetary 
procedures,  and  other related  matters.  Conclusions  in this  chapter  refer  only  to  EU 
regional policy and the Structural Funds operation. A comparison of  the main aspects of 
this fund with those of  the FNDR of Chile is carried out in chapter 7. 
The most significant aspects of  this fund are summarised below: 
•  Regional policy is  a central preoccupation within the EU.  The main instrument to 
cope with EU regional policy are the  Structural Funds, of which the ERDF is  the 
main component. 
•  Four  principles  rule  the  operation  of  the  ERDF:  Programming,  Partnership, 
Additionality, and Management, monitoring and evaluation. 
•  It is interesting to know of the many transformations that the Structural Funds have 
experienced over the years (against none in the Chilean FNDR). 
•  Funds investment is carried out in multi annual periods (seven years).  In contrast, 
the FNDR use a year by year procedure. 
•  An  important  part  of the  work  is  done  at  the  pre-investment  stage  (during  the 
programming period, before any physical action starts). This facilitates the carrying 
out of subsequent stages in the process of  investment. 
•  Communication of the action of the Structural Funds is a remarkable feature of the 
2000-2006  investment  period.  This  is  done  at  all  different  stages  of  the 
programming period and at different level of authorities. 
Concluding comments on Chapters 5 and 7 
Chapter 5 presented an in-depth analysis of five  elements that were considered to  be 
fundamental for the existence and operation of the FNDR i.e.  the  concept or overall 
objective of the FNDR, its  specific objectives, its methods of resource allocation, the 
type of action and  sectors of investment carried out,  and  finally,  a discussion on the 
potentiality  of further  actions  for  regional  development.  Chapter  7  compared  these 
aspects with those of  the ERDF. 
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the changes this fund has experienced over time due mainly to three circumstances: the 
application of different strategies of development in the country, the co-financing of  the 
fund by the IDB, and most recently the establishment of the 'provisions'. Despite these 
changes the  FNDR continues to  finance  almost the  same  kind of projects,  the  same 
sectors, and in the same way as  originally conceived. Comparatively, the ERDF, with 
almost  the  same  age  as  that  of the  FNDR,  has  experienced  five  structural  reforms 
incorporating  new  sectors,  and  over  all,  new  financial  instruments  and  sectors  of 
investment. 
Since the FNDR operates only with three objectives, compared to six of  the ERDF, one 
might anticipate more concentration and focusing in the Chilean case.  That is  not the 
case because the vagueness in the definition of objectives, among other things, gives as 
a result a wide dispersion of actions in terms of the sectors and the territories it covers. 
For that reason,  monitoring and  evaluation of the performance of the fund  is  a very 
difficult task. 
With respect to  the method of allocation of funds the main problem detected was the 
lack of correspondence between the objectives stated and the variables and indicators 
used for such distribution. For that reason, the resulting allocation of resources has little 
to  do  with the actual differences among regions in terms of their social and economic 
indicators.  Thus,  despite the  enormous  differences  in popUlation or population living 
under  the  level  of poverty  in  the  regIOns  of Chile,  among  others  considerations, 
peripheral,  less  populated  regions  receIve  almost  the  same  absolute  amounts  of 
resources that those of Central Chile that present most severe problems. 
Other significant methodological difference can be appreciated between the two funds 
in terms of the overall distribution of  resources. FNDR funds are allocated on an annual 
basis  and  in  a  project-by-project  scheme.  ERDF  resources,  on the  other  hand,  are 
allocated at the beginning of a programming period for  the whole of the  programme 
(seven  years  in  the  present  phase)  and  resources  are  used  in  a  programme-based 
approach. In the case of the Chilean FNDR, this strategy seriously limits the possibility 
of the funds to be used in conjunction with other public or private investment funds or 
programmes. The year by year approach has made the FNDR to become a sectoral offer 
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52 local administrations in the Biobio Region. 
With regard to the type of action, infrastructure investment represents over 90% of the 
total  FNDR  investment.  The  type  of infrastructure  financed  by  the  FNDR  is  not 
intended to  stimulate productive investment or competitiveness, but the answer to the 
objective of 'equal opportunities', in this case by providing access to basic services on 
education, health, and few other basic needs. This procedure is a direct consequence of 
the agreement with the IDB for the FNDR-Programmes. Although the IDB represented 
only 15% in the FNDR-Programme of 1995-1999 (and 40% in the 2000-2005 period), 
the fund  has overwhelmingly being used (over 80% in 1997) to  finance  IDB  eligible 
sectors. 
In  the  case  of the  ERDF,  infrastructure  is  also  the  main type  of investment,  but  a 
significant number of other actions are also carried out. The diverse nature of  the ERDF 
financial  assistance  includes  research  and  technology,  non-repayable  and  repayable 
direct aid and grants to assist local development initiatives, etc. The FNDR is far from 
implementing such measures, however much could be done in terms of  the sectors/areas 
of investment  that  could  be  incorporated  Gobs  creation,  industrial  areas,  small  and 
medium-sized enterprises, to mention just some). 
In the opinion of several public officials and scholars (reflected both in the literature and 
interviews carried out in  Chile), this  has  been the  responsibility of the own regional 
governments that have been unable to  go  beyond the  formal administrative limits to 
explore new possibilities of development of the existing funds.  A remarkable example 
of a region which has trespassed these limits is that of  the Region of  O'Higgins (Region 
VI). In fact,  O'Higgins was able,  and brave enough, to direct a significant share of its 
FNDR of one year to finance the construction of a road that connected the region's fruit 
plantation  to  a  main  export  port.  This  project  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
development  of the  whole  region  as  fruit  exports  was  one  of the  main  economic 
activities of  the regions and several other sectors were directed linked to this activities. 
With regard to "further actions for regional development", the excessive concentration 
of the FNDR on infrastructure measures clearly undermines the fund potentialities to 
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experiences. The two-column comparison between the FNDR and the ERDF presented 
in Chapter 7 evidenced several weaknesses of the Chilean fund  in  terms of its  limited 
range of activities and  possibilities of intervening  in  regional  development.  The main 
weakness  is  precisely  that, the FNDR resources  being  used  mainly  in  infrastructure 
projects in a few number of  sectors. 
However, recognising the many limitations of  the FNDR, there is no doubt that the most 
significant product of the  fund  has  been  the  build up of a vast  human capital  in  all 
regions  of the country. These groups of skilled  people  made up  of politicians,  social 
leaders and  professionals that have grown together with the development of the fund, 
constitute the fund's main legacy for the development of  regions. 
Main Elements for Regional Development in Chile 
Regional Fund 
R) 
In favour: 
Decentrali ation 
Human Capital 
•  Decentralisation:  A  process  that  since  the  1990s  ha  been  carried  out  with 
increasingly force in Chile (More autonomy in  administration of public investment, 
Creation of  Regional Go  ernments). 
•  Regional  Fund  : Particularly de FNDR,  but aJ  0  other regional  funds  managed in 
conjunction  with  the  FNDR  that  have  increa ed  as  a  proportion  of all  public 
inve tments in regions. 
•  Human Capital: Principally a  ociated to the experience gained  in the management 
of  FNDR  fund  but  al  0  from  the  clo ed  association  between  Regional 
Governments and regional univer itie  . 
272 Against: 
•  The legacy of a  very centralised system that comes  from  the  colonial period,  in 
which Santiago has always concentrated, and continuos to  do  so, the political and 
economical power. 
•  The  attitude  of regions  that fear  to  act  independently of the central  government 
(although they could do so) to make full use of  what they have at their disposal. 
With the endowment of a highly specialised human capital, together with an increasing 
number of responsibilities,  political  power and  resources  to  administer,  regions  can 
challenge the power of Santiago and start to playa more significant role in the social 
and economic development of  their territories. 
2  Considerations for further research and concluding remarks 
Theoretical aspects and empirical evidence on the role regional economies may play on 
the overall performance of  national economies provide a vast area of study that is worth 
exploring.  Two paths of study suggested here are the  'economic growth theories', to 
explain how growth occurs and how it spreads throughout space, and 'the relationship 
between public intervention (policies  and investment)  and regional  economic growth 
and development', to see how growth and development actually occurs in space. These 
two  particular  issues  (among  many  others)  should  be  further  investigated  as  they 
provide key element for the understanding of regional development. 
With respect to the main subject of this work, and in a practical approach, Table 8.1 
below proposes a simple model for the use of regional funds in Chile. The model was 
constructed bearing in mind the main well/working aspects of the two funds analysed 
and the main not-to-repeat problems encountered in the analysis of the two funds and 
the evidence provided by the other experiences reviewed in the operation of regional 
funds, particularly in the case of  the regional development fund of  Chile. 
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in Chile. This come from the fact that both, the process of decentralisation the country is 
undergoing,  and  the  increasing  regional  governments  participation  (not  only  in  the 
provision  of social  basic  infrastructure  but  also  in  productive  investment  and  the 
strengthening of regional  administrations) will  require  effective policy tools,  like  the 
FNDR, for regional development in the next years. 
The  model  proposed  begins  with  the  identification  of a  clearly  established  mam 
purposes  and  objectives for  the  fund.  Different specific  objectives  are  suggested  for 
each of the fund's main purposes, as  well as the allocation criteria to be used in each 
case  and the type of action and  sector of investment it could be carried out.  Several 
principles underpin the work of all three main purposes.  The main point here is that, 
whatever  the  main  purpose(s)  of a  fund,  there  must  exist  clearly  differentiated 
objectives associated to  them,  allocation criteria able to  discriminate according to  the 
specific  objectives,  and suitable  actions  and  sectors of investment to  accomplish the 
ultimate objectives for which the fund has been created. 
Table  8.1,  below,  introduces  the  "principles"  that  set  up  the  general  rules  for  the 
operation of the fund.  It then sets the  overall purpose or main objectives.  In front of 
every main objective it proposes several specific objectives that intent to clearly identify 
the fund' scope. Following, for each set of specific objectives it suggests the allocation 
criteria that have to be consistent with the objectives to attain. And, finally, it identifies 
the type of action and sectors of  investment to be accomplish. 
A particular fund can pursue more than one main objective (or overall purpose), such as 
the ones presented below, or others according to the particular needs of a country and 
the  historical  context of its  regional  development.  Nevertheless,  different  objectives 
have to be addressed with different type of allocation variables that have to be reviewed 
from time to time to make sure they still discriminate in favour of  the consecution of  the 
objectives. 
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Principles  Overall Purpose  Specific objectives  Allocation criteria  Type of  action and 
Sectors of investment 
*Provide training 
*Employment creation  *Number of  poor  *Type of  actions to be 
*Small and medium-sized  people (total, urban  defined by 
§  1) Tackle  enterprises  and rural)  programming period 
?  ?  Poverty  *Vital statistics and of  (4 or 5 years). For 
·is  0  *Social regeneration of  health and education  example: Productive 
"E  §  .~  urban neighbourhoods  *  Availability of  basic  investment; 
~ ]  g.  *Rural areas  social services  Infrastructure 
.~.§  ~ 1-_____  +.o..:~:::cq=c~:.::::.:::.!..::~o::._p~::.:~::.~:.;~=~e:.::i~:.L~e_s __  +__-------__j ~evce~~~:~~s~~~:~~; 
c  <l)  ~ • .§  .g  *Increase competitiveness  Research, technology 
.g  g -5  §  ~  2) Regional  *  Strengthening  *Economic and social  and innovation; 
i:l  tl '0  8  ~  Economic  partnership  indicators  Programmes, others. 
tH  .-......"  1) 
:.:::  i2  5  ~  "t;:;  Development  *  Sustainable jobs  *Territorial indicators 
E::  8  .§  .[:  *Support Industrial areas  (not all regions may 
·Vi  0  ~ 8  9-
""0  §  :::  e  .~  *  Assist Rural areas and  be selected for  *Type of sectors: Any 
§  .~ E 2  G':g  those depending on  assistance)  for which 
c  - .- 0. C  0.  fishing  MIDEPLAN(a) has  .g  §  ]  ~"G '-' 1--------+-=="'--------+---------1 
Bl  g  Cd  C  t;:: .f'  *Regional Executive  methodologies for the 
~ 8  §  E  'V"2  3) Institutional  *Other regional offices  *  All regions  preparation and 
!::  .....  .;:::  <l)  ?--.  0  development of  *Municipallevel  d·  t  th  .  evaluation ofproiects  5  ~ ~  ~  §  :E  accor  mg  0  elr  J 
~  1::!  15  §  ~::g  Regional  (Management and co- needs 
~  0  0:  ~  -g  --<  Governments  ordination, procedures 
it- -x- -x- ie- ..D  -x- and human resources) 
(a) The Ministry of  Planning in charge of  the National System of  Public Investment in Chile (SNI) 
The alternatives proposed above for the regional funds  of Chile do  not differ greatly 
from what it is actually being carried on, except for the second main objective Regional 
Economic Development.  In fact,  although productive  investment was included in the 
operation of FNDR funds since 1998 (see chapter 5) the sector continues to be marginal 
in the total FND  R. 
Thus, the most innovative elements in this proposal are the main purpose of Regional 
Economic Development and the specific objectives associated to it.  Among all possible 
alternatives for economic development, such as those existing in the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), or the regional funds in Spain, the ones presented here are 
the most pertinent to Chilean reality. 
As  the  amount of investment funds  for  economIC  development are  increasing  in  the 
regional level the discussion on what to do with them will soon occupy a relevant place 
among politicians and  public officials.  With regard to  FNDR funds,  however,  as  the 
new programming period has already been set up by the Chilean Government and the 
275 Inter  American  Development  Bank
70  the  intervention  in  productive  investment  will 
have  to  be  postponed  to  the  new  programming  period,  after  2005.  This  proposal 
specifically points in that direction and tries to  stimulate an anticipated debate on the 
subject. Further studies that take into account the reality of each region will have to be 
carried out to the light of the regions own strategy of development and the economic 
model followed by the country. 
70  Despite the recognised need for  intervention in  this area,  productive investment does not occupied a 
relevant position in the new programming period 2001-2005 (see Appendix 4) compared to other type of 
actions such as social infrastructure, that continues to be the main object of  the FNDR. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
CONARA 
CORBIOBIO 
CORCHILE 
CR 
CSF 
DGs 
DIPRES 
EAGGF 
EC 
ECLAC/CEP  AL 
ECSC 
EIB 
EMU 
EQUAL 
EU 
EURO 
ERDF 
ESF 
FCI 
FCM 
FDI 
FlAG 
FIFG 
FNDR 
FNDR-IDB 
FNDR-NR 
GDP 
GNP 
National Commission for Administrative Reform / Comision 
Nacional de la Reforma Administrativa (Chile) 
Corporation for the Regionalisation of  Biobio Region / Corporacion 
para la Regionalizacion del Biobio (Chile) 
Corporation for the Regionalisation of Chile / Corporacion para la 
Regionalizacion de Chile 
Community Regulation (EU) 
Community Support Framework (EU) 
Anyone of  the 26 Directorates Generals of  the European 
Commission (EU) 
Budgetary Office / Direccion de Presupuesto (of  the Ministry of 
Finance, Chile) 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EU) 
European Commission (EU) 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN) / 
Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (NU) 
European Coal and Steel Community 
European Investment Bank 
European Monetary Union 
Transnational co-operation to promote new means of  combating all 
forms of discrimination and inequalities in connection with the 
labour market (EU) 
European Union 
The Currency of  the European Union (except in United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Sweden) 
European Regional Development Fund (EU) 
European Social Fund (EU) 
Interterritorial Compensation Fund / Fondo de Compensacion 
Interterritorial (Spain) 
Municipal Shared Fund / Fondo Comun Municipal (Chile) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Financial Issues Advisory Group (Scottish Executive/Parliament) 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (EU) 
Regional Development Fund / Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo 
Regional (Chile). FNDR =  FNDR Programme 
Regional Development Fund - IDB part (Chile) 
Regional Development Fund - National Resources part (Chile) 
FNDR-IDB+FNDR-NT = FNDR Programme (or FNDR) 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Product IDBIBID 
IDR 
ILPES 
INE 
INTERREG 
lRAL 
ISAR 
LEADER 
LOCGAR 
MERCOSUR 
MIDEPLAN 
NAFTA 
NUTS 
ODEPLAN 
OECD 
OP 
PMB 
PMU 
RGs 
RM 
RO 
RS 
Inter-American Development Bank I Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo 
Regionally Allocated Investment I Inversi6n de Decisi6n Regional 
(Chile) 
Latin American and the Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning I Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificaci6n 
Econ6mica y Social (ECLAC/UN) 
National Statistic Institute I Instituto N acional de Estadisticas (Chile) 
Cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation intended 
to encourage the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development 
of  the whole of  the Community area (EU) 
Locally Allocated Regional Investment I Inversi6n Regional de 
Decisi6n Local (  Chile) 
Regionally Allocated Sectoral Investment I Inversi6n Sectorial de 
Asignaci6n Regional (Chile) 
Rural development (EU) 
Law on Regional Government I Ley Organica Constitucional de 
Gobierno y Administraci6n Regional (Chile) 
Southern Common Market I Mercado Comtin del Sur 
Ministry of  Planning and Co-operation I Ministerio de Planificaci6n 
y Cooperaci6n Nacional (Chile) 
North America Free Trade Agreement 
Nomenclature of  Territorial Statistical Units. Established by the 
Statistic Office of  the European Communities in co-operation with 
the national institutes for statistics (EU) 
National Planning Office I Oficina de Planificaci6n Nacional (at 
present MID  EPLAN  -Chile) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Operational Programme (EU) 
Neighbourhood Rehabilitation and Improvement Programme I 
Programa de Mejoramiento de Barrios (Chile) 
Urban Rehabilitation and Public Facilities Programme I Programa de 
Mejoramiento Urbano y Equipamiento Comunal (Chile) 
Regional Government (s) Chile 
Metropolitan Region of Santiago I Region Metropolitana de Santiago 
(Chile) 
Reglamento Operativo (FNDR-IDB Regulation) 
Projects assessed and recommended for execution (Chile's national 
system of  public investment-SNI) SEM 
SEREMI 
SERPLAC 
SMEs 
SNI 
SPD 
SUBDERE 
UA 
UCR 
UK 
UN 
URBAN 
US$ 
VAT 
Single European Market 
Regional Ministerial Office I Secretaria Regional Ministerial (Chile) 
Regional Planning Office I Secretaria Regional de Planificaci6n y 
Coordinaci6n (of  the Ministry of  Planning-Chile) 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
National System ofInvestment I Sistema Nacional de Inversiones 
(Chile) 
Single Programming Document (EU) 
Sub-secretary for Regional Development and Pubic Administration-
Home Office  I Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional y 
Administrativo (Ministerio del Interior, Chile) 
Universidad Austral de Chile 
Regional Unit Control I Unidad de Control Regional (of 
IDB/SUBDERE-Chile) 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
United Nations 
Economic and social regeneration of cities and of  urban 
neighbourhoods in crisis with  a view to promoting a sustainable 
urban development (EU) 
United States Dollar 
Value Added Tax APPENDIX  2  CHILE 
Basic Statistic: 
Official name: Republic of Chile. Capital City: Santiago. Population: 15,050,341  (INE, Census 
2002). Area: 774,759 sq. kms, Density: 51/sq.kms. Urbanization: 85.8% (2000 UNDP). 
Language: Spanish. Literacy Rate: 95.8% (2000). Religion: Roman Catholic (81%). 
Currency: 1 Chilean peso ($)=100 centavos. Exchange: 740 pesos per US dollar (08/2002). 
GDP per capita: US$9,420 (ppp, 2001  World Sank). Poverty: 2% (% of population below US$ 1 a 
day, 2001  World Sank). Major Exports: Commodities: copper 41 %, other metals and minerals 8.7%, 
wood products 7.1%, fish and fish meal 9.8%, fruits 8.4% (1991), Partners: EU 25%, US 15%, Asia 
34%, Latin America 20% (1995 est). Major Imports: Capital goods 25.2%, spare parts 24.8%, raw 
materials 15.4%, petroleum 10%, foodstuffs 5.7%, Partners: EU 18%, US 25%, Asia 16%, Latin Appendix 3 
Map of  the regions of  the European Union (example of  objective regions) 
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J Appendix 4 
The New FNDR: Programming period 2001-200Sa 
(IDB loan CH-0161) 
The IDB has co-financed the Regional Development Fund of Chile (FNDR) since 1985 
in three consecutive loans.  In the year 2001  a new FNDR programming period began 
which introduced some changes with respect to previous experiences. 
As this new FNDR programme was not considered in the analysis of  the performance of 
the fund, neither in the comparison with the selected aspects of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), a summary of the main features of this new programming 
period is presented below. 
The general purpose, objectives and areas of investment presented below describe only 
the IDB  part of the FNDR Programme. Nevertheless, as  this new IDB  loan will also 
finance investments of  the type previously financed with the FNDR National Resources, 
the IDB terms of reference will apply now to  almost any FNDR action in this coming 
programming period. 
1  Main Features of  the 2001-2005 FNDR Programme 
FNDR 2001-2005 
* Name of Programme: 
Programme for Improvement of  the Efficiency and Management of Regional 
Investment CH-0161 
* Appropriation:  ~ 
to 
Total:  500 million US$, of  which,  5' 
!DB:  300 million US$  Cil" 
to 
National Resources:  200 million US$  .....  s::  ..., 
(I) 
Ul 
*  The fund is sub-divided into three components: 
Investment (94%) 
Institutional strengthening (5.6%) 
Studies to deepen decentralisation (0.4%) 
In this new period there will be less resources for investment compared to the previous 
process  because  part  of the  funds  will  be  used  for  new  objectives  (Institutional 
strengthening and Studies for decentralisation). 
a Summarised from IDB documents:  1) "Program for Improvement of  the Efficiency and Management of 
Regional Investment (CH-0161)" and,  2) "Perfil II.  Chile,  12 de Julio de 2000". Retrieved August 2001 
from the !DB database on the World Wide Web: htlp://www.iadb.org The  introduction  of sub-funds  within  the  FNDR  has  to  be  added  to  the  eXIstmg 
provisions of the FNDR. As the total amount of US$ 500 million is less, in real terms, 
compared to the same nominal figure  of the previous period, this mean less resources 
and more objectives. 
2  Main Purpose and Objectives of  the Fund 
FNDR 2001-2005 
Main objective according to the IDB loan:  ~ 
The general objective of the programme is  to  support efforts to  improve the  ~ 
efficiency  and  management of regional  investment  in  the  framework  of an  .:  -a  expanded government decentralisation process.  ~ 
1)  Continue  channelling  investment resources  to  promote  socio-economic 
development and, especially, improve the living conditions of the lowest-
income groups. 
CD 
2)  Develop the capacity of regional governments to  plan, programme,  and 
allocate investment resourCes in accordance with the government's social  r/l 
development objectives and regional development priorities.  16 
() 
3)  Strengthen and rationalise the use of investment financing instruments at  8i 
the regional government level.  ~ 
4)  Improve  the  efficiency  of  regional  investment,  by  enhancing  the  S!. 
distribution and prioritisation of investments within each region in  order  B. 
to optimise results.  ~. 
5)  Improve  the  quality  and  targeting  of investments,  by  developing  the  r.Il 
capacity  of  municipal  governments  and  technical  units  within  the 
deconcentrated  government  system  to  plan,  evaluate,  design,  and 
efficiently execute investment projects. 
6)  Support the government in its efforts to deepen its decentralisation policy. 
The  main  objective  stated  for  the  current  FNDR  period  addresses  mainly  the 
'Institutional  strengthening'  component  of the  fund.  In  the  same  way,  the  specific 
objectives are mostly oriented to the new tasks of developing the capacity of regional 
government to  carry  out their  duties  and  to  improve the  efficiency  and  focusing  of 
investment. 
Being the objectives defined in these terms, the flexibility of  the fund actually increases. 
From  the  point  of view  of the  regional  governments,  as  theses  objectives  refer 
principally to  administrative issues  (or to  generic intentions in favour  of low income 
groups)  they can do  whatever they  think may be  better for  the  economic  and  social 
development of  their particular regions. 
Poverty targeting: The IDB declares that "As the make-up of  the project portfolio under 
the  programme may vary,  reflecting  demand in the  regions,  it  cannot be  ascertained 
whether more than half of the  direct beneficiaries  will  be  poor.  For this reason,  the 
programme does not qualify as a poverty-targeted investment" [IDB, 2001(a)]. 3  Areas of  assistance 
The  three  areas  of assistance  considered  in  this  last  programming  period,  i.e.  a) 
Investment,  b)  Institutional  strengthening;  and,  c)  Studies to  deepen decentralisation, 
refer to the following: 
a)  Investment 
According  to  the  IDB  requirements,  the  investments  must  be  consistent  with  the 
regional  strategic  plans  and  the  multi-annual  investment plans.  The  programme  will 
finance all sectors financed by the FNDR, including the following: 
(i)  areas  that  have  received  financing  through  prior  IDB  operations,  such  as 
education,  health,  sanitation,  rural  roads,  urban  street  paving,  rural 
electrification,  rural telephony,  flood  protection,  and infrastructure for  fishing 
coves; and, 
(ii)  investments  of the  type  that  the  FNDR  has  traditionally  financed  with  its 
National Resources, such as investments in recreation and sports infrastructure, 
fire control equipment, and irrigation infrastructure. 
Other projects that address emerging issues such as urban renewal, citizen security, and 
productive development will be supported on an experimental basis during the first two 
years of the programme. The IDB points out that the results of such projects will then be 
evaluated  in  order  to  determine  whether  they  should  be  fully  incorporated  into  the 
FNDR. As these types of intervention are found to be viable, the experience gained and 
the evaluation methodology used will be shared with the other regions. 
A total ofUS$ 470 million was allotted to this first component. 
b)  Institutional strengthening 
Under  this  component,  financing  will  be  provided  for  technical  assistance, 
consultancies,  and  equipment to  strengthen  the  managerial  capacity  of the  regional 
governments  and  regional  government  agencies  (de-concentrated  ministerial  offices, 
services, municipal administrations, etc.), as well as that of SUBDERE and the Ministry 
of Planning and Co-operation (MIDEPLAN) at the central government level. 
At  both  levels  of government  (national  and  regional),  the  aim  is  to  achieve  greater 
efficiency in regional investment through better co-ordination of available  sources of 
funding  and  by  financing  investments  that  are  consistent with regional  development 
plans and strategies. 
A total ofUS$ 28 million was allotted to this component. c) Studies to deepen decentralisation 
Financing will be provided for studies and advisory services to support implementation 
of  the government's decentralisation strategy in the short and medium terms. The studies 
will focus on the following four areas: 
(i)  political decentralisation and citizen participation to enhance local and regional 
democracy; 
(ii)  administrative decentralisation and de-concentration to configure the distribution 
of responsibilities among the various levels of  government; 
(iii)  financial  decentralisation  to  consolidate  a  more  autonomous  and  equitable 
financing system; and, 
(iv)  land-use management to  create the necessary conditions for regional and local 
development with a national perspective that will reduce geographic inequities 
and  address  the  specific  problems  faced  by  both  urban  areas  and  remote 
communities. 
The  studies  will  be  conducted  during  the  first  three  years  of the  program  and  will 
include  outreach  and  public  information  activities  (stakeholders  in  the  political  and 
academic  spheres  and  civil  society  organisations)  through  forums,  seminars  and 
workshops. 
A total of  US$ 2 million
b was allotted to this last component. 
The  main  changes  of the  new  programme  are  the  introduction  of new  sectors  of 
investment,  the  financing  of  sectors  traditionally  financed  with  FNDR-National 
Resources and the emphasis in institutional strengthening. 
The  IDB  assessed  negatively  the  achievement  of  the  objective  of  Institutional 
strengthening  of the  previous  period  [IDB  2001(a)].  According  to  the  IDB,  this  is 
mainly due to the Ministry of Finance's decision on reducing the amounts of resources 
(that  corresponded  to  the  National  counterpart  of the  programme)  that  had  been 
allocated to this purpose. The new programme aim to ensure that this does not happen 
again.  For this  reason,  the  new actions  will  not be  limited to  training,  but will  also 
include the development and use of instruments and mechanisms to  enhance planning, 
programming, and prioritisation of  the regional investment portfolio. 
In pursuing this objective, Institutional Strengthening Units will be established, as well 
as indicators that will permit to evaluate and monitor the activities carried out under this 
component.  The  creation  of these  units,  and  a  presentation  by  the  regions  of an 
'institutional strengthening programme'  is  a pre-condition for the disbursement of the 
IDB resources. 
IDB  also  argues that in order to  deepen the decentralisation process and increase the 
transfer of resources and autonomy to the regional governments it will be necessary to 
b  IDB  document "Program for Improvement of the Efficiency and Management of Regional Investment 
(CH-0161)" stated that the figures for each of these items were US$ 410.4 million, US$ 9.7 million, and 
US$  2 million  respectively.  Strangely, these figures  do  not sum  up  US$  500 million.  After consulting 
with the IDB (Oct. 4, 2001) the figures used in the text, above, are the correct ones. strengthen  the  technical  and  institutional  capacity  of the  regional  governments  by 
introducing new managerial instruments, such as strategic planning in the prioritisation 
of investments, multiyear investment programmes, and programming agreements. 
These  are  all  new  concepts  introduced  to  this  last  programming  period  that  were 
discussed in this work as serious lacks in the management of the fund.  The adoption of 
these instruments and procedures will certainly improve the administrative aspects of 
the management of  the fund.  What is still missing is a deeper discussion on the specific 
objectives, stated by law, for the action of  the FNDR. 
4  Evaluation and Information 
This  aspect  was  also  pointed  out  as  a  significant  lack  in  the  running  of previous 
programmes. In this new FNDR period, the programme states that: 
•  within 60  days  after the end of each semi-annual period of programme execution, 
the  executing  agency  will  submit  semi-annual  progress  reports  to  the  IDB  for 
consideration on the status of programme activities. The report submitted at the end 
of each year of programme execution will also include the investment plan for the 
following  year,  the  financial  status  of  the  programme,  information  on  the 
institutional  strengthening  activities,  and  the  studies  and  activities  for  public 
information carried out during the respective year, as well as those planned for the 
following year. 
•  annually, after delivery of  the semi-annual progress report at the end of each year of 
programme  execution,  SUBDERE  will  review  the  information  with  the  IDB  to 
assess the progress of the programme, identify any difficulties that have arisen, and 
devise the necessary corrective measures; 
•  as  part  of the  programme  evaluation  process,  two  external  evaluations  will  be 
conducted: a mid-term evaluation and a final evaluation according to a methodology 
and guidelines to be agreed upon by the executing agency and the IDB. The findings 
of the first evaluation are to be submitted to the IDB  once 50% of the programme 
resources  have been committed or  30  months  after the  effective date  of the  loan 
contract, whichever occurs first.  The final evaluation is to be conducted within the 
six months prior to the date of  last disbursement of  the financing. 